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ABSTRACT 
This socio-legal thesis has explored the factors responsible for explaining whether and 
how redress mechanisms control bureaucratic decision-making. The research 
considered the three principal institutions of administrative justice: courts, tribunals, 
and ombudsman schemes. The field setting was the local authority education area and 
the thesis examined bureaucratic decision-making about admissions to school, home-
to-school transport, and Special Educational Needs (SEN). The thesis adopted a 
qualitative approach, using interviews and documentary research, within a multiple 
embedded case study design. The intellectual foundations of the research were inter-
disciplinary, cutting across law, socio-legal studies, public administration, 
organization studies, and social policy. The thesis drew on these scholarly fields to 
explore the nature of bureaucratic decision-making, the extent to which it can be 
controlled and the way that learning occurs in bureaucracies and, finally, the extent 
to which redress mechanisms might exercise control. The concept of control was 
studied across all its dimensions – in relation both to ex post control in specific cases 
and the more challenging notion of ex ante or structuring control. The aim of the 
thesis was not to measure the prevalence of bureaucratic control by redress 
mechanisms, but to understand the factors that might explain its presence or absence 
in a particular area. The findings of the research have allowed for a number of 
analytical refinements and extensions to be made to existing theoretical and 
empirical understandings. 14 factors, along with 87 supporting propositions, have 
been set out with the aim of making empirically derived suggestions which can be 
followed up in future research. In terms of the thesis’ contribution to existing 
knowledge, its comparative focus and its emphasis on the broad notion of control 
offered the potential for new insights to be developed. Overall, the thesis claims to 
have made three contributions to the conceptual framework for understanding the 
exercise of control by redress mechanisms: it emphasizes the importance of 
‘feedback’ in relation to the nature of the cases referred to redress mechanisms; it 
calls attention to the structure of bureaucratic decision-making as well as its 
normative character; and it discusses how the operational modes of redress 
mechanisms relate to their control functions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Introduction  
 
1.1.1. This chapter introduces the thesis. It begins by situating the thesis 
within scholarly traditions and disciplines, before providing an account of 
the particular focus of this research. The aims, objectives, and locus of 
the thesis are set out and a brief account is given of its methodology and 
field setting. An argument is made for the contribution of the thesis to 
existing knowledge, whilst also highlighting the limitations of the study. 
The chapter ends by explaining the structure of the thesis. 
 
1.2. Situating the thesis 
 
1.2.1. This socio-legal thesis contributes to scholarship concerned with 
understanding the significance of law in society: does law matter in 
society and, if so, how? A particular strand within this literature has sought 
to understand the relationship between law and the behaviour of social 
actors. This has been investigated in relation to whether law structures 
the relationship of civil parties, whether it determines corporate 
behaviour, and whether it can control public bureaucracies. In each case, 
research has sought to address a fundamental paradox whereby law 
appears to be both central and peripheral to social life, at once knitted 
into the core of our social world and yet remote from it. The questions 
raised here are large ones that seek to understand the nature of social 
relationships, the determinants of social behaviour, and the structures 
that shape society. These underlying questions touch on the classic themes 
of social science and have been studied across disciplines, from law to 
psychology, from political science to philosophy, from public 
administration to sociology. 
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1.2.2. Within this broad canvas of scholarly interest, socio-legal researchers 
have sought to develop our understanding of a particularly important 
relationship: that between law and administration, and between courts 
and public bureaucracies. The idea that courts operate as a means of 
controlling bureaucracy and that legal principles arising from particular 
cases prospectively inform bureaucratic behaviour has often been assumed 
in traditional legal scholarship. However, widespread scepticism about this 
assumption has provided the prompt for empirical research which has 
sought to examine the extent to which received ideas about the role and 
significance of courts are reflected in real world settings. Judicial impact 
studies have aimed, therefore, to measure and explain the degree to 
which courts have an effect on public bureaucracies. The findings of this 
research have – with some notable exceptions – suggested that the impact 
of courts is limited and that their significance to routine processes of 
bureaucratic decision-making is likely to be peripheral. 
 
1.2.3. This, therefore, is the principal context in which the present thesis 
situates itself and the specific field of enquiry in which it seeks to make a 
contribution. At the same time, as suggested above, the thesis has been 
strongly influenced by a number of complementary and intersecting 
scholarly traditions. These include research into the implementation of 
public policy, the organisation of bureaucracy, the nature of bureaucratic 
decision-making, the exercise of control and accountability, and learning 
within organisations. As such, the thesis draws on approaches from diverse 
academic fields in order to generate rounded and interdisciplinary 
insights. Figure 1.1 below provides a visual representation of the thesis’ 
situation in relation to various disciplines, along with an indication of the 
particular fields of enquiry that are drawn on in each discipline. 
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Figure 1.1: the interdisciplinary context for the thesis 
 
1.3. Focus and purpose of the research 
  
1.3.1. Having provided an orientation to the intellectual foundations of the 
thesis, this section explains the particular focus of the research. The aim 
of the thesis is to explore the factors that facilitate or obstruct the 
control of bureaucratic decision-making by redress mechanisms. In setting 
out this aim, it is important immediately to define the terms used to 
describe the phenomenon under study, since these are both technical and 
used in a particular way in this thesis. This is done in box 1.1. 
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Box 1.1: definitions of key terms used in the thesis 
 
 
Control: This refers to the notion that the behaviour of bureaucratic 
decision-makers can be limited, corrected, and structured by external 
forces (Dunsire 1979, 1984, Feldman 1998, 2003). In this thesis, the 
particular emphasis is on the extent to which redress mechanisms exercise 
such control. See chapter 3 for an in-depth discussion. 
 
Bureaucratic decision-making: The thesis focuses on a particular type of 
organisational decision-making which involves the application of standards, 
with varying degrees of specificity and routinisation, to individual cases. 
This involves looking at what Galligan (1996) terms ‘routine administration’ 
and ‘modified adjudication’. See chapter 2 for an in-depth discussion. 
 
Redress mechanisms: In the UK, the principal means through which citizens 
can raise a grievance about bureaucratic decision-making are: the courts 
(via judicial review), tribunals, and ombudsman schemes (AJTC 2011). In 
this study, ‘redress mechanisms’ refer to these three mechanisms. See 
chapters 4 and 5 for an in-depth discussion. 
 
1.3.2. In support of this overall aim, a number of more specific objectives have 
been developed: 
 
(i) To describe how redress mechanisms, individually and collectively, seek 
to achieve control over bureaucratic decision-making and how 
bureaucratic decision-makers respond to the decisions (and other 
actions) of redress mechanisms; 
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(ii) To compare differences between individual redress mechanisms, 
between different areas of bureaucratic decision-making, and between 
the responses of bureaucratic decision-makers; 
 
(iii) To explain the circumstances in which redress mechanisms’ attempts to 
exercise control are more or less likely to be successful by providing (a) 
analytical refinements to existing theoretical understandings and (b) 
extending these through the generation of novel hypotheses; and 
 
(iv) To evaluate current administrative justice policies in light of the 
research’s findings. 
 
1.3.3. Chapter 6 discusses these points in detail but, by way of introduction, it 
may be helpful to identify some of the distinguishing features of the study. 
One of these is the comparative approach which is adopted, whereby 
several redress mechanisms are studied across several decision-making 
areas. The literature features only one example of comparative work 
(Hertogh 2001) and none which involves all three redress mechanisms 
considered here. In addition to seeking to study these three mechanisms 
individually, the thesis enters new territory by adopting a holistic 
perspective which seeks to examine the extent to which administrative 
justice institutions – as a whole – control bureaucratic decision-making. 
Generally, therefore, the thesis departs from the purely legal focus of 
much existing research, and adopts a broader administrative justice 
perspective, where the concern is not only with legal institutions but with 
the wider suite of mechanisms and processes which allow citizens to 
pursue grievances against the state.  
 
1.3.4. Another key feature is the thesis’ objective to refine existing theoretical 
understandings and to develop new hypotheses. This aligns the thesis with 
Halliday’s (2004) work and with research which has been more interested 
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in understanding the factors responsible for control, rather than in 
measuring the extent to which control is achieved in a particular area. 
While these questions are to some extent inter-linked, the focus of this 
research is on understanding the phenomenon of control by redress 
mechanisms rather than simply measuring it. Finally, the thesis seeks to 
consider how the question of control relates to administrative justice 
policy, an area which has tended to be ignored in previous studies. Here 
the thesis aims to make a connection with the literature on redress design 
(Bondy and Le Sueur 2012, Le Sueur 2012) and to reflect upon the way in 
which institutional design and the exercise of bureaucratic control may be 
connected. 
 
1.3.5. While the thesis’ main intellectual foundation can be found in the 
literature on the bureaucratic impact of courts (Hertogh and Halliday 
2004), it should be noted that its approach departs from this literature in 
an important way. The key conceptual difference relates to this thesis’ 
concern with the idea of bureaucratic control. This differs from the 
emphasis in existing literature which has tended to be on ‘impact’, 
‘influence’, or ‘compliance’. There are a number of reasons for adopting a 
control perspective. The first is that such a perspective gives a clearer 
sense of where the particular relationship under study (how redress 
mechanisms control administration) fits in with a broader phenomenon of 
legal and social scientific interest (how control over administration is 
achieved in general). The second is that, in the guise of Dunsire’s (1979, 
1984) cybernetic theory of control, it offers a helpful theoretical basis for 
understanding the idea of control and the means through which it may be 
achieved. The third is that it moves away from the legal emphasis of 
concepts such as compliance, which are less helpful when it comes to 
considering institutions such as ombudsman schemes which draw on extra-
legal standards in addition to the law. The fourth is that it is a more 
precise concept than either ‘influence’ or ‘impact’, drawing attention to 
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the normative premise underlying the assumption that redress mechanisms 
should have an effect on bureaucratic behaviour i.e. that public 
bureaucracies require to be held in check in the public interest. And, 
finally, the fifth is that it allows for a clearer identification of the 
regulatory purpose of redress mechanisms (Halliday 2004), which seek not 
simply to effect behaviour change in public bureaucracies for its own sake, 
but with the fundamental purpose of aligning that behaviour with 
principles of good administration. For these reasons, the concept of 
control is preferred in this thesis as the means of articulating the 
particular phenomenon under study. 
 
1.4. Fieldwork setting and methodology 
 
1.4.1. The thesis has sought to achieve its aims and objectives by conducting 
empirical fieldwork in a particular area of public administration and with 
particular redress mechanisms. The area selected for study was local 
authority education departments in England responsible for taking 
decisions in three areas of statutory decision-making:  admissions to 
school, home-to-school transport, and Special Educational Needs (SEN). 
The redress mechanisms operating in this area and subjected to study 
were the Local Government Ombudsman (from herein ‘the LGO’), the First 
Tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber – Special Educational Needs and 
Disability) (from herein, ‘the tribunal’) and the Upper Tribunal 
(Administrative Appeals Chamber) (from herein ‘the upper tribunal’), and 
the Administrative Court (from herein ‘the court’). This fieldwork setting 
was chosen for a number of reasons: it featured relatively high levels of 
review by each of the three redress mechanisms; it was an important area 
of public administration, involving significant rights and entitlements; and, 
more pragmatically, it offered the best chance of getting access to 
conduct the research. 
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1.4.2. In terms of the methodology, the research adopted a multiple embedded 
case design (Yin 2009). This involved selecting six local authorities, which 
were chosen on the basis that: they were heavily reviewed by redress 
mechanisms; they were geographically diverse; they featured a good 
urban-rural mix. The methodology employed was qualitative, and the 
methods employed were semi-structured interviews and documentary 
research. Interviews were conducted with decision-makers in each local 
authority, with redress mechanism staff, with policymakers, and with 
parent support organisations. In total 61 interviews were conducted with 
70 respondents. The documentary research considered the reported 
decisions of redress mechanisms and analyzed 66 decisions in total. The 
bulk of the research was conducted with decision-makers in local 
authorities, since it was considered that their perspectives were 
particularly vital in understanding whether and how redress mechanisms 
exercised bureaucratic control.  
 
1.5. The thesis’ contribution to existing knowledge 
 
1.5.1. The sections above will already have given some sense of the 
contribution that the thesis seeks to make to existing knowledge about the 
control of bureaucratic decision-making by redress mechanisms. However, 
it may be helpful to specify the particular gaps in the existing scholarly 
research base that the thesis seeks to address. The first of these has been 
touched on above and relates to the lack of comparative work on the 
bureaucratic control functions of redress mechanisms. This is an important 
area to address, not only because there are theoretical indications in the 
literature that there may be significant differences between redress 
mechanisms in terms of their control functions, but also because 
comparative approaches are particularly suited to theory development. 
Studying redress mechanisms in comparative perspective allows for 
insights to be obtained which may be hidden when they are studied in 
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isolation. The second gap relates to the lack of empirical knowledge about 
the control functions of ombudsman schemes and tribunals. There is 
currently a limited literature in both these areas, particularly in relation 
to tribunals.  In relation to ombudsman schemes especially, there are also 
widespread suggestions that they are well suited to the task of bringing 
about administrative change and there is an increasing need to test 
whether these suggestions match up to empirical reality.  
 
1.5.2. The third gap relates to the choice of fieldwork setting, which 
represents a novel area for the study of bureaucratic control by redress 
mechanisms. More importantly, the choice of this area – and its inclusion 
of several different ‘types’ of bureaucratic decision-making – allows for an 
exploration of the relationship between control by redress mechanisms 
and the fundamental structures of decision-making within a particular 
bureaucratic environment. The fourth gap relates to the relative lack of 
theoretical frameworks within the existing literature (Hertogh and Halliday 
2004). While this thesis does not have the lofty aim of grand theory 
building, there is nonetheless scope for suggesting analytical refinements 
to existing conceptual understandings and generating novel hypotheses for 
testing in future research. As a result, a space exists for this thesis to 
continue to contribute to the incremental development of scholarly 
understandings in this area. 
 
1.5.3. In terms of the knowledge contribution which the thesis has delivered, 
this is for the reader to judge, but the thesis makes three main claims in 
this regard. The first is that new empirical data is presented about the 
control of bureaucratic decision-making by redress mechanisms. This data 
provides novel insights into bureaucratic control in a context that has not 
previously been studied. The second is the development – in this thesis’ 
discussion chapter – of 14 factors and 87 supporting propositions which 
seek to explain the presence or absence of control by redress mechanisms. 
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For each of the 14 factors, the thesis contributes to existing knowledge 
either by confirming, amending or developing understandings in the 
existing literature. At a granular level, the thesis also proposes a series of 
models which seek to explain some of the relationships which contribute 
to the overall achievement of control by redress mechanisms. The third 
and final area relates to the overall model and conceptual framework that 
is derived from the analysis. Here the claim is that the thesis has extended 
the scope of existing conceptual frameworks (particularly, Halliday’s 
(2004) analytic framework) in three ways: firstly, by drawing attention to 
the importance of the inputs into control systems and the quality of the 
cases referred to redress mechanisms; secondly, by focusing on the 
processes and operational features of redress mechanisms and developing 
hypotheses about how these relate to the exercise of control; and thirdly, 
by highlighting the importance of variations in bureaucratic decision-
making structures. Chapters 8 and 9 provide a full discussion of these 
points. 
 
1.6. Limitations of the research 
 
1.6.1. A number of limitations affected the quality of the data collected in this 
thesis and should be considered when interpreting its findings and 
conclusions. One limitation related to the fieldwork setting which was 
selected. While, as noted above, there were good reasons for choosing the 
local authority education context, this setting was perhaps not optimal. Its 
major drawback was that it featured low numbers of judicial review cases 
and, although the authorities in the sample had been threatened with 
litigation, no cases had reached a hearing. Although respondents were still 
able to comment on judicial review in general and refer to reported cases, 
they had no direct experience of being subjected to judgments. This 
points to the difficulty of finding an area of public administration where 
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all three redress mechanisms operate to a significant extent and – 
importantly – where there is a reasonable chance of access being granted. 
 
1.6.2. Another limitation related to the depth and saturation of data that was 
achieved. While sufficient interviews were conducted to obtain a rounded 
sense of the phenomenon under study, too few interviews were conducted 
with each individual local authority to develop a full contextual sense of 
how each local authority varied. It had initially been hoped that practices, 
processes, and attitudes could be compared across local authorities, 
however, since interviews were conducted across three decision-making 
areas in each authority, there was insufficient data to confidently talk 
about variations. As a result, data is presented in aggregate form (across 
all six local authorities) for each decision-making area: admissions, 
transport, and SEN. This lack of data saturation resulted from the 
difficulty experienced in gaining access to conduct the fieldwork and the 
need to present the research to potential participants as light touch and 
unobtrusive.  
 
1.6.3. The final limitation referred to the methods employed as part of the 
research and the overreliance on interviews. There are strong indications 
in the literature that the use of direct observation is important when it 
comes to studying the bureaucratic control functions of redress 
mechanisms. This allows data to be triangulated and can highlight the gap 
between what respondents say they do and what they actually do in 
practice. Similarly, the use of primary documentary research, particularly 
case files, can provide more objective and comprehensive data than that 
which is available via interviews and published documents. While the 
strengths of observation and primary documentary research are 
acknowledged, a combination of ethical restrictions, difficulties in 
negotiating access, and a lack of time available to the researcher meant 
that these methods could not be included in the research design.  
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1.7. The structure of the thesis 
 
1.7.1. This thesis is in nine chapters, including this introduction. Chapter 2 
describes the literature on bureaucratic decision-making, situates the 
particular type of decision-making with which this thesis is concerned, and 
considers a range of theories put forward to explain decision-making in 
organisations. Chapter 3 summarises the literature on the control of 
bureaucracies, with a particular emphasis on accountability mechanisms, 
before considering the organisational learning literature and making an 
argument for drawing on these insights in the present study. Chapter 4 
gives an overview of the socio-legal literature on redress mechanisms’ 
control functions and provides the principal foundation for the empirical 
part of the thesis. Chapter 5 provides an analysis of education law and 
policy, explaining the various areas that are considered in this thesis and 
mapping out the redress landscape in education. Chapter 6 describes the 
methodology used in the research. Chapter 7 outlines the findings, while 
chapter 8 discusses them with reference back to the earlier literature 
chapters. Finally, chapter 9 provides a conclusion which outlines an overall 
model for understanding the control functions of redress mechanisms, 
summarises the extent to which redress mechanisms exercise control in 
the local authority education area, and discusses the implications of the 
thesis for policy and future research.  
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2. BUREAUCRATIC DECISION-MAKING 
2.1. Introduction 
 
2.1.1. This chapter explores the nature of decision-making within 
bureaucracies. It begins with a discussion of the changing nature of public 
bureaucracy, before focusing on bureaucratic decision-making. This is a 
particular type of decision-making, involving the application of 
authoritative standards to individual cases, with varying amounts of 
discretion awarded, or defaulting, to the decision-maker. The chapter will 
also explore the characteristics of the decision-makers charged with 
making these kind of decisions, the so-called ‘street level bureaucrats’ 
(Lipsky 1980). The chapter then considers decision-making theory and the 
debate between those who argue that decision-making is a rational 
process of utility maximisation and those who suggest it is a normative 
process of identity realisation. Finally, the chapter considers the 
administrative justice literature, which highlights the particular 
importance of ideas about fairness in explaining the behaviour of 
bureaucratic decision-makers. 
 
2.2. Developments in bureaucratic organisation 
 
Traditional conceptions of bureaucracy  
 
2.2.1. Max Weber’s (1864 to 1920) rational-legal model of bureaucracy is 
central to modern understandings of bureaucracy (Scholy et al 1991, 
Schofield 2001). The characteristics of bureaucracies fitting the Weberian 
model include: independence from the political sphere; separation from 
other forms of social organisation; routinisation of decision-making; a high 
degree of internal specialisation; a hierarchical organisational structure; 
the development and use of technocratic expertise; a high level of 
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formality and rationality, with an emphasis on documented records; and 
impartiality and disinterest in the application of rules (Galligan 1986; 
Pollitt 2009). Bureaucracy is seen by Beck Jorgensen and Vrangbaek (2011, 
p.489) as fitting with the ‘hierarchy’ mode of governance, a top-down 
approach in which it is conceived as an externally controlled and neutral 
‘machine’. The aims of this particular form of administration are to 
minimise variation in the process and outcomes of administering policy 
programmes, to increase efficiency, and to centralise control over both 
officials and the targets of the policy intervention (Sandfort 2000). As 
Harlow and Rawlings (2009) point out, bureaucracy, as a form of 
organisation, has developed to meet the challenge of administering a 
large-scale modern welfare state.  
 
2.2.2. Much of the commentary on bureaucracy has been negative (Farrell and 
Morris 2003). Kernaghan (2000), for instance, describes traditional 
bureaucracies as: concerned with the needs of the organisation rather 
than its clients; emphasising command and compliance rather than 
cooperation; focusing on the application of rules rather than the 
empowerment of individuals; failing to consult with those outside the 
bureaucracy; reluctant to change and favouring the status quo; and 
focused on process and losing sight of results. Beetham (1996) notes that a 
particular criticism of the traditional bureaucratic model is the naive 
assumption that bureaucracies are neutral, while Du Gay (2000, 2005) has 
pointed out that a key trend in the public imagination has been to see 
bureaucracy as a synonym for waste and inefficiency. Downs (1967), 
Tullock (1965), and Niskanen (1971) all argue that bureaucrats are 
motivated by self-interest and a desire to expand their bureaucratic 
empires. Dunleavy (1991) suggests an alternative to notions of bureau 
maximisation, with his concept of ‘bureau-shaping’ emphasising non-
monetary and other motivators to explain the way in which bureaucrats 
seek to shape the administrative environment. Some authors, such as Du 
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Gay (2000, 2005) and Woodhouse (1997) have argued strongly for a more 
positive view of bureaucrats, taking a balanced perspective on the costs 
and benefits of bureaucracy as a form of social organisation. However, 
such accounts have tended to be drowned out by the view that 
bureaucracy is dysfunctional. 
 
Administrative reform: the New Public Management 
 
2.2.3. The perception that bureaucracies suffer from bureau-pathologies has 
partly been responsible for the large-scale administrative reforms which 
have been implemented in most developed countries from the 1970s and 
1980s onwards (Hood 1991; Hood and Dixon 2015). According to Hood and 
Dixon (ibid.) one of the three major changes in government in the last 30 
years has been managerial makeovers, including the New Public 
Management (NPM) reforms. NPM is a tag that has been criticised for 
becoming something of a portmanteau for all changes that have occurred 
in government in the last 30 to 50 years (Pollitt 2009). Its exact meaning is 
fluid, but a key characteristic is its reliance on ideas from management in 
the private sector (Farrell and Morris 2003). Pollitt (2009) argues that 
there are two dimensions to this import of private sector notions. The first 
is doctrinal and involves an ideological argument for the perceived 
superiority of private sector practices. The second is more practical and 
involves a diffused cluster of practical tools and mechanisms (such as key 
performance indicators).  
 
2.2.4. In terms of the core substance of NPM, Dunleavy (1991) has argued that 
this can be summarised as involving competition, disaggregation, and 
incentivisation. Competition involves the increasing use of quasi-market 
mechanisms to structure public services; disaggregation refers to the 
separation of policymaking and policy delivery functions; and 
incentivisation refers to the mechanisms used to manage performance 
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towards the delivery of desired outcomes. Du Gay (2000) prefers the term 
‘entrepreneurial governance’ to NPM and includes a number of other 
features in his definition, including: the empowerment of citizens in 
relation to bureaucracy; the re-branding of citizens as customers with 
quasi-contractual rights; an emphasis on the fulfilment of broad missions 
rather than bureaucratic rules; and an emphasis on making money rather 
than only spending it.  
 
2.2.5. One aspect which has increasingly come to dominate NPM approaches is 
the emphasis on customer rights and choice (Taylor and Kelly 2006). The 
notion that satisfying citizen-consumers should be part of the mission of 
government has been controversial, but also seen as necessary 
counterweight to the traditional dominance of producer interests 
(Needham 2006; Simmons et al 2007). Clarke et al (2010) argue that 
choice has provided the underlying logic for public services provision under 
the New Labour government. Harlow and Rawlings (2009) see this 
approach as an attempt to soften previous NPM reforms, by placing an 
enhanced emphasis on the responsiveness of services and their 
accessibility to consumers. 
 
2.2.6. In the late 1990s and 2000s, there was a growth in focus on 
accountability, as recognition grew that quasi-markets could not take care 
of themselves (Dent et al 2004; Hood et al 2000; Taylor and Kelly 2006). 
According to Dent et al 2004, audit and accountability have now come to 
dominate NPM, while Taylor and Kelly (2006) talk about NPM having led to 
an increase in both top-down and bottom-up methods of accountability. 
Top-down methods include inspection, target-setting, and managerial 
oversight, while bottom-up approaches involve greater accountability to 
customers and stakeholders (accountability is discussed at length in 
chapter 3). Generally, the NPM approach continues to dominate 
government policy on public service delivery (Carolan 2013) and can 
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largely be summarised as an attempt to achieve improved policy outcomes 
via the creation of what are perceived to be more efficient bureaucratic 
structures and processes.  
 
Assessing the reforms 
 
2.2.7. A major question has been over the net effect of NPM reforms and the 
degree to which bureaucracy has been transformed. Some have suggested 
that NPM has led to ‘post-bureaucratic’ organisations (Kernaghan 2000; 
Pollitt 2009). Pollitt (ibid.) defines post-bureaucracies as those which have 
consciously moved away from the principles of traditional bureaucracy 
with the aim of being quicker, more flexible, and more efficient. Post-
bureaucracies can essentially be defined as the antitheses of the Weberian 
model surveyed above, in that they are: citizen centred; encourage public 
participation; supportive of employees; open to consultation and 
cooperation with stakeholders; oriented towards actions and outcomes; 
decentralised; and revenue-driven and competitive (Kernaghan 2000). 
Pollitt (2009) adds that they are characterised by flattened management 
structures, greater flexibility in employment patterns, and an emphasis on 
creativity and innovation instead of rule-following.  
 
2.2.8. The existence of post-bureaucracies has, however, been challenged by a 
number of scholars. Bolton (2004, p. 321), discussing organisational change 
in the NHS, has questioned the extent to which changes have actually 
occurred on the ground, suggesting that they may be ‘just a façade’. 
Similarly, Hoggett (1996) has argued that rather than casting off 
traditional bureaucratic mechanisms, NPM reforms have in fact re-
introduced or strengthened such approaches. The result has been a hybrid 
of old and new forms of management, rather than an entirely reformed 
system. Schofield (2001, p. 84) has also argued that bureaucracy as a 
mode of governance has in fact survived and proved very resilient. She 
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ascribes its longevity to the fact that elected members can rely on the 
obedience of bureaucrats, an obedience which is the result of a sense of 
bureaucratic vocation and professional reputation.  
 
2.2.9. A feature of traditional bureaucracy which some have been seen as 
surviving reforms is the notion of the public service ethos. This is 
composed of values such as impartiality, integrity and objectivity, 
selection and promotion on merit, and accountability (Du Gay 2000, 2005). 
Although hard to define in exact terms, it has been seen as a central tenet 
of traditional public administration and as being ‘…passed from generation 
to generation in the form of a ‘genetic code’ (Woodhouse 1997, p. 33). 
The public service ethos can be seen to fit with Hood’s (1991, p. 11) 
description of ‘theta type’ values for public management, where the 
overall aim is to ‘keep it honest and fair’. Such values are distinct from 
‘sigma type’ values associated with NPM, where the main aim is to ‘keep it 
lean and purposeful’. While theta and sigma values are in competition 
with each other, it appears that the public service ethos has retained a 
role in shaping the values and behaviour of public servants. The result is a 
plurality of new and old values co-existing in the moral universe of 
administrators (Beck Jorgensen and Vrangbaek 2011). 
 
2.3. Bureaucratic decision-making and decision-makers 
  
2.3.1. Having discussed broad developments in bureaucratic organisation, this 
section now discusses: different types of bureaucratic decision-making; the 
particular type of decision-making which is of concern in this thesis; and 
the nature of the street level bureaucrats charged with this decision-
making. 
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Types of bureaucratic decision-making 
 
2.3.2. Harrison and Pellettier (2001) argue that the following variables affect 
decision types: whether the decision is important or complex; whether the 
decision will recur frequently; and whether the likely outcome of a decision 
is relatively certain. Most accounts see these variables as producing two 
main types of decision-making, which have been variously described in the 
literature as programmed and non-programmed (Simon 1997), routine and 
factual (Gifford 1983), structured and unstructured (Cooke and Slack 1991), 
and generic and unique (Drucker 1967). The characteristics of programmed, 
routine, structured, and generic decisions are their high degree of 
recurrence, their relative simplicity, their suitability for routinisation, and 
their non-specific character. The characteristics of non-programmed, 
factual, unstructured, and unique decisions, on the other hand, include a 
high level of complexity, the need to consider individual circumstances in 
detail, the lack of clear pattern between decisions, and the need to adapt 
processes to each decision. This thesis follows Harrison and Pellettier 
(2001) in calling these two broad decision types category 1 and category 2 
decisions, respectively. While this simple distinction between decision 
types helps to highlight key categories of decision, a number of authors 
make clear that decisions in the real world may involve elements of both 
approaches.  
 
2.3.3. The idea of decision types existing on a continuum between routine and 
non-routine cases is helpful, and points to a middle ground of decision-
making that has been neglected in the social-science literature, but has 
tended to be the central focus of socio-legal literature. Galligan (1996) has 
made a particularly helpful contribution to this latter literature, and he 
argues that three main types of decision can be identified: routine 
decisions, decisions requiring an element of enquiry and judgment, and 
policy-based decisions. He describes routine decisions as those involving the 
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straightforward application of criteria to a set of easily established facts, 
while policy decisions are those in which only loose standards are provided 
as the basis for decision-making and significant judgment is required. These 
decision-types can clearly be seen to mirror, respectively, the category 1 
and category 2 decisions discussed above. Galligan (1996, p. 236), however, 
points out that a third category of decision exists: 
 
‘Between routine administration and policy-based discretion lies 
the great mass of administrative processes… Here decisions are 
made by the application of standards which require a greater 
degree of enquiry and judgment, even discretion, than is provided 
by routine administration, but fall short of strong policy based 
discretion.’ 
 
Such decisions – involving elements of both structure and judgement, 
routinisation and sensitivity to individual facts – can be termed category 3 
decisions. 
 
2.3.4. In a previous work, Galligan (1986) provides a more detailed breakdown 
of the types of decisions arising within bureaucracies. He identifies four 
types: adjudication; modified adjudication; specific policy issue; and 
general policy issue. Adjudication is the process of determining the rights 
and duties of individuals through the application of reasonably settled 
standards. Modified adjudication is similarly based on an individual’s rights 
and duties, but also involves considering how he or she should be treated. 
Here, standards are less settled and there is more freedom for decision-
makers to apply judgment. Specific and general policy decisions both 
involve the application of loose standards and significant elements of 
judgment, with a range of interests being affected. The key difference 
between the two is that specific policy decisions relate to a particular 
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individual, while general policy decisions refer to the formulation of 
general principles for future application in individual cases.  
 
2.3.5. The central concern of this thesis can, therefore, be summarised as 
being about category 1 and category 3 decision-making; it is these decision 
types that are referred to when the thesis speaks of ‘bureaucratic decision-
making’. The emphasis is on the application of standards, with varying 
degrees of specificity and routinisation, to individual cases (a process 
referred to as individuation by Harlow and Rawlings 2009). While routine 
decision-making under rules (category 1) is relatively uncontroversial, 
category 3 decisions – consisting of modified adjudication and specific 
policy decisions – are perhaps the most controversial within the 
bureaucratic setting, for the very reason that the balance to be struck 
between pre-programming and deciding on the spot is unclear. They are 
also, as we shall argue throughout this thesis, a particularly complex 
category of case due to the need to reconcile individual interests with 
those of the broader community with each decision that is made.  
 
Key features of bureaucratic decision-making  
 
2.3.6. This section considers two central features of bureaucratic decision-
making: the need to reconcile individual and collective interests; and the 
balancing of rules and discretion within decision-making processes.  
 
2.3.7. Individual and collective interests. Galligan (1996) describes 
individualised decisions as those which only affect the interests of a single 
individual, while collective decisions are those where a wide range of 
interests are affected. As we saw above, however, the situation with 
regard to category 3 decisions is more complex, since here each decision 
on an individual case involves careful balancing between the individual’s 
interest and the broader public interest. Tweedie (1989) refers to this as a 
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tension between an individual client orientation and a collective welfare 
orientation in bureaucracy. The former involves the careful tailoring of 
decisions to the individual circumstances of a case and the adoption of 
procedures that involve maximum participation for the individual. The 
latter is more concerned with ensuring that the goals of the policy 
programme are implemented in line with the interests of society at large 
and sees investment in practices to tailor services to individuals as 
detracting from resources available for others.  
 
2.3.8. The tension between the rights of the individual and the interests of the 
collective in public administration has been a concern of legal theorists 
such as Dworkin (1978), who argues for a view of rights as ‘trumps’ 
whereby individual rights should take precedence over collective interests 
in those cases where they come into conflict. The reality of bureaucratic 
decision-making is, however, likely to be significantly different. Indeed, 
Tweedie (1989) argues that bureaucracies have a natural tendency to 
prioritise collective interests as a result of a lack of resources 
meaningfully to individuate decisions and a bureaucratic mind-set which 
favours a collectivist view. This collectivist approach mirrors the form of 
decision-making which is widely seen to dominate public bureaucracies 
and which Mashaw (1983) calls ‘bureaucratic rationality’, Galligan (1996) 
describes as ‘bureaucratic administration’, and Kagan (2010) terms 
‘bureaucratic legalism’ (see section 2.5 below where these issues are 
discussed in detail). At the individual case level, the broader need to 
balance these interests is reflected in the need to appropriately balance 
the use of rules with the use of discretion. The latter is strongly associated 
with the ability of administrators to tailor decisions and adopt the 
individual client orientation discussed above (Ponce 2005), while the 
former are more clearly associated with collectivist approaches 
emphasising consistency and control (Jowell 2007). 
 
- 36 - 
 
2.3.9. Rules and discretion. The question of the proper apportionment of rules 
and discretion in bureaucratic decision-making has been a major concern 
of socio-legal and public administration scholarship. The latter has tended 
to frame the discussion in terms of the characteristics of street-level 
bureaucracy (Lipsky 1980), which will be considered in the following sub-
section. Here, our concern is with the long running debate about the 
extent to which discretionary decision-making can and should be 
constrained and rendered subservient to rule-based decision-making. This 
debate came to prominence with Davis’ (1969) argument that discretion 
was the major source of injustice in public administration and as a result 
needed to be brought under strict control. Following his work, there have 
been two strands of scholarship on discretion, one of which has bemoaned 
its existence and the other which has celebrated its value (Keiser 1999). 
Before we examine these arguments in more detail, the chapter will first 
consider what is meant by rules and discretion. 
 
2.3.10. There has been less controversy in relation to the definition of 
rules than discretion, and as a result this may be dealt with fairly briefly. 
Baldwin (1990, p. 321) provides the following definition: ‘A rule may be 
defined as a general norm guiding conduct or action in a given type of 
situation.’ It may be thought that discretion is the polar opposite of rules 
and the state that arises in the absence of rules. Indeed, some definitions 
seem to suggest this, and Dworkin’s (1978, p. 31) famous description of 
discretion as the ‘hole inside the donut’ provides a very visual illustration 
of the perceived separation of rules and discretion. Others have provided 
somewhat more nuanced definitions, which see discretion less as an all-
or-nothing matter arising from the absence of rules, and more as a matter 
of degree. Here, discretion is ‘…a series of gradations of freedom to make 
decisions’ rather than a matter of unconstrained choice (Evans and Harris 
2004, p. 871).  
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2.3.11. Different types of discretion may be identified as arising within 
the decision-making process. Dworkin (1978) distinguished between two 
types: weak discretion, which involves the discretion to interpret rules and 
to take decisions within the confine of rules; and strong discretion, which 
provides decision-makers with the freedom to devise their own decision-
making rules. Galligan (1986) challenges Dworkin’s approach by arguing 
that the latter’s description of rule interpretation as ‘weak’ assumes that 
rules are clear and that a single correct answer is possible when applying 
rules. Galligan (ibid.) considers that rules are often complex and 
suggestive of multiple possible answers, so that an official may in fact 
have significant ‘strong’ discretion when applying rules. Galligan’s (ibid.) 
alternative is to depict discretion as occurring in three aspects of the 
decision-making process: the finding, and interpretation, of facts; the 
search for, or creation of, relevant standards; and the application of 
standards.  
 
2.3.12. Taylor and Kelly (2006) have suggested a three-fold classification 
of discretion involving rule discretion, value discretion, and task 
discretion. Rule discretion is similar to the weak form of discretion 
suggested by Dworkin (1978) in that it involves discretion in the context of 
rule-interpretation. Value discretion involves the discretion to draw on 
extra-legal notions of fairness, often provided by professional or 
organisational codes. Finally, task discretion refers to the wide range of 
discretionary action (and inaction) which decision-makers can take in the 
course of decision-making, such as whether to collect information or how 
much information to collect. Sainsbury (2008) argues that task discretion is 
particularly important but is often more hidden than other forms of 
discretion. 
 
2.3.13. Much of the literature on discretion has been concerned with 
normative arguments about the role and value of discretion in public 
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administration. As noted above, Davis (1969) has been a central critic of 
discretion. His argument is that administrators are given far too much 
power to decide important issues affecting individuals without recourse to 
publicly determined standards. Davis (ibid.) accepts that discretion can 
play a part in a fair system of administration, but in order for this to be 
the case, discretion requires to be much more strictly controlled. His 
solution is to seek to confine, structure, and check the use of discretion 
through the greater use of rules. Confinement refers to an agency 
developing internal procedures to make sure that individuals are only 
allowed to exercise unfettered discretion in very limited circumstances. 
Structuring refers to using rules to limit the range of options that are open 
to a decision-maker: choices are structured through the provision of set 
options within the relevant rules. Finally, checking involves the use of 
external controls, such as courts, to ensure that decision-makers are 
acting properly and within the legitimate bounds of their discretion. Thus, 
Davis (ibid.) sees rules in a particularly positive light, as the means 
through which fairness, consistency, and equal treatment can be achieved.  
 
2.3.14. While Davis’ (ibid.) work has been very influential, the broad 
consensus in the literature has been that his thesis exaggerates the nature 
of the problem and is naïve in relation to the solution prescribed. Black 
(2001, p. 2), for example, states that Davis’s (1969) suggestion that more 
rules might help resolve the problem of discretion is ‘ambitious, if not 
misguided’ and that rules cannot be considered a panacea. Wilson (1972) 
provided an early critique and suggests that Davis’ (ibid.) assumption that 
discretion represents a distortion of the democratic will fails to recognise 
that discretion is often delegated as a result of failed processes of political 
compromise or as a result of attempts to shield elected members from 
taking responsibility for unpopular decisions. Baldwin (1990, p. 321), 
discussing the regulation of business by government, notes that rules are 
rarely determinative of behaviour. Indeed, a number of authors have 
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emphasised that compliance with rules, even assuming that individuals are 
willing to act in line with them, is mitigated by a range of political, social, 
and organisational factors (Harlow and Rawlings 2009; Hawkins 1992; Van 
Gunstersen 1976). Some authors have also suggested that the 
multiplication of rules in a bureaucratic environment can actually increase 
discretion, as bureaucratic systems become more complex, and provide 
more opportunities for decision-makers to shield their decision-making 
behind rules (Fletcher 2011; Hawkins 1992; Kagan 2010).  
 
2.3.15. In addition to pointing out the shortcomings of rules as a solution 
to inappropriate discretionary behaviour, a positive case for the use of 
discretion has also been made. Discretion has been seen as a means of 
coping with unpredictability and uncertainty in policy implementation 
processes (Hawkins 1992), a means of ensuring that justice is achieved for 
individual citizens (Hetzler 2003), a vehicle for maintaining administrative 
flexibility and creativity (King 2012), and a way of providing citizens with 
self-respect by engaging with them on a human level (Tweedie 1989). 
Titmuss (1971) was an early proponent of the idea that discretion is 
beneficial within administrative systems and he argues that one of its key 
benefits is to allow administrators to respond to changing circumstances. 
Although he strongly supports the necessity of discretion in bureaucratic 
decision-making, he recognises that it requires to be exercised within 
certain limits. Unlike Davis’ (1969) emphasis on rules, however, Titmuss 
(1971) argued for efforts to be made to shape bureaucratic cultures to 
encourage and reward the appropriate use of discretion. Some have 
argued that discretion is not only helpful in ensuring good administration, 
but is central to its very meaning. Jorna and Wagenar (2007), for example, 
state that the use of discretion is key to the core task of bureaucratic 
decision-making, which they see as ‘individualising public law’.  
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2.3.16. As will have become clear, the debate over the place of rules and 
discretion in bureaucratic decision-making has moved away from a sense 
that they are binary opposites and that either approach is inherently 
superior. What we end up with is not the separateness suggested by the 
‘hole in the donut’ metaphor, and instead something more akin to an 
occluded meteorological front, where rules and discretion coexist in a 
mixed form. In the same way that rules are seen to contain within them 
the potential for discretionary decision-making, so too grants of discretion 
(deliberate or otherwise) do not necessarily result in an absence of rules. 
Tweedie (1989), for example, in a study of admission to school decision-
making, found that even where administrators were given discretion to 
consider the individual circumstances of applicants, they preferred to rely 
on the use of standardised bureaucratic rules.  
 
Street level bureaucracy  
 
2.3.17. A discussion of decision-making would be incomplete without 
examining the decision-makers engaged in this activity. Here, the 
literature has been concerned with the analysis of a particular type of 
decision-maker, operating at the front line of public policy 
implementation and responsible for making the day-to-day decisions on 
individual cases which bring policy to life. The term ‘street level 
bureaucrat’ (SLB) was coined by Lipsky (1980) to describe state officials 
who: 
 
‘… interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs, and 
who have a substantial amount of discretion in the execution of 
their work. Typical street level bureaucrats… grant access to 
government programs and provide services within them’ (Lipsky 
1980, p. 3). 
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These officials include police officers, social workers, and officials in 
welfare bureaucracies. They are characterised by their low status within 
organisations and high levels of discretion (Scott 1997). Even where 
attempts are made to control the behaviour of SLBs, this has been seen as 
ineffective due to the nature of the street-level environment, which is 
characterised by insufficient resources, high numbers of cases, difficult 
clients, and a lack of clear goals in substantive policies.  
 
2.3.18. As Maynard et al (1990) point out, Lipsky’s description of SLBs was 
radical given existing assumptions at the time that frontline staff were 
machine-like implementers of policy. The SLB concept, therefore, sought 
to describe the space in which bureaucracies and citizens interact and to 
shed some light on the ‘black box’ of decision-making that occurred there 
(Sainsbury 2008, p. 328). SLBs in Lipsky’s (1980) account are depicted as 
harassed individuals, doing their best in impossible circumstances, and 
attempting to see their way through the ‘corrupted world of service’ they 
inhabit. Although they are powerful actors in the sense of having 
significant discretion to shape outcomes, they are simultaneously depicted 
as victims of circumstances. Fletcher (2011, p. 446) describes SLBs as 
‘…policymakers in an environment they do not control’. The effect of their 
use of discretion at the frontline is to produce practical versions of 
policies which look quite different from what policies look like on paper 
(Evans and Harris 2004).  
 
2.3.19. The major contribution of the SLB concept has been to emphasise 
the importance of bureaucratic organisation and practice in the 
implementation of public policy, and to seriously question the extent to 
which traditional assumptions of central control exist in the real world 
(Evans 2011). It has also led to the adoption of increasingly ‘bottom up’ 
approaches to the study of policy implementation given the apparent 
importance of SLBs to policy outcomes. Central to these discussions are 
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questions about why SLBs behave in ways which appear to depart 
systematically from the expectations of their superiors. Lipsky’s (1980) 
answer was largely situational and he described the use of discretion to 
adapt or distort mandated requirements as a coping mechanism to deal 
with the reality of the bureaucratic environment. Scott (1997) has 
suggested that the motivations of SLBs can arise from three sets of factors: 
the individual characteristics of decision-makers; the organisational 
environment; and the attributes of the clients whose cases are being 
decided.  
 
2.3.20. Alden (2015) has argued that organisational factors have tended 
to dominate accounts of SLB motivation and that the effective scope of 
individuals’ discretion is heavily constrained, such that individual factors 
have a limited importance in explaining variations in decision-making 
outcomes. Indeed, in his study of SLBs in the local authority housing 
context, Alden (ibid.) found that discretionary behaviour was largely 
shaped by top-down organisational pressures, and that dysfunctional SLB 
decision-making resulted from pressures within the organisation that 
required an adjustment away from mandated goals. Others concur and 
have argued that managers as well as SLBs have a significant role in the 
interpretation and potential distortion of policy (Evans 2011). While some 
have questioned the continued relevance of the SLB concept in the age of 
NPM (Taylor and Kelly 2006, Bovens and Zourdis 2002), the consensus in 
the literature remains that street-level staff continue to enjoy high levels 
of bureaucratic autonomy in the fulfilment of their tasks (e.g. Alden 2015, 
Evans 2011, Hoyle 2014, Rowe 2002). 
 
2.3.21. The next section now turns to discussing some of the main 
theories that have been advanced to explain decision-making in 
organisations. 
 
- 43 - 
 
2.4. Theories of decision-making 
 
2.4.1. The two key underlying debates in decision-making theory are: the 
relationship between structure and agency, and the differing ‘logics’ that 
have been ascribed to human behaviour in decision-making. The debate 
between structure and agency as the means of explaining human 
behaviour is at the core of many decision-making theories (Allen 2001). 
Put simply, the question here is whether action is the result of the agency 
of individuals, acting as autonomous agents, or whether it is produced by 
the range of structures – political, social, organisational – within which 
human action takes place (Sandfort 2000). While the relationship between 
individual decision-makers and their environments is seen as influential 
across the board, different theories take different views with regard to the 
extent to which such external influences are determinative of action, 
rather than simply providing a context for it. Perspectives emphasising 
agency are generally associated with rational choice theories, while 
perspectives which see individual autonomy as heavily constrained by 
structure are generally associated with theories such as rule-following 
(March 1994).   
 
2.4.2. Etzioni (1988) argues that decision-making can be considered from three 
perspectives: utilitarian, social, and deontological. The utilitarian view 
sees decision-makers as individual persons trying to maximise their self-
interest through a process of cost-benefit analysis. The social view sees 
decision-makers as desiring to conform to social norms to avoid 
punishment and to select courses of action that seem to them to be 
demanded by society. Finally, the moral or deontological view accepts 
that utilitarian and social perspectives bear upon decision-making, but see 
ethical and moral considerations as predominant and decision-making as a 
matter of ensuring that action is taken in line with moral codes. Each of 
these views fits with one of three broad categories of decision-making 
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theory: rational theory, bounded rationality theory, and rule-following 
theory. Each of these theories provide a different emphasis in their 
explanations of human behaviour, respectively: rationality and utility, 
rationality limited by human and organisational factors, and predominantly 
normative and value-based motivation.  
 
Rational theories of decision-making 
 
2.4.3. Taylor (1911) argued that organisations could be managed by drawing on 
principles from the natural sciences and that management could become a 
science guided by immutable laws that applied across all organisations. 
Decision-making approaches based on the scientific management model 
tend to envisage a single decision-maker operating in a world of perfect 
information: assuming the decision-maker follows a rational and logical 
process, correct decisions will be arrived at. That process is usually 
defined as involving the following steps: the problem to be addressed is 
defined and objectives are set; a range of possible solutions are identified; 
an exhaustive search is made for information to help resolve the problem; 
the information is analysed and each possible solution is evaluated in 
terms of the likelihood that it will help the decision-maker meet the 
objectives; finally, the solution which seems most likely to address the set 
objectives is selected (Bazerman 1998; Weiss 1982).  
 
2.4.4. The key feature of rational choice models that follow this basic pattern 
is the idea that ‘…human action is the result of human choice and that 
human choice is intendedly rational’ (March 1997, p.11). The decision-
maker is seen as machine-like in his or her application of a scientific, 
universal decision process.  An important element of choice in this model 
is the minimisation of risk and Beach and Connolly (2005) suggest that the 
image of decision-making presented in the classical model is akin to 
gambling, where the attractiveness of the pay-offs associated with one 
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particular option are weighed against the probability of those pay-offs 
actually being realised. As a result, decision-making is effectively a 
process by which information is collected in order to make two sequential 
guesses: what pay-offs are likely to be associated with particular courses 
of action; and what is the probability of those pay-offs materialising?  
 
2.4.5. The rational model has been much criticised for its simplification of the 
messy reality of organisational decision-making and its somewhat naïve 
view of human rationality. March (1997) argues that the model has 
effectively been discredited, with those who still adopt broadly rational 
approaches drawing on Simon’s (1997) ‘bounded rationality’ model (see 
paragraphs 2.4.7 and 2.4.8 below). At the same time, Harrison and 
Pellettier (2001) argue that rational models continue to dominate the 
academic literature and remain important in a number of disciplines. 
Hawkins (1992) sees the usefulness of rational choice theory as likely to 
vary depending on the particular type of decision-making being studied. 
He suggests, for example, that it may be useful when considering the 
decision of parties in a dispute to settle out-of-court, where rational 
calculation, weighing of alternatives, and probability assessments are all 
likely to be a factor. At the same time, however, Hawkins (ibid.) is critical 
of the individualistic approach of classical models and their association of 
rationality with utility theory and the pursuit of self-interest.  
 
2.4.6. In relation to this thesis, and its concern with individuated bureaucratic 
decision-making, it is clear that the element of rational choice theory 
which stresses utility maximisation is of limited relevance. It is unlikely 
that bureaucratic decision-makers applying authoritative standards to 
individual cases have any significant self-interest to maximise. In relation 
to this type of decision-making, therefore, the relevance of rational choice 
theories will be restricted to an emphasis on the pursuit of rational 
processes and outcomes as providing the best explanation for decision-
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making behaviour. Indeed, rationality remains a central expectation of 
bureaucratic decision-making, with procedural and substantive rationality 
required by administrative law and a much-valued principle of good 
administration. Where self-interest may have greater relevance is in 
relation to compliance decision-making and the assessments decision-
makers make about whether or not to comply with decisions by redress 
mechanisms. Here consequentialist decision-making is likely to play a part 
in decision-makers’ thinking, along with other factors, including their 
normative commitment to ideas such as the rule of law. As Hertogh (2001) 
has identified, decisions about compliance are likely to carefully way the 
costs and benefits of various courses of action with a view to finding 
outcomes that have the greatest individual and organisational utility. 
 
Bounded rationality 
 
2.4.7. Simon’s (1997) influential theory of decision-making – bounded 
rationality – contains a number of key tenets. As noted above, he retains a 
fundamentally rational view of human action, believing decision-makers to 
be acting purposefully towards the achievement of desired outcomes. In 
this respect, he argues that: 
 
‘…people are generally quite rational; that is to say, they usually 
have reasons for what they do… almost all human behaviour consists 
of goal-oriented actions’ (Simon 1985, p. 294). 
 
The starting point for Simon’s (ibid.) theory is, therefore, shared with 
classical theories. Where they diverge is with Simon’s (ibid.) central 
insight that, although decision-makers aim to pursue rational courses of 
action, various factors interfere with their ability to do so in practice. 
Some of the limitations on decision-makers are cognitive and relate to the 
limited capacity of decision-makers to process information, as well as a 
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tendency to make mistakes in the course of decision-making. Inherent 
biases may also colour decision-makers’ judgments when assessing 
problems, information, and possible solutions, meaning that purely 
rational outcomes are less likely (Khaneman and Tversky 1974; Khaneman 
2011). Another set of limitations are those imposed by the organisation 
itself. Pressures such as limited time and resources curtail the extent to 
which exhaustive information searches may take place and suggest that 
many decisions will be rushed in order to meet the imperatives of the 
business (be they financial or political). Other organisational factors, such 
as the way decision-making processes are structured and the range of 
individuals involved in a process are also seen as likely to restrict 
attempts at rational behaviour. Simon (1997), therefore, describes this set 
of circumstances – where individual cognition and capability are limited 
and where the organisational setting places constraints on decision-
makers – as bounded rationality.  
 
2.4.8. As a result of the bounded nature of rationality in decision-making 
processes and their inherent lack of rational perfection, Simon (ibid.) 
argues that decision-makers are unlikely to pursue the optimisation 
strategies suggested in the rational decision-making model. Instead of 
being ‘maximers’, he describes decision-makers as ‘satisficers’, content 
with achieving satisfactory results in recognition of the bounded sphere of 
rationality within which decision-making takes place. Satisficing refers to a 
curtailed decision-making process, where the search for possible solutions 
– rather than being exhaustive – ends as soon as an apparently workable 
option is found. As Beach and Connolly (2005) have commented, this 
approach to decision-making involves the considerable simplification of 
decision-making problems into ‘small worlds’ that are capable of being 
understood and processed by decision-makers. Simon’s (1997) theory, 
therefore, adapts the rational model by pointing out that decision-makers 
require the use of heuristics – rules of thumb for decision-making – that 
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simplify problems and present bounded versions of the world that are 
capable of producing adequate, if not perfect, results.  
 
Rule-following theory 
 
2.4.9. March’s (1994) rule-following theory represents a significant departure 
from both the rational and bounded rationality theories of decision-
making. March (ibid.) argues that, rather than seeing decision-making as 
following ‘the logic of consequence’, where alternatives are assessed on 
the basis of their likely consequences and ability to fulfil a desired 
objective, decision-making should be seen as following the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’. This involves decision-makers making decisions based on 
their perceptions of their identities and roles within an organisation and, 
consequently, taking actions that they believe to be normatively 
appropriate. March (ibid.) argues that this approach remains logical and 
rational, albeit it employs a different type of logic. He notes that rational 
models tend to be ‘choice-based’ while the model he suggests is ‘rule-
based’. Zhou (1997, p.287), referring to March’s work, offers the 
following, helpful definition of rule-following behaviour: 
 
‘...individual and organizational behaviour patterns that are 
either ‘pre-programmed’ by implicit rules, such as norms, 
conventions, and standards, or based on explicit rules such as 
formal procedures, policies and regulations.’ 
 
2.4.10. Decision-making according to the rule-following model, therefore, 
follows three steps. First, decision-makers must assess the decision-making 
situation they are confronted with. Second, decision-makers must assess 
what their role is in relation to the decision-making situation. Third, 
decision-makers must ask themselves what the appropriate course of 
action is for someone fulfilling their particular role when faced with the 
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particular situation. This last stage involves the decision-maker drawing on 
largely unwritten ‘rules’ about the type of behaviour expected of certain 
people in certain circumstances within an organisation. March (1994) 
argues that this model often operates implicitly and is not driven by 
personal preferences or the assessment of possible consequences – instead 
it is driven by a basic need to fulfil what decision-makers perceive to be 
their duties and obligations. Rule-following theory sees rational choice 
theory as derivative of rule-following, in that the rational search for and 
evaluation of alternatives may form a part of what decision-makers do 
when seeking to fulfil their roles and identities within the organisation. 
Indeed, March (ibid.) argues that rules that emphasise consequentiality 
are common and frequently seen in decision-making processes.  
 
2.4.11. The rule-following model can be seen to make two important 
contributions to our understanding of decision-making. The first is that it 
provides a strong corrective to rational choice’s limited understanding of 
human rationality. Instead of utilitarian calculation, human rationality is 
seen as the process by which decision-makers carry out what is expected 
of them within the social and organisational context in which they exist. 
The second, linked contribution, is that self-interest – while it may remain 
part of decision-making – is not a simple matter of cost-benefit analysis, 
but involves a fundamentally normative dimension. Decision-makers are 
driven not by assessing the consequences of particular courses of action, 
but by a normative desire to do the right thing, which is shaped by the rule 
environment (both formal and informal) of the organisational setting.  
 
2.4.12. Beach and Connolly (2005) note that the social science literature 
on decision-making has tended to neglect values, norms, and the ethical 
basis of much human decision-making. They concur with March (1994) that 
a sense of obligation – an impulse to follow organisationally mandated 
‘rules’ of behaviour – is fundamental to much human action. Beach and 
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Connolly (ibid.) suggest that there are two main forms of norms that 
provide such rules: social norms which shape behaviour through the threat 
of social sanctions if they are breached, and moral norms which operate 
internally and involve psychological penalties (such as guilt) when not 
followed. Norms, therefore, can be defined as follows:  
 
‘… informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to 
follow because of an internalised sense of duty, because of fear of 
external sanctions, or both’ (McAdams 1997, p. 341) 
 
2.4.13. Social and moral norms have, therefore, been seen to play a 
significant role in shaping decision-making. As Sunstein (1996, p. 907) 
argues ‘…behaviour is pervasively a function of norms’. Together with the 
cognitive and organisational influences discussed above, they help to 
complete our understanding of the way that decision-making is likely to be 
shaped within organisations. Of particular importance is the idea 
suggested here and in rule-following theory that decision-makers 
fundamentally want to do the right thing. As Musheno (1986) and 
Bazerman (1998) have argued, despite this factor often being neglected in 
the decision-making literature, the motivation to act fairly is likely to be 
of significant importance. Musheno (ibid.) calls this the ‘justice motive’ 
and argues that it explains decision-making much better than economic 
decision-making models. However, as the next section explores, the idea 
of justice in bureaucracy is a fundamentally contested and pluralistic 
notion. 
 
2.5. Administrative justice models and typologies 
 
2.5.1. A small but important socio-legal literature has endeavoured to theorise 
the nature of bureaucratic decision-making through the lens of 
administrative justice. Most of this work has its intellectual foundations in 
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Mashaw’s (1981, 1983) empirical study of social security decision-making, 
from which he developed a model for understanding the fairness values 
that legitimate various approaches to decision-making. Subsequent writers 
have extended, reformulated, and occasionally departed from Mashaw’s 
(ibid.) original insights, but all share the assumption that perceptions of 
what is fair lie at the heart of bureaucratic decision-making. They assume 
that it is important for actors to legitimise their actions, to themselves 
and others, and to have a reasoned basis for arguing that their decisions 
are fair. Administrative justice theories, therefore, portray decision-
makers as rational actors concerned with the pursuit of fairness, with the 
explanatory power of these theories lying in their contention that 
different models of fairness compete with each other for dominance 
within administrative settings. This competition between different 
normative models of fairness explains variations in decision-making from 
one setting to another. The focus of these theories on fairness may be 
explained by their origin in socio-legal scholarship and the fact that they 
are part of a wider enterprise seeking to understand the significance of 
legal norms within public bureaucracies. The paragraphs that follow 
provide a summary of each of the key contributions to administrative 
justice theory to date. 
 
Mashaw’s (1981, 1983) models  
 
2.5.2. Mashaw developed his models of administrative justice by drawing on 
three main criticisms of social security decision-making that were 
prevalent in the US at the time he was writing: it was inconsistent and 
unpredictable; it made insufficient use of professional expertise; and it 
ignored the law and individual rights. He hypothesises that each of these 
criticisms encompassed a different model of administrative justice, with 
justice in this context being carefully defined as ‘…the qualities of the 
system [of decision-making] that argue for the acceptability of its 
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decisions’ (Mashaw 1981, p. 184). Justice in Mashaw’s terms, therefore, is 
not seen as an absolute notion, but a relative one, which simply requires 
that an argument should be made for why a particular system of decision-
making should be considered fair. He suggests that three distinct models 
of administrative justice – or justificatory arguments for the fairness of 
decisions – can be identified in the context of social welfare 
bureaucracies: bureaucratic rationality, professional treatment, and moral 
judgment. Importantly, Mashaw argues that these models have two 
particular features which help to explain how they operate in practice: 
each model is coherent and attractive, which means that in the right 
circumstances both decision-makers and neutral observers are likely to be 
persuaded by their respective fairness claims; and, although the models 
may co-exist within a bureaucratic setting, they are highly competitive 
and the internal logic of each model will seek to achieve dominance 
wherever possible. 
 
2.5.3. The first model, bureaucratic rationality, has as its aim to devise a 
system of decision-making which, at the lowest possible cost, achieves the 
most amount of correct decisions. It therefore explicitly seeks to balance 
the cost of administering a decision-making system with the possible costs 
of errors that the system might produce. In doing so, it relies on the use of 
formal, impersonal processes to match individuals, relevant data, and 
rules in order to produce decisions. Its decision-making is hierarchical, 
tends to be operationalised through large-scale bureaucratic routines, and 
is strongly rule-based. 
 
2.5.4. The second model, professional treatment, has as its main goal to 
provide a professional service to a client. Examples of areas which involve 
the professional treatment model include medicine, law, and social work. 
This model emphasises the client-centred nature of decision-making and 
the attempt to meet individual client needs through the application of 
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expert knowledge and judgment. Unlike the bureaucratic rationality 
model, which emphasises the replicable use of rules and similarity 
between cases, the professional treatment model sees each case as unique 
and values intuitive judgment based on knowledge and experience. 
 
2.5.5. The final model, moral judgment, shares some similarity with 
bureaucratic rationality, in that it seeks to achieve fair outcomes partly 
through the application of rules to cases. It differs, however, in two 
respects. The first is the way in which it seeks to achieve fair outcomes, 
with the moral judgment model paying closer attention to the individual 
circumstances of claimants and the events and contexts which give rise to 
a claim. The second is that, in addition to applying rules, the moral 
judgment model is also ‘value-defining’ (Mashaw 1981, p. 188). This means 
that intense scrutiny is given to the individual facts and circumstances of a 
case in order to determine the deservedness of the individuals subject to 
the decision. Values are not entirely pre-prescribed within rules, but are 
created through the process of adjudication. 
 
2.5.6. In setting out his models of administrative justice, Mashaw makes clear 
that the achievement of compromise between the models is unlikely. As  
noted above, the models are highly competitive and the different bases on 
which they justify the basis of bureaucratic decision-making are difficult 
to reconcile. Mashaw found that the bureaucratic rationality was dominant 
in the social security offices he studied and he suggests that this is likely 
to be the case for most large-scale welfare bureaucracies. In such settings, 
he argues that a central tension is likely to be between the bureaucratic 
rationality model’s emphasis on accuracy and efficiency and the moral 
judgment’s model on establishing the deservedness of the parties.  
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Adler’s (2003, 2006, 2008, 2010) models  
 
2.5.7. Adler has adapted and extended Mashaw’s models of administrative 
justice.1 He argues that changes in public administration (such as those 
covered in section 2.2 above) have meant that new and distinct models of 
administrative justice have emerged which he calls the managerialist, 
consumerist, and market models. Managerialism is characterised by 
managerial autonomy, a drive for efficiency, and the use of performance 
indicators to manage decision-making performance. Consumerism is 
characterised by decision-making processes that emphasise the 
participation of affected individuals, that seek to provide rights to 
consumers in terms of complaining, and ultimately aims at ensuring 
consumer satisfaction. Finally, the market model shares some of the 
characteristics of the managerialist and consumerist model, but here 
decision-making is characterised by the matching of supply and demand, 
while the goal of decision-making is ultimately to make a profit for the 
shareholders to whom they are accountable. Adler makes clear that his 
additional models of administrative justice operate in the same 
competitive way as Mashaw’s  and notes that this approach allows for the 
robust analysis of administrative decision-making through the 
identification of ‘trade-offs’ between the models. 
 
2.5.8. Adler’s additional models of administrative justice have been subjected 
to some criticism in the literature. Halliday (2004) has argued, for 
example, that the managerialist model is insufficiently distinct from the 
bureaucratic rationality model and that the mode of decision-making 
suggested in the managerialist and bureaucratic rationality models are 
substantially the same. He also suggests that the managerialist, 
                                               
1
 In terms of Adler’s reformulation of Mashaw’s models, he proposes certain terminological changes: 
preferring to refer to them as the bureaucratic model, the professional model, and the legal model. This 
thesis, however, focuses on Adler’s extension of the model rather than his reformulation of it and, as a 
result, prefers to preserve Mashaw’s original terminology.  
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consumerist, and market models are not distinct models of administrative 
justice and that they do not have the coherence and attractiveness which 
Mashaw stipulated as characteristics for his models. Instead, Halliday 
argues that Adler’s models are better seen as part of a single model 
associated with NPM. Sainsbury (2008) also argues that Adler’s  models 
lack distinctiveness and states that they do not make clear what decision 
processes underlie them. He notes that Mashaw’s  models aimed to explain 
different approaches to bureaucratic decision-making and that they 
suggested three clear decision processes: rule-application (bureaucratic 
rationality), the application of professional judgement (professional 
treatment), and the adjudication of competing claims (moral judgment). 
Adler’s (2003) models, on the other hand, do not clearly associate distinct 
decision processes with each conception of administrative justice. 
 
2.5.9. Others have been more sympathetic to Adler’s work and Halliday also 
appears to have revised his criticism somewhat. In Halliday and Scott 
(2010), for example, the argument is made that the consumerist and 
market models represent a novel and distinct contribution to Mashaw’s 
original models. Benish (2014) considers the managerialist model to be 
distinct from bureaucratic rationality, arguing that managerialism places 
emphasis on wide managerial discretion to deliver suitable outcomes 
rather than consistency and as a result is different from the rule-
application approach of bureaucratic rationality. He also argues that – 
especially when considering the increasing trend to outsource decision-
making to the private sector – Adler’s models are important for analysing 
all aspects of bureaucratic decision-making. Adler (2010) has himself 
responded to his critics. He notes that although his models can be put 
together to provide a description of NPM, this does not mean that they are 
not distinct and could not equally exist independently.  
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Galligan’s models 
 
2.5.10. Galligan’s (1996) approach stands somewhat to the side of other 
scholars, in that he does not draw substantially on Mashaw’s work and 
because he provides a normative analysis of decision-making. Galligan 
suggests that two models struggle for dominance in shaping bureaucratic 
decision-making: the bureaucratic administration model and the fair 
treatment model. The bureaucratic administration model is similar to 
Mashaw’s bureaucratic rationality model. It is concerned with maximising 
the common good and seeks to achieve the best overall outcomes and the 
most accurate decisions taking account of bureaucratic constraints. Its 
concern with justice in the individual case is limited, since it is firmly 
focused on achieving acceptable aggregate outcomes. The fair treatment 
model, on the other hand, not only seeks to ensure that rules are applied 
fairly, but also draws on wider notions of fairness in order to make sure 
individuals receive their due. The emphasis of the fair treatment model is 
on ensuring justice in every individual case, not only in terms of the 
overall outcomes of decision-making. As will be evident, the fair 
treatment model closely matches Mashaw’s moral judgment model.   
 
2.5.11. Galligan (1996, p. 238) argues that public administration is 
dominated by the bureaucratic administration model, which represents 
‘…one of the major organising principles of modern government’. 
However, he argues that in the vast majority of cases that model is 
inappropriate since it privileges social and community goals over individual 
rights. Galligan (1996, p. 240) suggests that effort should be made to 
devise procedures that conform to the fair treatment model: 
 
‘The practical problem in devising procedures is that the 
bureaucratic administration model, because it better matches the 
internal dynamics of administrative bodies, will be the natural and 
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dominant model. The result is that special efforts will be needed to 
curb that natural hegemony in order to support the fair treatment 
model’. 
 
Adler (2010) considers that Galligan’s approach here is limiting, because it 
takes a normative stance in relation to the fairness claims of each model. 
Adler prefers the pluralist and relativist approach originally suggested by 
Mashaw and accepts that different types of decision-making processes are 
likely to be seen as fair in different settings. 
 
Kagan’s (2010) models 
  
2.5.12. Like Galligan, Kagan does not rely on Mashaw’s models as his 
starting point. He suggests the existence of four main approaches to 
bureaucratic decision-making: bureaucratic legalism, expert or political 
judgment, adversarial legalism, and negotiation. Kagan’s first three 
models – although developed separately – can be seen to be direct matches 
of Mashaw’s bureaucratic rationality, professional treatment, and moral 
judgment models. The additional contribution in Kagan’s model, 
therefore, is the emphasis he places on negotiation as a distinctive 
decision-making process. The justificatory claim for the fairness of this 
type of decision-making is its emphasis on the participation of those 
subject to decision-making and the production of outcomes that are 
acceptable to affected parties. 
 
Halliday and Scott’s (2010) cultural typology of administrative justice  
 
2.5.13. Halliday and Scott draw on cultural theory to propose what they 
consider to be a more comprehensive framework for explaining 
administrative justice, which integrates existing typologies and aims to be 
exhaustive in its approach. The foundation of cultural theory is that 
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culture mediates human perception and that behaviour can be understood 
to vary according to two factors: the degree to which individuals are part 
of a group or are detached from group structures (‘group factor’); and the 
degree to which individuals are restricted by external prescriptions or 
have freedom of action (‘grid factor’). Placed within a matrix, the group 
factor and the grid factor produce a four way typology of ‘cultural biases’: 
hierarchism, egalitarianism, individualism, and fatalism. These cultural 
biases are ideal types which represent extreme, rather than accurate 
visions, of reality. Nonetheless, Halliday and Scott argue that they provide 
a basis for systematically analysing different approaches to bureaucratic 
decision-making.  
 
2.5.14. Each of the four cultural biases is seen to represent a model of 
administrative justice. Hierarchist administrative justice stresses authority 
and expertise and views citizens as the passive objects of official decision-
making. Mashaw’s bureaucratic rationality and professional treatment 
models, Galligan’s bureaucratic administration model, and Kagan’s 
bureaucratic legalism and expert judgment models all fit within the 
hierarchist bias. Egalitarian administrative justice is distrustful of 
government expertise and prefers to seek consensus between members of 
a group, with officials and citizens co-producing decisions. Mashaw’s moral 
judgment model, Galligan’s fair treatment model, and Kagan’s adversarial 
legalism can be seen to fit with this model, in that they lay an emphasis on 
participation in decision-making.   
 
2.5.15. Individualist administrative justice places a high degree of 
emphasis on individual choice and freedom of action, with bargaining seen 
as the main mode of decision-making. It emphasises a competitive setting 
in which individuals seek to pursue their self-interest and where officials 
seek to respond to the needs and desires of consumers. Adler’s 
consumerist and market models are seen as fitting into this part of the 
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framework. Finally, Halliday and Scott note that fatalistic administrative 
justice is an underexplored area, but suggest lotteries may be the form of 
decision-making most appropriate in a context where individuals have low 
attachment to a group at the same time as being highly constrained by 
external prescription. Overall, having incorporated existing models into 
the grid-group framework, Halliday and Scott conclude that existing 
models of administrative justice have been ‘lop sided’, with a tendency to 
focus on hierarchist and egalitarian cultural biases. Their contribution, 
therefore, lies both in the integration of existing models into a coherent 
framework and in suggesting the areas that have yet to be fully explored. 
 
Buck et al’s (2011) typology  
 
2.5.16. Buck et al provide the most recent contribution to this seam of 
administrative justice literature and set out a model which combines 
existing approaches, at the same time as adding additional dimensions. 
There are two key innovations in their approach: the first is to extend the 
functional sphere of administrative justice beyond first-instance decision-
making and redress mechanisms to include the institutions by which 
redress mechanisms are themselves supervised and kept in check. They 
refer to these dimensions as ‘getting it right’, ‘putting it right’, and 
‘setting it right’. The second innovation in their model is to suggest that 
Mashaw’s definition of administrative justice was limited in only explicitly 
applying to first-instance decision-making. Building on Adler’s insight that 
each model of administrative justice is accompanied by a characteristic 
mode of redress, Buck et al go further and suggest that existing models of 
administrative justice can equally be applied to explain decision-making 
practices within redress mechanisms. As a result, it is possible to identify 
redress mechanisms with particular models of administrative justice, in 
the same way that these can be identified in bureaucratic environments.  
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2.6. Chapter summary 
 
2.6.1. This chapter initially sought to situate bureaucratic decision-making in 
the context of recent public administration reform. While NPM reforms 
undoubtedly changed the delivery of public services, bureaucratic 
structures have remained surprisingly resilient. The result is a hybrid 
system where old and new structures, mechanisms, and values co-exist 
and compete with each other. The chapter then identified the two types 
of decision-making of concern to this thesis: category 1 (routine decisions) 
and category 3 (modified adjudication and specific policy decisions). Here 
the chapter considered key debates around individual and collective 
interests, and rules and discretion, both of which reveal the inherently 
conflicted nature of bureaucratic decision-making. Such fundamental 
tensions were also reflected in analyses of street level bureaucrats, with 
an important concern of this literature being the extreme difficulty in 
achieving control in public bureaucracies. 
 
2.6.2. The chapter then turned to consider decision-making theories and 
considered three theories which have sought to explain decision-making: 
rational choice; bounded rationality; and rule following theory. In 
considering these models, the chapter argued that each made a 
contribution to our understanding of bureaucratic decision-making and 
contained an element of truth with application to the decision-making of 
concern to this thesis. The chapter ended by focusing on the normative 
nature of bureaucratic decision-making, drawing on administrative justice 
theories which stress the importance of fairness perceptions in explaining 
decision-making. As we shall see, these were found to be particularly 
important in relation to this thesis’ empirical findings. 
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3. CONTROL, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND LEARNING IN BUREAUCRACIES 
3.1. Introduction 
 
3.1.1. This chapter explores the idea that bureaucratic decision-making may be 
controlled. It considers various theories of control in order to situate the 
control exercised by redress mechanisms within the broader panorama of 
bureaucratic control. The chapter moves on to discuss a particular sub-set 
of control mechanisms concerned with accountability, again seeking to 
situate more clearly the place of redress mechanisms within the overall 
landscape of mechanisms concerned with controlling bureaucratic 
decision-making. The chapter’s final section argues for a connection to be 
made between the concepts of control, accountability, and organisational 
learning. Organisational learning, therefore, is framed as a significant 
process through which review activity carried out by accountability 
mechanisms subsequently leads (or does not lead) to changes in the 
bureaucratic status quo.  
 
3.2. The concept of control 
 
What is control? 
 
3.2.1. The issue of control is central to public administration. It arises because 
of the need for delegation of authority that arises in complex, democratic 
societies: since citizens cannot rule directly they delegate to elected 
representatives, and since elected representative cannot perform all the 
tasks of government themselves they, in turn, delegate to bureaucrats and 
others. Issues of control, therefore, arise wherever power is conferred on 
officials in order to carry out mandated tasks (Galligan 1986).2 An 
important idea in relation to control is principal-agent theory, which 
                                               
2
 This thesis is interested in a particular type of control – that which seeks to ensure that public agencies 
act appropriately, rather than other types such as the control of elected representatives by citizens. 
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examines the implications of delegated authority (Gormley and Balla 
2004). The principal is seen as entering into a contract with an agent, who 
is entrusted to carry out the specified wishes of the principal. Principal-
agent theory identifies two problems wherever power is delegated: it is 
difficult, ahead of time, to know whether the agent entrusted with a task 
has the capacity to perform it (adverse selection); and it can be very 
difficult to monitor subsequently how the agent is performing in practice 
(moral hazard). Any delegation is seen to involve ‘agency loss’ (ibid., p. 
55) where the capacity of the principal to achieve their goals is limited by 
adverse selection and moral hazard.   
 
3.2.2. Control can, therefore, be seen to be a purposive notion which relates to 
the ability of principals to ensure that the authority delegated to their 
agents is being, or has been used, appropriately. This is, however, only 
one dimension of control and Dunsire (1984, p. 83) points out that a 
distinction can been made between being ‘in’ control of a bureaucracy 
and a bureaucracy being ‘under’ control. Beck Jorgenson and Larsen 
(1987, p. 279) make a similar point when they distinguish between 
hierarchical modes of control and those that are ‘inspector free’. The 
notion that bureaucracies may be ‘under control’ without the hierarchical 
oversight of ‘inspectors’ suggests that self-regulated and stable systems 
are possible without the command and control type of oversight with 
which the word ‘control’ is often associated. As Beck Jorgensen and Larsen 
(ibid.) argue, developing an understanding of how bureaucracies come to 
be under control, is a broader question than that which is concerned only 
with how principals seek to be in control of them. While this thesis is 
principally concerned with the ways in which actors external to 
bureaucracies (redress mechanisms) exercise control, it is nonetheless 
important to consider how self-regulatory controls operate. This is partly 
because hierarchical forms of control may harness ‘inspector free’ 
approaches (Hood 1995) and partly because understanding the operation of 
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control in its broad sense is essential to considering the narrower question 
asked in this thesis about the control function of redress mechanisms.  
 
3.2.3. Dunsire (1984, p. 118) makes the argument for taking this broader view 
as follows: 
 
‘Thinking of control as underlying and ubiquitous (rather than only 
exercised from central ‘control rooms’ and specific devices)… is a 
more amorphous and less graspable concept altogether. Yet it is the 
necessary underpinning of careful thought about control over 
government.’ 
 
Whether operated through conscious, centralised control mechanisms or 
through self-regulatory means, Dunsire (ibid. p. 82) offers the following 
definition of control: 
 
‘…control means limitation of excess, or correction of deviation, or 
the capacity to change the world as-it-is, in some particular 
manner, into the world-as-you-would-have-it-be.’  
 
3.2.4. Dunsire’s (1979, 1984) theory of control, which draws on cybernetic 
theory (Ashby 1956), provides the most detailed and complete description 
of the concept of control as it relates to bureaucracy. He argues that 
control mechanisms require three elements to be in place in order for 
control to be exercised. The first is referred to as a ‘director’ and involves 
a statement of the required actions to be performed or standards to be 
met. The second, the ‘detector’, refers to the means by which 
performance is measured in order to find out whether actions have been 
carried out as directed. The third, the ‘effector’, is the means by which 
any discrepancy can be corrected and the ‘directed’ state of affairs can be 
brought into being. Dunsire (ibid.) notes that a control system requires 
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three things: two types of information and power. The director requires 
normative information about what should be; the detector requires 
empirical information about what is; and the effector requires power to 
change behaviour from one state to another. A system of control is, 
therefore, made up of norms, facts, and leverage. An important insight 
from this tripartite view of control is that a system of control will only be 
as effective as its weakest element: unclear norms, a lack of factual 
information, or a lack of leverage can all significantly disrupt the control 
system’s effectiveness. 
 
3.2.5. There are two further, important features of Dunsire’s (ibid.) control 
theory that help elucidate the notion of control. The first draws on the 
law of requisite variety as formulated in Ashby’s (1957) cybernetic theory. 
This law posits that a system of control must be able to match the 
complexity and variety of the system to be controlled (here, bureaucratic 
decision-making). So, control devices must be as complex and varied as 
the decision-making behaviour that they seek to control. Dunsire (1992, p. 
23) puts it as follows: 
 
‘…in order to govern a more dynamic, complex and diverse world, 
forms of control must become more dynamic, complex and diverse’. 
 
The second notion is that complex systems are maintained in a stable and 
relatively steady state as a result of the balancing of various forces acting 
within and upon the system. This balancing of conflicting forces is known 
as isostasis and the process by which such a balance is reached is known 
as collibration. Isostasis explains why many social systems are able to 
exist in relatively stable states without the imposition of hierarchical 
control. Stability is the result of a number of forces pulling against each 
other, with each force checking the other, thus holding the whole system 
together. Control, therefore, becomes a matter of using collibration to 
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intervene in isostatic systems in order to produce change via a shift in the 
balance between opposing forces.  
 
Forms of control over bureaucracy 
 
3.2.6. Having defined the idea of control and outlined its main theoretical 
elements, the following paragraphs set out some of the key forms that 
control mechanisms may take. While a number of different typologies have 
been suggested (Beck Jorgensen and Larsen 1987, Dunsire 1984), the focus 
here is on Hood’s (1995) typology. He uses Mary Douglas’ cultural theory3 
and associates the following forms of control which each of the four 
cultural biases: review (hierarchism), mutuality (egalitarianism), 
competition (individualism) and contrived randomness (fatalism).  
 
3.2.7. Review is a form of control where one group of people is given the 
authority to decide on the correctness or otherwise of actions taken by 
another group of people. Review involves a hierarchical use of authority, 
where superiors in the hierarchy have the power ‘…to act as the referee 
who stops fouls in the game’ (Hood 1995, p. 218). Mechanisms of control 
here include courts, inspectorates, and committees. Mutuality refers to 
using processes of social control within groups in order to ensure that 
desired behaviour is achieved. Control devices here include the use of 
peer review, mutual surveillance, and group veto. In terms of external 
controls, this type of control emphasises the importance of maximum 
interaction between citizens and officials, so that official action becomes 
co-produced (rather than imposed) and subject to the oversight of the 
community.  
 
                                               
3
 See Chapter 2 where the basis of cultural theory is explained in relation to Halliday and Scott’s (2010) 
typology of administrative justice. 
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3.2.8. Competition is a frequently used form of control in public 
administration. Although it is often associated with market mechanisms, it 
has also been used in non-marketised bureaucracies (e.g. encouraging 
internal competition between departments, competition for promoted 
posts, etc.). Competition functions as a control mechanism because it is 
assumed that groups in competition will maximise efforts to please clients 
(be they governments or consumers themselves) and, as a result, optimal 
performance will be achieved. Finally, contrived randomness is a form of 
control that seeks to use unpredictability to keep officials on their toes. 
Random checks on officials are a way of controlling against deviant 
behaviour and the random nature of this method of control means that it 
is less easy to manipulate. Examples of the way this form of control 
operates include staff rotation and semi-random postings. Hood (ibid.) 
notes that it is also possible to observe hybrid forms of control. An 
example would be a combination of review and mutuality, involving 
elements of both hierarchical authority and peer review (a model that can 
be seen to operate in the assessment of university teaching and research).  
 
3.2.9. The usefulness of Hood’s (ibid.) typology lies in the fact that it allows us 
to identify the strengths and weaknesses of various control modes. 
Review’s strength is seen as its ability to transfer best practice across 
organisations, while its weakness is that it is prone to juridification as 
rules are used to achieve control. Review also suffers from information 
asymmetry, with the controller finding it difficult to measure the 
performance of the controlled. Mutuality’s strength is in providing 
redundancy, as peer group oversight ensures that many eyes are constantly 
watching for deviations. Its disadvantage is that it can break down 
depending on the culture within the group. Competition’s strength lies in 
the strong incentives it provides to out-perform rivals. Its weakness is that 
it can lead to a ‘race towards the bottom’ rather than an enhancement of 
actual performance. Finally, contrived randomness is particularly effective 
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in protecting against corruption and conspiracy, but its weakness lies in 
the fact that it offers little in the way of incentives to improve. As Hood 
(ibid.) points out, therefore, none of the types of control are superior in 
every respect to the others. 
 
3.2.10. Some observations may be made regarding the various control 
typologies and the place of redress mechanisms within them. As will be 
clear, most of the forms of control discussed above are ‘inspector free’ 
forms, where – although they might be initiated by, or sublimated to the 
needs of, a hierarchical controller – control is effectively exercised 
through self-regulatory or random processes (Hood et al 2000). As a result, 
it seems that since redress mechanisms clearly involve an inspector in the 
form of a judge or an ombudsman they fit most clearly into the review 
mode of control. While this is their dominant mode of control, it is worth 
noting that redress mechanisms can contain elements of each of the other 
modes. They share something with the mutuality mode of control in that 
redress mechanisms are initiated by citizens, and can be seen as a means 
through which the ‘voice’ of the citizen can be heard and amplified within 
public administration. Redress mechanisms also, arguably, draw on 
broader principles of fairness when reaching their decisions. In the courts, 
the common law has at times been represented as a repository of 
community values (Cotterell 1994), while ombudsman schemes appear to 
draw on a pragmatic, everyday sense of good administration in the course 
of their work. It is also possible to see ombudsman schemes, being in a 
horizontal (or possibly diagonal) rather than a vertical relationship with 
bureaucracies: they have authority in relation to their investigatory 
powers but may only recommend changes and as such could be seen as 
engaging in a dialogue with peers rather than as a coercive form of 
hierarchical authority.  
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3.2.11. While it may at first seem that redress mechanisms can have 
nothing in common with contrived randomness again, the method by which 
initiation of their control functions takes place (citizen complaint) is 
random. Bureaucrats cannot know which cases will be challenged, and 
recent research has confirmed that at least some of the power of judicial 
review comes from the fact that it has ‘shock’ value for administrators 
(Platt et al 2010). Finally, while there is no suggestion that redress 
mechanisms may operate according to the market mode of control, they 
may be able to harness market ideas in order to exert greater control. For 
example, ombudsman schemes, through their annual reports, effectively 
produce league tables showing which organisations are most complained 
about and found to be most often at fault. These could be used as the 
basis for encouraging competition and improving performance in line with 
the market control mode. 
 
3.3. Accountability-based control mechanisms 
 
3.3.1. Although we have noted that redress mechanisms have some hybrid 
elements, they nonetheless fit most clearly with the ‘inspector’ or 
‘review’ form of control. This mode of control has both an internal and an 
external element – senior bureaucrats within the bureaucratic hierarchy 
exercise ‘managerial control’, while external mechanisms of 
accountability exercise ‘accountability-based control’ (Scott 2000, p. 39). 
It is with accountability-based control that the chapter now concerns 
itself.  
 
What is accountability? 
 
3.3.2. Accountability is a concept that has recently been subject to significant 
academic interest and there has been concern that its meaning is 
becoming distorted (Lindberg 2013). The particular concern has been its 
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use in some literature to refer to a virtue held by administrators (that they 
are, in some way, responsive) rather than to refer to the operation of 
mechanisms which require administrators to give an account of their 
actions (Bovens 2007). Nonetheless, despite this concern, the literature 
provides a fairly uncontroversial sense of what accountability requires: 
accountability is the process of an individual or organisation being 
compelled to give an account of their actions to an authoritative person or 
organisation (Mulgan 2000, Scott 2000). While accountability is closely 
linked with the notion of control and, indeed, is a type of control 
mechanism, it has particular features which distinguish it from other 
mechanisms: 
 
‘…it [accountability] refers only to one type of institutional 
mechanisms for controlling governments and government officials, 
where governments and government officials are actually called 
to account, made to answer for their actions and to accept 
sanctions’ (Mulgan 2000, p. 564). 
 
Therefore, the central elements that must be in place in order for 
accountability mechanisms to be defined as such are: a person or 
institution who must give an account (the accountee); an area or subject 
for which the accountee is accountable (the domain); an institution to 
which the accountee must give account (the principal); and the right of 
the principal to impose a sanction (Lindberg 2013). 
 
Types of accountability mechanism 
 
3.3.3. In the same way that there are a number of different modes of control 
over bureaucracies, so there are also different forms of accountability 
mechanism. One way to describe the various forms is to describe their 
‘spatial’ dimension, that is to say, to look at the direction of the 
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accountability relationship. Scott (2000), for example, refers to upwards, 
horizontal, and downwards accountability. Upwards accountability refers 
to giving account to a higher authority, horizontal accountability to giving 
account to an institution of equal status, and downwards accountability to 
giving account to stakeholders such as consumers. Bovens (2007) adds a 
further spatial dimension, which he calls diagonal accountability, to 
account for institutions such as ombudsman schemes, which he argues fit 
somewhere between vertical and horizontal control. Scott (2000) also 
suggests that accountability mechanisms can be grouped in terms of the 
basis on which the account is to be given. Some accountability mechanisms 
will be concerned with ensuring economic values (such as value for 
money), while others may focus on social values (such as fairness) or 
security values (such as health and safety).  
 
3.3.4. Jos and Thompkins (2004) distinguish between performance-based 
accountability and compliance-based accountability: some mechanisms 
will be concerned with accounting for outcomes, while others will be 
predominantly concerned with whether processes have been followed. Jos 
and Thompkins (ibid.) argue that performance-based processes are 
generally ongoing processes of review that seek to shape future action, 
whereas compliance-based mechanisms tend to be episodic, case-based 
mechanisms that do not generally lead to broader change. Accountability 
mechanisms have also been categorised on the basis of the way in which 
they operate. Jos and Thompkins (ibid.) and Page (2010), for example, 
refer to ‘police patrol’ and ‘fire alarm’ oversight to distinguish between 
proactive, ex ante approaches by accountability mechanisms and more 
reactive ex post approaches. Generally, ex ante approaches have been 
seen as more powerful ways in which control can be exercised: 
 
‘… ex post sanctioning is likely to be evidence of a poorly 
functioning accountability system, not an effective one… The 
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crucial purpose of accountability is really forward looking and 
prophylactic’ (Mashaw 2006, p. 132). 
 
3.3.5. A common way in which accountability mechanisms are described is by 
reference to the nature of the forum in which an account will be given. 
Romzek and Dubnick (1987) identify four types of accountability 
mechanism, which they refer to as bureaucratic, legal, professional, and 
political. Bovens (2007) adds a fifth category to this typology, which he 
calls administrative accountability. Taking each form in turn, bureaucratic 
accountability refers to internal processes of accountability, where 
subordinates give accounts for their actions to their superiors within the 
organisational hierarchy. As Bovens (2007) and Mulgan (2000) have pointed 
out, however, it is debateable whether this should be treated as 
accountability, since some authors consider that accountability 
mechanisms must function in an external and public fashion. Nonetheless, 
from the perspective of the decision-maker, it will be to internal, 
bureaucratic superiors that they most frequently are required to give 
account and it is helpful, therefore, to retain this form of mechanism 
within the typology. Political accountability refers to accountability to 
elected representatives, which could be through a minister in charge of a 
department or by appearance before parliamentary committees. Legal 
accountability refers to the work of administrative courts, which are able 
to impose sanctions for non-compliance. Bovens (ibid.) suggests that this 
mode of accountability is the least ambiguous, since it is based on detailed 
legal standards.4 Professional accountability refers to accountability to the 
professional group which an individual may be part of, such as teachers’ or 
medical associations. These may operate complaint or disciplinary systems 
as well as issue standards for members. Finally, administrative 
accountability refers to: 
                                               
4
 As we shall see in chapter 4, socio-legal scholars have taken a different view with regard to the clarity of 
the requirements imposed by courts. 
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‘… [a] whole series of quasi-legal forums that exercise 
independent and external administrative and financial oversight 
and control’ (Bovens 2007, p. 188). 
 
Such mechanisms are seen, in the accountability literature, to include 
auditors and ombudsman schemes. 
 
3.3.6. There are, therefore, numerous approaches, spatial directions, and 
types of forums, to which bureaucratic decision-makers are held 
accountable. In addition to traditional legal and political modes of 
accountability, what Scott (2000, p. 40) refers to as ‘extended 
accountability’ mechanisms have taken on an increasingly important role 
in recent times as a result of a growing recognition of the inadequacy of 
traditional mechanisms to control a complex and fragmented state. To 
borrow Dunsire’s (1979) terminology, the greater variety and complexity of 
arrangements for public administration have required greater ‘requisite 
variety’ in terms of accountability mechanisms. Power (1997) has referred 
to the growth in extended accountability mechanisms as an ‘audit 
explosion’ and as having created an ‘audit society’. Hood et al (2000) 
meanwhile have sought to chart the rise of regulatory mechanisms within 
government, arguing that they have become a major ‘industry’ (with 
direct costs of £1 billion a year). This has involved the creation of a host of 
bodies such as: auditors, inspectorates, ombudsman schemes, grievance 
handlers, central agency regulators, funding bodies with regulatory 
functions, departmental regulators, and central regulators of local 
government and the NHS. Overall, bureaucracies can be seen to be held to 
account from multiple, overlapping perspectives, in what has been termed 
a ‘regulatory jungle’ (ibid.) and a ‘minefield’ (Page 2010).  
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3.3.7. The literature is currently divided with regard to whether accountability 
is a positive phenomenon or one that leads to bureaucratic dysfunction, 
and whether there remains too much or too little of it (Aucoin and 
Heintzmann 2000, Bovens et al 2008, Carolan 2013, Schillemans 2010). 
Some, for example, have argued that the evidence is mixed with regard to 
whether accountability mechanisms actually lead to better bureaucratic 
performance (Lapsley and Lonsdale 2010). Jos and Thompkins (2004) have 
argued that accountability mechanisms can have perverse effects because 
they discourage bureaucrats from developing good judgment and do not 
encourage commitment to the values being safeguarded. Others have 
noted that the growth in the number of accountability mechanisms may 
lead bureaucrats to adopt shallow and superficial modes of compliance 
and ‘tick box’ approaches to deflect criticism and retain their autonomy 
(Power 1997). Bovens (2007) highlights three dysfunctions that may affect 
bureaucratic approaches – rule obsession, proceduralism, and rigidity. All 
of these imply that an effect of accountability mechanisms is to lead to a 
narrow focus on rules, at the expense of flexibility and creativity.  
 
3.4. Accountability mechanisms and learning in organisations 
 
3.4.1. This section begins by considering the purposes of accountability, 
focusing on its learning function, before making an argument for linking 
the concept of control with the concept of organisational learning. The 
chapter then discusses the processes by which organisations learn. 
 
The purposes of accountability 
 
3.4.2. Accountability can be seen to serve a number of purposes within the 
state. Aucoin and Heintzmann (2000) argue that three purposes can be 
identified: the control of abuse of authority; the provision of assurance 
regarding use of resources and compliance with law;  and the promotion of 
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learning and improvement in government. The first two purposes have 
traditionally been seen as the heart of accountability, but this is 
increasingly shifting: ‘It is now fashionable to depict this third purpose as 
the most important…’ (Aucoin and Heintzmann 2000, p. 52). Bovens et al 
(2008) also highlight three core purposes of accountability, noting a  
democratic purpose (checking to ensure that the will of political principals 
is done), a constitutional purpose (uncovering and correcting abuses of 
power), and a learning purpose (helping the administration to deliver on 
promises in future). The concept of accountability as learning is 
considered to be particularly important in this thesis. This is because it is 
argued that it helps to explain the processes that intervene between the 
pronouncements of accountability mechanisms and the changes (or lack 
thereof) that occur within bureaucracies. Learning is, therefore, 
conceptualised as the internal organisational processes which mediate the 
extent to which control over bureaucratic decision-making – in the sense 
of amending prospective cognition and action – is achieved.  
 
3.4.3. The literature on organisational learning provides a number of powerful 
insights into the way organisations respond to inputs from their 
environment and the way in which such inputs may lead to change: 
learning is a key concept because it provides a framework for 
understanding organisational responses to external stimuli. At a high level 
of abstraction, that is effectively the concern of this thesis: to understand 
the processes through which stimuli generated by redress mechanisms (a 
particular from of accountability process, fitting within particular modes 
of control) are perceived and responded to by decision-makers in 
bureaucratic organisations.  
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What is organisational learning? 
 
3.4.4. The organisational learning literature is now extensive, albeit Gilson et 
al (2009) have rightly pointed out that there is little in the way of strongly 
contrasting positions between scholars. One obvious trend has been a lack 
of attention given to the particular issues that may affect learning in 
public administration (Rashman et al 2009). Nonetheless, some work has 
been done in this area and, although learning in public bureaucracies 
presents additional challenges, many of the core concepts in the 
organisational learning literature are transferable. The only major area of 
disagreement in the literature has been around the definition of 
organisational learning, with debate about the extent to which 
organisational learning refers to the learning of individuals in an 
organisational context, or whether it implies that – to some extent at least 
– organisations actually learn themselves. Simon (1991), for example, is 
critical of literature that seems to anthropomorphise organisations by 
suggesting that they can somehow learn independently from individuals.   
 
3.4.5. While it is clear that only individuals can learn, Simon’s (ibid.) approach 
risks denying the social and group dynamics of learning processes and also 
seems to overlook the capacity of organisations – if not to learn 
themselves – to become repositories of the knowledge of their members 
through their policies, procedures, and storage capacity. Thus, this thesis 
prefers those accounts of organisational learning which provide a middle 
ground, accepting that organisations do not learn themselves, but 
conceiving of organisational learning as something more than just what 
happens when individuals learn in the workplace. Berends et al (2003, p. 
1041), for example, consider organisational learning to refer to ‘… the 
increase or development of organisational knowledge’. This involves one or 
more individuals developing knowledge relevant and applicable to the 
organisation’s particular mission, with the potential to change its 
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activities. Schilling and Kluge’s (2009) definition emphasises the group 
nature of learning and the relationship between learning and the 
organisation’s processes: 
 
‘We define organisational learning as an organisationally 
regulated collective learning process in which individual or group 
learning experiences concerning the improvement of 
organisational experience and/or goals are transferred into 
organisational routines’ (Schilling and Kluge 2009, p. 338). 
 
3.4.6. This definition, stressing the social element of learning and the fact that 
it is part of a collectively organised effort, is adopted here. Before 
discussing particular aspects of the organisational learning literature in 
more depth, it is worth pointing out that another notable feature of the 
literature – despite its many prescriptions for enhancing organisational 
learning – is its consensus that organisations are not very good at learning. 
Leeuw and Sonnichsen (1994) and Marshall et al (2009), for example, have 
argued that organisations are poor at finding the causes of their problems 
and that learning tends to be ad hoc and in response to particular 
problems, rather than being systematic.  
 
Types of learning 
 
3.4.7. Argyris and Schon (1978) have developed the concepts of single and 
double loop learning to describe the different types of learning that occur 
within organisations. Single loop learning occurs when an error is detected 
and corrected, but without raising any questions about the basic values of 
the system in question. Single loop learning, therefore, might involve 
amending a procedure for taking a decision, rather than amending the 
substantive policy which the procedure was intended to deliver. Double 
loop learning occurs when the underlying values of an organisation are re-
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evaluated before action is taken to correct any errors. Double loop 
learning is, therefore, much more fundamental and seeks to look further 
into the root causes of problems. This is not to say that single loop 
learning cannot be useful and effective, since it can allow an organisation 
to operate its existing processes and practices more effectively (Leeuw 
and Sonnichsen 1994). However, it cannot lead to radical transformation 
of an organisation.  
 
3.4.8. Double loop learning is significantly more disruptive and potentially 
powerful in terms of the change required of an organisation and it is 
probably not surprising that, as a result, single loop learning is considered 
to be the most frequent type of learning discernible in organisations 
(Argyris 1992). Some have noted that because of the political environment 
in which public bureaucracies work, they may find double loop learning 
extremely difficult, since actors outside the organisation will have a 
significant (if not the controlling say) on policy (Common 2004; Thomas 
2015). A third, triple loop form of learning, has also been discussed in the 
literature and been taken to refer to learning which not only corrects the 
organisation’s existing processes (single loop) or questions the 
organisation’s values (double loop) but also reflects on why the need to 
learn something was not noticed sooner (Van Acker et al 2015). This type 
of learning is where the organisation self-reflexively considers its learning 
capacity and learning processes and seeks to improve this, as well as, its 
substantive areas of performance.  
 
The process of organisational learning 
  
3.4.9. Huber (1991) has produced one of the clearest and most comprehensive 
models to describe the processes of organisational learning. He argues that 
organisational learning takes place in four steps: knowledge acquisition, 
information distribution, information interpretation, and organisational 
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memory. Although models that suggest a series of distinct steps have been 
criticised for obscuring the fact that learning is often an iterative, 
continuous, and dynamic process, such models remain useful from the 
perspective of describing some of the fundamental elements of 
organisational learning processes (Rashman et al 2009). The following 
paragraphs will discuss each of the areas in Huber’s (1991) model in turn. 
 
3.4.10. Knowledge acquisition. Huber (ibid.) points out that learning can 
result from conscious, directed attempts at improvement and can also 
arise unconsciously. There are various sources from which these 
experiences might emanate and it is useful to enumerate these, partly in 
order to get a better sense of the concept of organisational learning and 
partly in order to begin to sketch out the range of influences (other than 
redress mechanisms) from which bureaucracies might learn. Gilson et al 
(2009) identify six sources of information: internal experiences (e.g. 
stored experiences, day to day reflections on work); citizens (e.g. 
customer research and feedback from redress mechanisms); other 
organisations (e.g. rivals, partners and similar organisations); top down 
direction (e.g. internal direction from senior sections of the bureaucracy); 
critiques and advice (e.g. media criticism, think tank reports, political and 
public opinion); crises and review (e.g. systematic learning from major 
mistakes, audit). 
 
3.4.11. Knowing where information may come from is not sufficient, 
however, and a key concept in relation to organisational learning, 
particularly where the source of learning is external, is information 
seeking. Downs (1967) suggests that organisations are all, to some extent, 
involved in gathering information about themselves and their 
environments. Such scanning for information may be fairly minimal and 
only include information which organisations receive directly, without 
effort. For others, information seeking will be fairly regular and systematic 
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(Huber 1991). Two types of search have been described by Gilson et al 
(2009, p. 19): problematistic searching and ‘slack search’. Problematistic 
searching is where the organisation is facing a particular problem and 
conducts a search in order to learn how it may deal with it. It is, 
therefore, reactive and ad hoc, arising only when it appears to be 
required. Slack search on the other hand occurs when staff have enough 
time to reflect on what they are doing, try new ideas, and search for new 
ways of doing things in the absence of having a present problem to deal 
with. Huber (1991) refers to three forms of search behaviour as scanning 
(routine monitoring or slack search), focused search (problematistic 
search) and performance monitoring (which involves continuous 
comparison of performance against expectations). 
 
3.4.12. Information distribution. Once information has been acquired, it 
requires to be shared with others in the organisation in order to lead to 
broader based learning and the possibility that it will be institutionalised. 
In the same way that organisations must have processes to identify 
relevant information and bring it into the organisation, processes must 
then exist to spread the information internally.  
 
3.4.13. Information interpretation. Crossan et al (1999) note that this 
stage involves the individual or group who have acquired the knowledge 
explaining the insight gained as a result of experience to themselves and 
to others in the organisation. The aim is to create a shared understanding 
amongst organisational members and to begin to understand the 
significance of the learning in terms of current and future practices. Huber 
(1991) argues that information interpretation is likely to be mediated by 
five factors: the extent to which there is existing uniformity of 
understanding across an organisation; whether the information is 
presented along with a clear interpretation; the richness of the medium in 
which the information is transmitted; the amount of information that 
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recipients are required to process; and the extent to which the new 
information requires a departure from previous practice. 
 
3.4.14. Organisational memory. This stage is referred to by Crossan et al 
(1999) as institutionalisation, where new interpretations and responses to 
information are routinised into the standard practices of the organisation. 
Learning here can be both cognitive and behavioural – changes can be 
geared towards helping organisational members to think differently about 
their tasks, or to behave differently, or both (Dekker and Hansen 2004). 
Although organisations are able to ‘store’ newly acquired knowledge 
within routine procedures (hard information), much organisational 
knowledge is held tacitly within the minds of individuals (soft information) 
and as a result may be problematic in terms of employee attrition. 
 
3.4.15. Other useful models have been suggested in the literature in 
relation to particular aspects of organisational learning. Barrados and 
Mayne (2003), adapting a concept drawn from the work of Lipshitz and 
Popper 2000) discuss organisational learning mechanisms (OLMs) in relation 
to learning in the public sector. OLMs are described as the: 
 
‘…institutionalised structural and procedural arrangements that 
allow organisations to systematically collect, analyse, store, 
disseminate, and use information relevant to the performance of 
the organisation’ (Lipshitz and Popper 2000, p. 345). 
 
The idea of OLMs provide a helpful elaboration to Huber’s (1991) 
framework, by calling attention to the procedures and mechanisms that 
underlie each of the stages of learning he describes. Barrados and Mayne 
(2003) identify three elements to OLMs: measurement and analysis (a 
mechanism to monitor performance, seek solutions to problems, and 
provide an analysis of the options); information dissemination (includes 
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systems of knowledge storage and management, as well as other 
communication practices to provide information in a timely, useful, and 
relevant format); regular review (this involves a mechanism for the 
continuous review of performance rather than ad hoc learning). 
 
3.4.16. Another model that is particularly relevant to this thesis is 
Rashman et al’s (2009) model of inter-organisational learning. Its emphasis 
on how one organisation can lead to learning in another is clearly 
important when considering the ability of redress mechanisms to control 
and bring about change in bureaucracies. This model stipulates three main 
factors to explain learning between organisations: the context of both 
organisations, the characteristics of the source and recipient organisation, 
and the characteristics of the relationship between these organisations. 
Contextual factors will be returned to in the next section of this chapter, 
and as a result, we focus here on the characteristics of, and relationships 
between, organisations.  
 
3.4.17. In terms of relationships, Rashman et al (ibid.) and Knight (2002) 
highlight the importance of reciprocal and supportive networks for 
encouraging learning between organisations. They suggest that public 
sector organisations may be particularly able to learn in this way as a 
result of low levels of competition between agencies. Another key factor 
relates to the power balance in the relationship between the 
organisations. Some organisations may have coercive powers over others or 
have a formal hierarchical relationship with them that will influence 
potential outcomes. However, even where an organisation has formal, 
coercive power over another, Van Acker et al (2015) point out that 
learning is not a matter of ‘dragging and dropping’ knowledge from one 
place to another, but instead involves adaptation by the receiving 
organisation. Here the presence of ‘communities of interaction’ (Rashman 
et al 2009, p. 477) where the transmitting and receiving organisations are 
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able to develop shared understandings is thought to be particularly 
valuable.  
 
The factors facilitating and preventing learning 
 
3.4.18. The organisational learning literature has identified a significant 
number of factors, enablers, and prohibitors of learning in organisations. 
Shilling and Kluge (2009), reviewing the literature and collecting together 
perceived barriers to learning, identify 81 such barriers. Authors adopt 
various approaches to such lists of factors, with some like Schilling and 
Kluge (ibid.) focusing on barriers and others, such as Greiling and 
Halachmi (2013) focusing on enablers of learning. Since such lists of 
factors, while they have the advantage of being comprehensive,  can be 
difficult to take-in meaningfully, the approach here has been to (a) select 
those factors that appear to be most relevant to learning in the context of 
public bureaucracies and (b) rationalise factors as far as possible into 
relevant groups and categories. In organising the factors, the thesis follows 
Shilling and Kluge’s (2009) approach of dividing factors into individual, 
organisational, and environmental issues. It adds a fourth category, 
‘source of learning stimuli’, to account for Rist’s (1994) argument about 
the importance of the source of information, when that source is external 
to the organisation.  
 
3.4.19. Individual level factors. Individual level factors cover the 
attitudes of employees and their cognitive ability and capacities. Schein 
(1995) argues that the concepts of learning anxiety and psychological 
safety are important in explaining how individuals respond to potential 
learning situations. Learning anxiety refers to a fear within individuals that 
admitting current approaches are wrong will lead to a loss of self-esteem 
and effectiveness. As a result, individuals will often resist admitting 
mistakes in order to preserve self-esteem. Psychological safety is 
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suggested as a possible answer to the problem of learning anxiety and 
involves providing an environment in which individuals feel safe from 
potential loss of self-esteem. Generally, commitment to learning is 
identified as a key issue at the individual level, with a number of factors 
potentially responsible for an individual’s overall commitment level. These 
include individual biases, whether individuals associate change and 
learning with conflict, whether they have very fixed ideas, and so on. In 
terms of the capacity for learning, basic cognitive limitations, like the 
ability to take on new data are important, as are the skills of those who 
have a potential learning insight to advocate for change. A key capacity 
issue is whether staff have the ability to recognise the root causes of 
problems and generate double-loop learning. In a study looking at frontline 
workers’ learning behaviours, Tucker et al (2002) found that they tended 
to focus on day-to-day problem solving, which reduced opportunities for 
deeper learning, thereby emphasising single-loop learning at the expense 
of double-loop learning.  
 
3.4.20. Organisational factors. Most of the factors referred to in the 
literature fit within this category and relate to the nature, culture, 
structure, and processes of the organisation. A key issue at the 
organisational level is the attitude to learning that exists within the 
organisation’s prevailing culture. Argyris (1992), for example, has referred 
to the common existence of defensive routines and anti-learning 
approaches within organisations, as they seek to protect themselves from 
potential embarrassment. In public bureaucracies in particular, an 
approach which does not like to admit that things have gone wrong can 
represent a significant barrier to learning (Barrados and Mayne 2003, 
Common 2004, Olsen and Peters 1996). Given the importance of trial and 
error to learning, an aversion to admitting error is likely to be 
problematic, as is the tendency in some organisations to focus on blaming 
rather than learning (Vince and Broussine 2000). This also ties in with the 
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organisation’s general openness in dealing with problems. Marshall et al 
(2009), for example, note that free exchanges of information and dialogue 
are essential to learning and, therefore, require an open culture where 
discussion is encouraged. At a practical level, the nature of the 
organisation and the extent of staff turnover or resources at its disposal 
can seriously affect the presence or absence of learning (Pollitt 2009). 
 
3.4.21. An organisation’s structure is suggested to be important in 
facilitating or preventing learning. Here, the degree of fragmentation in 
an organisation, separation between sub-units, and the extent of role 
specialisation are all seen to influence the extent to which knowledge can 
be internally disseminated (Schilling and Kluge 2009). The presence of 
boundary spanning officials, communicating between units, is likely to be 
particularly important in facilitating such dissemination. As noted above, 
in discussing OLMs, the presence of specific processes to allow 
organisational learning to take place – rather than ad hoc arrangements – is 
likely to increase the chances of learning occurring (Barrados and Mayne 
2003). In addition to ensuring that substantive learning mechanisms are in 
place, Van Acker et al (2015) suggest that follow-up arrangements are 
likely to be useful to monitor and assess changes.  
 
3.4.22. Environmental factors. A range of factors in an organisation’s 
environment are seen to condition the extent to which learning is likely. In 
some cases these factors will militate against change and in some cases 
they will be catalysts for change. Professional norms within an industry, 
for example, could lead to slower organisational change if that change 
goes against prevailing ideas, but professional groups may also be the 
instigators of fresh ideas. Political factors are particularly important in 
relation to public sector organisations, with a number of authors 
suggesting that they represent serious problems for organisational learning 
(Common 2004, Thomas 2015, Smith and Taylor 2000). These problems 
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include election cycles which can disrupt learning continuity, the poor 
quality of legislation which means that learning is restricted, and a blame 
environment which discourages risk taking. A further environmental factor 
is the influence of management fads which encourage quick fixes rather 
than long term thinking, reflection, and learning from experience. In the 
public sector context, Pollitt (2009) has noted that the NPM reforms have 
severely limited the capacity of organisations not only to learn in the first 
place, but to remember what they have learnt.  
 
3.4.23. Source of the learning stimuli. As noted above when discussing 
learning between organisations, the source of the information that might 
lead to learning is particularly important when that source is external. Rist 
(1994) states that four factors matter in relation to the transmission of 
information from an external source into an organisation: the credibility of 
the source of the information, the credibility and authority of the person 
within the organisation receiving the information, the perceived 
legitimacy of the external organisation, and whether the relationship 
between the organisation transmitting information and that receiving it is 
close and trusting. In general, Rist (ibid.) notes that organisations are 
more likely to find internally produced information credible. 
 
3.5. Chapter summary 
 
3.5.1. This chapter has considered three linked concepts which are central to 
the conceptual basis of the thesis: control, accountability, and learning. 
Following Dunsire (1979), control was described as the ability to limit 
excess, correct deviation, and change the world from one state to 
another. In Dunsire’s (ibid.) theory of control, the principle mechanisms of 
control are directors, detectors, and effectors, and control is 
conceptualised as the ability to intervene in isostatic systems in order to 
disrupt power balances and effect change. The chapter proceeded to 
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outline Hood’s (1995) typology of control and situated redress mechanisms 
primarily within the review mode of control, but also able to draw on 
mutuality, contrived randomness, and competitive control modes.  
 
3.5.2. The chapter then turned its focus onto a category of control mechanism 
known as accountability mechanisms (of which redress mechanisms are a 
sub-category). While there is contention in the literature with regard to 
whether overlap and redundancy helps to ensure better accountability, it 
seems likely that multiple points of accountability increase the 
competition for bureaucrats’ time and attention. Understanding that 
bureaucrats face a ‘minefield’ of accountability and need to respond to 
various organisations for various aspects of their performance, helps to 
contextualise the particular role of redress mechanisms and to highlight 
possible dysfunctions arising from the operation of accountability and 
control. 
 
3.5.3. The chapter concluded by arguing that organisational learning was a key 
concept when considering questions of control and accountability, because 
it helped to provide the link between pronouncements by control 
mechanisms and potential changes in organisational cognition or 
behaviour. Organisational learning was, therefore, described as an 
important process through which control could be understood, since it 
sheds light on the way in which organisations receive new information and 
convert (or do not convert) it into concrete changes.  
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4. REDRESS MECHANISMS AND THE CONTROL OF BUREAUCRATIC DECISION-MAKING 
4.1. Introduction 
 
4.1.1. Having examined bureaucratic decision-making in chapter 2, and the 
various means by which attempts are made to control it in chapter 3, this 
chapter now turns to considering the control function of redress 
mechanisms. It begins by reviewing the theoretical, normative, and policy 
debates that surround this issue. The chapter then reviews the conceptual 
and empirical literature on the impact of redress mechanisms. The 
literature offers insights into the degree to which redress mechanisms 
have been found to control bureaucratic decision-making and suggests a 
range of factors that may facilitate or prevent the exercise of control. 
 
4.2. Theoretical, normative, and policy debates 
 
Should redress mechanisms control bureaucratic decision-making?  
 
4.2.1. Redress mechanisms potentially fulfil a number of roles and their role in 
controlling bureaucratic action is neither uncontested nor does it 
necessarily predominate. The following paragraphs explore critical debates 
in the literature about the role of each redress mechanism. 
 
4.2.2. Judicial review. In relation to judicial review, an important question is 
whether an instrumentalist focus on the effects of court decisions is 
appropriate. Cane (2004) has argued that this approach is reductive and 
neglects the expressive function of judicial review. He sees the value of 
judicial review lying in its ability to symbolically project a society’s values, 
rather than necessarily in its ability to affect human action. King (2012) 
follows Cane (2004) and argues that there is a danger that scholars neglect 
other valuable roles which society expects courts to play. King (ibid.) 
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argues that judicial review remains a powerful tool for individuals seeking 
redress against the state and that aspects of judicial review (such as its 
emphasis on principled reasoning, its facilitation of public participation in 
government processes, and its expressiveness) retain a value that risks 
being lost in adopting too narrow a control perspective.  
 
4.2.3. Others have considered what exactly the notion of control means in the 
context of judicial review. Harlow and Rawlings’ (2009) famous 
characterisation of ‘red light’ and ‘green light’ theories of administrative 
law is instructive here. Red light theorists emphasise the need to control 
the power of an administrative state that is seen to be increasingly 
encroaching on the lives of individuals; green light theorists see state 
intervention as socially transformative and argue for a more limited and 
enabling role for courts. The idea of control also raises important 
constitutional questions. As Feldman (1988) has argued, judges must tread 
a careful line, maintaining their role as adjudicators and resisting the 
temptation to usurp the role of administrators. He notes that there is a 
danger that courts are perceived as attempting to take on legislative or 
executive functions if they take the notion of control too far. 
 
4.2.4. One question is not only about whether control is an appropriate goal for 
judicial review but, if it is, what dimensions of control it should be 
expected to perform. Feldman (ibid., 2003) has suggested that judicial 
control can be broken down into three techniques: directing refers to 
control where judges impose particular duties required by statute in a 
particular case; limiting refers to control where judges set out the lawful 
limits on administrative discretion; and structuring refers to control where 
judges impose principles which affect future decision-making. Feldman 
(ibid.) and Dunsire’s (1979) notions of control (see chapter 3) can be 
categorised according to whether the control that is sought is ex post or ex 
ante: directing (correction of deviation) and limiting (limitation of excess) 
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are ex post forms of control, while structuring (the capacity to change the 
world) is an ex ante form of control. While the ex post function of judicial 
review is less controversial, the ex ante function begins to raise some of 
the constitutional dilemmas and fears of usurpation discussed by Feldman 
(1988).  
 
4.2.5. A final question that is worth considering in exploring the normative 
aspects of judicial review’s control function relates to understanding on 
whose behalf control is being exercised. This is likely to be particularly 
important from the perspective of legitimising the bureaucratic control 
function of courts. Cotterell (1994) explores this issue in his discussion of 
the constitutional position of judicial review. He argues that there are two 
influential images of judicial review in legal philosophy: the ‘imperium’ 
image suggests a hierarchical view in which courts are servants of a higher 
legislative power which controls all branches of the state; on the other 
hand, the ‘community’ image suggests that the common law principles of 
judicial review represent the cumulative wisdom of society at large and, 
therefore, act as an alternative source of legitimate power. Put another 
way, the issue here is whether the relationship between the court and the 
administration is one where the court acts as the principal of its 
administrative agent or whether the court, itself an agent of a superior 
legislative power, merely acts as a surrogate principal. Although both the 
imperium and community images offer arguments in favour of judicial 
review exercising a control on bureaucratic action, the point is that the 
basis on which control is exercised may lead to normative questions about 
the extent to which that control is appropriate.  
 
4.2.6. Ombudsman schemes. The role of ombudsman schemes is similarly 
contested but, unlike judicial review, also varies significantly depending 
on the particular scheme being considered (Harlow 1978; Gill et al 2013). 
Traditionally, scholars have emphasised the parliamentary nature of UK 
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ombudsman schemes: they are an adjunct of Parliament designed to assist 
elected members in the resolution of constituents’ grievances (Drewry and 
Harlow 1990; Morson 1993; Giddings 2008). As such, ombudsman schemes 
have been seen as form of political control over government and as a 
means of reinforcing the legislature’s dwindling capacity to control the 
executive (Giddings et al 1993). Similarly to the ‘imperium’ image of the 
courts discussed above, ombudsman schemes have been cast ‘…as auxiliary 
mechanisms to aid political principals to oversee their administrative 
agents’ (Van Acker et al 2015, p.40). On the other hand, however, 
ombudsman schemes have also been seen as a supplement to traditional 
administrative law remedies (Maggette 2003). Here, the adjudicative mode 
of ombudsman schemes is seen to distinguish them from political methods 
of control, which results in a hybrid perspective (Gill 2014).5  
 
4.2.7. When it comes to considering the role of the Local Government 
Ombudsman (LGO), however, both the political and the hybrid conceptions 
seem inadequate. This is because, due to concerns about the propriety of 
parliamentary oversight of local democracy (Kirkham 2008), there has not 
been the same connection between the LGO and Parliament as exists for 
the Parliamentary and Health Services Ombudsman (PHSO). The lack of 
democratic connection to the LGO may place a question mark over its 
legitimacy and uncertainty about the basis on which it is seeking to 
exercise control over local administration. The suggestion we are making 
here, therefore, is that the type and extent of control that is to be 
exercised over public administration is intimately connected with the 
source of constitutional power which legitimates that control.   
 
                                               
5
 Other arguments have recently been put forward to explain the constitutional position and role of 
ombudsman scheme. Buck et al (2011) and Kirkham et al (2009), for example, have suggested that a 
fourth ‘integrity branch’ should be added to conventional understandings of the tripartite constitution. See 
Gill 2014 for further discussion of this point. 
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4.2.8. There has also been a significant development over time in relation to 
the control ombudsman schemes are expected to perform. This 
development is neatly captured by Harlow and Rawlings’ (2009) ‘fire-
fighting’ and ‘fire-watching’ metaphor. Traditionally, ombudsman schemes 
in the UK have been very much seen as ‘fire-fighters’, meaning that they 
are concerned predominantly with remedying individual injustices. This 
model sees ombudsman schemes as a small claims court, focussing on 
processing large volumes of low value disputes (De Leuuw 2009). This 
conception of the ombudsman’s role has been subject to criticism in the 
literature, with arguments being made that ombudsman schemes are 
better suited to the task of administrative audit (Harlow 1978: Lewis and 
Birkinshaw 1993). While it appears that ombudsman schemes are devoting 
ever greater attention to this fire-watching role in the UK (Buck et al 
2011; Gill et al 2013; Gill 2014), the debate over whether this should be 
the case remains an important controversy within ombudsman studies 
(Stuhmcke 2010). There is, therefore, a similar malaise in relation to the 
control function of ombudsman schemes as there is in relation to that of 
courts.  
 
4.2.9. Tribunals. Unlike in relation to courts and ombudsman schemes, the 
issue of control has not been subject to significant scholarly debate here. 
According to Thomas (2015, p.131), the idea that administrators might 
learn from the decisions of tribunals is ‘rarely mentioned’. While, as we 
shall see below, recent policy developments have suggested an increased 
role for tribunals in providing feedback to first instance decision-makers, it 
seems that tribunals remain predominantly conceived as fora for the 
settlements of claims in high volume and highly specialised area of public 
administration. One interesting issue in this respect relates to the growing 
trend in the UK to see tribunals as judicial bodies, a trend confirmed with 
the creation of a unified court and tribunal service in 2008. While some 
have argued that the judicial character of tribunals has been entrenched 
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since the Franks Report (Richardson and Genn 2007), Thomas (2011) argues 
that too much emphasis has been placed on the idea that tribunals are 
judicial bodies separate from the administrative activities of government. 
He argues that tribunals have a direct role in the implementation of public 
policy, and that adjudication is better seen as existing on a spectrum, 
along with administration, as a tool for policy implementation.  
 
4.2.10. UK tribunals, in this perspective, may be seen as something of a 
hybrid between judicial and executive-self-control, in the same way that 
ombudsman schemes exist in the zone between judicial and political 
control. At the same time, there is no doubt that the direction of travel in 
relation to UK tribunals is towards judicialisation. The operation of the 
doctrine of precedent in tribunals is particularly interesting when seen 
from a control perspective. Buck (2006), reviewing the limited literature 
on the operation of the stare decisis doctrine in tribunals, argues that 
differences between courts and tribunals in this respect have been over-
emphasised and that de facto systems of precedent have developed in 
most tribunals. Hickingbottom (2009, p.5) has also commented on the 
upper tribunal’s role in developing precedent, setting out his ambition to 
‘… work towards a more coherent and distinctive system of tribunal 
justice…’. He argues that there are three ways in which the reformed 
tribunal service can deliver ‘tribunal justice’: by developing jurisprudence 
in the particular area of law covered by the tribunal; by developing 
overarching administrative law principles; and by providing practical 
guidance to users about decision-making. In emphasising the formal, 
judicial nature of the tribunal’s role, these developments seem to suggest 
a move away from the policy implementation perspective suggested by 
Thomas (2011) and towards a more conventional, court-like approach. 
They also suggest a move towards tribunals seeking greater ex ante control 
of administration through the development of precedent and provision of 
feedback. 
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Can redress mechanisms control bureaucratic decision-making? 
 
4.2.11. Tied to the discussion of whether redress mechanisms should 
control bureaucratic decision-making has been analysis of the extent to 
which such control is possible. In relation to all three redress mechanisms, 
a significant impediment is the fact that they are reactive institutions, 
dependent on individual citizens bringing their concerns to them (Adler 
2003, Pearson 2008, Rawlings 1986). The result of this is that complaints 
may be unrepresentative (Steyvers et al 2009) and the discovery of errors 
will be random (Harlow and Rawlings 2009). Some areas of administration 
do not involve a great deal of contact with citizens and, as a result, these 
areas in particular are likely to escape the form of control that redress 
mechanisms bring to bear. A great deal of scepticism has also been 
expressed about whether the external nature of redress mechanisms 
makes them ill-suited to exercise meaningful control (Adler 2003, Gregory 
and Hutchinson 1975). A somewhat different criticism has been that, to 
the extent that they have an effect, this will be negative, rather than 
improving practice (Compton 1970, Gregory and Hutchinson 1975, Harlow 
and Rawlings 2009, Morson 1993). In the paragraphs that follow, a 
theoretical discussion is provided of the ability of each redress mechanism 
to exercise bureaucratic control. 
 
4.2.12. Judicial review. Assessments of the potential for judicial review 
to control bureaucratic action have generally been bleak. Feldman (1988, 
p.21) has stated that ‘judges do not control government’, while Rawlings 
(1986, p. 135) has argued ‘…judicial review fails in any sense to control 
central government’. Feldman (2003) puts forward a number of reasons in 
support of his conclusion and proposes that: bureaucracies are norm-based 
organisations; legal norms are only one set of competing norms; 
administrators are unlikely to give legal norms any privileged status over 
other norms; and, to be effective, legal norms must be seen by 
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administrators to be compatible with the realisation of the legitimate ends 
of public policy. Feldman (ibid.) goes on to argue that the ability of 
judicial review to control routine administration is heavily constrained by 
the presence of resource constraints and the strength of internal 
management control in bureaucracies. Harlow (1976) is similarly 
unconvinced and argues that a combination of judicial deference and 
bureaucratic disregard, means that judicial review can exercise only a very 
partial control. 
 
4.2.13. Other authors have offered more positive accounts and King 
(2012), in particular, has sought to argue that courts have more value than 
is suggested in some of the more pessimistic assessments. One reason for 
this is the fact that an increase in judicial interventionism and the 
additional jurisdiction provided to judges following the introduction of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 mean that there has been a shift in the 
traditionally deferential approach of British judges. Other strands of 
thinking in legal scholarship also seem to be pointing in a somewhat 
different direction. Cooper (1995), for instance, has investigated the idea 
of juridification in local government and concluded that administrators see 
the law as a powerful colonising force, increasingly encroaching on 
administrative discretion. This more powerful view of law’s influence is 
reflected in narratives developed in the US literature on courts. Galanter 
(1983), for example, famously suggested that courts had a radiating 
effect, with the principles developed in a small number of cases being 
hugely influential in shaping disputing behaviour and outcomes outwith the 
court.  
 
4.2.14. Greer and Del Alamagro Iniesta (2014) have argued in a similar 
vein that a narrow view of courts as institutions of hierarchical command 
has meant that the importance of courts as resources to be used by social 
actors has often been neglected. Rosenberg (2008) meanwhile has pointed 
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out that two common images are reflected in literature on courts. One 
sees courts as ‘constrained’ and limited by a lack of power and resources 
which render them weak and ineffective. The other sees courts as 
‘dynamic’ and argues that courts are powerful and vigorous institutions 
able to induce substantial social change. While Rosenberg (ibid.) 
concluded that courts represent a ‘hollow hope’, his work is important in 
highlighting the paradoxical view that is present in much legal scholarship, 
where the courts are represented as at once powerful and powerless 
institutions. 
 
4.2.15. Ombudsman schemes. Scholars have generally been more positive 
about the potential of ombudsman schemes to influence bureaucratic 
action. As noted earlier, some have seen ombudsman schemes as 
particularly suited to a fire-watching approach, and argued that this 
distinguishes them from other administrative justice institutions. Kirkham 
(2006), for example, highlights the inquisitorial approach of ombudsman 
schemes as facilitating the kind of intense scrutiny likely to lead to 
administrative improvement. The strong inquisitorial powers of 
ombudsman schemes and their ability to make recommendations in 
addition to findings of fact in relation to individual injustice, has often 
been seen as a strength of the institution (Gregory and Drewry 1991).  
 
4.2.16. The ability to publish annual and other reports and issue guidance 
is also cited as an advantage in relation to shaping future bureaucratic 
action (Steyvers et al 2009). The LGO has been identified as particularly 
effective here and as more proactive than other ombudsman schemes in 
seeking to provide guidance (Kirkham 2005, Seneviratne 2002). Some 
ombudsman schemes have argued that their very existence exerts an 
influence on administrative practice which, although it cannot be 
measured, should be not ignored (Clothier 1986, Diamandorous 2008). One 
former ombudsman referred to this as a ‘tonic effect’ (Compton 1970, 
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p.6). Others have been more cagey in making their assessments of 
ombudsman schemes’ influence on administrative practice, with Adler 
(2003, p. 328) providing an example of this more cautious approach: 
 
‘…the opportunity of complaining to an ombudsman has 
contributed, if only to a small extent, to enhancing the justice 
inherent in administrative decision-making.’ 
 
4.2.17. The nature of ombudsman schemes’ jurisdiction has also been 
perceived as a strength in relation to controlling administrative action. 
Indeed, it is clear that the concept of maladministration allows 
ombudsman schemes to go much further in probing bureaucratic action 
than does the legal conception of good administration (Steyvers et al 
2009). As Kirkham (2006) has pointed out, the UK courts have recognised 
that ombudsman schemes are entitled to make findings of 
maladministration even where a court has found no breach of good 
administration in administrative law terms. That ombudsman schemes are 
able to consider a broader range of bureaucratic behaviour is, therefore, 
seen as potentially enhancing their ability to exert control.  
 
4.2.18. Although, as we shall see, ombudsman schemes have been 
criticised for their lack of power and ability to compel public bodies to 
follow their recommendations, their ability to name and shame bodies and 
to use the media as a sanction (O’Reilly 2008) mean that there are 
generally few concerns in the literature about ombudsman schemes’ 
ability to secure compliance with their rulings (Giddings 1998). Indeed, 
rather than emphasising the importance of sanctioning power, a suggestion 
in the literature is that their relative closeness to administrators and to 
public policy networks allows them to be more influential. The fact that 
ombudsman schemes are able to build a relationship, and enter into 
continuous dialogue with, the bodies they investigate is seen as providing 
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a strong basis for the receipt of guidance and advice by administrators 
(Farrand 1999). This is particularly the case for local ombudsman schemes, 
which are able to develop more direct and personal relationships with 
administrators (Van de Pol 2009).  
 
4.2.19. A number of limitations have, however, been suggested in relation 
to the theoretical potential for ombudsman to exercise control. One issue 
is the increasing trend for ombudsman schemes to use informal resolution 
methods rather than the ‘Rolls Royce’ administrative audit style 
investigations that used to characterise the institution (Bondy et al 2014, 
Seneviratne 2002). The key idea behind ‘modern complaints management’ 
appears to be that quick resolutions to complaints are proposed without 
finding out what went wrong or why (Cabinet Office 2000). From a control 
perspective, the risk is clearly that a focus on individual satisfaction and a 
superficial treatment of cases militates against the intense scrutiny of 
processes provided by more formal investigations. Indeed, Kirkham (2005) 
has noted that some have criticised the ‘local settlement’ process used by 
the LGO because it can be used by local authorities to shield themselves 
from more probing investigation.  
 
4.2.20. A major limitation highlighted by those who consider that 
ombudsman schemes should primarily be fire-watchers is the absence of 
own initiative powers of investigation in UK ombudsman schemes. As 
Steyvers et al (2009) have pointed out, ombudsman recommendations can 
often be dismissed by administrators on a ‘damage score argument’, 
where complaints are seen as representing a small sample of 
unrepresentative cases. More generally, while we noted above that 
compliance with ombudsman decisions and recommendations in the UK is 
generally good, it is not perfect. Kirkham (2006) and Kirkham et al (2008) 
have noted with concern a tendency by government departments to push 
back on a number of cases that have been upheld by the PHSO in recent 
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times. Although they are not in favour of ombudsman schemes having 
enforcement powers, others have suggested that ombudsman schemes’ 
reliance on the goodwill of those investigated is problematic, especially in 
relation to the LGO where, as noted above, there is an absence of 
parliamentary support for the office (Lewis and Birkinshaw 1993). While 
the idea that ombudsman schemes’ closeness to, and good relationships 
with, administrators suggests that they will be able to exert influence over 
them more effectively, there is also a danger that this closeness will be 
seen to impinge on the impartiality of the office (Gill 2014, King 2012, 
Kirkham 2005).  
 
4.2.21. A final issue relates to ombudsman schemes’ ability to develop 
coherent standards to guide the behaviour of public bodies. While the 
maladministration standard is broader than good administration in law, its 
exact meaning is ‘notoriously uncertain’ (Kirkham 2005, p. 386). While the 
development of ‘principles’ (PHSO 2009) and ‘axioms’ (LGO 1993) of good 
administration has undoubtedly been a step forward, there remains 
uncertainty about the extent to which pragmatism or principle 
predominate in the decision-making of ombudsman schemes (Gill et al 
2013). In the Netherlands, there has been a recent surge of interest in the 
development of ‘ombudsnorms’ (De Leuuw 2009; Langbroek and Rijkema 
2006; Langbroek and Remac 2012; Remac 2013). This literature has sought 
to understand the extent to which a distinctive ‘ombudsprudence’ may 
develop. One criticism of current practice (which also applies to UK 
ombudsman schemes) is that published decisions rarely make reference to 
guidelines such as the Principles of Good Administration and do not, 
therefore, demonstrate the connections that may be made between the 
particular facts of the case and the general principle that may be drawn 
from it. 
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4.2.22. Tribunals. As noted above, there has been much less interest in 
the literature about the extent to which tribunals control bureaucratic 
action. The high volumes of cases dealt with by tribunals, and the 
expertise inherent in their specialist jurisdictions, certainly suggests some 
potential for exerting control over administrative decision-making. 
Wikeley (2006, 2008), however, has suggested that the extent to which 
tribunal decisions are used as a source of learning and possible 
improvement by decision-makers is very limited. He argues that lawyers 
have tended to view the administrative justice system as a pyramid, with 
decision-makers at the bottom and progressively more authoritative 
tribunals and courts at the top. In this view, principles of good decision-
making flow downward through pyramid. However, the reality is that: 
 
‘… administrative justice is… an arctic panorama in which there is 
only limited connection between individual ice floes, representing 
upper tier decisions, and the other frozen land masses of official 
decision-making’ (Wikeley 2008, p.176). 
 
Wikeley’s (ibid.) conclusion is that while tribunals have a clear influence 
in individual cases, there is little evidence of their wider impact on 
bureaucratic decision-making. Factors that prevent this include: resource 
constraints on administrators; opposing values between administrators and 
tribunals; time pressures; and the volume and types of cases appealed. 
Another problem is the fact that because tribunals hear cases de novo, 
adverse decisions may simply reflect the fact that new information is 
presented at a hearing.6  
 
4.2.23. The issue of feedback from tribunals to decision-makers has 
received some attention in the literature. Thomas (2015) and Richardson 
                                               
6
 Data from a pilot study looking at feedback from the Social Security and Child Support Tribunal indicates 
that only 15% of cases are overturned because the tribunal reached a different view to the initial decision-
maker on the same facts (DWP 2012). 
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and Genn (2007) have argued that, although there is potential for tribunals 
to improve decision-making through feedback, this potential has yet to be 
realised. Partington and Kirton-Darling (2007) have surveyed existing 
approaches to feedback and possible ways that it might be provided in 
future. They discuss three ways in which tribunals might provide feedback 
to first instance decision-makers: official reports, direct communication, 
and informal feedback. In terms of the effectiveness of current feedback 
mechanisms, while making additional use of tribunal feedback is a 
common suggestion (McKeever 2014), there has been little in the way of 
exploration of current approaches. 
 
Does administrative justice policy expect redress mechanisms to control 
bureaucratic decision-making? 
 
4.2.24. Before we turn to the empirical literature, a final question 
concerns whether current administrative justice policy supports the notion 
that redress mechanisms should be exercising a control function in relation 
to bureaucratic decision-making. While it is evident that provision of 
state-sponsored mechanisms for resolving grievances against 
administrative bodies represents an acceptance of control in its corrective 
and limiting sense, the issue of an ex ante and structuring role may be 
more controversial. In this respect, a key turning point had been the 
former Department for Constitutional Affairs’ White Paper Transforming 
Public Services: Complaints, Redress, and Tribunals. The White Paper 
introduced a holistic definition of administrative justice which 
encompassed both redress mechanisms and first instance decision-making. 
As a result, it created a new focus on the relationship between the 
decisions of redress mechanisms and the routine decision-making of public 
bodies, and an expectation that learning would occur following upheld 
cases. The White Paper led to the passing of the Tribunals, Courts, and 
Enforcement Act 2007 and the establishment of the Administrative Justice 
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and Tribunals Council (AJTC), which developed the vision of the White 
Paper by producing a number of publications which aimed at improving 
bureaucratic decision-making and enhancing the ability of redress 
mechanisms to do so (AJTC 2011, 2012). There have also been some 
attempts to make greater use of feedback by government departments and 
a recent initiative by the Ministry of Justice and the Department of Work 
and Pensions to analyse and make greater use of tribunal decisions appears 
to have produced positive results (Ministry of Justice 2014). The Ministry of 
Justice’s Administrative Justice and Tribunals Strategic Work Programme 
2013 – 2016 also has improving initial decision-making through better 
feedback as a key aim (albeit it focuses solely on tribunal feedback). 
 
4.2.25. While these developments suggest support for the idea that the 
decisions of redress mechanisms should be used systematically by 
bureaucratic decision-makers as part of their routine work, other 
developments in administrative justice may militate against this. Adler 
(2012) considers that the eventual abolition of the AJTC demonstrated a 
lack of support for administrative justice from government and that the 
holistic vision of a distinct administrative justice system had effectively 
been abandoned. Recent changes in practice in some areas of primary 
decision-making have also had potentially important, although as yet 
unclear effects on the ability of redress mechanisms to exercise control. 
The introduction of a process of mandatory reconsideration by the 
Department of Work and Pensions in 2013, for example, may be a positive 
step forward in improving decision-making given the suggestions in the 
literature that internal processes may be effective in this respect (Adler 
2003; Cowan and Halliday 2003). On the other hand, King (2012) has 
questioned whether internal processes are likely to improve decision-
making given that administrators appear to be driven by different values 
to those that would be imposed externally.  
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4.2.26. Perhaps more importantly, one effect of mandatory 
reconsideration has been to reduce massively the number of appeals being 
heard by tribunals (Gill and Mullen 2015). Indeed, given that the receipt of 
cases is the lifeblood of redress mechanisms’ control capacities, changes 
in the accessibility of the administrative justice system must be seen to 
threaten any policy commitment to enhance the influence of redress 
mechanisms over administrators. Mullen (2016, p.82) has identified six 
ways in which the Coalition government’s administrative justice policies 
affect access to administrative justice:   
 
‘1) the broader vision of administrative justice has disappeared 
from government thinking, (2) there has been a serious attempt 
to undermine judicial review, (3) important rights of appeal have 
been removed, (4) there has been a failure to address those areas 
in which there were not adequate remedies and (5) in areas 
where there had been satisfactory remedies, new obstacles to 
their use have been created, and (6) there has been a decline in 
the availability of advice, assistance and representation to 
citizens in dispute with the state.’ 
 
4.2.27. The situation in relation to ombudsman schemes is a little  more 
positive. In Scotland, the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman has been 
given a new ‘design authority’ role in relation to public service complaints 
procedures, which involves developing standardised complaints processes 
and then monitoring their effectiveness. While this quasi-regulatory role 
has been questioned in relation to its constitutional implications (Gill 
2014), it is clear that – if successful – it represents an innovation with 
potential to improve complaint handling and may even have a knock-on 
effect on primary decision-making (Gill 2012, Mullen and Gill 2015). Wales 
has shown similar innovation through its creation of ‘Complaints Wales’, a 
one-stop-shop providing advice and signposting for citizens with a 
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complaint against government (Complaints Wales 2015). Both the Welsh 
and Scottish developments represent important steps forward in improving 
the accessibility of administrative justice and in rethinking the distinctive 
contribution that ombudsman schemes may make in this regard.  
 
4.2.28. The situation in relation to the UK-wide and English ombudsman 
schemes is less clear. A recent review conducted by Robert Gordon, 
following an inquiry by the Public Administration Select Committee, 
recommended a range of changes that would significantly enhance the 
accessibility and fire-watching capacities of the PHSO (Gordon 2014). The 
government’s response to the subsequent consultation on these proposals 
has ruled out the granting of own-initiative powers of investigation (the 
most radical part of the proposals) albeit some kind of ‘design authority’ 
based on the Scottish model may still be on the cards. While these 
developments are much more limited than they might have been, they 
nonetheless represent a small move towards seeking to enhance the 
ombudsman’s influence over bureaucratic practice. 
 
4.2.29. Overall, therefore, while policy in relation to ombudsman 
schemes seems to hold some potential for an increase in their fire-
watching role, the same cannot be said for courts and tribunals. While the 
feedback agenda remains alive in the letter of government policy, and 
although the increasingly judicialised nature of tribunals perhaps offers 
enhanced standard setting potential, the reality of the marginalisation of 
the administrative justice system and the significant reductions in its 
accessibility are unlikely to make a positive contribution to redress 
mechanisms’ ability to control bureaucratic action. Indeed, in relation to 
both tribunal and court reform, reducing legal control and oversight can 
be seen to be at the heart of the current government’s policy agenda.  
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4.3. The empirical evidence: do redress mechanisms control bureaucratic 
decision-making? 
 
4.3.1. The chapter now turns to the findings of empirical studies: what do we 
know about the extent to which redress mechanisms control bureaucratic 
decision-making?7 This section provides a summary of the evidence in 
relation to each redress mechanism.  
 
Judicial review 
 
4.3.2. King (2012, p.79) has provided a pithy summary of the ‘mean point’ 
around which the findings of the judicial impact literature coalesce: ‘some 
impact, occasionally too much, more often too little’. Halliday (2004, p. 
162) has commented in a similar vein that the research data suggests that 
judicial review’s influence is ‘patchy and varied’. While the general trend 
of the findings is downbeat, some studies have bucked this trend. Creyke 
and McMillan’s (2004) work on the influence of judicial review on 
administrators in Australia’s federal government, for example, reported 
that judicial review had a significant impact on administrative policy and 
practice. The work of Calvo et al (2007) and Platt et al (2010) also stands 
out for its upbeat findings. These scholars approach the question of impact 
with a different emphasis, seeking to establish an empirical connection 
between judicial review and the overall quality of service delivery in local 
government. They conclude that: 
 
‘The findings provide a quantitative basis for arguing that judicial 
review challenges may contribute to improvements in local 
government services and therefore that the effect of judicial 
                                               
7
 The literature uses a number of different terms in investigating redress mechanisms’ control functions. 
Most have talked about their ‘impact’ or ‘influence’, while some have framed the enquiry in terms of 
‘compliance’. A few have explicitly used the concept of ‘control’ (Gregory and Hutchinson 1975, Hertogh 
2001). See chapter 1 for a justification of this thesis’ emphasis on control. 
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review is neither insignificant nor wholly negative’ (Platt et al 
2010, p.243). 
 
Calvo et al (2007) and Platt et al (2010) also found a high level of 
commitment amongst bureaucrats to implementing judgments and 
positive attitudes in relation to the helpfulness of court judgments. 
 
4.3.3. Buck (1998), whose findings are based on his personal experience of 
working with the organisation, considered the impact of judicial review on 
the Independent Review Service (IRS) of the Social Fund. He concluded 
that the level to which administrators had internalised the legal norms 
suggested that the court’s influence had been ‘comparatively high’ (ibid. 
p. 129), even though this was constrained somewhat by the inconsistent 
application of administrative law principles by the courts. Similarly, 
Hammond’s (1998) assessment of his own experiences working for the 
Treasury Solicitor’s Department concluded that judicial review had a 
significant impact on government administration, with increased 
consideration being given to such issues as inviting representations, giving 
reasons, and granting hearings. James (1996), also writing from direct 
experience in administration, asserts that judicial review can have a 
powerful disruptive effect on administrators. Describing administrators as 
being ‘irked’ by judicial review, he considers that it has had an impact, 
albeit not always a positive one. 
 
4.3.4. As suggested above, however, other assessments have been more 
negative. Kerry (1986), for example, considers that judicial review is 
generally peripheral to administration and that there has been no change 
in the general approach of administrators as a result of judicial review. 
Empirical studies conducted by academics have often shared this 
pessimistic view. Loveland (1995, p. 314), as part of a larger study looking 
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at homelessness decision-making in local government, reached damning 
conclusions about the impact of judicial review: 
 
‘Legalism is an intruder... It does not prescribe administrative 
behaviour but challenges it. It does not facilitate the decision-
making process, rather it gets in the way.’  
 
4.3.5. Mullen et al 1996 found some evidence of judicial review’s impact in 
their study of homelessness decision-making in Scottish local government. 
They found evidence of changes in administration as a result of particular 
cases and attempts to pre-empt judicial reviews through such activities as 
training and manuals. Nonetheless, when placing such changes in context, 
Mullen et al (ibid.) concluded that although judicial review was not 
irrelevant, it had only a limited impact, and that internal methods of 
control might be more effective. Obadina (1998) in a study of gypsy site 
provision in local government, found that administrators did not 
consciously consider judicial determinations in devising their policies. 
Obadina (ibid.) considered the impact of a high profile and potentially far 
reaching judicial review case and found that it had limited impact beyond 
the authority subject to the challenge. 
 
4.3.6. Richardson and Machin (1999, 2000) investigated the impact of judicial 
review on the Mental Health Review Tribunal, seeking to explore the 
hypothesis that judicial review may have a greater impact where the body 
acts in an adjudicatory rather than administrative manner. Overall, 
Richardson and Machin (ibid.) suggest that the court’s influence was 
‘patchy at best’. Sunkin and Pick (2001) investigated the impact of judicial 
review on the Independent Review Service (IRS) of the Social Fund and 
sought to assess its impact over a ten year period rather than at a single 
point in time. They found that the influence of judicial norms was very 
strong when the organisation was first created, but waned over time as 
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the organisation’s goals changed and as judicial norms came into 
competition with more managerial concerns. 
 
4.3.7. Hertogh (2001), researching the extent to which the administrative court 
and the national ombudsman scheme in the Netherlands controlled the 
actions of government agencies, found that courts were more likely to 
lead to defensive reactions from administrators and less likely to engender 
a positive sense of mutual understanding. Halliday’s (2000, 2004) study of 
compliance with administrative law in homelessness decision-making, 
meanwhile, found a significant degree of non-compliance in the 
authorities he studied. Where judicial review did have an effect, this was 
often negative, with administrators using legal knowledge to engage in 
defensive administrative practices.  
 
4.3.8. Finally, it is worth noting that the literature on the impact of judicial 
review is not without its critics. In recent work examining compliance of 
local authorities with roads maintenance law in Scotland, Halliday (2013) 
has argued that the focus on the top-down impact of courts has excluded 
other perspectives that shine a light on the significance of law to the 
administrative process. He points out that other modes of governance exist 
apart from top down legal control, such as governance through markets 
and communities. In the context of road maintenance law, Halliday (ibid.) 
found that compliance had risen significantly, not only as a result of the 
hierarchical control of courts, but largely because of the commitment to 
change of professional networks and market pressures created through the 
insurance system operating there.  
 
4.3.9. King (2012) has been critical of judicial impact studies and highlights a 
number of important limitations in the literature: the areas that have 
been investigated are not representative of general administration; the UK 
literature is out of step with the more mixed findings obtained in other 
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jurisdictions; and the literature generally adopts a qualitative approach 
and would benefit more from mixed method approaches. Some of these 
concerns are shared by Cane (2004, p.40) who argues that there are so 
many caveats around the findings of most judicial impact studies that the 
major contribution of the field to date has been to highlight our 
‘ignorance and uncertainty’. 
 
Ombudsman schemes 
 
4.3.10. In keeping with the theoretical arguments reviewed above, the 
empirical literature on the impact of ombudsman schemes has been more 
positive than the judicial review literature in its findings.8 Beginning with 
research which has produced more pessimistic or at least ambivalent 
findings, Hill (1972, 1976) conducted the first empirical study seeking to 
evaluate the effect of ombudsman schemes on public administration. He 
investigated the reactions of senior civil servants in New Zealand to the 
New Zealand Ombudsman. His findings indicate that although 
administrators and the ombudsman shared a congruent and mutually 
reinforcing set of values, most considered that the ombudsman had little 
impact on their work.  
 
4.3.11. Gregory and Hutchinson (1975) conducted a small scale empirical 
enquiry as part of a broader piece of research looking at the UK’s 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (PCA).9 They found that 
the creation of the commissioner in 1967 had not led to any changes in the 
attitudes of central government administrators and that, although changes 
to procedures and administrative systems had been brought about, these 
were peripheral. Gill (2012), meanwhile, conducted a small-sample study 
of the ex ante impact of the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman on the 
                                               
8
 Due to the limited number of studies conducted in the UK, the literature reviewed in this section is more 
international than that considered in relation to judicial review. 
9
 The PCA is the formal name of the UK’s Parliamentary Ombudsman. 
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decision-making of local authority housing departments. He found that 
administrators showed little detailed awareness of the ombudsman’s 
rulings and that commitment to learning from the work of the ombudsman 
was variable. Recognising the limited nature of the study and that its 
findings were less positive than a number of others, Gill (ibid.) 
nonetheless suggested a need for greater caution in assessing the claims 
made about the impact of ombudsman schemes, because many of the 
barriers that affect the ability of judicial review to control administrative 
action were also likely to affect ombudsman schemes. 
 
4.3.12. Turning to the more upbeat literature, Friedmann (1976) 
researched the impact of the Alberta Ombudsman on public services and 
found that, while the ombudsman was rarely in the minds of 
administrators as they conducted their day-to-day work, attitudes to the 
ombudsman scheme were very positive. Overall, Friedmann (ibid.) 
concluded that given the positive attitudes of officials toward the 
ombudsman, it was likely to have a considerable ability to influence public 
administration. As noted above, Hertogh’s (2001) research explored the 
impact of the administrative courts and the ombudsman in the 
Netherlands. His findings in relation to the ombudsman were very positive, 
suggesting its cooperative approach helped to reduce the barriers to 
administrators making changes to policies and procedures. Interestingly, 
Pajuoja (2009) – in a study looking at the impact of the Finish Ombudsman 
– also found a very high level of influence, but in that case it was ascribed 
to the ombudsman’s strong powers of coercion, which included criminal 
prosecution. 
 
4.3.13. In a sign that ombudsmen themselves are becoming more 
interested in their impact, two studies have now been commissioned by 
ombudsman schemes. The first, commissioned by the PHSO, examined the 
impact of 21 decisions which had led to adverse findings and 
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recommendations (IFF/PHSO 2010). This study concluded that individual 
recommendations did lead to change, although the study did note that the 
timeliness of investigations, some lack of clarity in recommendations, and 
the absence of a more cooperative approach, militated against impact in 
some cases. The second commissioned study, conducted on behalf of the 
Toronto Ombudsman, reported similarly positive findings (Siemiatycki et al 
2015). This study found that the ombudsman had had an ‘overwhelming 
positive impact’ (ibid., p.2) on municipal administration. A particular area 
where administrators reported that the ombudsman had led to 
improvements was in terms of the way administrators communicated with 
members of the public and in the treatment of vulnerable citizens.   
 
4.3.14. Three further recent studies have been conducted in a European 
context. Kostadina (2012) researched the influence of the European 
Ombudsman on the European Commission. She found that in the majority 
of cases, the ombudsman’s recommendations were accepted and that the 
Commission was willing to learn from the ombudsman. While Kostadina’s 
findings are clearly positive, it is notable that the rate of compliance of 
the European Ombudsman’s recommendations is poor compared with that 
achieved by UK public service ombudsman schemes. Hossu and Karp (2013) 
studied the administrative perceptions of the Romanian Ombudsman, 
finding generally positive views of the ombudsman and its influence. 
Administrators here reported that the ombudsman had ‘very much’ 
influenced their future activity even though they found it difficult to 
highlight specific changes arising from cases. Finally, Van Acker et al 
(2015) conducted a comparative study of the role of ombudsman schemes 
and audit bodies in generating and sustaining administrative innovation in 
a number of European countries, including the UK. This study’s overall 
conclusion was that the recommendations of ombudsman schemes were 
effective in driving sustainable innovations in organisations.  
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Tribunals 
 
4.3.15. The very limited empirical interest in the impact of tribunals 
allows us to summarise the literature briefly. Young and Wikeley (1992) 
considered the influence of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal on the 
decision-making of bureaucrats working in the Benefits Agency. While 
noting that the quality of decision-making remained low and that 
bureaucrats faced significant pressures in dealing with their day-to-day 
work that might present a barrier to impact, Young and Wikeley (ibid., p. 
260) concluded that the tribunal did influence administrative action and 
‘cast a long shadow’ over administrators.10 Evans (1999) investigated the 
impact of the Special Educational Needs Tribunal on decision-making in 
local authorities in England. This study provided a mixed view of the 
tribunal’s impact, with 85% of respondents reporting that the tribunal had 
not led to any major changes in policy, although 41% said that they had 
amended their procedures as a result of the possibility of an appeal to the 
tribunal. Evans (ibid., p. 32) found that local authorities generally adopted 
a reactive approach and tended to see tribunal decisions as ‘one-offs’ 
rather than as grounds for fundamental changes in policy and practice. 
The National Audit Office (2003) evaluated the way in which feedback 
from tribunals is used as part of a report looking into decision-making and 
medical assessments for incapacity and disability benefits. The report 
found that the feedback arrangements that were in place had been used 
very little and had not had a significant impact on decision-making.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
10
 It should be noted that in later work, Wikeley (2006, 2008) has concluded that changes in social 
security administration mean that the tribunal’s influence on routine decision-making is likely to now be 
reduced.  
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4.4. What factors facilitate or impede the control of bureaucratic 
decision-making by redress mechanisms?  
 
4.4.1. This section reviews the factors that have been suggested as important 
in explaining why redress mechanisms do or do not control bureaucratic 
decision-making. It begins by describing Halliday’s (2004) ‘analytic 
framework’ and then uses an amended version of this framework in order 
to discuss the various factors in the literature.  
 
Halliday’s (2004) framework 
 
4.4.2. Although impact studies have added to our empirical understanding in 
incremental ways, they have not necessarily greatly developed our ability 
to theorise the relationship between redress mechanisms and bureaucracy 
(Hertogh and Halliday 2004). And although individual studies have brought 
particular issues into sharper focus, the broad sweep of factors likely to 
influence the impact of redress mechanisms has been established some 
time ago. Indeed, reviewing literature on the impact of the Supreme Court 
in the United States, for example, Wasby (1970) listed 41 hypotheses 
which he grouped into the following six categories: characteristics of the 
cases and decisions; communication of decisions; the political 
environment; the extent of any follow up; characteristics of those 
responding; beliefs and values of those responding. While this list was 
produced in the context of US impact studies, and produced some 45 years 
ago, the broad categories of factors highlighted by Wasby (ibid.) closely 
match modern attempts at explaining the impact of redress mechanisms. 
 
4.4.3. The most detailed recent attempt to understand the conditions under 
which judicial review will lead to compliance has been made by Halliday 
(2004). His ‘analytic framework’ sets out the conditions required in order 
for judicial decisions to influence bureaucratic behaviour. The conditions 
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relate to three areas: the law; the decision-makers; and the decision-
making environment. In relation to the law, the conditions for impact are 
that the law, as expounded in judicial review decisions, must be clear and 
consistent. In relation to the decision-makers, the conditions are that 
decision-makers must: be aware of the judicial decisions, be committed to 
implementing them, and have the competence to understand and apply 
them. Finally, in relation to the decision-making environment, the model 
of administrative justice set out by judicial review must be dominant 
amongst other influences in the administrative environment.  
 
4.4.4. Halliday’s analytic framework provides a very helpful basis for 
categorising important explanatory factors and has been found to be a 
useful basis to guide empirical enquiry in different contexts (Cowan and 
Halliday 2003, Gill 2012, Hall 2011). It does, however, require some 
amendment to take account of this thesis’ emphasis on multiple redress 
mechanisms and some suggestions in the literature that are not fully 
accounted for in the framework as it stands. The first amendment that is 
required is to broaden out the framework’s first area to include not only 
the law but also non-legal principles of good administration such as those 
developed by ombudsman schemes. In addition, the comparative 
perspective adopted in this thesis requires not only that redress 
mechanisms should be investigated in terms of the clarity and consistency 
of the principles of good administration they propound, but a range of 
other variables in relation to how they operate. Hertogh (2001), for 
example, has suggested that a redress mechanism’s ‘style of control’ is 
important in understanding its policy impact, while Hall (2011) has argued 
that the medium and approach to communicating decisions is as important 
as their substantive content. As a result, the first area of Halliday’s (2004) 
framework is recast to consider the way in which redress mechanisms 
operate, including their roles, their decision-making, the nature of their 
proceedings, and so on.  
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4.4.5. The second area that requires some amendment is Halliday’s (ibid.) 
focus on conditions relating to decision-makers, which currently does not 
have an explicit focus on the nature and structure of bureaucratic 
decision-making as possible factors influencing the likelihood of 
bureaucratic control by redress mechanisms being achieved. As chapters 5 
and 6 will make clear, this is important to this thesis’ field setting, where 
several decision-making areas are considered, with quite different types of 
decision-making operating in each. A clearer focus on decision-making 
itself in addition to the characteristics of decision-makers is, therefore, 
required. As a result, Halliday’s (ibid.) framework is adapted as follows, to 
consider the following areas: 
 
 The characteristics of redress mechanisms 
 The characteristics of decision-making and decision-makers 
 The characteristics of the decision-making environment 
 
Within each area of the adapted framework, the thesis does not limit 
itself to the conditions proposed by Halliday (ibid.) but also draws on a 
range of other factors suggested in the literature. These are considered 
below, organised under the headings of the amended framework. 
 
The characteristics of redress mechanisms 
 
4.4.6. The obvious starting point when considering the ability of redress 
mechanisms to control bureaucratic action is whether the principles being 
expounded in rulings are clear and consistent. If administrators are unable 
to perceive a clear and consistent line of reasoning in decisions, they will 
not be able to deduce what is required of their decision-making. Clarity 
and consistency in the principles of good administration being expounded 
has been found to be a factor in relation to the control function of judicial 
review (e.g. Halliday 2004, Hertogh 2001, Calvo et al 2007), tribunals 
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(Evans 1999), and ombudsman schemes (Gill 2012, Hertogh 2001, IFF/PHSO 
2010, Van Acker et al 2015).  
 
4.4.7. There appears to be broad consensus in the academic literature that the 
principles of good administration developed within administrative law lack 
clarity and coherence, being described by Halliday (2004, p. 112) as 
‘schizophrenic in character’. Daintith and Page (1999) have also pointed to 
the open textured nature of administrative law, which means that 
judgments are unlikely to be predicted by administrators. In relation to 
ombudsman schemes, Van Acker et al (2015) consider that a lack of clarity 
in the evaluation criteria used by ombudsman schemes is a major potential 
barrier to their influence. While some authors have found the principles 
advanced by ombudsman schemes to be clear and consistent (Gill 2012),  
others have emphasised their pragmatic approach and their lack of 
principle (e.g. Crawford and Thompson 1988).  
 
4.4.8. Calvo et al (2007) discuss the importance of considering the type of 
decision being made by the redress mechanism, in addition to the clarity 
and consistency of the principles themselves. Different types of judicial 
decisions are likely to prompt different kinds of outcomes. Calvo et al 
(ibid.) note, for example, that decisions that require the extension of a 
service to a new category or group of citizens are likely to have significant 
consequences at all levels of an organisation; on the other hand decisions 
that are more operational in nature are likely to have a greater impact on 
middle managers and frontline staff.  
 
4.4.9. One issue which has received only limited attention in the literature has 
been the way in which decisions are communicated, particularly in 
relation to the format and presentation of decisions. Langbroek et al 
(2015) in a study looking at judicial decisions in the Netherlands, found 
that judges wrote judgments primarily with a judicial and legal audience 
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in mind, and that the result was that they were unlikely to meet the needs 
of lay people. Meanwhile, one of Wasby’s (1970, p. 246) 41 hypotheses 
concerning the impact of the Supreme Court in the US is that ‘the greater 
the technicality of the language of a decision, the smaller the impact’. Gill 
(2012) also found that, in order to maximise their potential to be 
influential, ombudsman schemes needed to communicate their messages 
in ways that could be easily assimilated by administrators.  
 
4.4.10. The need for channels of communication between redress 
mechanisms and administrators and for their overall relationship to 
emphasise mutual understanding and cooperation has been highlighted by 
some authors. Hertogh’s (2001) insights here are particularly important, 
and he argues that cooperative relationships between redress mechanisms 
and administrators are likely to reduce the barriers that affect each of 
three stages of the implementation process. He suggests that cooperative 
approaches make it easier for administrators to understand judgments (the 
information stage), and are key to reducing both the degree of policy 
tension between a judgment and existing administrative policies (the 
transformation stage) and the possibility of defensive reactions during 
implementation (the processing stage).  
 
4.4.11. Although he does not include it as a distinctive element in his 
framework, Halliday (2004) has discussed the importance of dialogue in 
assisting administrators to understand judicial norms and values. While he 
comments that judges simply issue decisions without further engagement 
with administrators, he points out that literature on regulation has 
suggested that intimate relationships between a regulator and regulatee, 
and the creation of interpretative communities, can be helpful in 
achieving a shared worldview. Given that control by redress mechanisms 
can only be achieved through achieving congruence between their values 
and those of administrators, this appears to be a particularly important 
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factor. Hertogh’s (2001) conclusions also stress this relational dimension, 
while Hall (2011) emphasises the point with reference to communication 
theory, a key tenet of which is that for communication to be effective the 
sender of a message must have a good understanding of the persons for 
whom the message is intended. A close and cooperative relationship 
between redress mechanisms and administrators, therefore, is suggested 
not only to be important in terms of allowing them to disseminate 
messages, but also in terms of improving their understanding of 
administrative contexts and the future effectiveness of their messages.   
 
4.4.12. Direct experience of, and repeated contact with, redress 
mechanisms has also been suggested as a potentially important factor 
(Gregory and Hutchinson 1975, Friedmann 1976, Young and Wikeley 1992). 
Young and Wikeley (ibid.) largely ascribe the influence of the Social 
Security Appeals Tribunal to the fact that decision-makers might be called 
up to defend their decisions and that hearings offer an opportunity to 
understand at first hand the tribunal’s approach to administrative justice. 
Although Partington and Kirton-Darling (2007) suggest that widespread use 
of presenting officers is likely to be impractical, they also point to the 
value of feedback being provided to administrators as part of informal 
relationships. They suggest that feedback is more likely to be effective 
where the relationship between the tribunal and the administrator is one 
of trust and collaboration. The use of mechanisms for feedback such as 
face-to-face communication and training, in addition to written feedback, 
is also suggested as likely to improve the way feedback from tribunals is 
used. In the context of ombudsman schemes, Gill (2012) concluded that 
personal contact was likely to be the most effective way of ensuring that 
administrators found out about and used the messages being sent out by 
an ombudsman scheme.  
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The characteristics of decision-making and decision-makers 
 
4.4.13. Decision-makers’ awareness of what redress mechanisms require 
of them is clearly important: they cannot be controlled and directed by 
principles of good administration of which they are not aware. While this 
may sound simple, the reality of administrators’ routine work means that 
there are significant barriers to finding out about relevant cases (Wikeley 
2006). Halliday (2004) identifies two main factors in relation to awareness: 
whether knowledge is contained within a small group of individuals (such 
as more senior staff); and whether administrators have close and frequent 
contact with their legal advisers. Gill (2012) suggests that, in the context 
of ombudsman schemes, variations in administrators’ awareness are likely 
in terms of both seniority and the degree to which an official occupies a 
specialised dispute resolution role. Gregory and Hutchinson (1975) and 
Friedmann (1976) agree and also suggest that an administrator’s level of 
experience may be significant. Important here is the degree to which 
organisational structures are created for the reception of knowledge from 
redress mechanisms; as Greer and Del Almagro Iniesta (2014) have pointed 
out, institutional structures can be a good indicator of the way in which 
public bodies approach compliance. Hall (2011), for example, found that 
none of the organisations she studied had a formal system for identifying 
and disseminating court judgments to administrators; instead, awareness 
of judgments was ad hoc and dependent on individuals making specific 
efforts to find out about them. Awareness, therefore, appears to be a 
matter of an individual’s role within the organisation, their degree of 
personal commitment to becoming aware of cases, and the extent to 
which organisational structures exist for the dissemination of knowledge 
arising from the work of redress mechanisms. Here, the literature on 
organisational learning (see chapter 3) highlights some important factors, 
particularly in relation to the importance of organisational learning 
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mechanisms in explaining the process through which awareness of 
decisions is achieved. 
 
4.4.14. The degree to which administrators are committed to acting in 
line with the requirements of redress mechanisms is widely seen as an 
important factor. Halliday (2004) argues that decision-makers’ value 
systems must be congruent with those of redress mechanisms and that 
they must feel that compliance with the rulings of redress mechanisms is 
important. In his study, Halliday (ibid.) found that decision-makers were 
influenced by a different set of normative values to the courts, and that 
their administrative culture was resistant to legal norms. The idea of a 
‘clash of values’ between legal and other normative frameworks acting as 
an impediment to the ability of courts to control administrative decision-
making is frequently cited by scholars (e.g. Loveland 1995, Richardson and 
Machin 2000, Sunkin and Pick 2001). Richardson and Machin’s (2000) study 
of the impact of judicial review on the Mental Health Review Tribunal 
presents perhaps the starkest example of such a clash, where the legal 
values of the court and the professional values of doctors were found to be 
in strong competition. Indeed, a number of impact studies have drawn on 
Mashaw’s (1983) models of administrative justice (see chapter 2 where 
these are discussed) in explaining the way that competing value systems 
act as a barrier to the exercise of control by redress mechanisms. Sunkin 
(2004, p.47) refers to the range of factors competing within bureaucracies 
as an ‘administrative soup’ of influences.  
 
4.4.15. King (2012) presents the clash of values between courts and 
administrators as absolute, while Woodhouse (1997) also perceives a 
strong and irreconcilable clash between public law values and those of 
modern managerial bureaucracy. As Mashaw (2010) and Thomas (2011) 
state, few systems of administrative justice can reconcile the inherent 
tensions between individual and collective interests, and between 
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administrative fairness and administrative efficiency. Overall, therefore, 
divergence between the value systems of redress mechanisms and 
administrators is likely to condition commitment to learning from their 
decisions. Similar value clashes have been suggested in relation to 
tribunals. Evans (1999), for example, found that the Special Educational 
Needs Tribunal’s lack of concern for resources meant that its approach to 
decision-making was fundamentally different to that of local authority 
decision-makers. In relation to ombudsman schemes, studies to date have 
not considered the issue in depth, although there is a suggestion that 
ombudsman schemes and decision-makers have values that are reasonably 
congruent (Friedmann 1976, Hertogh 2001). 
 
4.4.16. Halliday (2004) argues that even decision-makers who are aware 
of judgments and are committed to acting in line with them, may fail to 
comply if they lack the skills to identify, draw out, and apply the 
principles contained in judicial decisions. As noted above, court judgments 
are unlikely to be written primarily with the needs of administrators in 
mind, and a degree of legal training will be required to decipher the 
meaning and import of decisions. Decisions of tribunals and ombudsman 
schemes may be more accessible to administrators and, certainly, Gill 
(2012) found that decision-makers reported having no difficulty in 
understanding what ombudsman schemes required of them. Calvo et al 
(2007), differentiating between factors that particularly influence either 
the speed or comprehensiveness with which judgments are implemented, 
argue that legal consciousness and competence are factors that are likely 
to be particularly important in relation to comprehensiveness. Hertogh 
(2001), drawing on concepts from the literature on the implementation of 
public policy, breaks the question of competence down into three 
processes: information, transformation, and processing. Information 
involves the administrator asking themselves what the plain text of the 
ruling means; transformation involves the administrator asking themselves 
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what the consequences of the ruling are in terms of the goals of the 
organisation; and processing involves the administrator asking themselves 
what they should do about a ruling and whether or not to implement it.  
 
The decision-making environment 
 
4.4.17. The final cluster of factors relates to the decision-making 
environment and the idea that the principles being propounded by redress 
mechanisms must be dominant within the bureaucratic setting in order for 
control to be achieved. In his study of homelessness decision-making, 
Halliday (2004) found that a plurality of oversight regimes, an emphasis on 
financial management, and strong pressures from elected politicians all 
competed for influence with judicial norms. He suggested that the extent 
to which one set of norms is stronger than another in bureaucratic settings 
is governed by the degree of sanctioning power associated with those 
norms. In relation to judicial review, he argued that the extent to which it 
is perceived as a sanction is likely to vary and that it has significantly less 
sanctioning power than other regulatory mechanisms.   
 
4.4.18. Other researchers have also pointed to the importance of the 
context in which decision-making takes place. Mullen et al (1996), for 
instance, found that even where a group of officials were legally 
conscientious, their attempts to implement changes could be thwarted by 
internal political pressures within the bureaucracy. Sunkin and Pick (2001) 
also demonstrate the strong influence of organisational values in their 
study, finding that the predominant concerns of an organisation could pull 
in different directions to the concerns expressed by the courts. In addition 
to specific pressures and influences (such as other accountability 
mechanisms), organisational culture appears to be a key factor in terms of 
the way in which judgments are responded to (Calvo et al 2007). Indeed, 
as Thomas (2015) has noted in his exploration of organisational learning in 
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the administrative justice system, culture can operate as a significant 
barrier to improved decision-making. 
 
4.5. Chapter summary 
 
4.5.1. This chapter began by considering the extent to which redress 
mechanisms should control bureaucratic decision-making and 
acknowledged that this was a contested issue in relation to each 
mechanism. It then considered the linked issue of whether redress 
mechanisms could control bureaucratic decision-making to any significant 
degree, with reference to theoretical discussions in the literature. This is 
an issue which has been treated with a great deal of scepticism in relation 
to judicial review, which has received little attention in relation to 
tribunals, and which has generated a more optimistic outlook in relation to 
ombudsman schemes. This section of the chapter proceeded to conclude 
with a discussion of whether current administrative justice policy endorsed 
and supported the control functions of redress mechanisms. While 
rhetorical commitment to the idea that decisions by redress mechanisms 
should guide administrative behaviour still appears to be in place, the 
chapter noted that outwith the ombudsman area, there were few positive 
policy developments aimed at making this apparent commitment a reality. 
 
4.5.2. The chapter then considered the empirical evidence about the 
effectiveness of redress mechanisms’ control functions. Studies about 
judicial review are largely pessimistic in relation to the extent to which it 
achieves impact, although a small number of studies are more positive. 
The more optimistic outlook of the theoretical work on ombudsman 
schemes is also reflected in the empirical literature, while the very small 
number of studies regarding tribunals makes even tentative conclusions 
difficult. The chapter ended by considering the perhaps more important 
question of why control may be exercised in some cases and not others. 
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Here, Halliday’s (2004) analytic framework was adapted to suit the 
broader focus of this thesis and then used as a basis for organising and 
discussing the various factors that have been found to be relevant in the 
empirical literature.  
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5. EDUCATION LAW, POLICY, AND REDRESS 
5.1. Introduction 
 
5.1.1. This chapter provides an outline of education law and policy in England. 
The chapter begins by providing an historical overview of the education 
system in England. It then concentrates on the areas of education law and 
policy that are of interest in this thesis: admission to schools, home-to-
school transport, and special educational needs (SEN). For each area, an 
overview of the system for decision-making is provided, as well as a 
description of the statutory framework that governs that decision-making. 
A brief section also considers the role of cross-cutting legislation, such as 
the Human Rights Act 1998, in the education sector. The chapter ends by 
discussing the various redress mechanisms that are available for citizens to 
challenge decision-making in the education field. 
 
5.2. The education system in England: an historical overview 
 
5.2.1. While warning against over-simplification, Ball (2014, p.65) nonetheless 
suggests that it is helpful to divide modern education policy into three 
distinct periods: 1944 to 1976, 1976 to 1997, and 1997 to 2013. This 
division is followed in the discussion below although the period of the 
Coalition government (2010 – 2015) is discussed separately.  
 
1944 to 1976: the post-war consensus and beyond 
 
5.2.2. The Education Act 1944 (‘the 1944 Act’) was a key moment in the 
development of English education law and policy. The 1944 Act introduced 
free primary and secondary education for all children, with provision being 
made by local authorities and voluntary organisations (Noden et al 2014). 
It introduced a tripartite system of secondary schools, which included 
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technical schools, secondary modern schools, and grammar schools. There 
was, at this time, significant consensus amongst politicians, civil servants, 
and teachers, that state education was crucial to economic and social 
welfare (Chitty 2014). The system that emerged from the 1944 Act was 
one of partnership between central government, local government, and 
schools, in which a national framework of state education was 
administered on a local basis. While the 1944 Act was a landmark, it 
nonetheless fudged a number of issues. Feintuck and Stephens (2013, p.31) 
argue that unresolved issues included the debates between meritocracy 
and egalitarianism, secularism and faith, and parental choice and state 
planning. The other major development in this period was the 
development of comprehensive education, the schooling of all children 
within a single type of school and without selection (Chitty 2014). The 
implementation of comprehensive reorganisation has been described as 
‘patchy and incomplete’ (Feintuck and Stephens ibid., p. 32), albeit West 
et al (2011) note that by the early 1980s comprehensive education was 
almost universal in England.  
 
1976 to 1997: a quasi-market in education 
 
5.2.3. In the period 1976 to 1997, successive governments saw education as a 
means to enhance economic productivity rather than as a social good 
(Feintuck and Stephens 2013). This period saw a break from the 
comprehensive system of schooling that had partially emerged in the 1960s 
and increasing polarisation over education policy between the main 
political parties (Gorard et al 2013). The partnership between central 
government, local government, and teachers began to fray as central 
government’s approach became more directive (Chitty 2014). Initially, the 
most important piece of legislation was the Education Act 1980 which 
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introduced the concept of parental choice of schools (Noden et al 2014).11 
The next watershed was the Education Reform Act 1988 (‘the 1988 Act’), 
which inter alia established a national curriculum, enhanced school 
autonomy, and entrenched the concept of parental choice. The 1988 Act 
effectively provided for a ‘quasi market’ in education, in which parental 
choice, league tables of examination results, and independent reports on 
the quality of schools were all designed to improve standards through 
competition (Rodda et al 2013). At the same time, however, there was a 
countervailing impulse towards centralising power and imposing uniformity 
(Glatter 2012).  
 
1997 to 2010: a neoliberal consensus 
 
5.2.4. The period 1997 to 2010 featured the end to the ‘national system, 
locally administered’, with a significant reduction in the role of local 
authorities, an increase in the role of central government, and a huge 
increase in the autonomy of the school system. Despite some departures 
from previous Conservative policy, the New Labour Government’s 
approach was broadly congruent with the approaches of the 1980s and 
1990s (Chitty 2014; Feintuck and Stephens 2013). The most significant 
legislation introduced at this time was the School Standards and 
Framework Act 1998 (‘the 1998 Act’), which included, amongst other 
measures, provisions for increasing diversity by allowing more schools to 
specialise and changes to the structure of the school system. Chitty (2014) 
notes that the period between 1997 and 2010 resulted in an extremely 
complex and divided school system, with more than 20 types of secondary 
school in existence. An important development was the introduction of 
academies in 2000. Academies are publicly-funded independent schools, 
which operate as charities and have a funding agreement with the 
                                               
11
 Although the language of choice was used, in reality parents have only ever had the right to express a 
preference with regard to the school they wish their child to attend.  
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Secretary of State for Education rather than being part of the local 
authority framework (Glatter 2012).  
 
2010 to 2015: accelerated change  
 
5.2.5. Ideologically, the Coalition Government which assumed office in May 
2010 shared many of the assumptions of the preceding administration 
(Feintuck and Stephens 2013). The main difference has been the speed 
with which the Coalition was prepared to push for a reformed schools 
system. One innovation was to repurpose the academies programme so 
that, rather than being schools sponsored in disadvantaged areas, academy 
status would be a reward for excellence (Chitty 2014). Indeed, the 
Academies Act 2010 (‘the 2010 Act’) allowed maintained schools to apply 
for academy status and gave all schools rated ‘excellent’ by Ofsted an 
automatic right to this status. Lupton and Thomson (2015, p.31) show the 
scale of the transformation in the schools system following the 2010 Act: 
while there were only 203 secondary academies when the Coalition took 
office in 2010, by 2014 there were 1,893. Another major and controversial 
innovation to the school system was free schools. These schools are a type 
of academy, which can be set up by parents, community groups, and faith 
groups in response to parental demand (Lupton and Thomson 2015; Green 
et al 2015). They have, however, been subject to debate in terms of the 
extent to which they will lead to further social segregation within the 
school system and the extent to which they can be held publically 
accountable (Harris 2012). Free schools have been described by Green et 
al (2015) as the final stage in the process of neoliberal, supply-side reform 
to the education system.  
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The current school system in England 
 
5.2.6. West and Bailey (2013, p.138) describe the current system of education 
in England as follows: 
 
‘…the school-based education system in England is changing 
radically from a national system locally administered via 
democratically elected local education authorities to a centrally 
controlled system with the Secretary of State having legally 
binding contractual arrangements with an increasing number of 
private education providers.’  
 
While the local authority’s role has been much reduced, it nonetheless 
retains significant powers and responsibilities in relation to those schools 
which remain under local authority control. As we shall see in the next 
sections of this chapter, local authorities also retain important functions 
regarding the coordination of admission arrangements, the provision of 
home-to-school report, and the identification, assessment and provision 
for children with SEN (the areas which are of main concern to this thesis).   
 
5.3. The policy and statutory framework for admissions to school 
 
Overview 
 
5.3.1. School admission is one of the most controversial areas of education 
policy, since the allocation of pupils to schools has powerful implications 
for equal opportunity (Tough and Brooks 2007, West et al 2011). The 
school admissions process strongly affects the interests of children and 
parents, and the latter often report feeling a high degree of anxiety about 
the process (Coldron et al 2008, Lamb 2009). One reason for the increasing 
importance of the admissions system is the market-based reforms referred 
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to earlier and the diversity in school provision which has resulted; the way 
in which school places are allocated in such a system is of central 
importance from the perspective of equity and social mobility (Feintuck 
and Stephens 2013). Much of the empirical literature on admissions has 
been concerned with assessing the extent to which local admission criteria 
and policies are lawful (Allen et al 2011; Morris 2014; West et al 2009; 
West et al 2011) and whether the system promotes social justice (Green et 
al 2015). 
 
5.3.2. Not surprisingly, the school admissions area is one which generates large 
numbers of individual disputes (Feintuck and Stephens 2013). There were 
50,550 appeals for primary and secondary school places in 2013/ 2014 
(Department for Education 2014, p.1). Of those, 36,965 appeals proceeded 
to a hearing (Ibid., p.1). The percentage of appeals decided in favour of 
the parents was 26.7% for secondary school places and 19.6% for primary 
school places (Ibid., pp.2-3). Taylor et al (2002) argue that the high 
volume of appeals which are lodged by parents are a symptom of market 
frustration, caused by an inability to satisfy parental demands. Another 
concern has been that the admissions appeal system facilitates access to 
school choice for well-educated middle class parents at the expense of 
others (Coldron et al 2002). Meanwhile both the LGO and the AJTC have 
issued guidance on good practice in admission appeals in response to 
concerns about the fairness of the process (LGO 2011, AJTC 2012a). 
 
How the admissions system works  
 
5.3.3. The statutory framework for school admissions is provided by Part III of 
the 1998 Act, regulations made under the Act, and statutory codes of 
practice issued by the Secretary of State. The period in which the 
fieldwork was completed was one of transition and, therefore, 
bureaucratic decision-makers were still conducting part of their work 
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under regulations issued in 2008, in addition to using the new regulations 
issued in 2012 for their prospective work. In addition to the regulations, 
detailed guidance was provided to local authorities in the Schools 
Admission Code (the Admissions Code) and the School Admission Appeals 
Code (the Appeals Code). 
 
5.3.4. The first step in the admissions process is the creation of admission 
policies (known as ‘admission arrangements’) by the admission authorities 
of individual schools. The body which carries out the role of admission 
authority varies depending on the type of school: for community and 
voluntary controlled schools it is the local authority, while for other types 
of schools it is the school’s governing body. The main purpose of school 
admission arrangements is to set out the criteria which will be applied to 
decide which children will receive a school place in cases where a school is 
oversubscribed. Each school is entitled to have its own admission 
arrangements and criteria (Office of the Children’s Commissioner 2014). 
 
5.3.5. Once admission authorities have drawn up their admission arrangements, 
it is the local authority’s responsibility to coordinate the admissions 
process: they bring together the admission policies of individual schools 
and publish them within a single composite prospectus. Parents fill out a 
single application form, which asks them to list the schools they would like 
their child to attend in order of preference. The form is then submitted to 
the local authority. Where a parent has expressed a preference for a 
school and where the school is not oversubscribed, parental preferences 
must be met. However, where a school is oversubscribed, admission 
authorities must then apply the criteria in their admissions arrangements. 
Once the criteria have been applied, local authorities are responsible for 
making an offer of a school place to children. 12   
                                               
12
 Parents may also apply for school places ‘in year’. Such applications might be due to children moving 
to a new locality or due to issues such as exclusion from school. 
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5.3.6. Admission authorities are required to set up Independent Appeal Panels 
(IAPs) to hear appeals. IAPs are set up by the admission authorities against 
whom cases have been appealed i.e. local authorities or governing bodies 
depending on the type of school. Panels are composed of three members, 
one of whom must have experience of working in education and one of 
whom must be a lay member. Admission authorities have a duty to recruit 
and train panel members and to provide a clerk to administer hearings. 
Once a parent lodges an appeal, they will be invited to attend an appeal 
hearing. In reaching a decision, IAPs must first consider whether the 
admission arrangements were lawful and properly applied and, assuming 
that is the case, must reach a decision on whether any prejudice to the 
school in admitting the child outweighs the prejudice that the child would 
suffer as a result of not being admitted. There is no right of appeal against 
the decisions of IAPs, although parents may make complaints to the LGO or 
apply for judicial review. 
 
5.4. The policy and statutory framework for provision of home-to-school 
transport 
 
5.4.1. The statutory framework for home-to-school transport is simpler than 
admissions, being neither subject to regulations nor binding guidance. The 
main statutory provisions for school transport are contained in the 
Education Act 1996 (‘the 1996 Act’) and, essentially, (a) require local 
authorities to assist certain children with home-to-school travel 
arrangements and (b) empower local authorities to assist other (non-
eligible) children should they so wish. Children for whom transport must 
be provided include: those with SEN, disabilities or mobility problems; 
children who live on a walking route which is not suitable; and who live 
outside the statutory walking distance. Another factor that local 
authorities must consider as part of making decisions about the provision 
of school transport is the religious preferences of the parents. Most local 
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authorities also apply locally determined health and social criteria as part 
of discretionary arrangements. 
 
5.4.2. The 1996 Act is supplemented by non-binding statutory guidance issued 
by the Secretary of State (The Guidance on Home to School Travel and 
Transport – ‘The Transport Guidance’), to which local authorities must 
have regard in exercising their functions. Unlike school admissions and the 
SEN area, there is no statutory right of appeal against decisions of the 
local authority to refuse to provide home-to-school transport. The 
Transport Guidance in place during the fieldwork period recommended 
that a ‘robust’ appeals process should be set-up to review decisions 
challenged by parents, but did not specify the form that this should take. 
In the absence of a right of external appeal, parents’ remedies in this area 
are restricted to making a complaint to the LGO or applying for judicial 
review. 
 
5.5. The policy and statutory framework for special educational needs 
(SEN) 
 
Overview 
 
5.5.1. Children with SEN can be defined as ‘…children who face significant 
barriers in learning due to disability or other inherent cause of difficulty’ 
(Harris and Smith 2011, p.54). In practice, the conditions that are 
considered to amount to SEN are subject to controversy between 
professionals, politicians, parents, and academics (Tomlinson 2012). In 
2014, 17.1% of pupils in English schools were identified as having some 
form of SEN (Norwich 2014, p. 405). It is important to note that SEN can be 
associated with, but is different from, disability: children with SEN may or 
may not also be disabled (Harris and Smith 2011). Although the focus in 
this thesis is on decision-making conducted within the SEN framework, it is 
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important to note that children with SEN also have certain rights and 
entitlements arising from other cross cutting and overlapping statutory 
frameworks, including disability discrimination (the Equality Act 2010) and 
children’s social care (e.g. the Children Act 2004). Booth et al (2011) 
argue that a distinguishing feature of the statutory SEN regime is that it is 
rights based and largely resource blind, unlike other areas of 
administration, which explicitly allow for a balancing of entitlements to 
services with the availability of resources. 
 
How the SEN system works 
 
5.5.2. The main provisions for SEN that applied at the time of the fieldwork 
were contained in Part IV of the 1996 Act and the Special Educational 
Needs and Disability Act 2001 (‘the 2001 Act’).13 The regulations made 
under the 1996 Act were the Education (Special Educational Needs) 
(England) (Consolidation) Regulations 2001 and the statutory code issued 
by the Secretary of State is referred to as ‘The Special Educational Needs 
Code of Practice’ (the SEN Code). The latter was statutory guidance rather 
than a binding code. The main aims of the SEN system are to ensure that 
children with SEN are identified and assessed, and a determination made 
regarding what kind of provision was required (Harris and Smith 2011). 
Three levels of support existed: School Action (where needs can be met 
within a school), School Action Plus (where needs can be met within a 
school but with some external help), and statements of SEN (where 
following an assessment, the education of a child is legally prescribed in a 
statement). The responsibilities of local authorities within the SEN system 
relate largely to identifying, assessing and providing for children with the 
highest level of need, as well as ensuring suitable local educational 
provision exists to meet such needs (Tomlinson 2012).  
 
                                               
13
 The Children and Families Act 2014, subsequently brought in a new system for SEN in England. 
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5.5.3. Local authorities are only required to carry out assessments where they 
consider that a child probably has SEN. Where a decision to carry out an 
assessment is taken, a formal multi-disciplinary assessment is carried out 
of the child’s needs. Once the assessment is completed, the local 
authority must decide whether to make and maintain a statement of the 
child’s SEN. The local authority may decide, at this stage, that a child’s 
needs can be adequately dealt with under School Action or School Action 
Plus. If a child’s needs cannot be met adequately from within a school’s 
own resources, local authorities produce a draft statement of SEN, which 
is shared with parents before being finalised. The final statement, which 
must be reviewed annually, is a legally enforceable document of 
entitlement and is seen by many parents as a guarantee that their child’s 
needs will be consistently met (Booth et al 2011). Parents may appeal to a 
tribunal if they are unhappy with decisions taken by local authorities. 
 
5.5.4. The system for the identification, assessment, and provision of SEN 
education described above has often been seen by those with experience 
of it as a field of ‘unwarranted and unnecessary struggle’ (Lamb 2009, 
p.6). Booth et al (2011) refer to the SEN area as the locus of a number of 
‘fights’: parents fight for services, local authorities fight to safeguard 
public resources, and children fight to have a voice of their own. The 
widespread view that the SEN area represents a battleground for parents, 
schools, and local authorities, combined with parents’ willingness to 
challenge decisions about their children’s education, has made SEN ‘one of 
the most dispute-laden areas of education’ (Harris and Riddell 2011, 
p.xiv). The most recent figures for appeals to the tribunal show that in 
2012/ 2013 3,602 appeals were registered by parents, with the most 
common decisions appealed against being a refusal to carry out an 
assessment (36%) and the content of a statement (46%) (Department for 
Education 2014a, p.23). 
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5.6. Human rights and equalities legislation 
 
5.6.1. Several growing and cross-cutting areas of law have effect in the 
education area. In international law, there has been a consistent 
commitment to the right to education and the right to have individual 
preferences met with regard to its provision (Harris and Riddell 2011, p.1). 
A number of international law instruments contain provisions in relation to 
educational rights, although in practice they tend to operate as 
declarations of principles rather than enforceable rights (Harris 2007). In 
the UK, Protocol 1 Article 2 of the ECHR has been incorporated into 
domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998 (‘the HRA 1998’). This article 
requires that no one is denied the right to education and that respect must 
be given to parents’ rights to ensure their child is taught in line with their 
moral and philosophical convictions. However, Harris and Smith (2011) 
have argued that the right to education in the ECHR and the HRA 1998 only 
provides guarantees in the most extreme cases. Feintuck and Stephens 
(2013) have similarly argued that the notion of individual rights in the 
context of education, an activity which is fundamentally collectivist in 
nature, must in practice be heavily curtailed. In the admissions context, 
for example, the Admissions Code states that although the HRA 1998 
confers the right to education, it does not entitle parents to secure a 
place at a particular school of their choice (Department for Education 
2014). 
 
5.6.2. An important development in education law was the Special Education 
Needs and Disability 2001 Act, which made the Disability Discrimination 
Act 1995 (‘the DDA 1995’) applicable to schools and extended the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction to consider disability discrimination claims. As a 
result, local authorities and schools came under a duty to make reasonable 
adjustments to education provision, prevent discrimination in admissions 
to school, and guarantee access to the curriculum for disabled children 
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(Booth et al 2011). The DDA 1995 was subsequently consolidated into the 
Equality Act 2010, which extended the duties of schools and local 
authorities by requiring that they provide disabled children auxiliary aids 
as a reasonable adjustment where required (Booth et al 2011). The 
Admissions Code outlines the key duties imposed by equalities legislation 
in relation to disability as avoiding discriminating against, harassing, or 
victimising disabled children with regard to arrangements for and decisions 
about admissions to school. The SEN Code makes clear that these duties 
also apply to schools with regards to arrangements made for SEN provision. 
 
5.7. The redress landscape in the education sector 
 
5.7.1. This section now provides an outline of the overall dispute resolution 
landscape in education. Figure 5.1 below provides a summary of the main 
formal mechanisms for challenging local authority decision making in each 
decision-making area.14 As shown in figure 5.1, the major redress 
processes available in this area are: internal complaint and appeal 
processes; the IAPs; the LGO; the tribunal and upper tribunal; and the 
court (via judicial review). The following paragraphs discuss each of these 
processes.15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
14
 Figure 5.1 focuses on disputes with regard to actions and decisions affecting individual children and, as 
a result, excludes the Office of the Schools Adjudicator (OSA). The OSA is not a redress mechanism, in 
the sense that it does not provide remedies for individuals but is limited to considering the lawfulness of 
admission arrangements. Figure 5.1 also does not include the Education Funding Agency (EFA), which 
has a role in relation to admission complaints for own admission authorities.  
15
 A description of the role of IAPs has already been provided above, as a result, IAPs are not discussed 
again here. 
- 137 - 
 
Figure 5.1: redress mechanisms for challenging local authority 
education decision-making 
  
 
 
Internal appeal and complaints procedures 
 
5.7.2. For each area of decision-making, parents’ first recourse is to raise the 
matter informally with the local authority. Attempts at resolution through 
negotiation are likely to be common, although there is no published 
information on the volume of cases challenged in this way. In the SEN 
area, Harris and Smith (2011) point out that a high volume of cases are 
likely to be solved through negotiation and with the help of the Parent 
Partnership Service.16 If informal attempts at resolution fail to produce an 
acceptable outcome, one option will be to use an internal complaint or 
                                               
16
 Local authorities are required to fund advice for parents in relation to SEN. Local Parent Partnership Services 
exist in all local authority areas. 
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appeal process operated by the local authority.17 For all three decision-
making areas, complaints about the service that has been provided can be 
made using the local authority’s corporate complaints procedure. Referrals 
may then be made to the LGO. In the school transport area, as noted 
above, statutory guidance recommends that local authorities should set up 
robust internal appeal procedures for challenging decisions to refuse the 
provision of home-to-school transport. Such procedures are different from 
complaints processes in that they consider the merits of decisions. School 
transport is the only area considered in this thesis which features an 
internal appeal process and also the only area in which there is no 
external right of appeal.  
 
LGO 
 
5.7.3. The LGO considers complaints about maladministration resulting in 
injustice. The LGO was established by the Local Government Act 1974 
(‘the 1974 Act’). The 1974 Act makes clear that the LGO’s jurisdiction is 
restricted to considering the service provided to individuals: the LGO is not 
an appeal mechanism and cannot question the merits of decisions arrived 
at without maladministration. However, where maladministration is 
identified, the LGO can ask local authorities to review a decision. In 
education, the LGO’s jurisdiction is restricted to considering the actions of 
local authorities and complaints about the internal management of schools 
are excluded from its jurisdiction. The LGO’s decisions and 
recommendations are not binding and are subject to judicial review.  
 
5.7.4. The LGO received 3,051 complaints about education and children’s 
services in 2013/ 2014 (figure derived from LGO 2014), which amounted to 
17% of the total complaints received by the organisation. 38% of 
                                               
17
 Although figure 5.1 suggests a sequential process, the use of negotiation may continue throughout the life of the 
dispute.  
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complaints about education and children’s services were upheld in 2013/ 
2014. Unfortunately, the LGO no longer provides a detailed breakdown of 
the nature of the complaints received and detailed data is now only 
available for the year 2011/ 2012 (LGO 2012). Figures for this year show 
that 4,035 education and children’s services complaints were received, of 
which 1,451 complaints related to children’s services and 2,584 complaints 
related to education. Complaints about the operation of IAPs were the 
most significant area of education complaint (1,119 complaints). There 
were 349 complaints about SEN provision, 194 complaints about school 
transport, and 102 complaints about the general admissions process. The 
LGO does not produce formal investigation reports on all cases and 
resolves most of them informally. In 2011/ 2012, 77 investigation reports 
were published by the LGO, of which 19 related to education matters. 13 
reports related to school admission and admission appeals, 5 related to 
special education needs, and 1 related to school transport. In the SEN 
area, common areas of complaint are delays in carrying out assessments or 
producing statements, and failures to implement the provision required in 
a statement (Harris and Smith 2011). 
 
The tribunal and upper tribunal 
 
5.7.5. A national tribunal for dealing with SEN appeals was first established 
following the Education Act 1993 as the Special Educational Needs 
Tribunal. Subsequently, as a result of the 2001 Act, the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction was extended to cover disability discrimination claims and 
became known as the Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal 
(SENDIST). As a result of the reorganisation of the tribunal service 
provided for by the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, SENDIST 
was incorporated into a new unified tribunal structure, consisting of a first 
tier tribunal, with various chambers, and an upper tribunal, also with 
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several chambers. Prior to the creation of the upper tribunal, appeals 
were heard by the Court of Appeal. 
 
5.7.6. The tribunal has jurisdiction to consider appeals against a range of local 
authority decisions in the SEN area.18 The most commonly appealed 
decisions are when a local authority has refused to carry out an 
assessment and when a parent disagrees with the contents of a statement. 
The tribunal considers the merits of the situation being appealed and its 
legality. It does not consider whether the original decision was sound, but 
only what the decision should be on the basis of what is known at the time 
of the hearing. The tribunal’s decisions are binding (subject to an appeal 
to the upper tribunal on a point of law). In 2012/ 2013, 3,602 appeals 
were lodged with the tribunal in relation to SEN and disability. 76% of 
these appeals were withdrawn or resolved prior to a hearing. Of the 24% 
that reached a hearing, 85% were successful, at least to some extent, from 
the parent’s perspective (Department for Education 2014). According to 
Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service’s tribunal decisions database, 
64 education related decisions were published by the upper tribunal 
between 2009 and June 2015.19  
 
The court  
 
5.7.7. Parents may apply for judicial review if they consider that an action or a 
failure to act on the part of the local authority was illegal, either because 
to do so breached a particular statute or because the action breached 
administrative law. Applications for judicial review are usually heard by 
the Administrative Court, although they may also now be considered by 
                                               
18
 As noted in chapter 1, unless otherwise specified, references to ‘the tribunal’ in this thesis are to the 
first tier tribunal (special educational needs and disability). 
19
 Not all UT decisions are published. Instead, HMCTS decides which cases to publish based on various 
criteria laid out in guidance (HMCTS 2013).  Statistics are not provided for the number of education cases 
appealed to the upper tribunal. 
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the upper tribunal.20 The main grounds for judicial review are that a 
decision, action or omission by a public body was: ultra vires; 
unreasonable; breached a citizen’s legitimate expectations; or was 
procedurally unfair. If a court finds in favour of the applicant a range of 
remedies are available, including: quashing a decision, prohibiting a course 
of action, and requiring a course of action.  
 
5.7.8. The Ministry of Justice’s (MoJ’s) summary statistics are only broken 
down on the basis of whether judicial review applications relate to 
criminal justice, immigration and asylum, or ‘civil – other’. In 2014, there 
were 1,903 applications for permission to apply for judicial review falling 
in the ‘civil – other’ category (Ministry of Justice 2015). The MoJ now 
publishes data tables showing more detailed categories for the ‘civil – 
other’ category. In 2014, 79 cases were listed under the topic ‘education’. 
Of the 79 education cases, 15 were granted permission to proceed to 
judicial review, 48 were refused, and 17 were classified as ‘other’ 
(derived from Ministry of Justice 2015). Of the 15 cases that were granted 
permission to proceed, 5 remained open at the time the statistics were 
published in March 2015. Of the 10 closed cases that had been granted 
permission to proceed, the court reached a substantive decision in seven 
cases (it is assumed that the three other cases were withdrawn). Four of 
these cases were allowed, while three were dismissed. Although these 
statistics give a sense of the volume of activity in relation to education 
judicial reviews, it should be noted that the statistics also cover further 
and higher education and the activities of bodies other than local 
authorities, which are not of concern to this thesis. As a result, the 
number of judicial reviews relating to the specific area under 
consideration here is likely to be very small.   
 
                                               
20
 As noted in chapter 1, unless otherwise specified references in this thesis to ‘the court’ refer to the 
Administrative Court. 
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5.8. Chapter summary 
 
5.8.1. This chapter has provided an overview of education law and policy in 
England. In relation to the decision-making areas of concern to this thesis, 
the chapter outlined how each of these operates in practice and described 
the statutory framework which governs them. The chapter then considered 
human rights and equalities legislation, before ending with an overview of 
the redress landscape in this area. 
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6. METHODOLOGY 
 
6.1. Introduction  
 
6.1.1. This chapter sets out the methodology used to investigate empirically 
the control of bureaucratic decision-making by redress mechanisms. The 
chapter aims to describe the methodology, to justify it, and to identify its 
limitations.  
 
6.2. Research aim and objectives  
 
6.2.1. The overall aim of the research was: to explore the factors that 
facilitate or obstruct the control of bureaucratic decision-making by 
redress mechanisms. This overall aim was supported by a series of more 
detailed objectives: 
 
(i) To describe how redress mechanisms, individually and 
collectively, seek to achieve control over bureaucratic decision-
making and how bureaucratic decision-makers respond to the 
decisions (and other actions) of redress mechanisms; 
 
(ii) To compare differences between individual redress 
mechanisms, between different areas of bureaucratic decision-
making, and between the responses of bureaucratic decision-
makers; 
 
(iii) To explain the circumstances in which redress mechanisms’ 
attempts to exercise control are more or less likely to be 
successful by providing (a) analytical refinements to existing 
theoretical understandings and (b) extending these through the 
generation of novel hypotheses; and 
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(iv) To evaluate current administrative justice policies in light of 
the research’s findings. 
 
6.2.2. Walliman (2006) states that there are a number of potential objectives 
that a research project may have in relation to a phenomenon of interest: 
description, categorisation, explanation, evaluation, comparison, and 
action or change. As will be clear, this thesis seeks to describe, compare, 
explain, and evaluate aspects of redress mechanisms’ bureaucratic control 
functions. With regard to the thesis’ aim to provide ‘explanation’, some 
important caveats need to be discussed. The first is that objective (iii) 
should be read in the context of the overall aim to ‘explore’ the exercise 
of bureaucratic control by redress mechanisms. As a result, it is expected 
that the explanations produced will be exploratory and suggestive, rather 
than conclusive. The second is that caution is required with regard to 
generalisation in qualitative research: 
‘Simply put, small-N studies are not so much designed to offer 
analytical generalisation as analytical refinement… opportunities 
for refining our understanding of certain phenomena.’ (Tsoukas 
2009, p.295) 
As Gray (2009) notes, the development of hypotheses for testing in future 
research is often a more realistic objective than grand theory-building. As a 
result, objective (iii) has been defined very carefully: the objective here is 
to produce analytical refinements in relation to existing theory and, where 
novel areas are identified, to develop hypotheses for testing in future 
research. 
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6.3. Choice of field setting  
 
6.3.1. This section explains why the decision was taken to study the 
phenomenon of bureaucratic control by redress mechanisms in the local 
authority education area. In order to demonstrate the quality of research, 
it is important to be transparent about the reasons for selecting a 
particular field setting (Flick 2009, Gough 2003). The main criteria for 
selecting the field setting was to find an area which was subject to 
significant review by all three redress mechanisms. It was considered 
important that bureaucratic decision-makers should have significant 
exposure to redress mechanisms, so that they would be able to provide 
sufficient and meaningful data.  
 
6.3.2. Statistical data produced by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), Her Majesty’s 
Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS), the Parliamentary and Health 
Services Ombudsman (PHSO), and the LGO were reviewed to identity areas 
subject to high levels of review. Statistics for 2010 – the latest available at 
the time the empirical fieldwork was being designed – showed that there 
were 10,548 judicial review applications in total, with 8,122 of these 
related to asylum and immigration cases, 335 to criminal cases and 2,091 
were classified as ‘other’ (Ministry of Justice 2011). No breakdown was 
provided about which cases fell within the ‘other’ category.21 As a result 
of this limited court data, the choice of fieldwork setting was determined 
with reference only to incidence of review by tribunals and ombudsman 
schemes. 
 
6.3.3. In 2009/ 2010, there were 793,900 appeals made to tribunals (HMCTS 
2011), 8,543 complaints received by the PHSO (excluding NHS complaints) 
(PHSO 2011), and 18,020 complaints received by the LGO (LGO 2011). 
                                               
21
 Data tables referred to in chapter 5, providing a more detailed breakdown of applications for judicial 
review, were published subsequent to the fieldwork being undertaken. 
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Table 6.1 below shows the top six areas in which complaints and appeals 
were received in 2009/ 2010, including the total number of complaints and 
appeals received in that year. 
 
Table 6.1: top six areas of complaint and appeal in 2009/ 2010 across 
central and local government 
 
Tribunal PHSO LGO 
Social security and 
child benefit (339,200 
appeals) 
The Department of 
Work and Pensions 
(3,000 complaints) 
 
Housing (3,694 
complaints) 
 
Immigration and 
asylum (159,800 
appeals) 
Her Majesty’s Revenue 
and Customs (1,896 
complaints) 
 
Education and 
children’s services 
(3,137 complaints, 
with 2,136 about 
education) 
 
Mental health (25,200 
appeals) 
 
 
Home Office (952 
complaints) 
 
Planning and building 
control (3,007 
complaints) 
 
Tax (10,400) 
 
 
 
Ministry of Justice (931 
complaints) 
 
Benefits and tax (2,106 
complaints) 
 
Criminal injuries 
(3,800 appeals) 
 
 
Department for 
Transport (353 
complaints) 
 
Highways and 
transport (1,676 
complaints) 
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Special education 
needs and disability 
(3,400 appeals) 
Other (1,411 
complaints) 
 
Environmental 
services, public 
protection and 
regulation (1,851 
complaints) 
 
6.3.4 The above data provided a guide to narrow down areas in which the 
research could be located. Social security was initially seen as the most 
suitable field, as it featured high levels of review and was a classic area of 
welfare administration. Unfortunately, however, the Department for Work 
and Pensions declined the researcher’s request for access. In choosing an 
alternative field work setting a key consideration was to minimise the risk 
of access being denied. For this reason, it was decided to select an area of 
local rather than central government decision-making for the research, the 
idea being that there were more local authorities and, therefore, more 
chance that some would agree to take part.  
 
6.3.5 Having come to this view, the administrative area that seemed most 
suitable was the local authority education area. It had relatively high 
volumes of complaint and appeal (3,400 appeals and 2,136 complaints in 
2009/ 2010). This represented the 6th highest volume of appeals to the 
Tribunal Service and the 3rd highest volume of complaint to the LGO. The 
local authority education area was also attractive in that it was important 
in terms of the rights and entitlements being decided and featured a variety 
of decision-making approaches across admissions, transport, and SEN.   
 
6.4 Ontological and epistemological considerations 
 
6.4.1 Even where a researcher takes a broadly a-theoretical stance, it is not 
possible to conduct research ‘…without some theory that guides the 
researcher in what is relevant to observe and what name to attach to what 
- 148 - 
 
is happening’ (Anfara and Mertz 2006, p.195). Ontology has been described 
as the study of ‘what kind of things really exist in the world’ (Hughes and 
Sharrock 1997, p.5) or ‘what there is to be investigated’ (Walliman 2006, 
p.15). According to Gray (2009) there are two important ontological 
positions: the first is the idea that the world is continually changing around 
us and that reality is an emergent process; the second posits that the world 
is unchanging and that the reality we see around us is permanent and static. 
Gray (Ibid.) summarises the positions as being an ontology of ‘becoming’ 
and an ontology of ‘being’.  
6.4.2 Epistemology has been described as ‘how we know things and what 
knowledge is acceptable within a discipline’ (Walliman 2006, p.15). As 
opposed to ontology, therefore, which deals with the nature of social 
reality, epistemology refers to the status of our knowledge about social 
reality, how knowledge is generated and how knowledge relates to truth. 
Gray (2009) has suggested that there are three types of epistemology: 
objectivist epistemology assumes that reality is separate from the 
consciousness of the observer and that objective truth can be established; 
constructionist epistemology assumes that reality is constructed through 
interaction between the observer and external reality; and subjectivist 
epistemology assumes that meaning is entirely imposed on the outside 
world by the observer.   
6.4.3 The position adopted in this thesis does not fit comfortably within these 
ontological or epistemological paradigms. The main assumptions 
underpinning the thesis are that: (i) social reality is created through 
interaction of the observer with an external, objectively existing social 
world and (ii) as a result of the interactive process through which social 
reality is constructed, it is often indeterminate and in flux, yet still based 
on objectively existing structures. The thesis, therefore, adopts a position 
between idealism (the idea that external reality exists purely in the mind) 
and materialism (the idea that reality exists materially) (Hughes and 
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Sharrock 1997). As a result, the thesis accepts that peoples’ perceptions of 
the social world are important, but seeks to avoid the ‘constructionist cul-
de-sac’ (Hammersley 2011), where it is only possible to generate knowledge 
about how knowledge is constructed rather than about social phenomena 
themselves (Seale 2004).   
6.5 Research paradigms 
6.5.1 Sarantakos’ (2012) argues that there are three dominant paradigms within 
social research: positivism, interpretivism, and critical theory. These are 
briefly discussed, before the thesis situates itself within a fourth research 
paradigm: critical realism. Gray (2009) summarises positivism as the view 
that the social world has an objective existence outwith the researcher, 
which can be measured through empirical observation. According to 
Sarantakos (2012) positivist approaches involve: the use of strict, replicable 
procedures for generating data; the separation of facts from values and the 
pursuit of objectivity; and the use of research for the development of 
universal laws. 
6.5.2 The key criticism of positivism relates to the way it seeks to transfer the 
assumptions of natural science to the study of the social world. The idea 
that human society can be understood in the same way as the inanimate 
world has been described as ‘obnoxious’ (Hughes and Sharrock 1997, p.21). 
At the same time, however, it remains an important paradigm and while it 
is frequently derided at a theoretical level, much social research seems to 
revert to positivist assumptions in practice. Indeed, it is difficult to conduct 
meaningful empirical research without reference to employing valid social 
scientific methods, and without assuming a link between observed 
behaviour and objective reality.  
6.5.3 Interpretivism is the major anti-positivist stance, with many of its tenets 
adopted in opposition to positivist ideas (Gray 2009). The interpretative 
paradigm is generally concerned with the meaning that social actors ascribe 
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to their behaviours, attitudes and actions. Whereas the positivist tradition 
has sometimes been associated with quantitative approaches that aim to 
measure the prevalence of phenomena, interpretivism is more concerned 
with description and explanation of people’s lived experiences (Fitzgerald 
and Dopson 2009). Interpretivism does not see a simple and uncomplicated 
relationship between ourselves and the social world. It argues that the 
world is mediated through individual, social and historical interpretations.   
6.5.4 Although much qualitative social research now works within a broadly 
interpretive paradigm, the position is not without critics. One source of 
criticism comes from the third major paradigm in the social sciences: 
‘critical inquiry’ (Gray 2009, p.25). This includes Marxist, feminist and 
critical sociological approaches, which are characterised by a desire to 
change the world rather than to understand or explain it (Sarantakos 2012). 
Critical perspectives are sceptical of ‘facts’, seeing it as part of the 
researcher’s role to challenge the interests of powerful actors in society. 
The critical approach, therefore, represents a departure from both 
positivism and interpretivism.  
6.5.5 This thesis recognises the limitations of each research paradigm in its pure 
form and as a result prefers a critical realist approach, which has 
sometimes been described as a middle way between positivist and 
interpretivist paradigms (Walliman 2006).  According to Yeung (1997, p.53) 
critical realism: 
‘... celebrates the existence of reality independent of human 
consciousness..., ascribes causal powers to human reasons and 
social structures..., rejects relativism in social and scientific 
discourses ... and reorientates the social sciences towards its 
emancipatory goals...’  
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6.5.6 Like positivism, therefore, realism argues that certain objectively existing 
external structures underpin social reality. However, realism considers that 
these are not directly observable and cannot be understood by merely 
looking at surface phenomena (Walliman 2006). Instead, interpretation is 
required, allowing for fluidity and evolution in social scientific 
understanding as opposed to the generation of immutable laws. Realism 
also suggests that a single representation of reality is impossible and that 
multiple versions of the world will always be available, although this stops 
short of relativism (Porter and Shorthall 2009). The major difference 
between interpretivists and realists is that the former do not accept that 
there are any underlying structures shaping the social world (Walliman 
2006). In this thesis’ view, the distinct advantage of realism lies in its 
escape from the relativism that an intepretivist approach entails, and its 
concurrent escape from a superficial and naive positivistic view of social 
reality.  
6.6 Methodology 
6.6.1 Methodology ‘…translates the principles of a paradigm into research 
language and shows how the world can be explained and studied’ 
(Sarantakos 2012, p.32). The two key methodologies in the social sciences 
are qualitative and quantitative methodologies (ibid.). Quantitative 
methodology is associated with positivist approaches, with social reality 
regarded as an objective fact and hypothesis testing being a prime method 
of enquiry. Qualitative methodology is associated with interpretivist 
approaches, stressing individual constructions of social reality and the 
importance of individual perceptions (Walliman 2006).   
6.6.2 The selection of a qualitative methodology in the present research was 
driven by a search for the most appropriate means of fulfilling the research 
aim and objectives described above. In this respect, quantitative 
methodologies were rejected because a key objective of the research was 
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to gain an in-depth understanding of the way in which local authority 
decision-makers respond to review by redress mechanisms.  The aim of the 
research was not so much to measure the extent to which redress 
mechanisms achieved bureaucratic control, but to understand that 
phenomenon in the first place. Gaining this understanding, it was thought, 
could predominantly be achieved by the collection of detailed, qualitative 
data obtained from close proximity to the study subjects.  
6.7 Research design 
6.7.1 Research design provides the link between research questions and the data 
collected within a piece of research (Yin 2009). Walliman (2006) has 
identified four main types of research design: experimental; cross sectional; 
longitudinal; and case study. Each type of design is capable of producing 
particular types of data that will allow researchers to answer particular 
types of question. With regard to the present research, a case study design 
was selected as being most appropriate on the basis that it was seen as the 
best design for achieving the kind of deep, holistic and context-dependent 
data necessary for the research to be successful.  
6.7.2 Case studies have a number of advantages as a research design. One is that 
they are particularly suited to bridging the gap between the particular and 
the general, allowing for the generation of both context-dependent 
knowledge and theoretical generalisation (Flyvbjerg 2004). Flyvbjerg (ibid.) 
argues that the aim of social science should not be to prove things, but to 
learn things and that case studies are particularly useful when viewed from 
a heuristic perspective. Others have stressed that case studies seem to be 
particularly in tune with the way in which human beings explain the world: 
‘this method has been tried and found to be a direct and satisfying way of 
adding to experience and improving understanding’ (Stake 2000, p.25).   
6.7.3 In terms of what case study designs involve, the following definition is 
helpful: 
- 153 - 
 
‘...a case study in organisational research involves the collection 
of empirical data from multiple sources to explore an identified 
unit of analysis, such as an organisation, part of an organisation, 
or a division or group, and the characteristics of its context’ 
(Fitzgerald and Dopson 2009, p.465). 
 
Core features of case study design include: a focus on a single or small 
number of cases; the collection of unstructured, qualitative data in 
naturalistic social settings; and the collection of multiple sources of 
evidence in order to obtain a holistic understanding of the cases subject to 
study (Gomm and Hammersley 2000; Yin 2009). There are, however, 
different types of case study design available (Yin ibid.) and this thesis 
adopted a multiple embedded case study design: several local authorities 
were selected and within each local authority three ‘embedded’ decision-
making areas were considered: admissions, transport, and SEN. A multiple 
case study design was preferred over a single case study design, because of 
the desire to develop theoretical as well as contextual insight into the 
phenomenon under study.  
 
6.7.4 It was decided to select six local authorities for inclusion in the multiple 
case study, in order to get the right balance between local 
contextualisation and comparison. The decision to recruit six case studies 
was also driven by pragmatic considerations: local authorities were 
considered more likely to agree to take part if fewer interviews were 
requested within each. The other important sampling decision related to 
the selection of decision-making areas for study. Admissions, transport, and 
SEN decision-making were chosen as these were the main areas in which 
local authorities make decisions affecting the individual rights and 
entitlements of children. There were also good theoretical reasons for 
focusing on these areas since each area is typical of particular approaches 
to bureaucratic decision-making.   
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6.8 Case selection and sampling 
6.8.1 Flyvbjerg (2004) notes that there are two broad approaches to sampling: 
random sampling and information-oriented case selection. Random sampling 
aims to allow for statistical generalisation and to avoid biases that may be 
present in data if not selected randomly. Information-oriented case 
selection aims to maximise the usefulness of information that can be 
obtained from a small number of cases. As may already be clear, the nature 
of the present research called for information-oriented case selection, in 
order to optimise the relevance and value of the data. A number of 
information-oriented case selection strategies are available: purposive, 
quota, emblematic, and snowball sampling (Gobo 2004).  
6.8.2 Purposive sampling involves the researcher choosing cases based on whether 
they feature the phenomenon in which the research is interested (Silverman 
2011). Quota sampling seeks to recruit a sample that has a proportional 
relationship with a wider population. Emblematic sampling involves 
selecting cases based on them being either typical or atypical and, finally, 
snowball sampling involves developing a sample as the research progresses. 
Patton (2002) has suggested further sampling approaches including: 
maximum variation sampling and intensity sampling. Maximum variation 
sampling seeks to include cases that are as different as possible. Intensity 
sampling involves selecting cases on the basis of the intensity with which 
they feature the particular issue being investigated.  
6.8.3 Following the principles of purposive and intensity sampling, it was decided 
only to select cases that had significant experience of being reviewed by 
redress mechanisms. As Halliday (2004) has argued in relation to his study of 
compliance with judicial review in the local authority homelessness setting, 
studying heavily litigated authorities is the most appropriate sampling 
strategy when concerned with understanding the factors that facilitate or 
inhibit compliance. To select heavily reviewed local authorities, an 
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‘incidence of review factor’ was created, calculated by adding up the 
number of tribunal appeals and ombudsman complaints received by each 
English local authority over a two year period. Invitations to participate in 
the research were then sent to 30 local authorities with a high incidence of 
review. A maximum variation approach was followed in selecting authorities 
to participate in order to ensure that the sample contained a relevant range 
of authorities across three variables: nature of the local authority (county 
council/metropolitan borough council), geographical location, and 
rural/urban make up.   
6.8.4 Six positive responses were received to the invitations to participate and all 
six were included in the study. Figure 6.1 below shows the approximate 
locations of the local authorities that were included in the study.22 
Figure 6.1: map showing the approximate location of the case study 
authorities 
 
                                               
22
 To ensure the anonymity of participating authorities fictitious names were created.  
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6.8.5 Appendix 1 shows the characteristics of the final sample, which contained a 
good mix of local authority locations and urban-rural make up. Importantly, 
the final sample contained only authorities that fell within the top 25% of 
local authorities that were most heavily reviewed. Figure 6.2 plots local 
authorities against their incidence of review by redress mechanisms and 
highlights the approximate position of the case study authorities. 
Figure 6.2: scatter graph plotting local authorities against the incidence of 
review factor and highlighting, in the shaded circled area, the position of 
the case study authorities  
 
6.8.6 The main limitation of the sample was that no metropolitan borough 
councils were recruited and the sample was composed entirely of county 
councils. 
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6.9 Method selection 
6.9.1 Having drawn up the multiple embedded case study design and selected the 
local authority case studies, the outstanding issue was to select the 
methods that would be used. The methods considered for use in the 
research included the three principal qualitative research methods, which 
Kritzer (2002) has referred to as watching (observation), talking 
(interviews), and reading (documentary research). In an ideal world, case 
study research would use all three methods (Yin 2009). While each method 
has weaknesses when used individually, when used together these 
weaknesses can be alleviated.  Unfortunately, the research was not able to 
achieve this ideal and was limited to using only documentary research and 
interview research. The paragraphs that follow explain how and why these 
methods were selected. 
Observation 
6.9.2 Observation has been seen to have a number of advantages for the kind of 
research this thesis wished to conduct (Cannon 2004). However, it was 
decided that it could not be used effectively in the context of this research. 
There were a number of reasons for this: the decision to select six local 
authorities spread across England limited the amount of time that could 
have been spent observing decision-makers; observation was likely to have 
been seen as more burdensome by potential participants, with a higher 
chance of access being denied; and there were ethical concerns around how 
consent could be obtained from individuals whose cases might be being 
discussed in the office environment being observed. As several authors have 
pointed out, it is more difficult to obtain access for observation than other 
methods (Kritzer 2002, Flood 2005) and observation often ends up being 
‘impossible or at least impractical’ (Cannon 2004, p.99).   
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Documentary research 
 
6.9.3 Documentary research involves the collection and analysis of documents in 
order to answer the research questions and provide appropriate 
contextualisation (Prior 2004). The initial research design envisaged the 
analysis of individual case files in each local authority, in order to provide 
for triangulation between data sources and verification of data obtained in 
other contexts. However, the University of Glasgow Ethics Committee would 
only provide consent for the researcher to review case files if (a) explicit 
consent was obtained from each individual whose file would be considered 
or (b) an anonymised copy of the files was provided to the researcher. 
These requirements were considered to be overly burdensome for 
participating authorities and as a result the documentary research was 
limited to considering publicly available decisions and other documents 
produced by redress mechanisms.  
Interview research 
 
6.9.4 For the reasons noted above, interview research was the principal method 
used in this study. The key advantages of interviews are that they provide 
insight into the experiences of research participants, they allow for those 
experiences to be appropriately contextualised, and they provide a 
reflective space in which participants can give meaning to their experiences 
(Fitzgerald and Dopson 2009). One of the ways in which interviews are 
particularly useful is in providing insight into the motivation of research 
participants (Kritzer 2002). Interviews have been seen as being particularly 
useful in organisational settings, when studying phenomenon such as 
decision-making that are not necessarily easy to isolate and observe 
(Hughes and Sharrock 1999). 
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6.10 Interview sampling and design 
Interviewee sampling 
6.10.1 The approach to selecting interviewees for interview within each case study 
authority was information-oriented. A key priority in selecting interviewees 
was to ensure that a range of perspectives were obtained across the 
relevant decision-making areas and centralised or advisory services. A 
further priority was to ensure that the sample contained a mix of senior and 
less senior staff. Appendix 3 shows the anonymized identifiers used for 
research participants and gives a sense of their roles. 
6.10.2 The final sample included 44 local authority interviewees, with an average 
of 7.3 interviews conducted per case study. 38 interviews were conducted 
in person, while 6 were conducted on the telephone. The average duration 
of interviews with local authority staff was 55 minutes. The research also 
recruited interviewees in each local authority area to provide a parental 
perspective. A total of 9 interviews were conducted with parent 
organisations; two of the interviews were conducted with several 
participants, so that there were a total of 15 participants in total. All 
interviews were conducted in person, with an average duration of 62 
minutes. 
 
6.10.3  Six interviews were conducted with redress mechanism staff: a court 
judge, an upper tribunal judge, two tribunal judges, an LGO manager, and 
three LGO investigators (who were interviewed as a group). One of these 
was over the telephone, while 5 were conducted in person. The average 
duration of interviews with redress mechanism staff was 62 minutes. 
Finally, two policymakers from the MoJ and the Department for Education 
were interviewed. Both interviews were conducted over the telephone and 
lasted an average of 56 minutes.   
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Interview design 
 
6.10.4 There are various types of interviews available to researchers, all of which 
vary in terms of the extent to which they are structured or unstructured 
(Cassell 2009). Structured interviews tend to be more suitable for the 
production of data which can be quantified. Unstructured interviews tend 
to produce qualitative data, with the research being guided by respondents. 
Between these two extremes is the semi-structured interview, which allows 
researchers to pursue pre-existing ideas while at the same time remaining 
open to new ideas (Silverman 2011).  Given the aims of this research, semi-
structured interviews were chosen as the most appropriate interviewing 
style. Appendix 2 shows the interview guide used with local authority 
respondents. To test the guide in practice before use, a pilot interview was 
conducted with an acquaintance working in a local authority. 
6.11 Data analysis 
Interview data 
6.11.1 Interviews were digitally recorded and subsequently transcribed by a 
professional transcription company. The Nvivo computer software was used 
to assist the data analysis. The analysis employed the ‘pragmatic realist’ 
approach suggested by Miles et al (2014, p.7) which involves three 
elements: data condensation, data display, and drawing and verifying 
conclusions. The data condensation approaches used in this thesis included: 
writing summaries of the key points arising in each interview, conducting 
primary and secondary coding, and writing analytic memos to reflect on 
developing themes. The data display approaches used involved the 
development of matrices whereby summarised data could be displayed and 
compared across categories and the development of flowcharts and 
diagrams to explore important relationships between categories. The 
drawing and verifying conclusions phase involved, firstly, firming up the 
- 161 - 
 
tentative suggestions recorded in analytic memos and, secondly, a return to 
the various data displays and interview summaries in order to ensure that 
the conclusions were reflective of the data. 
 
Decision analysis  
 
6.11.2 It was decided to select reported redress mechanisms decisions published 
within three years of the fieldwork period commencing (in July 2012). 
Because the first SEN case considered by the upper tribunal was published 
in September 2009, the 34 months period between then and July 2012 was 
used as the sampling period for all redress mechanisms. 23 66 cases were 
identified in total, including 24 LGO cases, 29 upper tribunal cases, and 5 
court cases (in addition 7 Court of Appeal cases and 1 Supreme Court case 
were included in the analysis). The analysis sought to identify possible 
learning points arising from cases, assess the extent to which the messages 
they contained were clear and consistent, and provide an assessment of the 
way in which decisions were written and presented. 
 
6.12 Quality, reliability, and validity  
6.12.1 This section discusses the measures taken to ensure the quality, reliability 
and validity of the research process. Seale (2004, p.407) has stated that 
quality in qualitative research refers to ‘the transparency of the whole 
research process’. In the context of qualitative research, reliability refers 
predominantly to giving assurance to external audiences that an objective 
research process was conducted (Yin 2009). Validity refers to the 
truthfulness of the findings produced through the research (Silverman 2011) 
and, for qualitative research, this refers to maximising attempts to 
demonstrate the link between research findings and the phenomenon being 
studied.  
                                               
23
 The tribunal ceased publishing its decisions in 2006. 
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6.12.2 A number of concrete steps have been taken to ensure that the research 
produced good quality findings, including: the use of triangulation; adopting 
a reflective approach; being transparent; and using a systematic approach 
to data analysis. Triangulation involves the use of various data sources, 
investigators, theories, and methods to corroborate data (Patton 2002). This 
thesis uses both methodological triangulation and data triangulation (Gray 
2009). Methodological triangulation involves the use of several methods 
within the same study, while data triangulation involves the gathering of 
data using multiple sampling strategies: this includes space triangulation 
(collecting data from different locations) and person triangulation 
(collecting data from a variety of individuals within the sample) (ibid.).   
 
6.12.3 In the context of interview research in particular, the skill and 
craftsmanship of the researcher is essential to the production of good 
quality data (Kvale 2007). In this case, the researcher sought to ensure good 
research practice through training, reading in the methodological literature, 
and ongoing reflection. Another important step relates to the transparency 
with which the research process is described (Caelli et al 2003). This 
chapter has aimed to do this by spending time situating the author’s 
theoretical stance, explaining the connections between each stage of the 
research process, and describing measures taken to help ensure the 
production of quality data. Key to both the transparent presentation of 
research methods and findings is the researcher’s reflexivity (Gough 2003).  
In this case, an attempt was made before the research began to identify the 
possible ways in which the researcher’s background and attitudes might 
influence the research.  
 
6.12.4 The data analysis stage of the research is particularly crucial for ensuring 
the validity of findings. Qualitative research is often criticised for producing 
anecdotal accounts that reflect the existing prejudices of the researchers 
(Silverman 2011). The approach to data analysis described in section 6.11 
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incorporated important safeguards including: establishing the 
representativeness of data; scrutinising data for researcher effects; 
triangulating data sources and corroborating data; checking on the meaning 
of outliers and extreme cases; following up on surprises; looking for 
negative evidence once initial theories or ideas have been established; and 
brainstorming for rival explanations (Miles et al 2014). A further means 
through which the quality of the research was assured was by sharing the 
findings with research participants (Gray 2009).   
 
6.13 Limitations of research 
 
6.13.1 There were a number of limitations in the final research design including: a 
choice of field setting that was not optimal; a sampling strategy that did 
not achieve ideal levels of depth and data saturation; and an overreliance 
on interview research. 
 
6.13.2 With regard to the field setting selected for the research, the choice of the 
local authority education area had some limitations. One of these was that 
individual local authorities were subject to reasonably low relative volume 
of review. Low volumes of review have been seen as a general problem with 
research assessing the impact of redress mechanisms (Cannon 2004) and 
some of the case studies did not have as much experience of review as had 
been expected. In particular with regard to judicial review, the education 
area generally was not subject to very high levels of challenge.  
 
6.13.3 A further limitation in the design of the research relates to the sampling 
strategy adopted. This attempted to get a good balance between breadth 
and depth but, perhaps, can be criticised with hindsight for not achieving 
sufficient depth. Indeed, given the number of ‘embedded’ decision-making 
areas considered in each local authority, the number of interviews 
conducted was too low to provide a fully bottomed out description of the 
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phenomenon in each case. Talking with more local authority staff within 
each authority would have allowed for a fuller picture to be presented. The 
lack of metropolitan borough councils in the final sample was also a 
limitation. 
 
6.13.4 The thesis’ reliance on interviews as the primary source of data was a final 
limitation of the research. Although the research includes a degree of 
triangulation, this is not as extensive as it could have been. The lack of 
access to case files was a limitation in terms of being able to verify 
information obtained in the course of interviews. It is also acknowledged 
that direct observation would have provided valuable data.   
 
6.14 Ethical considerations 
 
6.14.1 In addition to committing to an ethical approach (Murphy and Dingwall 
2001) and consulting the guidance of the Social Research Association (2003), 
the following practical steps were taken to ensure the conduct of ethical 
research: seeking informed consent by providing potential research 
participants with information sheets prior to agreeing to take part; asking 
participants to sign consent forms; giving participants an opportunity to ask 
questions; anonymising data; and confidentially and securely storing 
primary data.  
 
6.15 Summary 
 
6.15.1 Table 6.2 below concludes the chapter by providing a summary of the 
methodological approach adopted in this thesis. 
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Table 6.2: summary of the thesis’ methodological approach 
 
Research aim To explore the factors that facilitate or obstruct the 
control of bureaucratic decision-making by redress 
mechanisms. 
Research type Exploratory, but also descriptive, explanatory and 
comparative. 
 
Ontology/ 
epistemology 
Adopting a midpoint between idealist and materialist 
perspectives, and recognizing that social reality is 
made up of both objective and subjective elements. 
Research paradigm Critical realist. 
Methodology Qualitative. 
Research design Multiple embedded case study design. 
Sampling strategy Mix of purposive, intensity and maximum variation 
sampling. 
Methods Interviews (semi-structured) and documentary 
research. 
Quality measures Triangulation, researcher reflexivity, developing 
research craftsmanship, systemic data analysis and 
respondent verification. 
Limitations The choice of field setting, sub-optimal depth, and 
limited objective data verification. 
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7. FINDINGS 
 
7.1. Introduction 
7.1.1. This chapter reports the findings from the empirical research. It presents 
the data in three parts, matching the framework set out in chapter 4, 
which was amended from Halliday’s (2004) work. Part I reports data 
relating to the characteristics of redress mechanisms; part II describes 
data about the characteristics of decision-makers and their decision-
making; and part III considers the characteristics of the decision-making 
environment. The data include the documentary analysis of redress 
mechanism decisions and four sets of interviews: with local authority 
decision-makers, with parent support organisations, with redress 
mechanism staff, and with policymakers.  
 
PART I: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF REDRESS MECHANISMS 
 
7.2. Introduction to part I 
 
7.2.1. This part of the chapter describes data that relate to: the nature of the 
cases referred to redress mechanisms; the nature of the principles of good 
administration being propounded by redress mechanisms; the quality of 
decisions issued by redress mechanisms; the status and legitimacy of 
redress mechanisms; the sanctioning power of redress mechanisms; the 
procedural approaches of redress mechanisms; and redress mechanisms’ 
role perceptions and control styles. 
 
7.3. The nature of the cases referred to redress mechanisms 
 
7.3.1. The nature of the cases referred to redress mechanisms was seen as 
important in determining the extent to which learning was likely to result 
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from cases. Low volumes, the individual and context-dependent nature of 
cases, and the ‘weakness’ of the types of cases referred to the LGO and 
the tribunal were seen as problematic. Respondents were more likely to 
consider that judicial review cases were ‘strong’ and had potential to 
generate significant change. 
 
Low volumes 
 
7.3.2. The low volume of cases referred to the LGO was seen by many 
respondents as limiting the extent to which learning from cases could 
routinely take place, particularly compared to the higher volume of cases 
considered by the tribunal. Respondent A4 was forthright in making the 
point: ‘I have just never really seen any professional value in getting to 
grips with it… [it’s] a bit out of proportion really’ (A4). Although 
respondents were much less likely to experience judicial review 
challenges, the low volume of the latter was not seen as a reason to ignore 
them. As respondent T8 commented ‘Though lowest in frequency [judicial 
review cases are] sometimes highest in influence’ (T8). 
 
Individual and context dependent 
 
7.3.3. Tribunal cases were seen as highly contingent on the unique needs of the 
child involved: ‘No two cases will ever be the same’ (C4); ‘There is always 
a way of saying, ‘This isn’t like that case’’ (B3). Respondent E6 felt the 
higher volumes of tribunal cases meant that patterns were more likely to 
emerge, whereas LGO cases ‘tend to be about how an individual case has 
been administered’. LGO cases were generally seen to result most often 
from individual errors and localised problems, such as failures to follow 
established processes, rather than systemic problems. Respondents 
considered that judicial review cases had the most potential to challenge 
current administrative systems and to lead to widespread change. 
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Weak cases 
 
7.3.4. Some respondents considered that learning from LGO cases was limited 
by the fact that complaints were ‘weak’ (A4) and difficult to derive any 
principles from. Others commented that the cases were often ‘total 
howlers’, where the failures were too obvious to learn anything: ‘It was 
very obvious that their processes were not clear... So there is no direct 
learning from that’ (B2). A common point in relation to both LGO and 
tribunal cases was that there was little left to learn; respondent L1 felt 
LGO cases were more likely to involve ‘re-emphasising points’, while 
respondent E8 said ‘you’re not going to get any surprises anymore’ (E8). In 
relation to the tribunal, cases were considered to be weak because those 
that reached hearings most often involved disputes about whether 
expensive private provision was required:  
 
‘Tribunal is… not around… the process of decision-making. It's 
around a view as to which school is appropriate… it's irritating. 
Maybe I'd feel differently if we had different cases going’ (A1). 
 
7.4. The nature of redress mechanisms’ decision-making 
 
7.4.1. This section draws on the decision analysis to describe the potential 
learning points contained in the reported cases of each redress mechanism 
(see chapter 6 for details with regard to the method adopted). It also 
reports how redress mechanism respondents described the issues arising 
from their work and how local authority respondents perceived the 
decision-making of redress mechanisms. Appendix 4 summarises the 
findings of the decision analysis. 
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LGO 
 
7.4.2. 24 decisions were analysed. 11 related to SEN, 10 to school admissions 
(including admission appeals), and 3 to school transport. In the SEN area, a 
common area of complaint considered by the LGO was failure by local 
authorities to make the provision listed in a statement. Decisions on this 
issue provided guidance in relation to the way in which local authorities 
should satisfy themselves that adequate provision was being made and the 
need to review needs and provision where this was felt to be appropriate. 
Delays were a common feature of the maladministration identified by the 
LGO, and guidance was provided about the need to meet statutory 
timescales even when attempts at negotiation with parents were ongoing. 
Several cases commented on the need for good decision-making practices, 
including the full consideration of evidence and the provision of clear 
reasons for decisions. Some cases involved situations where a child was 
being transferred between local authorities, and the LGO emphasised the 
importance of good collaborative working in such cases. A further linked 
theme was the importance of ensuring a holistic view was taken of 
children’s needs. 
 
7.4.3. The vast majority of LGO cases related to the operation of Independent 
Appeal Panels (IAPs). A clear theme in LGO decisions in this area related to 
basic issues of procedural fairness such as: recording the reasons for 
decisions, providing adequate reasons for decisions to the parties, and 
considering all parts of the appeal/ evidence. A difficulty highlighted in 
several cases related to the consideration of disability discrimination 
arguments, with guidance provided about the need to consider these in 
terms of equalities legislation (with appropriate legal advice if necessary). 
LGO decisions also contained specific guidance on decision-making, such 
as: the factors to be considered when determining whether there would be 
prejudice to oversubscribed schools in admitting a child; the need to 
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consider each child’s individual circumstances when a number of appeals 
were being heard together; and the fact that decision-making must be 
based on established criteria rather than novel criteria invented by an IAP. 
The need for IAPs to be visibly impartial was stressed in several cases. 
Many cases emphasised the important role of the admission authority in 
providing adequate training for clerks and panels members. Other specific 
guidance for admissions authorities included the need to provide their case 
to the parent ahead of hearings and to respond appropriately to requests 
for information. 
 
7.4.4. There were few transport cases. Two cases provided guidance that 
would be of particular relevance to officials in transport departments, in 
relation to the commissioning of contracted travel services and the 
content of travel policies. More broadly, the cases provided suggestions 
about good decision-making practice: ensuring there were good reasons for 
departing from previously agreed positions; convening new review panels 
when cases are re-heard; and the consideration of a child’s individual 
circumstances in decision-making. 
 
7.4.5. In addition to specific decisions, the LGO has issued more general 
guidance to administrators. Its Axioms of Good Administration (LGO 1993), 
provide generic guidance to administrators across all areas of 
administration. There are 42 axioms, covering: the law; policy; decisions; 
actions prior to decision-taking; administrative processes; customer 
relations; impartiality and fairness; and complaints. Specific guidance has 
also been produced for decision-makers in the education area. Two Focus 
Reports concentrating on education decision-making have been produced: 
School Admissions – Are Parents Getting a Fair Hearing (LGO 2011a) and 
Out of School…Out of Mind? How Councils Can Do More to Give Children 
Out of School a Good Education (LGO 2011b). The former report 
highlighted 6 priority areas for improvement: provision of clear 
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information to parents ahead of hearings; explaining the case for 
‘prejudice’ to parents and panel members; ensuring parents and local 
authority representatives are treated equally by IAPs; evaluating each case 
on its individual merits; making good notes of hearings; and providing plain 
English decisions detailing clear reasons. The latter report highlighted 6 
areas of good practice: considering individual circumstances; seeking 
professional advice when assessing needs; using evidence to decide to 
enforce attendance or make alternative arrangements; keeping part-time 
alternative provision under review; aiming to reintegrate children and 
have a plan for doing so; and avoiding delays. In addition to written 
guidance, the LGO provides training (at a fee) which disseminates good 
administrative practice in relation to the handling of complaints.  
 
7.4.6. To supplement the decision analysis, LGO respondents were asked to 
describe the key issues picked up in their decisions in the education area. 
The key problem in the SEN area was perceived to be implementation of 
statements with one respondent noting that complaints about SEN had 
increased in the last two to three years (O4). In the admissions and 
general education area, a recurring issue had been alternative provision 
for children who were out of school and, as noted above, this had been the 
subject of a Focus Report. Across all areas, the key issue being picked up 
related to delays, failures to follow established policies and procedures, 
and poor complaint handling (O4). Respondent O3 described the issues as 
follows: ‘Lack of transparency. Lack of consultation. The classic areas of 
good administrative practice’ (O3). 
 
7.4.7. As will be made clear below, local authority respondents were generally 
fairly positive about the quality of the LGO’s decision-making. However, 
they also perceived some important differences between their approach 
and that of the LGO.  One of these was the LGO’s concern with the 
individual case: ‘What we have to consider is not just those complainants 
- 173 - 
 
who felt they were hard done by, but equally we had to consider all the 
other families’ (T2). Several respondents noted that the LGO took 
decisions free from practical pressures: ‘It is the same goals, but perhaps 
approached from slightly different directions with different pressures.’ 
(T8); ‘The ombudsman isn’t disabled by… the knowledge that, look, what 
these people want is huge, and what we’re facing is I've had a pay cut…’ 
(T7). Respondents noted that the LGO tended to look at issues from the 
complainant’s perspective and that a major difference between their 
approach and that of local authority decision-makers was they tended to 
give exceptional consideration to cases: ‘They’re looking at it from the 
complainant’s perspective… [and] will be looking to see… if they’ve got a 
case there really for any exceptional consideration’ (L2). Linked to this 
perception that the LGO approached issues from a different perspective, 
was the notion commented on by one respondent that the LGO did not 
fully understand the local decision-making context: ‘These people don’t 
live and breathe it like we do… have they ever been operational?’ (T5). 
 
The tribunal and upper tribunal 
 
7.4.8. As noted in Chapter 6, only the decisions of the upper tribunal are 
reported. In addition to considering the upper tribunal’s decisions, this 
section also considers court of appeal decisions published during the 
relevant period, where the court of appeal considered an appeal on a 
point of law from an upper tribunal decision. 29 upper tribunal cases were 
analysed. The vast majority of cases related to challenges about the 
school to be named in the SEN statement. A recurring issue in these cases 
involved decision-making around the comparative costs of parental 
preferences and the local authority’s preferences. The upper tribunal’s 
decisions provided significant guidance in this area, including: the 
circumstances in which comparative costs should be assessed; the need for 
admission of a child not only to effect the efficient use of resources for 
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other children, but to be ‘incompatible’ with such efficient use of 
resources; the factors that may be considered in assessing comparative 
costs, including social and health benefits to the child and the additional 
costs of transport to a parent’s preferred school; and the basis on which 
comparisons should be made, including the use of the Age Weighted Pupil 
Unit in calculations.  
 
7.4.9. Other important decisions provided guidance, albeit these have not 
formed part of a string of cases. Guidance was, for example, provided on 
the circumstances in which an individual may still be considered a child, 
even when above compulsory school age and not registered at a school, 
and the approach that should be taken to giving weight to the views of 
children in decision-making. Individual decisions clarified specific points, 
such as the limited grounds on which a parent’s preference for mainstream 
education may be ignored and the need to abide by parental preference 
otherwise. One judgment provided helpful guidance in relation to 
decision-making on provision other than in a school and, where such 
provision is made, authorities must consider both whether the whole of 
the provision or ‘any part’ of it would be inappropriate to be made in a 
school. Another case made clear that when deciding whether or not to 
assess formally a child for a SEN statement, authorities must consider not 
only the adequacy of current provision for the child but its 
appropriateness. As might be expected, much of the upper tribunal’s work 
was concerned with the first instance tribunal’s decision-making practices. 
As a result, a number of cases highlight issues and provide guidance that 
would only be of relevance to first tier judges. 
 
7.4.10. As noted above, court of appeal decisions published during the 
relevant period have also been analysed. There were 4 such decisions. Two 
of these confirmed some of the learning points highlighted above in the 
upper tribunal’s decisions (in relation to consideration of transport costs 
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and the Age Weighted Pupil Unit). As such, they provide guidance from the 
higher courts endorsing the upper tribunal’s approach. The two other 
cases involved narrow issues, one relating to the tribunal’s approach to 
costs awards and the other relating to cost comparison where an 
independent school has agreed a fee reduction. 
 
7.4.11. In terms of the common issues the upper tribunal picked up on 
during casework, respondent TR3 noted that there were too few cases 
being appealed for trends to develop, although there had been a number 
of cases about comparative costs of private and local authority provision, 
cases about the duty to assess, and cases about the inclusion of children in 
mainstream education. In relation to tribunal cases, respondent TR2 
commented as follows: 
 
‘One very, very common theme is that local authorities make their 
decisions without applying the law. That they don’t have an eye on 
the relevant legislation and the guidance in the Code of Practice… 
there is a genuine problem with people understanding the 
statutory framework and what they need to ask themselves’ (TR2). 
 
The same respondent, while noting that some authorities prepared their 
cases very rigorously and also provided excellent reasons in support of 
decisions to parents, said: 
 
‘I can’t bring to mind an example of when we’ve had a [local 
authority] panel express reasons for their decisions, they simply 
reach a conclusion and there we are.’ (TR2) 
 
7.4.12. Local authority respondents provided extensive comments on the 
tribunal’s underlying perspective on dispute resolution, which was seen to 
diverge significantly from that of the local authority in three ways: 
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adopting a strict legalistic approach; being biased towards parent’s needs; 
and failing to account for local context. Each of these areas of divergence 
is dealt with in turn in the paragraphs below. 
 
7.4.13. Local authority and parent support organisation respondents 
widely noted that the tribunal had become more legalistic since its 
incorporation into the unified tribunal service. Many respondents noted 
that this had changed the decision-making style of the tribunal, from one 
which was consensual and inquisitorial to one which was formal and 
adversarial. Previously tribunals were seen as solution-focused ‘business 
meetings’ (C4), whereas tribunal reforms had created hearings that were 
increasingly court like: ‘It’s more cross-questioning… It’s more about the 
two sides having a pop at each other’ (A1). One respondent noted that 
there had been a ‘whole culture shift’ within the tribunal and was told at 
one hearing: ‘Why can’t you get barristers like everybody else?’ (B4). 
Another respondent provided a more detailed description of this culture 
shift: 
 
‘[Before] it was mediation. It was, ‘We’ve got a little bit stuck 
now. It’s time for somebody independent to help us with this.’… 
[Now it is] ‘We’re going to a court of law and I’m bringing a 
solicitor’’ (C6). 
 
7.4.14. The result of these changes was seen by many respondents as 
creating an excessive focus on legalism on the part of the tribunal, 
whereas local authorities saw their decisions as based on sound 
professional advice and an in depth knowledge of local provision and 
needs:  
 
‘It feels like case law snap at times…  to win it you actually 
have… to bring in current case law … They try to make it black 
- 177 - 
 
and white, but I think there’s lots and lots of very subtle shades 
of grey’ (C4).  
 
The tribunal’s legalistic approach was seen as running counter to the 
needs of children and as offending the decision-making values of several 
respondents:  
 
‘That’s probably why we’re so crap at tribunals, because we still 
believe in the rights of the child and everybody else has moved 
onto ‘Let’s just win it because it’s a legal case’… regardless of 
whether it’s morally right or wrong’ (C4).  
 
Respondent A1 described the tribunal as a foreign environment, in which 
the needs of children are lost:  
 
‘I have a strapline for our service which is ‘children and young 
people at the heart of everything we do’… When you go out into 
a different environment and that’s not the case, it’s quite 
difficult to understand the decision-making… Where’s the child in 
this?’ (A1). 
  
7.4.15. The tribunal’s approach was also perceived as being in conflict 
with the views of local authority’s professionals:  
 
‘I think professionals generally… don’t agree with the law. So, 
they know better for their professional reasons… they don’t 
really like what they hear sometimes’ (E2).  
 
The same respondent noted that in her authority, a key reason for the 
high volumes of appeals conceded was the fact that professional views 
were privileged above the legal framework in decision-making:  
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‘It would be very easy to have a template setting that out so that 
when the experts are looking at all the evidence, they are not 
just randomly throwing in their professional view… it must be 
within the legal framework’ (E2).  
 
Respondent C4 provided a very graphic description of the perceived 
difference between local authority and tribunal decision-making:   
 
‘This is about… child development, special needs. This is about 
we should be more at Morrison’s supermarket than the High 
Court… you do need to have a good eye on SEN legislation and the 
law. [But] it’s about something that’s delicate and precious, like 
a rosebud, and they [the tribunal] then take a shotgun to it’ (C4).  
 
7.4.16. The second area where respondents felt, almost universally, that 
the tribunal’s approach was different to theirs related to a perception that 
the tribunal was biased towards parents and placed too much emphasis on 
their anxieties: ‘You need to detach what the parent has decided to do, 
with what we think is right for the child… I think some judges are pro 
parents’ (T6). Some respondents felt that not only was the tribunal pro-
parent, it could also tend to be anti-local authority: ‘The only belief I 
think they [the tribunal] have is that authorities… are being very tight, 
and that this family is the underdog’ (E8). Respondent L3 said that local 
authorities’ motives were not viewed positively by the tribunal: ‘[There 
isn’t]… any assumption that… the local authority has actually tried to 
work to best practice’ (L3). Many respondents felt that parents were 
successful in manipulating tribunals through the commissioning of 
independent reports, so that tribunal judgments based on these were seen 
as less legitimate. One respondent felt the tribunal was permissive of 
these parental strategies, referring to cases where independent reports 
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had been submitted late as being unfair ‘because someone can go and 
‘buy’ more information in cold terms’ (T6). 
 
7.4.17. The final area where respondents felt that the tribunal’s approach 
to decision-making diverged from theirs related to the extent to which 
tribunal decisions took proper account of the local educational context. 
The major issue raised by respondents here was that the tribunal did not 
take account of the local authorities’ local policies and criteria in its 
decisions. Whereas local authorities tended to use these as their principal 
decision-making tools, they played no part in the tribunal’s decisions. The 
latter’s decisions were based only on the law and were seen to take place 
in an ‘ideal world’ rather than the real local context inhabited by local 
authorities:  
 
‘Every local authority has its own criteria, but the tribunal is not 
bound by that criteria… The tribunal turns around and says, 
‘Well, it’s all very well, but your criteria doesn’t mean anything 
to us’’ (L4).  
 
One respondent noted that local criteria devised by authorities did not 
necessarily match up with the requirements of the SEN Code of Practice 
and that this was one of the reasons for the conflict between the 
tribunal’s decision-making and that of local authorities: ‘I find that Local 
Authorities’ own criteria, I’m not sure how much they match up with the 
code of practice’ (B1). This view echoes comments made by respondent 
TR2, that authorities often failed to take account of the statutory 
framework in their decision-making (see paragraph 7.4.11). 
   
7.4.18. Other respondents noted that the local authority’s decision-
making was very much influenced by local contexts and educational 
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expertise, neither of which were reflected in the tribunal’s decision-
making:  
 
‘The tribunal system is a hard edged legal system. It’s not always 
clear that… [it has] knowledge of child development, of 
education or even the subtleties of special educational needs at a 
practitioner level’ (C4);  
 
‘They don’t actually have a detailed knowledge of the provision 
that the parent is asking for… Sometimes, you want to say, ‘For 
goodness sake, I wouldn’t put my dog in that school’ (C6).  
 
One respondent summarised the feelings of several respondents who 
commented on this area when she talked of there being ‘a lack of shared 
purpose’ between the tribunal and the local authority:  
 
‘They seem to operate in terms of different guidelines, and they 
have got a different remit. [The tribunal] has a different remit 
to my job… It is not interested in resources… it is not restrained 
by capacity or local area resources… So [the tribunal] is freed 
from those burdens of allocation.’ (E3) 
 
7.4.19. An important point raised by some respondents was that the 
purpose of local policies and criteria being devised by authorities was to 
ensure parity across cases: ‘You have to have some criteria because 
otherwise, how are you going to ensure that it’s a fair and transparent 
process?’ (L4). The gap in concerns between individual and collective 
interests was referred to as ‘a real mismatch’: ‘It’s the mismatch between 
a class teacher with responsibility for 30 children, and a parent of one 
child in that class’ (E8). Some saw divergent views on fairness between 
the tribunal and administrators as a matter of morality: ‘My feeling is that 
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the individual child will get a Rolls Royce service rather than the same as 
everyone else… It just feels morally wrong to me’ (E3). 
 
The court 
 
7.4.20. In addition to considering judicial review decisions of the court 
reported during the relevant period, the decision analysis also considered 
decisions of the court of appeal and the supreme court arising from 
judicial review applications. 5 decisions of the court were reported during 
the relevant period. 3 related to school admissions, 1 to SEN, and 1 to 
school transport. Given the small number of cases reported, there are no 
themes as such in decisions, although two of the admissions cases related 
to the adequacy of reasons provided by IAPs. These cases provided helpful 
guidance in relation to the approach to reason-giving that is likely to be 
found acceptable on judicial review, and the statutory grounds which must 
support certain types of decision-making by IAPs. The decision on the SEN 
case helpfully clarified that a pending appeal before a tribunal did not 
relieve a local authority of its responsibility to make provision for a child, 
where the provision named in the SEN statement subject to appeal cannot 
be made. Finally, in the decision on the transport case, the court 
suggested that transport review panels should consider the suitability of 
educational provision as part of their decision-making on transport 
entitlement.  
 
7.4.21. Two decisions of the court of appeal were reported in relation to 
appeals from the court in the relevant period. One related to admissions 
and one to SEN. The latter case was very straightforward and should not 
have reached the court of appeal; the judgment confirmed simply that 
provision listed in a SEN statement was mandatory and that the court had 
clearly erred in deciding otherwise. The admissions case provided guidance 
on the approach of IAPs to the two stage decision-making process required 
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under the School Admissions Appeal Code. Whereas the court had held that 
the child’s individual circumstances should be considered at the first stage 
of decision-making, the court of appeal disagreed. It ruled that the first 
stage of decision-making should simply consider whether the admission of 
any child would lead to prejudice to a school. Only at the second stage of 
decision-making does the particular child’s individual circumstances 
become relevant in assessing whether prejudice to the school outweighs 
prejudice to the child. Finally, the supreme court considered a single 
admissions case in which it ruled that admissions criteria could prioritise 
children with a particular religious affiliation, as long as this was on 
religious rather than ethnic grounds. 
 
7.4.22. Respondent AC1, when asked whether there were any areas of 
law that seemed particularly problematic in the education area, 
responded: ‘I think they find the Equality Act difficult to handle, and not 
surprisingly. A lot of legislation is difficult to understand’ (AC1). When 
asked about any themes and trends in relation to local authority decision-
making in the education, she noted that the court dealt with insufficient 
numbers and that the tribunal would be better placed to answer such 
questions: ‘They know much more about it than I do’ (AC1). As a result of 
their much more limited experience of the court, local authority 
respondents were not able to comment on its decision-making in the same 
way as on the LGO’s and the tribunal’s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 183 - 
 
7.5. The quality of redress mechanisms’ decision-making 
 
Clarity of decision-making 
 
7.5.1. Table 7.1 shows how local authority respondents perceived the clarity of 
LGO, tribunal and court decisions.24   
 
Table 7.1: local authority respondents’ perceptions of the clarity of 
LGO, tribunal, and court decisions 
 
 Mean perceived clarity* 
 
LGO decisions 1.98 (32)** (clear) 
 
Tribunal decisions 2.87 (15)^ (fairly clear) 
 
Court decisions 3.19 (13) (fairly clear) 
 
 
* Respondents were asked to rate their perception of the clarity of decisions on the 
following scale: 1 = very clear; 2 = clear; 3 = fairly clear; 4 = neither clear nor unclear; 5 
= fairly unclear; 6 = unclear; 7 = very unclear. 
 
** The number in brackets represents the total number of responses to this question.   
 
^ The low number of responses in relation to the tribunal (n = 15) compared with the LGO 
(n = 32) is explained by the fact that the LGO has jurisdiction over all the decision-making 
areas under study, whereas the tribunal only has jurisdiction over SEN decision-making.  
 
                                               
24
 The quantitative data presented here and in subsequent sections has limitations. The following points 
should be noted: respondents occasionally found it difficult to provide a response on the scales; due to 
time pressures when conducting the interviews, not all respondents were asked to provide a response to 
these questions; respondents had less experience of dealing with court decisions and fewer respondents 
commented about court decisions.  
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7.5.2. Table 7.1 shows that respondents perceived LGO decisions as being 
clearer than tribunal and court decisions. Tribunal decisions, in turn, were 
perceived as being clearer than court decisions. LGO decisions were, on 
average, perceived as being ‘clear’, while tribunal decisions were closer to 
being perceived as ‘fairly clear’.  Similarly, perceptions of court decisions 
were closer to being ‘fairly clear’. Overall, respondents perceived the 
decisions of all redress mechanisms as being in the ‘clear’ to ‘fairly clear’ 
range.  
 
7.5.3. Where respondents were critical of the clarity of the LGO’s decisions, 
this tended to be around the rationale provided for recommending 
financial redress: ‘It’s a bit opaque… ‘We believe the local authority 
should pay x pounds’, and you say, ‘Well, how do they work that figure 
out?’’ (L1). Several respondents pointed out that LGO decisions could be 
variable in quality: ‘Some are very clear and I think others are less clear’ 
(C7). Some respondents noted that it could be difficult to understand the 
LGO, noting that they ‘lack understanding’ (T5) and that the reasoning 
around decisions could be ‘a bit shady’ (E8). Others considered that 
reasoning could be incorrect: ‘The ombudsman makes mistakes, as we 
perceive it’ (E2); ‘The LGO got it so wrong it was unbelievable’ (T6).  
 
7.5.4. Where respondents perceived LGO decisions to be clear, one of the 
reasons cited for this was that the kind of issues dealt with by the LGO 
tended to be related to process issues: ‘Because that’s the type of thing 
[process] that the LGO deals with and because we’re reasonably hot on 
processes’ (B3). Several respondents commented favourably on LGO 
decisions, especially in comparison to other redress mechanisms: ‘The 
ombudsman ones are normally bullet-pointed and nailed down’ (C4); ‘The 
ombudsman cases are… designed to be read by a parent… Whereas some 
of the judicial reviews… you can’t see the wood for the trees’ (C3).  
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7.5.5. Respondents’ qualitative comments regarding the tribunal were less 
positive. Nonetheless, several respondents did perceive tribunal decisions 
as very clear: ‘I might not agree with them, but I think they’re very clear’ 
(L3). Respondent L4 said that the clarity of the tribunal’s reasoning had 
increased as a result of the presence of the upper tribunal. Other 
respondents noted that, as with LGO decisions, clarity could be variable 
and that it depended to some extent on the particular case. Some of those 
respondents who were critical of the clarity of the tribunal’s decisions, 
noted that the rationale for decisions was not always clearly laid out: 
‘They [the tribunal] have got simpler language [than the court]  It’s the 
actual decision-making which is unclear in that case. It’s ‘On what basis 
have you made that decision?’ (C4); ‘Sometimes… I’m looking at the 
evidence and I’m looking at the conclusions and I don’t understand that at 
all’ (B3). One respondent compared the tribunal’s decisions and the LGO’s 
decisions as follows: ‘You’ve got reasons for the judgment in the 
ombudsman… ‘We’ve reached this decision because of x, y, z.’ The 
tribunal decision will say ‘After considering all of the above, we have 
reached this decision’ (C4). 
 
7.5.6. The court’s decisions received the most negative comment from 
respondents in terms of their clarity. The main issue that was raised was 
the length of the judgments and the language they used:  
 
‘[Cases are] not particularly written in a lay person’s terms. I 
think they go round and round the houses sometimes…’ (C3).  
 
‘Their wording is nowhere near as direct as… the LGO in 
explaining what they expect or think should happen’ (A6). 
 
‘I find the odd court ruling that I read wordy … they’re not easy 
to get to the decision bit of’ (B7).  
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Several respondents pointed out that the real difficulty lay in working out 
what the consequences of the judgment might be for the future: ‘The 
implications may be less clear than the decision itself’ (B4). Respondent 
E8 referred to the need for expert assistance to decipher court cases, 
which was not required with the LGO or the tribunal: ‘I need a bit of help 
to think, ‘Okay, what does that mean for me’ (E8). 
 
Consistency of decision-making  
 
7.5.7. Table 7.2 shows how local authority respondents perceived the 
consistency of LGO, tribunal and court decisions.   
 
Table 7.2: Local authority respondents’ perceptions of the consistency of 
LGO, tribunal and court decisions 
 
 Mean perceived consistency* 
 
LGO decisions 2.26 (27) (consistent)** 
 
Tribunal decisions 3.2 (15) (fairly consistent) 
 
Court decisions 3.33 (6) (fairly consistent)^^ 
 
 
* Respondents were asked to rate their perception of the consistency of decisions on the 
following scale: 1 = very consistent; 2 = consistent; 3 = fairly consistent; 4 = neither 
consistent nor inconsistent; 5 = fairly inconsistent; 6 = inconsistent; 7 = very inconsistent. 
 
** The number in brackets represents the total number of responses to this question.   
 
^ The low number of responses in relation to the tribunal (n = 15) compared with the 
LGO (n = 27) is explained by the fact that the LGO has jurisdiction over all the decision-
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making areas under study, whereas the tribunal only has jurisdiction over SEN decision-
making. 
 
^^ The low number of responses in relation to court decisions was due to respondents not 
having seen sufficient cases to comment on consistency. 
 
7.5.8. Comparing tables 7.1 and 7.2, we can see that respondents tended to 
perceive the clarity of decisions taken by the LGO, the tribunal and the 
court more positively than they perceived their consistency. Looking at 
table 7.2, we can see that respondents perceived LGO decisions as being 
more consistent than court and tribunal decisions, and tribunal decisions 
as more consistent than court decisions.  Looking at the overall picture 
painted by table 7.2, we can see that the perceived consistency of LGO, 
tribunal and court decisions was in the ‘consistent’ to ‘fairly consistent’ 
range.   
 
7.5.9. Qualitative comments on the LGO’s consistency were broadly positive, 
with most respondents saying they could not think of any examples of 
inconsistency: ‘I cannot recall something that flew in the face of a 
previous decision’ (B2). Others pointed out that although they did not 
agree with decisions, they did not have any issues in relation to their 
consistency ‘They’re not necessarily consistent in a good way, but they 
are consistent’ (L1). Respondent T8 pointed out that the issue of 
consistency depended to some extent on the time period over which cases 
were being considered, as positions could vary over time.  
 
7.5.10. Some considered that the issue of inconsistency was more 
widespread and noted: ‘There are… many cases where different 
ombudsman investigators… have come up with significantly different 
views’  (T7); ‘The previous manager would… say to you that it depends 
which ombudsman, which officer, investigates’ (E9). Another respondent 
noted that in her view inconsistency occurred around the LGO 
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investigation process: ‘That particular year, they weren’t consistent… as 
to how they were looking at things. You did feel that you were being 
interrogated’ (C2). Others pointed out that there could be contradictions 
in LGO decisions: ‘One minute they say they can’t reverse an independent 
appeals panel’s decision, but then they’re actually telling us to put the 
child in’ (E5). 
 
7.5.11. Respondents were more likely to report negative perceptions with 
regard to the consistency of the tribunal’s decisions, although some 
commented positively. One respondent noted that consistency was ‘not a 
pressing concern’ (L6), while another commented: ‘I think we go into 
tribunals with a strong sense of what is likely to be the outcome’ (L3). 
Other respondents were less positive and even those who noted that the 
tribunal was fairly consistent, did not feel that it was entirely so: ‘You do 
get ones where you go, ‘Really?’ (E8). Another respondent noted that the 
tribunal was ‘not consistent enough’ (B3) to be treated as precedent. 
 
7.5.12. Some respondents expressed stronger feelings about the 
consistency of the tribunal’s decisions and noted that they were 
unpredictable and could vary ‘enormously’:  
 
‘I’ve always had a view of tribunals that you could take a 
particular set of facts to one tribunal…  and get one decision. 
And … on another day, with exactly the same facts, get a 
different concrete decision’ (B4).  
 
Respondent L1 noted:  
 
‘You get completely rogue decisions and sometimes you have to 
look at that and say, ‘Well, I don’t believe on another day they 
would have made that decision’ (L1).  
- 189 - 
 
7.5.13. Very limited data was provided by respondents in relation to the 
consistency of court decisions, since most respondents had not seen 
enough of them to comment. Of those that did comment, a mix of opinion 
was presented. At one extreme, a respondent noted that: ‘It doesn’t jump 
out at me that… a judge has said that and that one’s said that’ (A6). 
While another respondent noted that: ‘The High Court swings left and 
right, doesn’t it?... So it’s not consistent’ (E8). The two other respondents 
that provided qualitative data on this subject noted that the court’s 
decisions were ‘generally consistent’ (T8 and B3).  
 
7.5.14. Having described how local authority respondents perceived the 
clarity an consistency of redress mechanisms’ decisions, the following 
paragraphs return to the decision analysis to provide the researcher’s 
assessment with regard to the presentation, clarity and consistency of 
reported cases. 
 
7.5.15. LGO decisions were generally clear and it was easy to understand 
the nature of the complaint, the legal and policy context of decision-
making, the facts of the case, and the reasons for the LGO’s decisions. 
Decisions were prefaced with a one page summary setting out the basis of 
the decision. While decisions contained a technical approach that might be 
unclear to a lay person, an experienced public servant is unlikely to have 
major difficulties in comprehending them. While decisions were clear on 
the facts, it was rare for the LGO to comment on the wider applicability of 
decisions or to seek to explicitly distil any learning points that arose from 
the case at issue. The decisions did not cross-reference with the Axioms of 
Good Administration and, as a result, did not make clear what the broader 
points of good administration at issue were. While it was possible to 
extract learning points (a process referred to a ‘reconstructing norms’ by 
Langbroek and Ripkema 2006, p. 87), this would involve additional 
interpretative effort for administrators. While rarely providing guidance in 
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the broader application of cases in individual decisions, the LGO’s Focus 
Reports did provide such broader guidance in a clear and accessible format 
– tying together learning across cases to distil short lists of good practice. 
In terms of consistency, there was no obvious inconsistency of principle or 
approach identifiable in the sample of cases analysed here.   
  
7.5.16. In terms of the upper tribunal decisions, the format and 
presentation of decisions was less accessible, with only some of them 
containing a summary of the case upfront. The style of decisions was more 
idiosyncratic, with variations in approach between judges, and less of a 
consistent house style than the LGO reports. As might be expected given 
the legal status of the upper tribunal’s decisions, they involved 
sophisticated technical and legal argument, which required close reading 
and significant legal capacity in order to understand. It is likely that 
administrators would require assistance in interpreting the legal 
significance of these decisions and the way in which principles might be 
applied elsewhere. Given that the cases have, as their primary focus, the 
decisions of the tribunal, there was an additional layer through which 
administrators would need to delve in order to identify matters that 
related to their own decision-making. As with the LGO’s decisions, the 
upper tribunal’s decisions generally made little effort to comment on the 
wider significance of judgments. As can be seen from appendix 4, there 
were a number of cases where no particular learning points could be 
distinguished. In relation to consistency, there were no clear examples of 
inconsistency between cases in the sample analysed here, although it is 
arguable that in case [2011] UKUT 468 (AAC), the upper tribunal’s decision 
was not consistent with a previous court of appeal judgment on the 
specificity of statements (Stout 2012). 
 
7.5.17. Court decisions were clearly aimed at a judicial and legal 
audience, rather than administrators. Judgments tended to be lengthy and 
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densely reasoned, with the significance of various legal arguments unlikely 
to be instantly obvious to a lay person. An administrator looking for lessons 
in relation to his or her decision-making practice was likely to find this a 
difficult task. The question of clarity here must be distinguished depending 
on the audience which the judgments were meant for: they might be clear 
to a suitably trained legal audience. But if their aim was to be clear to 
bureaucratic decision-makers, then the analysis of these cases suggested 
that such an aim would be far from being met. There are too few cases to 
comment on the question of consistency, although as with the other 
redress mechanisms, there was no obvious inconsistency in the sample 
analysed here. 
 
7.6. The status, legitimacy and sanctioning power of redress mechanisms  
 
LGO 
 
7.6.1. Several respondents referred to the fact that the LGO was a respected 
organisation, whose investigations were taken seriously. One respondent 
(B5) said that ombudsman investigations were a ‘high priority’ for her 
local authority, while several other respondents commented that they took 
the ombudsman very seriously: ‘We try everything we can to avoid 
complaints’ (B4). A number of respondents pointed to the fact that the 
LGO was at the back of their mind in the course of decision-making: ‘So 
any decision-making we would think, ‘Is that maladministration? Are we 
open to challenge?’ (T5). The LGO was also seen as a significant sanction, 
particularly where findings were made public: ‘Members are very 
concerned, rightly, about reputational issues’ (T7). Several respondents 
noted that the publicity attached to LGO reports was a particular reason 
why decisions were treated with respect: ‘Ombudsman is a very painful 
process, it’s a very public process… So that has to make sure that you 
change everything’ (E8). A local authority lawyer commented: 
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‘My clients are very, very scared, and very, very wary of the 
ombudsman. Because they are aware of the power of that, and 
the consequences… of a public announcement’ (T4). 
 
Not all perceptions were positive, however, with a number of respondents 
suggesting that the LGO’s decisions would not always lead to changes if 
there was disagreement about their merits. One respondent noted that 
the LGO’s legitimacy could be particularly questionable in the 
controversial area of compensation: ‘I don’t see what right they have 
telling us that we should compensate the parent’ (E5). 
 
The tribunal 
 
7.6.2. Most respondents considered that the tribunal was a necessary 
institution: ‘You need an ultimate place to go, don’t you?’ (A1).  
Respondents tended to highlight particularly the upper tribunal as 
authoritative: ‘I would treat the upper tribunal like I treat the court; it’s 
basically at that level’ (B3).  The status of the tribunal was, however, 
generally acknowledged grudgingly, with a widespread view that its 
judgments were not particularly authoritative: ‘I think there’s a little 
pinch of salt with the first [tier tribunal]’ (E8); ‘It’s not the same as the 
supreme court’ (B3). Commenting on a specific case in which, despite an 
upper tribunal and court of appeal decision having been issued, the local 
authority had decided not to change its general policy on SEN transport 
respondent B5 commented:  
 
‘I think the way we viewed it altogether, it was sort of a joint 
view, that it wasn’t a legal determination… We weren’t going to 
change our policy because of one decision based on an individual 
tribunal decision’ (B5).  
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Court 
 
7.6.3. Those respondents who felt able to express an opinion generally 
perceived the court to be authoritative and its judgments to have a 
straightforward legitimacy: ‘It produces case law doesn’t it?... Case law 
helps you to clarify and inform your practice’ (L5); ‘I think, when there’s 
a new relevant piece of case law, it’s about disseminating that, and 
people understanding it, and absorbing it into their practice’ (E8). Several 
respondents, comparing the LGO and the court, noted that the latter 
would be taken much more seriously by staff and that its decisions were 
less subject to debate around implementation:   
 
‘Well for me personally there is no comparison. A court case is an 
entirely more serious matter… [The LGO] are making different 
decisions, they are not making quite as high-level decisions as a 
court would make’ (L5). 
 
7.6.4. Several respondents commented on the fact that judicial reviews tended 
to be significant events for local authorities, with judgments carrying a lot 
of weight and authority:  
 
‘It does not reflect well on the organisation’s reputation, which 
matters. It also can end up with findings which… carry absolute 
legal weight, and it means that our policy and practice is 
determined by a body well outside our control’ (L3).  
 
The public nature of the process was again seen as the principal sanction 
being applied, in addition to a sense that judicial review cases would lead 
to a loss of local control over policy and practice. 
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7.7. The procedural approach of redress mechanisms 
 
LGO 
 
7.7.1. The LGO’s inquisitorial approach was seen by respondents as making 
their decisions more persuasive: ‘I would love to be able to argue with 
this, but… they have come in afresh, they have looked at the evidence, 
and you have got to go with it’ (T6). One respondent, comparing her 
perceptions of the LGO with the tribunal, said the fact that the LGO was 
concerned with maladministration rather than attacking the merits of 
decisions, meant that its decisions were more likely to lead to learning:   
 
‘I think an LGO case is much rarer and I think they are genuinely 
about, in a sense, somebody receiving a bad service... Whereas 
tribunals are just about somebody not getting the gold standard 
that they wanted’ (L1). 
 
‘The root and branch way that they [LGO] approach stuff... In 
their questioning they will say, ‘Okay, how was this decision 
taken, and by whom, and what are the terms of reference?’… 
Whereas the tribunal does not do any of that’ (E8) 
 
7.7.2. While LGO decisions were seen as clear, they were not seen as generally 
requiring major changes. A focus on maladministration was widely 
perceived as being about bringing authorities into line with existing 
practices and policies, rather than being about changing those practices 
and policies in the first place: ‘Any major changes now are going to come 
about because of case law really, ombudsman should really be about 
bringing everyone in line’ (L5). Respondent B5 made the point more 
explicitly when commenting on the different ways in which ombudsman 
decisions were perceived compared to case law: ‘An ombudsman 
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decision… might lead to a tweak in our process... Whereas case law may 
well change our policies’ (B5).  
 
Tribunal 
 
7.7.3. The increasingly adversarial nature of the tribunal process was seen by 
some respondents as creating negative feeling towards its decisions. 
Respondents perceived the experience of the tribunal as traumatic, unfair, 
and disruptive to ongoing relationships with parents. Several respondents 
commented on the fact that the tribunal could lead to local authority staff 
being unfairly criticised: ‘I mean, sometimes it’s just downright rude’ 
(L1). Several respondents reported staff feeling alienated by the process 
of going to tribunal: ‘I've heard the special school heads here say they are 
sick to death of their professional integrity being challenged’ (E8). One 
respondent noted that a colleague had had an experience which was so 
bad that it had seriously affected how she approached the rest of her job: 
‘She felt she’d been cheated in… a court of law, basically… [Since then] 
she's been very guarded’ (C4). 
 
7.7.4. Respondent TR1, a tribunal judge, commented on the importance of the 
tribunal’s de novo approach to appeals. Appeals were described as an 
appeal of the child’s situation rather than the decision taken by the local 
authority. This meant that new evidence produced by parents could often 
lead to a different decision: ‘They are not fighting the same case which 
they started with in many, many cases’ (TR1). Respondent TR1 expressed 
her hope that in future, the tribunal could move to considering whether 
the original decision was correct as that would be fairer and provide 
clearer feedback to local authorities.  
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Court 
 
7.7.5. Respondents noted that the precedental effect of court decisions made 
a difference to how they would see court decisions as opposed to those of 
the LGO:  
 
‘With the high court there should be a stream of case law that is 
consistent and follows on… The ombudsmen have always been 
clear that it is a standalone decision’ (T8).  
 
Comparing the court with the tribunal, one respondent noted that the 
public nature of the judicial review process and the greater scope of 
issues considered meant that reactions to the court and tribunal would be 
different: 
 
‘I think we would be much more worried… to be facing a judicial 
review process… because it’s a much wider, more public, and 
potentially powerfully directed force, around wider issues than 
just this child, we would have a different emotional response I 
think’ (L3). 
 
7.8. Redress mechanisms’ role perception  
 
7.8.1. This section presents data from interviews with redress mechanism 
respondents discussing the extent to which they considered that 
influencing bureaucratic decision-making was part of their roles. 
 
LGO respondents’ role perception 
 
7.8.2. Respondents described the LGO as having three roles: providing 
individual redress, generating administrative improvements through 
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casework, and helping authorities improve administrative practices 
through the provision of training and advice. LGO respondents were in 
agreement that the redress of individual grievances was the LGO’s most 
important function. Other functions were described as ‘residual’: ‘The key 
area is to address an individual grievance’ (O3). Several respondents were 
keen to distinguish the LGO’s investigation process from ‘systemic 
investigations’ and ‘audits’: ‘We don’t do systemic investigations’ (O2); 
‘What we tend not to do is then say, ‘I’m now going to carry out a 
council-wide investigation about how they handle all of those types of 
issues… That’s not really our role’ (O1). Indeed, respondents were clear 
that while administrative improvements could be recommended, they had 
to remain closely justified in terms of the individual complaint or a series 
of individual complaints.  
 
7.8.3. Complaint investigation was seen as an essentially reactive activity, 
which was limited in the extent to which it could lend itself to 
administrative improvements: ‘It’s always going to be reactive, isn’t it? 
Investigations always are’ (O1). The same respondent also noted that 
there were limits to the extent to which the LGO could follow up 
individual recommendations: ‘It’s difficult because once we complete our 
work… we wouldn’t necessarily chase up unless we had it referred back to 
us’ (O1). Respondents explained that some recommendations were 
difficult to follow up since they might require the involvement of local 
authority committees and take significant time to implement. The status 
of recommendations was noted as being somewhat ambiguous with one 
respondent noting that ‘we recommend changes… Well a lot of the time… 
we would phrase it in way that the council should consider doing X, Y or 
Z’ (O2). Where recommendations were made as part of local settlements 
‘we don’t generally as a matter of course follow up. We rely on the local 
authority to act in good faith’ (O4). Respondents, therefore, saw the 
LGO’s improvement role as requiring to be delineated with great care.  
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Tribunal respondents’ role perception  
 
7.8.4. Similarly to the LGO, tribunal respondents saw themselves as fulfilling 
several functions, but with a prime focus on the provision of individual 
redress. One respondent summarised the tribunal’s distinct roles as 
follows:  
 
‘The essential function of the tribunal is to make a decision in 
accordance with the law… we also need to ensure that a parent 
puts forward the best case they can. So that is our, if you like, 
our interrogatory function… Our function on the local authority… 
is to ensure that they get it right first time… But they are the 
secondary functions; the primary function is to make the correct 
decisions so that people have a rock, if you like, to anchor these 
things’ (TR1).  
 
Another respondent commented in similar terms, but went on to discuss 
the role that tribunals sometimes had in picking up on bad practice in 
their decisions: ‘I don’t think that there is any fear among the panels in 
this tribunal about criticising or indeed congratulating good practice 
when they see it’ (TR2). Respondent TR2 noted that – in another 
jurisdiction – the upper tribunal had recently criticised the practice of 
flagging up issues as part of decisions. When asked whether she thought 
the current balance between providing individual redress and contributing 
to administrative improvement was right, she responded: ‘I’m quite happy 
with things as they are… I think that putting it into the decision is an 
effective means of getting that authority to address the problem which 
has arisen in this particular appeal’  (TR2). 
 
7.8.5. Respondent TR3, an upper tribunal judge, said that generating 
administrative improvement was part of the tribunal’s general function 
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but considered that this role was limited: ‘We would take some steps to 
publicise what we regarded as the more important of our decisions in the 
area. So, to that extent anyway… there is a wider role, potentially, 
contributing to administrative decision-making’ (TR3). Beyond publishing 
important decisions, however, respondent TR3 considered that there was 
little the tribunal could do in relation to local authority decision-making: ‘I 
think it’s up to people, really, what they make of it... We don’t exist to 
train one or the other party really’ (TR3). Respondent TR3 considered 
that, despite the fact that the upper tribunal was able to publish 
important cases, the tribunal was more likely to be influential in terms of 
the routine decision-making of local authorities. She noted:  
 
‘They have a much greater caseload. There will be the 
interaction between the panel members and the local authority’s 
witnesses… that sort of question and answer has got a much 
greater capacity for influencing the authority than someone 
could find in the recherché things that we get up to’ (TR3).  
 
One of the policy officials who took part in the research considered that 
the provision of feedback was currently more likely in low volume 
tribunals, where more detailed judgments could be handed down (PO1). 
 
Court respondent’s role perception 
 
7.8.6. The court judge who participated in the research (AC1) made it clear 
that, beyond taking a decision on the facts of a case and applying what she 
considered to be the correct interpretation of the law, little conscious 
effort was spent in trying to influence future practice in local authorities. 
She commented that cases that were brought would often have wider 
ramifications as they tended to have significant costs involved and be used 
as test cases. However, what happened after cases was not something that 
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she would concern herself with and she would only find out what 
happened after decisions if they were appealed or there were reports in 
the press. 
 
7.9. Redress mechanisms’ style of control 
 
7.9.1. This section reports data describing the extent to which redress 
mechanism and local authority respondents considered that redress 
mechanisms adopted facilitative and cooperative approaches. 
 
LGO 
 
7.9.2. Several LGO respondents commented on the informal, cooperative, and 
advisory role that they had in relation to local authorities. They noted that 
local authorities would look to the LGO for advice and that this was given 
in the course of informal interaction. One respondent provided an example 
of being asked for advice on remedies and providing ‘back of a fag packet’ 
advice: ‘They would ring up and say, ‘Look, we’ve done the stage two 
investigation. We recognise we haven’t done well here… What would you 
suggest?’’ (O2). Respondents emphasised that contact for advice tended to 
be around the complaint process rather than requests for advice on 
substantive issues.  
 
7.9.3. Respondents noted that they generally had good relationships with local 
authorities. One respondent noted that the LGO’s intervention was at 
times welcomed as a prompt for change: ‘Councils ring up and say, ‘Can 
you be highly critical because this department needs to get its act in 
order’’ (O2). Respondents noted other ways in which the LGO sought to 
develop its advisory function and cooperative relationships with local 
authority staff. One respondent pointed to an annual seminar being held 
for officers where recurrent themes could be discussed. Respondent O2 
- 201 - 
 
noted that there were opportunities for informal contact between the LGO 
and local authority: ‘Council officers find it very helpful just to meet 
informally… they recognise we are professionals trying to be professional 
with them’ (O2). 
 
7.9.4. While stressing an overarching approach to their role which was 
cooperative and which sought to help local authorities, one respondent 
noted that more coercive approaches were sometime required to ensure 
that the LGO could fulfil its core function around individual redress. One 
respondent cited an example of the kind of coercive approaches that the 
LGO could employ: ‘It was decided to subpoena them. The Chief Exec and 
three senior managers had to come with all the files and sit there… that’s 
our final [sanction]’ (O2). 
 
7.9.5. Some local authority respondents described their relationship with the 
LGO in similar terms, referring to a relationship between professionals 
with shared goals. One respondent, for example, referred to the LGO as a 
‘critical friend’ and characterised her relationship with the LGO as one of 
‘cooperation’: ‘I find it constructive… I find the dialogue helpful… The 
culture is one of cooperation’ (B7). Another respondent commented in 
similar terms, describing the relationship as less adversarial or even 
inquisitorial and more as a kind of partnership: ‘We have all got the same 
objective in mind … It is more about working together’ (L5). Another 
respondent commented on the personal nature of the interaction between 
herself and the LGO, noting that: ‘They have always been approachable… 
They have never shied away from actually talking things through’ (A6). 
One result of this cooperative approach was that respondents found LGO 
decision to be generally clear as there were opportunities to ask 
questions, seek clarification, and lobby for changes: ‘I find them clear, 
because they normally put a provisional view out, so I think if there was 
any uncertainty…’ (B7). 
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7.9.6. While there was a significant strand of opinion referring to good, 
cooperative relationships with the LGO, the data presented above in 
relation to different approaches between the LGO and administrators 
should be born in mind. Not all administrators agreed that the LGO and 
decision-makers had a shared purpose, nor did all respondents view the 
LGO’s recommendations positively. One respondent also noted that, as the 
LGO had grown and as they made more use of paper investigations, it was 
harder to build relationships with LGO staff than in the past: ‘There is 
more investigators [now, so] you don’t have that ability to build that 
relationship’ (T4). 
 
Tribunal 
 
7.9.7. Tribunal judges described having some interaction with local authority 
decision-makers outwith hearings. The tribunal ran a number of user 
groups where local authorities and parent support organisations could 
discuss issues in relation to appeals with tribunal staff. Respondent TR2 
noted that these user groups – while they would not discuss individual 
cases – could be used to provide general feedback to decision-makers: ‘We 
will chair discussions… I’ve given a talk to local authorities about the best 
way to proceed, what a tribunal expects and how they should approach 
matters’ (TR2). When asked whether there was scope to provide oral 
feedback to decision-makers at hearings, respondent TR3 felt this would 
be inappropriate and work against the tribunal’s impartiality. She 
considered that there were strict limits on the extent to which feedback 
could be given to one of the parties in dispute and to the kinds of 
relationships that could be engaged in outwith particular cases.  
 
7.9.8. Respondent TR1 mentioned an important example of the kind of work 
that the tribunal undertook to contribute to the ‘right first time’ agenda. 
This was a pilot project they had been working on with some local 
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authorities to improve the administrative process around appeals. This 
involved using LEAN methodology, in partnership with two local 
authorities, to review processes around refusal to assess appeals. This was 
seen to have led to improvements in the system for parents: ‘It’s about 
actively engaging the parents and getting them to participate, giving 
them a voice I suppose’ (TR2). Respondent TR1 commented that the pilot 
sought to work collaboratively with local authorities in order to determine: 
‘How they should approach an appeal and making sure that everything 
was right before they came to us’ (TR1). Respondent TR1 described the 
processes used prior to the pilot as ‘deeply daft’. 
 
7.9.9. Very few local authority respondents mentioned their interactions with 
tribunal judges outside of cases and, as noted above, the tendency was for 
these encounters to be viewed as stressful and negative by administrative 
staff. Tribunal user groups were mentioned, but generally they were 
viewed as forums in which technical matters of tribunal process were 
discussed rather than substantive issues. One respondent did comment 
very positively about her relation with the tribunal; she noted: ‘We’ve got 
a good reputation at tribunal… I was with the president yesterday. We 
have respect’ (E2). 
 
Court 
 
7.9.10. Local authority respondents did not report having had any 
interaction with the court, since no cases went to a hearing. They also 
reported having no other interaction with the court. AC1 made clear that 
she did not engage in any conversations with local authorities about their 
practices outside of cases in order to steer clear of arguments. One of the 
policy officials who took part in the research said that the ‘right first time’ 
strand of the Ministry of Justice’s administrative justice strategic work 
programme had not engaged much with courts: ‘It’s certainly a less 
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developed area. It can be quite difficult to work with’ (PO1). Commenting 
on this area of policy in relation to all redress mechanisms, PO1 noted: 
‘There has certainly been a lot of work going on, but just not as an 
agenda in itself.  It hasn’t been pushed on as it could have been, I think’. 
 
PART II: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DECISION-MAKERS AND THEIR DECISION-MAKING 
 
7.10. Introduction to part II 
 
7.10.1. This section reports data about: the nature of decision-making; 
decision-makers’ commitment to learning from the work of redress 
mechanisms; and the processes of organisational learning they undertake 
in order to acquire, interpret, disseminate, and store information arising 
from the work of redress mechanisms. 
 
7.11. Characteristics of the decision-making areas 
 
School admissions 
 
7.11.1. There was a great deal of consistency amongst respondents in 
terms of how they described school admissions decision-making. A key 
feature was the high volume of applications dealt with; Carron Council, for 
example, reported approximately 6,000 applications a year, Tummel 
Council approximately 40,000, and Almond Council approximately 15,000. 
Admissions decision-making was described as being driven by the 
consistent application of policy to cases: ‘All aspects of our job are policy 
driven… we haven’t got a lot of leeway’ (E5). Decision-making was 
described as governed by clear criteria and routinised. In Almond Council, 
respondent A2 referred to a computer system which matched cases to 
criteria, so that aspects of the process did not even require a human 
decision-maker. 
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7.11.2. Interestingly, one respondent challenged the idea that school 
admissions could be described as ‘decision-making’: ‘There is no 
discretion, there is no decision-making, it is government policy’ (E7). 
Applying discretionary judgment was perceived as subjective and unfair, 
leaving the system open to abuse: ‘We apply no discretionary judgment to 
that, because if we do, then it becomes an unfair process’ (A6). Indeed, in 
describing their decision-making and the values that underpinned it, 
respondents noted that consistency, transparency and equity between 
cases were essential: 
 
‘You are either an impartial service that does everything strictly 
according to a criteria, or you are not… we have to be impartial 
and treat children as a number, as a number of parents say, 
rather than treat them as human beings.’ (A2) 
 
Respondents noted some circumstances in which limited discretion could 
be exercised, such as on social or medical grounds. However, even where 
discretion was exercised, it was referred to as being in ‘pre-prescribed 
ways’ (A7).    
 
7.11.3. As noted in chapter 5, local authorities are also responsible for 
setting up and administering Independent Appeals Panels (IAPs) for schools 
where they are the admission authority. Respondent C7 noted that the key 
decision-making task of IAPs was deciding whether admitting a child would 
result in greater prejudice to the child or the admitting school. Rather 
than reviewing the original decision based on the same criteria applied by 
the local authority, IAPs were described as having discretion to take into 
account a host of personal circumstances which had previously not been 
considered by the local authority. Respondents suggested that IAPs were 
perhaps best seen as part of the continuation of the general decision-
making process of admissions: ‘We tend not to normally get involved in 
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the individual case of the family…We probably use the Panel to look at an 
individual case like that’ (A3).  
 
Home-to-school transport 
 
7.11.4. Transport decision-making was often conducted by integrated 
admission and transport teams and there were strong parallels between 
the way respondents described their admissions and transport decision-
making. Respondents generally noted that although local transport policy 
often involved discretionary elements that were not required by statute, 
this did not mean that they had any more discretion in deciding individual 
cases: ‘the policy is discretionary, we don’t necessarily have discretion 
ourselves’ (E7). As with admissions decision-making, local transport 
policies generally provided for the consideration of some individual 
circumstances, such as medical conditions: ‘We do have a slight 
discretion’ (E5).  
 
7.11.5. Some respondents described a situation whereby discretion was 
exercised in relation to transport decision-making, but only once those 
cases were escalated to the transport review panel: ‘Normally where it’s 
discretionary it has to have an authorisation’ (C3). The process of cases 
being escalated from initial decision, to review by a manager, and then to 
review by an appeal panel was described as allowing the circumstances of 
a case to be fully considered: ‘It’s been looked at from every possible 
angle’ (A6). As in admissions decision-making, review panels were seen as 
being allowed a much greater degree of discretion and this was seen as 
helpful in delineating the role of administrators: ‘It’s far better to leave it 
to the panel, because it then doesn’t set a precedent, in that sense of the 
word’ (A6). Overall, decision-making around transport was described by 
respondents as ‘policy led’ (L2) and designed to ensure the consistent 
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application of pre-determined rules to individual cases: ‘This is the 
criteria. If you don’t meet it, you don’t get it’ (E5).  
 
Special Educational Needs 
 
7.11.6. SEN decision-making was described in very different terms. An 
important feature of the approach of local authorities in the sample was 
the ubiquitous use of multi-disciplinary panels to advise SEN officers on 
cases. Panels were advisory rather than decision-making bodies: ‘the panel 
cannot reach a decision, the local authority has to do it through a named 
officer’ (E8). While panels received a range of professional inputs, the role 
of SEN officers and managers was generally to chair the panels and provide 
input on issues around the law: ‘As a SEN Manager, we have to keep 
abreast of developments in the law because the others on the Panel have 
expertise in other areas really’ (E6). Administrators also had to consider 
the likely stance of a tribunal in case of dispute: ‘Particularly me, rather 
than maybe the psychologist… is thinking… given past decisions, is it 
defendable?’ (B1). 
 
7.11.7. Respondents described the assessment of a child’s needs as the 
core of their decision-making: ‘We’re looking at the needs of the young 
person. The advice that we’ve been given is: it’s needs-driven’ (C6). The 
SEN Code of Practice and its definition of needs were seen as important 
here, as was the balancing of a wide range of evidence and professional 
views:  
 
‘It’s really about looking directly at the needs and all the 
information that we’re presented with and applying the Code of 
Practice to that. It is a very multidisciplinary view on what we 
have in front of us’ (C6). 
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7.11.8. Respondents were generally clear that, although resources were a 
significant factor in decision-making, they were secondary. One 
respondent noted that unlike in other areas of public service, SEN 
legislation did not allow services to be rationed: ‘There’s a notion in SEN 
legislation, if it’s necessary it’s necessary, and finance is not allowed to 
fetter our judgments’ (B4). Another respondent noted that need was 
always the driving factor rather than resources: ‘Whilst I have to have an 
eye to the budget, I’m aware that we have to make appropriate 
allocations to meet needs’ (A1). While no respondents in the sample said 
that this general need to have ‘an eye to budget’ had any direct effect on 
the way in which individual cases were dealt with, the need to conserve 
finite resources was clearly a strong driver: ‘You can’t spend all the 
money in the first six months, and then in month seven say… ‘Sorry, 
we’ve spent all the money’ (E8). Resource issues were widely perceived as 
being a factor that made SEN decision-making complex: ‘You are going to 
immediately get a confrontation between a parental viewpoint and our 
own viewpoint in that use of resources’ (C4).  
 
7.11.9. Respondents noted that there remained a perception that SEN 
decision-making was a ‘battleground’ (B4) and that parents had to ‘fight’ 
in order to get the provision they felt was required for their children. 
Indeed, when describing decision-making in other local authorities, a 
number of respondents stated that SEN decision-making was often 
confrontational and driven by resources or other considerations: ‘I do have 
to say that in my experience there are authorities who fight for the sake 
of fighting’ (E8). Another respondent said: ‘I’ve been in other authorities 
where accountants rule’ (C4). Many respondents felt that their decision-
making compared favourably with other local authorities and, indeed, a 
tendency to see their decision-making positively was a feature of all 
respondents.  
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7.11.10. Several respondents pointed out that SEN decision-making was an 
area which was devoid of hard and fast rules. Respondent B4 illustrated 
this point clearly when commenting that he was often ‘on his own’ in 
making important decisions: ‘On the key issues, to some degree, you’re on 
your own’ (B4). Another respondent noted that SEN decision-making often 
involved a more negotiated approach to decision-making: 
 
‘You’ve got your Education Act, you’ve got your code of practice. 
But having pooled all that in together you still then have to sit 
down with the parent… what are their areas of mediation that 
they may take?’ (C4) 
 
Indeed, most respondents perceived their decision-making as involving 
significant negotiation with parents to find mutually acceptable 
compromises: ‘We will agree whatever we can agree’ (E2). 
 
7.11.11. Data provided by parent support organisations provided a more 
critical view of local authority decision-making.25 One area that was 
subject to significant criticism across the sample related to the degree to 
which parents were involved in decision-making: ‘I think there is still a bit 
of the 'us and them’’ (P6). Respondent P14 commented in similar terms 
that the extent to which officers welcomed parental involvement was a 
‘postcode lottery’. Respondent P15 saw a lack of responsiveness in her 
local authority’s approach: ‘I don’t think they think that the Local 
Authority really listens to their issues, then realigns what they’re doing… 
in the light of parents’ complaints’ (P15). 
 
7.11.12. Respondents across the sample echoed local authority 
respondents’ concerns that more effort could be made to resolve cases 
                                               
25
 The parent support organisations who took part in the research were mostly focused on helping parents 
whose children had SEN. They were generally not able to comment on other areas of decision-making. 
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early: ‘We’re very much about trying to promote early meetings, face to 
face meetings right from the very beginning’ (P6). One of the policy 
officials who took part in the research also considered that there was 
scope for more early resolution of cases: ‘Decisions could be considered 
earlier and, perhaps, better judgements come to’ (PO2). Respondents P9 – 
P1326 commented that parents would like to be more involved in decision-
making particularly at the ‘elusive panel’: ‘You get decisions being made 
on evidence that parents don’t always agree is the most accurate, up-to-
date reflective evidence on their child’ (P9 – P13). Parent support 
organisations considered that local authority cultures remained defensive: 
‘They [decision-makers] feel… very threatened by parents who have more 
knowledge than them on many occasions’ (P1-P3). 
 
7.11.13. Several respondents said that local policy priorities tended to 
predominate in terms of determining local authority decision-making: 
 
‘The whole drive… is to improve provision everywhere. So that 
actually children can go to their local school and get good quality 
provision. So in effect what would be happening, if the authority 
is paying for a child to go to school B, and they are paying say 
£100 a month to transport them to school B, that is letting school 
A off the hook’ (P8).  
 
Respondents P9 – P13 referred to parents with disabled children receiving 
almost identical letters with regards to request for school transport, 
without their specific needs having been assessed at any point: ‘Which 
sort of supports the, I suppose, the cynical kind of approach to the fact 
that this is not led by individual; this is led by saving money’ (P9 – P13). 
Respondent P7 spoke about the policy drive to reduce the number of 
statements being issued as shaping the local authority’s decision-making: 
                                               
26
 This was a group interview and data is reported together rather than individually. 
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‘The local authority don’t make it easy for parents… It’s all about 
reducing the number of statements, I think’ (P7). This gatekeeping 
approach was widely seen as prevalent in local authorities’ approaches: 
‘It is now the Local Authority’s policy to turn that down at least twice 
before they’ll go ahead and give you one.’ (P15); ‘They try and wear you 
down’ (P9 – P13). 
 
7.12. The commitment of decision-makers to learning from the LGO 
 
7.12.1. This section presents data, drawn from interviews with local 
authority respondents and LGO respondents, about decision-makers’ levels 
of commitment to learning from the LGO.  
 
Local authority respondents’ perceptions 
 
7.12.2. Expressed commitment to learning from the LGO was generally 
high. The need to simply comply with its decisions was perceived as self-
evident: ‘We would automatically look at that. I think we would want to 
keep a good rapport with the ombudsman’ (C3). Other respondents 
referred in similar terms to how they approached learning from LGO 
decisions: ‘So we do say, ‘Look, we can’t do this again…. We need to 
change our practice’’ (L3). Respondents generally saw implementing LGO 
decisions as part of a broader commitment to legality and to doing the 
right thing: ‘We are not a maverick authority’ (C7); ‘We’re very law 
abiding really here’ (T5). Some respondents were more ambiguous and felt 
that, although they would not disregard the LGO’s findings, it was not a 
particularly significant influence on decision-making:  
 
‘What I consider, and I guess it’s eventually what the Ombudsman 
considers but that’s not why we consider it… I consider our 
agreed procedures’ (C5).  
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Respondent E1 also commented that the LGO was not a strong motivating 
factor in her work: ‘My work is influenced by trying to do the best for 
children in school and not particularly influenced by whom somebody 
might go to complain to’ (E1).  
 
  LGO respondent’s perceptions 
 
7.12.3. LGO respondents commented that it was difficult to know how far 
LGO decisions were used as a source of learning, although they provided 
some evidence that the LGO had been influential in a number of cases. 
Respondent O4 noted that around 95% of recommendations were 
accepted, although she accepted that few checks were conducted. 
Respondent O3 noted that, although the LGO was reliant on receiving new 
complaints to find out if recommendations had been carried out, this 
happened very infrequently, which suggested that they were generally 
being implemented. The high rate of compliance was seen as due in part 
to the fear and respect with which the LGO was held by local authorities: 
‘If I ring up… You can almost hear them tugging the forelocks’ (O1). 
Respondents O1 and O2 also noted that sanctions such as publicity and the 
political scrutiny that surrounded published reports meant that compliance 
was generally not an issue: ‘Most councils will fall over backwards to 
avoid reports’ (O1). 
 
7.12.4. LGO respondents noted changes in the quality of information 
provided to the LGO and in complaint handling: ‘I think councils have 
taken [things] on board’ (O1). Attempts to improve complaint handling 
had not only occurred through individual recommendations, but also 
through the delivery of training to local authorities. A particular area 
where respondents felt the LGO had been influential was in the production 
of the ‘Focus Reports’ referred to in part I of this chapter above. 
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Respondent O4 noted that some positive feedback had been received from 
local authorities about these reports. 
 
7.12.5. Other specific examples where the LGO had been influential 
included a case on prejudice in school admissions as a result of which an 
amendment was made to the Admissions Code (O4). Another instance 
where respondent O4 felt the LGO had been influential was in terms of the 
administrative process for setting up admission appeals, where she 
described a ‘huge influence’: ‘We issued a special report… which basically 
became a model of good practice’ (O4). Respondent O2 cited an example 
where, after a series of complaints, a particular local authority had 
changed its approach in order to avoid the possibility of a public report: 
‘We had a whole spate of SEN complaints… As a result of that they 
reviewed how they were delivering the SEN function (O2). Another 
respondent also noted that authorities would seek to learn from each 
other’s cases: ‘They will read other councils’ reports’ (O1).  
 
Specific instances of learning from the LGO 
 
7.12.6. Respondents reported more changes having occurred as a result of 
LGO decisions than as a result of tribunal and court cases. This finding may 
in part be explained by the fact that respondents had significantly more 
experience of LGO cases than court cases and that only respondents in the 
SEN area were under the tribunal’s jurisdiction. In general, respondents 
tended to minimise the importance of adverse LGO decisions, often 
suggesting that the issues criticised had been peripheral and not core to 
the complaint. It was also clear that the vast majority of instances of 
learning cited by respondents related to their own cases; cases published 
against other local authorities did not seem to have led to changes in 
practice. Table 7.3 below presents a summary of changes made as a result 
of LGO cases. As the table indicates, there were a range of different 
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responses following LGO cases, although by far the most common changes 
were individual feedback, the circulation of information about a case, and 
minor procedural and practice changes. There were no examples provided 
where LGO decisions had not been complied with. In addition to these 
specific examples of changes, several respondents mentioned a more 
difficult to identify influence of the LGO, whereby its presence – ‘the 
ombudsman in the background’ (A4) – had a cumulative effect over time:  
 
‘I do think we have had incremental change over time, as a sort 
of incremental response to a single case, and then further 
incremental response to a similar further case, which over time 
does result in quite significant changes.’ (L3) 
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Table 7.3: adverse LGO findings and types of response reported by 
respondents 
 
Adverse LGO findings 
Admission appeals Admission and transport SEN 
Procedural unfairness 
in conduct of IAP 
Unclear information 
provided to IAP 
Inappropriate 
decision to quash IAP 
decision  
Inadequate advice 
provided to IAP 
Poor administrative 
system for issuing IAP 
decisions 
Fairness of the block 
IAP appeal process 
Failure to avoid 
perception of bias in 
conduct of IAP 
Unclear guidance 
Misapplied policy 
Poor wording in letters 
Failure to consider 
Equality Act 
Poor information/ 
communication 
Communication and 
notice periods for policy 
changes 
Fettering discretion 
Unclear process for 
measuring distances 
 
 
 
 
Delay in reaching a 
decision 
Specificity of 
statements 
Poor communication 
between departments 
Poor communication 
between authorities 
Arrangements for out-
of-school children 
Failure to evidence 
decision-making 
 
Types of response 
Individual remedies for the complainant  
Feedback provided to individual decision-makers 
Information about decisions circulated to staff 
Practices changed 
Guidance/ procedures amended 
Training conducted  
Reviewing similar cases 
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7.13. The commitment of decision-makers to learning from the tribunal 
 
Local authority respondents’ perceptions 
 
7.13.1. Most local authority respondents expressed a commitment to 
using tribunal decisions to improve their decision-making and few rejected 
this out of hand: ‘They’re [SEN officers] very aware of those cases… and 
that feeds into their provision decisions’ (C6). Many respondents, 
however, were not wholeheartedly committed, seeing the tribunal as more 
of a necessary evil than an unmitigated good: ‘If there is something that 
they can improve on they do take that up... I don’t think anybody 
particularly likes the tribunals’ (T1). As we will see further below, some 
respondents’ commitment to learning took on a very limited form, relating 
to improving their arguments in order to ‘win’ cases rather than learning 
in relation to the authority’s broader decision-making: ‘All we can do is to 
make it more difficult for even the most cantankerous panel to decide 
against us.’ (B4). Even where commitment to learning was expressed, as 
with the LGO, respondents were clear that the tribunal’s work was not a 
great influence when it came to their decision-making: ‘I don’t think that 
decision-makers are thinking of tribunal… They have the evidence at hand 
and they have the experts at Panel that they can consult’ (L4). 
 
Tribunal respondents’ perceptions 
 
7.13.2. One respondent noted that the scope for learning from upper 
tribunal decisions was ‘real but limited’: ‘But I think it’s a relatively 
small part, in reality, of what a local authority… will be engaged in doing’ 
(TR3). Respondent TR3 went on to comment that the SEN area presented 
limitations in terms of whether learning was likely, both because the law 
was relatively simple and because there were so many different 
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organisations implementing it. TR3 felt there was greater scope for 
tribunals to influence social security decision-making: 
 
‘The SEN framework is far less detailed, in terms of actual legal 
provisions. I think a lot of the questions that arise are heavily 
influenced by the particular factual context… [also] where you've 
got all the local authorities with education functions appearing… 
one doesn’t have the same awareness of there being information 
sharing mechanisms among themselves’ (TR3). 
 
In relation to the tribunal, respondent TR2 commented on her experience 
of how local authorities had responded over time, particularly in relation 
to deciding what cases to defend: ‘They’re using their knowledge and 
experience of the tribunal to decide what they’re defending’ (TR2). 
Respondent TR1 noted, however, that it was frustrating that local 
authorities seemed to take decisions late in the day on whether to defend 
cases or not: ‘They do look at the case, even if it is quite late. That is 
obviously extraordinarily frustrating for us’ (TR1).  
 
Parent support organisations’ perceptions 
 
7.13.3. Although parent support organisation respondents were able to 
provide some limited examples of situations where local authorities had 
learnt from tribunal decisions, they expressed some scepticism about the 
extent to which they were generally committed to learning. Respondents 
P9 – P13 for example said: ‘I don’t think they learn. Because it seems that 
they are really so willing to pile money into, ‘Let’s go to tribunal’’ (P9  - 
P13).  Respondent P7 noted that the she had experience of a case being 
upheld at tribunal one week, and an almost identical case being refused by 
the local authority a few weeks later. Respondent P15 felt that her local 
authority should be learning from the tribunal and that there was much 
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scope to do so, but that this was currently unrealised: ‘I am not aware 
that [the local authority] actually analyse things like that’ (P15). P9 – P13 
noted that even where learning from cases was disseminated, the 
information was not necessarily clear enough to influence practice: ‘I 
don’t know that necessarily the reasoning behind it, necessarily cascades 
to the bottom’ (P9 – P13).  
 
7.13.4. In explaining why decision-makers might not always be committed 
to learning from the tribunal, respondents suggested that a tension 
between the statutory framework and what local authorities were 
resourced to deliver was important: ‘They’re not the same thing’ (P15). 
Another reason was organisational culture, with many respondents 
criticising local authorities for assuming that parents were making 
unreasonable demands in relation to their children: ‘In an organisation you 
get convinced of the rightness of your own position… You start to decide 
that parents are pushy parents’ (P7). Respondent P7 went on to elaborate 
that the tribunal’s basic stance, in line with the SEN legislation, was that 
need rather than resources should be the primary consideration, but that 
this was a message that had trouble getting through. Indeed, several 
respondents noted that decision-makers did not place sufficient emphasis 
on legal considerations in their decision-making: ‘I think it’s making sure 
that the local authority is working in terms of the law and not their 
interpretation of the law which suits them’ (P6). Respondents P1 – P3 saw 
a divergence in approach between local authorities’ main decision-making 
tool (panels) and that of the tribunal: 
 
‘The panels as I understand it are basically resourcing, aren’t 
they? Whereas the tribunal is more of a legal thing in the sense 
of, ‘What’s our entitlements and what counts as legal evidence?’’ 
(P1 – P3). 
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  Specific instances of learning from the tribunal 
 
7.13.5. Respondents reported a number of changes that had occurred in 
light of tribunal cases. As with the LGO, changes reported related to 
respondents’ own cases rather than those against other local authorities. 
The most commonly reported changes related to changes in practice 
defending and presenting cases at tribunal. There were very few examples 
given of where the tribunal had led to a change in practice, process or 
policy in terms of SEN decision-making. Respondents did report that the 
tribunal could lead to fairly major changes in provision over time. This 
tended to be largely a reflection of changing parental demands and 
developments in SEN education, with the tribunal potentially affecting 
local provision where it consistently agreed that certain types of provision 
ought to be made available to meet a child’s needs. Interestingly, the only 
example of non-compliance cited in the course of the fieldwork occurred 
in relation to the tribunal, and this is discussed in more detail below.  
Table 7.4 highlights adverse tribunal findings which respondents reported 
had been made and shows that types of changes that were made as a 
result. 
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Table 7.4: adverse tribunal findings and types of response reported by 
respondents 
 
Adverse tribunal findings 
Refusal to over-admit child to a school that is full but is the parent’s 
preferred choice 
Inadequate joint working between departments and partner 
organisations 
Over complexity of some educational and care packages 
Calculation of comparative costs of provision between the authority’s 
choice and the parent’s choice 
Weak evidence, poorly presented and defended cases 
Inadequate professional reports 
Inadequate provision 
Types of responses 
Changes in practice 
Changes in approach to defending tribunal cases 
Changes in approach to conceding tribunal cases 
Changes in educational provision 
Ambivalent response to cases involving comparative costs 
 
  Example of limited compliance 
 
7.13.6. Many of the respondents who commented on the tribunal’s 
decisions referred to those cases that involved comparisons of costs (see 
also the decision analysis). A particular case  that was discussed in 
interviews was heard in the upper tribunal, [2011] UKUT 67 (AAC), and 
subsequently in the court of appeal, [2012] EWCA Civ 346, [2012] ELR 206. 
In brief, the case involved the question of what was a reasonable 
additional transport cost that local authorities should have to pay in order 
to meet parental preferences. While it was clear that its implications were 
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given serious consideration by local authorities, it appeared that they 
were generally unwilling to amend their transport policies as a result. This 
was because they felt the cost was prohibitive. Instead, it seemed that 
respondents had decided to maintain their current policies and deal with 
any cases that arose on a case-by-case basis. 
 
7.13.7.  Respondent C3 described the case and her authority’s response in 
the following terms:  
 
‘If it was a decision where we didn’t think there was going to be 
that much cost implication, then we may accept that ruling and 
go with it. But I think in this case one of the things we will be 
doing is to look at what that cost implication might be’ (C3).  
 
Respondent E3 noted that the tribunal’s decision had led to a change in 
practice but the overall policy had not been changed:  
 
‘Now when a case comes to panel and the parent doesn’t want 
their nearest school, I have to have the costings before I can 
decide… I don’t think we’ve changed policy though’ (E3).  
 
The same case was commented on in some detail by respondents in Braan 
Council, where respondent B3 (a legal adviser) noted that the tribunal’s 
approach was in conflict with the authority’s policy and he advised that 
the safest course would be to amend the policy accordingly. Respondent 
B4 noted that, although the policy had been reviewed, a decision was 
taken not to amend it and to see how the issue played out in future 
appeals and challenges:  
 
‘We decided to retain our present policy in relation to the 
nearest appropriate school. We may, and the premise of your 
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discussion today is about learning from experience, then if I go to 
tribunal and have my ears boxed presenting that kind of 
argument on more than one occasion, then I, battered and 
bruised, may have to come back and say ‘Look, it’s not working’ 
(B4). 
 
7.14. Decision-makers’ commitment to learning from court decisions 
 
Local authority respondents’ perceptions 
 
7.14.1. Despite having the least direct experience of court decisions, 
respondents’ comments often indicated that courts were potentially the 
most significant redress mechanism in terms of their decision-making: 
‘Courts are the most influential of the three… Though lowest in frequency 
[they are] sometimes highest in influence’ (T8). Indeed, respondents were 
generally positive about their commitment to learning from the courts, 
noting that important cases tended to be written into codes and become 
part of their practice: ‘Any court decision could have an impact on not 
only the Code, but it could impact on what we would determine as an 
authority as a fair process’ (A3). Respondents were enthusiastic about the 
ability of judicial review to clarify the law and provide guidance: ‘[Case 
law] will set the precedent and say, ‘You must do this.’ Then you can 
change your practice in accordance’ (L5). One respondent noted the 
influence of classic administrative law cases as well as cases that occurred 
specifically in the education area: ‘We do have backgrounds of the 
Wednesbury rules…and various cases. We do have at the back of our heads 
easily-accessible case law’ (C2). In addition to actual judgments, 
respondent E6 noted that threats of judicial review had a significant 
influence on his local authority and provided great impetus to resolve 
cases: ‘[Pre-action protocol letters] have  quite an effect because, 
obviously, we want to avoid getting embroiled in that’ (E6).  
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  Court respondent’s perceptions 
 
7.14.2. Respondent AC1 said she had no knowledge of what happened 
following her decisions and how they were used by local authorities: ‘Well, 
I think they would just have to go off and think about it… The only thing 
we know is if it’s appealed or not appealed and we see some stuff in the 
newspapers that we look at very quickly’  (AC1). Asked whether she had 
any sense of what happened after cases left the courtroom, respondent 
AC1 responded: ‘No, none at all, and we distance ourselves from people 
like that because we don’t want to get into arguments’ (AC1). 
 
Specific instances of learning 
 
7.14.3. Respondents provided limited data in relation to court decisions 
that had proved influential in terms of their decision-making and 
information that was provided was often vague. Nonetheless, some 
respondents did highlight changes that had been made following specific 
court judgments against other authorities, while others commented on 
responses to threatened litigation against their own. In terms of responses 
to specific judgments, one respondent commented on a case that had led 
to a change in wording used in standard letters in the transport area: 
‘We’ve taken the recommended wording from that particular case’ (C5). 
In the admissions area, many respondents referred to the importance of 
historic cases, which had now been written into the School Admissions 
Code and the School Admissions Appeal Code. These were widely seen as 
influential and introduction into the Code meant that there was clarity 
about the application of particular judgments. One respondent referred to 
a case that had had broad influence on the admissions area at the time, 
which involved the way in which local authorities should approach the 
issue of parental preferences: ‘The Rotherham Judgment, which is going 
back quite a long time ago… That had quite an impact’ (T2). A local 
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authority lawyer (respondent B3) commented on an influential case which 
referred to the required specificity of learning difficulty assessments; this 
case had led to changes in the advice he provided to colleagues.  
 
7.14.4. Respondents who commented about threatened litigation tended 
to be lawyers and emphasised that threats of judicial review and the 
receipt of pre-action protocol letters were influential in terms of achieving 
a resolution to the particular case being challenged. The cost of fighting 
cases, along with the fact that there was often at least some merit to the 
challenge, meant that threatened litigation was described as an effective 
way of changing a local authority’s approach on particular cases: ‘Usually 
what it does is it provokes dialogue between the two parties… [and] we 
will inch our way towards a solution that’s somewhere in the middle’ 
(B3). The few respondents who commented on responses to threatened 
litigation tended to emphasise that these were pragmatic and involved a 
strong element of bargaining, along with consequential assessments of the 
costs involved in pursuing various courses of action. It appeared that 
decisions on how to respond to cases were often driven by costs or the 
potential for negative publicity, rather than an acceptance that the 
authority’s original course of action had been wrong. One respondent 
implied that achieving resolutions in individual cases was a way of avoiding 
more widespread compliance with judgments; she referred to the 
approach in her local authority as ‘damage limitation’: ‘The last thing we 
want is hundreds of people coming forward and challenging… that would 
cost us an arm and a leg’ (T4). A respondent (L6) in an another authority, 
however, suggested that negotiated settlements could achieve broader 
changes in a local authority’s policies.  In one case, a possible breach of 
human rights law was identified which led to a re-appraisal of the policy in 
question in addition to a remedy for the individual. 
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7.15. Processes of organisational learning 
 
7.15.1. Data presented in this section describe the processes of 
organisational learning used by local authority respondents. The data are 
shown using Huber’s (1991) framework: knowledge acquisition, 
information interpretation, information dissemination, and organisational 
memory. Respondents tended not to distinguish between learning 
processes used for different redress mechanisms and, as a result, the data 
presented below relates to all redress mechanisms. 
 
Knowledge acquisition 
 
7.15.2. Respondents were asked how they became aware of decisions 
taken by redress mechanisms against other authorities. Systematic, ad hoc 
and unsystematic approaches were reported. 
 
7.15.3. Systematic approaches. Respondent B5 reported the most 
systematic approach to finding out about redress mechanisms’ decisions. 
She brought a file of LGO decisions about other authorities to the 
interview and commented: ‘We are aware of them…. We have got a file’ 
(B5). Another respondent noted that the manager in her team had specific 
responsibility for monitoring for decisions of redress mechanisms: ‘She 
does a lot of work on looking at information that’s come off the internet, 
news bulletins, making sure that anything [is picked up]’ (C3). Similarly, 
respondent E8 noted that she had responsibility for ensuring cases were 
identified and, in relation to the LGO, this tended to be done once a year 
when they published their annual reports. 
 
7.15.4. Respondent C1 noted that the legal team had a responsibility for 
becoming aware of cases in her authority: ‘The Legal Officer has a regular 
responsibility to do a monthly update’ (C1). Respondent L5 saw routine 
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monitoring for decisions by redress mechanisms as a part of her wider 
responsibility to keep aware of developments outwith the local authority. 
One respondent (T2) noted that there was a formal monitoring process for 
decisions at a corporate level in her authority. Another respondent noted 
that in addition to routine monitoring of cases, sometimes searching 
occurred as a result of having encountered a particular problem on which 
guidance was required: ‘It also works the other way… you backtrack to 
something that’s come from some guidance’  (C5). 
 
7.15.5. Ad hoc approaches. A greater number of respondents reported 
that they had ways of finding out about decisions, but that these did not 
necessarily take the form of proactive monitoring and scanning for cases. 
Instead, information would arrive to them through a variety of sources 
and, while they felt that they did get to find out about cases, it was often 
acknowledged that this was ad hoc: ‘To some extent we pick these things 
up. Heaven knows it isn’t watertight’ (T7). Respondent L2 reported that 
she did occasionally look out for cases, but did not have time to monitor 
for cases regularly. When she did proactively look for cases, it would be in 
response to a particular problem she was trying to address: ‘I don’t have 
time to [monitor regularly] Well, I mean, if there’s something with a 
specific issue, I may’ (L2). 
 
7.15.6. Most respondents who reported a more ad hoc approach, noted 
that they tended to pick up information through colleagues and 
networking groups and, therefore, in a more reactive fashion. Respondent 
L1 referred to finding out about cases ‘anecdotally’. Respondents L3 and 
E2 noted that although various bits of information would reach them, 
there was not a formal process for monitoring: ‘I wouldn’t say it’s 
systematic’ (L3); ‘There’s no formal way’ (E2). Respondents E5 and E6 
also mentioned the importance of continuous routine dialogue between 
officers as an important process of acquiring knowledge about cases. 
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7.15.7. Unsystematic. Several respondents noted that there was either no 
system in place to monitor decisions about other authorities, or that they 
were unaware of any. Respondents L4, A6, C7 and T3, for example, made 
this point with the latter commenting that some form of monitoring would 
be a ‘good idea’. Another respondent noted that she did not have the time 
to look for cases: ‘People have got so much to do that there is probably 
less time now for reading’ (C7). Respondent L1 commented that there 
were perhaps issues with the way in which information about tribunal 
cases was shared nationally: ‘I certainly couldn’t think of one where we 
sat up and we took notice. Maybe that’s an issue about information-
sharing’ (L1). Respondent L4 also made the point that more could be done 
to find out proactively about cases: ‘Whatever is happening in other local 
authorities should be shared with us and vice versa’ (L4). 
 
7.15.8. Table 7.5 below shows the top five sources of information through 
which respondents found out about redress mechanisms’ decisions against 
other authorities.  
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Table 7.5: top 5 sources of information about redress mechanisms’ 
decisions cited by respondents 
 
Source of information about redress 
mechanisms’ decisions 
Number of times cited 
by respondents 
Professional networking groups 
 
27 
Training 
 
15 
Email updates/ newsletters 
 
9 
Internet/ websites 
 
8 
LGO Annual Report 
 
4 
 
 
7.15.9. Table 7.5 shows clearly that the major source of information 
about decisions against other local authorities was professional networking 
groups. Training and various forms of email updates also rated highly in 
terms of sources of information.  Email updates referred to included news 
bulletins from the LGO and legal or professional updates to which the local 
authority was signed up.  
 
Information interpretation 
 
7.15.10. There were two broad ways in which respondents described the 
process of interpreting information acquired from redress mechanisms. 
The first involved a process where the relevance, value, and practicality of 
judgments were unquestioned. Here, a single manager or member of staff 
in a specialist role, was responsible for establishing what needed to be 
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learned from decisions and then passing those messages on to others for 
implementation. The second approach saw compliance as more 
problematic, and involved widespread discussion of cases in order to 
determine their relevance and implications for the local authority. Here 
decision-making was not restricted to how to learn from decisions, but 
included whether and to what extent to do so. 
 
7.15.11. Single interpreter. Respondent T8 noted that part of her role 
involved assessing cases and then making sure that any changes required 
were implemented by her team. This process involved changes being 
decided and then communicated to relevant staff. Respondent L2 noted 
that the process of deciding what should happen as a result of decisions by 
redress mechanisms was fairly uncomplicated: ‘we just take it on board’ 
(L2). Respondent E8, referring to LGO and court cases, said that learning 
involved an immediate process of implementation: ‘You just have to 
incorporate that straight away’ (E8). Respondent E1 noted that changes 
were made quickly following decisions: ‘I think it’s something that is dealt 
with immediately, the people involved are told about it and the processes 
are reviewed ’. Respondent L4, meanwhile, said that she was responsible 
for producing a summary of cases after every appeal, listing what went 
well and what went less well. She outlined what learning was required and 
then passed it on to others in the team: ‘now, what they do with that, it’s 
up to them’ (L4). 
 
7.15.12. Group interpretation. A number of respondents reported that 
adverse findings against their authority, or significant cases against other 
authorities, would initiate a process of reflection and discussion amongst 
decision-makers and that this was the primary means by which the 
meaning and significance of cases would be interpreted. Some respondents 
noted that the first step would be in deciding whether they thought the 
redress mechanism’s decision had been valid. Respondents T5 and E5, 
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referring to the LGO, noted that if they received an adverse ruling but felt 
that they had been correct in their actions and were not persuaded by the 
LGO’s judgment, they would not consider making any changes. As noted 
above, Respondent B2 made a similar comment in relation to the 
tribunal’s decisions, where a single decision in a single case would not 
necessarily be seen as persuasive.  
 
7.15.13. Respondent C3 noted that an individual would be given 
responsibility for what should happen as a result of decisions, but that this 
would involve a wide process of consultation with a number of parties: 
 
‘We make sure that one person co-ordinates it, but we go back 
round to all the people… “Can we incorporate that?”  … “Is this a 
possible change?’’ (C3). 
  
A number of other respondents made the point that, in determining what 
should be done as a result of a particular case, questions were asked 
about how important it was, what its consequences were, and how 
feasibly any changes could be incorporated into the local authority’s 
current practice. Respondent C5/ C6, for example, commented: ‘What we 
do at the moment, rather than comply with it, is take notice of 
information that comes through and consider it really in our situation.’ 
(C5/ C6). Respondent B2 similarly commented that the process of deciding 
what to do with cases was one of careful reflection rather than simple 
compliance: ‘We continue to be aware of such decisions, and reflect on 
them accordingly’ (B2). Respondents’ comments in relation to assessing 
the validity of judgments were generally restricted to the LGO and the 
tribunal; the court’s decisions were seen to require compliance regardless 
of their perceived merits. 
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7.15.14. Rather than decisions about what needed to happen being 
imposed on decision-makers, respondents C5/ C6 noted that frontline staff 
were involved in considering what should happen: ‘Then we will discuss as 
a team. It’s not from on high’ (C5/ C6). Respondent T8 similarly 
commented that decision-makers would be directly involved in discussing 
what should happen as a result of adverse findings: ‘Frontline staff would 
be involved in the review’ (T8). This discursive element and the idea that 
group processes of discussion and sense-making were required to 
understand the potential impact of redress mechanism decisions, was 
reflected by a number of respondents who referred to holding a ‘debrief’ 
or an ‘autopsy’ following upheld cases. The approach to identifying areas 
for improvement and understanding their significance varied in relation to 
its formality. Respondent T6 described a very thorough process through 
which potential learning might be identified: 
 
‘If we lose at a tribunal, or more to the point, if the LGO takes a 
dim view of what we are doing… What I do is I take the LGO 
report to my board… and we pull it apart... I tend to ask an 
officer to go away and say, ‘Right, read the case, bring back 
lessons learnt.’ If it is a really tricky case… I normally bring an 
outside person in to look at it for me’ (T6). 
 
Others described the process through which discussions happened as much 
less formal, often because teams were small and discussions could happen 
over people’s desks: ‘it’s funny how much information you gain by talking 
to each other’ (E5); ‘There are a number of fora where we can have 
conversations… But I'm not sure I would be confident… [that] an agreed 
dataset is shared, and a strategic response is decided upon, in truth (L3). 
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Knowledge dissemination 
 
7.15.15. Various approaches were taken to the dissemination of 
knowledge. As noted in the preceding section, in many cases 
interpretation and dissemination of knowledge were connected – 
interpretation was a group exercise and shared meanings were developed 
through conversation. However, respondents also referred to a range of 
other means through which information was disseminated. In some cases, 
rather than group processes of reflection, information appeared to be 
passed on to decision-makers in order for them to reach their own 
conclusions. In other cases, more directive methods of dissemination, such 
as the use of training or specific process changes were used.  
 
7.15.16. Often respondents referred to the circulation of written 
information to colleagues as a means of dissemination. In some 
authorities, these messages were the ‘raw’ information from redress 
mechanisms, while in others the information was the result of previous 
interpretation processes. One respondent, for example, said that all 
information would be passed on to colleagues as it was received: ‘All cases 
go through. I don’t filter anything’ (C6). Others, however, would provide 
more selective information: ‘[An officer] reviews them on a weekly basis 
and prepares the update’ (C1). Respondent B2 referred to drawing out 
‘learning points’ from cases and disseminating these, while respondent C3 
referred to changes required from cases being put in a ‘procedural note’ 
that would be circulated. One respondent referred to dissemination as a 
process of leading through example: ‘You disseminate it by demonstrating 
it’ (E8). Generally, it is unclear that processes of dissemination were 
particularly effective. Indeed, the data above on knowledge acquisition 
shows respondents in the same authority reporting different approaches to 
knowledge acquisition, which indicates that information may not be widely 
and clearly shared in all cases. 
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Organisational memory 
 
7.15.17. Few respondents referred to specific systems for storing 
knowledge that arose out of cases. Some kept paper or electronic files (C4 
and B5). Most seemed to assume that tacit knowledge gained through 
discussions would be maintained within the collective consciousness of 
staff, or that changes embedded through process changes would be a 
sufficient record of learning that had been achieved. One respondent 
noted that discussions arising from important redress mechanism cases 
would ‘permeate practice’ and become embedded in the organisation’s 
routine approaches (E8). 
 
7.16. Levels and variations in awareness 
 
Levels of awareness  
 
7.16.1. Table 7.6 below presents an overall summary of local authority 
respondents’ awareness levels of decisions taken by redress mechanisms 
against their own local authority.27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
27
 The same caveats apply to the data presented here as were noted for tables 7.1 and 7.2.  
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Table 7.6: respondents’ awareness levels of decisions taken by redress 
mechanisms against their own authority* 
 
 Mean awareness of decisions* 
 
LGO 2.12 (33)** (high awareness) 
 
Tribunal 1.96 (12) (high awareness) 
 
Court 2.11  (9) (high awareness) 
 
 
* Respondents were asked to rate their awareness levels on the following scale: 1 = very 
high awareness; 2 = high awareness; 3 = fairly high awareness; 4 = neither high nor low 
awareness; 5 = fairly low awareness; 6 = low awareness; 7 = very low awareness. 
 
** The number in brackets represents the total number of responses to this question.   
 
7.16.2. Table 7.6 provides a clear picture of respondents’ awareness 
levels of decisions taken by redress mechanisms against their own 
authority: these were all in the ‘high’ range. Next, respondents were 
asked how aware they were of decisions taken by each redress mechanism 
against other local authorities around the country; this data is shown in 
Table 7.7 below. 
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Table 7.7: respondents’ awareness levels of decisions taken by redress 
mechanisms against other local authorities 
 
 Mean awareness of decisions* 
 
LGO 4 (34) (neither high nor low) 
 
Tribunal 4 (12) (neither high nor low) 
 
Court 4.45 (29) (neither high nor low) 
 
 
* See table 7.6 above for information on how to interpret this table. 
  
7.16.3. Table 7.7 above shows that respondents’ average awareness of 
decisions taken by each redress mechanism against other local authorities 
was ‘neither high nor low’. Comparing table 7.6 with table 7.7 above, a 
clear finding, as might be expected, is that respondents reported being 
more aware of decisions taken by redress mechanisms against their own 
authorities compared to decisions against other local authorities. This 
suggests, generally, a low level of confidence amongst respondents in the 
effectiveness of their organisational learning mechanisms and a limited 
commitment, in practice, to learning from cases against other authorities. 
 
Variations in awareness 
 
7.16.4. Qualitative data indicated that there were significant individual 
variations in awareness, related to the individual’s level of seniority and 
the nature of the individual’s role. 
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7.16.5. Indeed, several respondents reported that an individual’s level of 
seniority within the organisation was likely to affect the degree to which 
they became aware of redress mechanisms’ decisions. The more junior the 
staff, the less likely they would be to be aware. Awareness of the actual 
details and significance of decisions was more likely to reside with more 
senior staff. Respondent E1 noted that she would get informed of the 
outcomes of cases but not the reasoning for the decision: ‘we wouldn’t get 
any specifics about it’ (E1). Particularly in relation to awareness of cases 
that occurred in other local authorities, respondents noted that more 
senior officers were likely to be more aware: ‘Obviously other officers 
higher up [would know more]’ (A5). 
 
7.16.6. The degree to which an individual’s role was operational rather 
than strategic, or specialised rather than generic, was commented on by 
some respondents to explain variations in levels of awareness. One 
respondent, with a specialist role dealing with complaints, commented: 
‘They [transport and admission officers] wouldn’t obviously know it in the 
same way that I do… their role is so operational’ (L2). Another officer 
with a specialist complaints role commented in similar terms: ‘When I was 
an operational manager… I’d never heard of the local government 
ombudsman’ (T7). Several respondents commented that officers were 
likely to be aware on a need-to-know basis: ‘In terms of the wider office, 
if you like, that’s a bit of information overload’ (B7).  
 
7.16.7. Several respondents pointed out that, in relation to the LGO, staff 
who were ‘link officers’ (responsible for providing a central point of 
communication with the LGO) had higher levels of awareness. A similar 
point was made in relation to the tribunal, where legal advisers and 
officers who had a specialist role in relation to tribunal cases had higher 
levels of awareness: ‘There was a key officer, who held all this 
information… at the point that they walked through the doors of the 
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tribunal. But other members of staff, in a wider staff group, who were 
interacting with parents on a day to day basis, did not necessarily know 
that’ (E8). Also in the SEN area, where administrators worked in 
collaboration with other professionals, several respondents commented 
that awareness was likely to vary: ‘Other people on the panel, I think they 
are aware, but I don’t think that’s at the forefront of their minds’ (B1). 
 
PART III: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DECISION-MAKING ENVIRONMENT 
 
7.17. Introduction to part III 
 
7.17.1. This part of the chapter describes the challenges, pressures, and 
influences that local authority respondents reported within their decision-
making environment. 
 
7.18. Challenges and pressures affecting decision-making 
 
7.18.1. Respondents were asked whether there were particular challenges 
and pressures that affected the work of decision-makers; these fell 
broadly into the areas shown in table 7.8. 
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Table 7.8: challenges and pressures mentioned by respondents 
 
All areas SEN 
 Changes in demand for services 
 Volume of work 
 Resource pressures 
 Parents becoming more 
demanding and difficult to deal 
with 
 Use of legal representation by 
parents 
 The impact of central 
government policy changes 
 The commissioning of 
independent reports by parents 
 Working with health 
professionals 
 
 
Changes in demand for services 
 
7.18.2. Some respondents reported pressure on their admissions teams 
from growing numbers of children. Respondent T6, for example, reported 
that Tummel Council had one of the country’s fastest growing pupil 
populations. Respondent C7 reported a similar issue and stated that: ‘The 
thing calling for attention at the moment is the growing number of 
children’ (C7). In the SEN area, a number of respondents referred to 
changing local needs amongst children providing a challenge for the local 
authority: ‘We’re seeing a big growth in a requirement for specialist 
provision… the authority is playing catch-up’ (E6). 
 
Volume of work 
 
7.18.3. Linked to the issue of changing demand for services, many 
respondents referred to the volume of work they had to deal with as 
constituting a significant pressure. Respondent E7, who worked in the 
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admissions and transport area, said: ‘We have lots and lots of appeal 
dates set up… So therefore letters aren’t being answered, and we have 
more and more angry parents.’ (E7). High volumes of work were 
influential in determining the kind of service that the local authority was 
able to provide to parents: ‘When you’ve got 17,000 applications coming 
through… it’s very hard to keep that level of ‘We’re doing well’ (E5). This 
theme was picked up by respondents in other authorities, who pointed out 
the seasonal spikes in work in the admissions area in particular which 
could lead to very pressured periods of decision-making. Similar comments 
were made in relation to the SEN area: ‘Volume does make a difference’ 
(E6). 
 
Resource pressures 
 
7.18.4. It was noted above that resourcing played an important part in 
local authority decision-making, however, many respondents said this had 
become acute as a result of cuts in public spending. Lack of resources 
meant that it had become difficult to implement policy in line with central 
government rhetoric: ‘I think the rhetoric from the government implies 
that local authorities should have all these things available, but we don't’ 
(A1). Respondent A6 noted that it had become difficult to fulfil basic 
tasks: ‘Would you like my desk? My computer? I will just do it by 
telepathy’ (A6). The recession also meant that parents were asking for 
more resources than they otherwise might have done: ‘There has been a 
definite correlation between the recession and the number of people 
appealing’ (C3).  
 
Parents becoming more demanding and difficult to deal with 
 
7.18.5. Many respondents mentioned that difficult behaviour on the part 
of some parents was a challenge. There was a widespread view that 
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decision-making around educational entitlements was highly emotive: 
‘People are very passionate… they want the best school for their child’ 
(E7). Respondent C2 said admission to a particular school could become a 
matter of ‘life and death’ for parents. Parents were described by 
respondents as being vigorous in the pursuit of what they wanted and 
increasingly knowledgeable about how to obtain this: ‘The majority of 
them know their rights, they are very articulate’ (T5). Knowledgeable 
consumers presented a challenge for administrators: ‘I welcome it as a 
problem, but it is hugely time consuming’ (T6). Respondent L1 
commented about parents in her area that: ‘They’ve basically got their 
appeal papers ready from the minute they haven’t got the decision they 
want’ (L1). As well as a greater propensity to appeal or complain, 
respondents noted that parents were more knowledgeable about their 
children’s entitlements: ‘Parents have been reading this, ‘How to win your 
admission appeal’ book’ (C7).  
 
7.18.6. A number of respondents mentioned the challenges caused by a 
small number of parents who were – rather than just demanding – 
unreasonable. Respondent T6, for instance noted that: ‘We have some 
parents who are very, very unreasonable, and aggressive, and unpleasant, 
and difficult’ (T6). A respondent from Earn Council noted that ‘people’s 
mentality in this day and age is still a case of he who shouts the loudest 
gets what they want’ (E5), while a colleague reported that ‘we have a lot 
of angry parents… which can cause quite a lot of pressure’ (E7). Although 
respondents were often clear that parents had the right to pursue their 
child’s interests, it appeared that distinctions were sometimes made 
between individuals with ‘genuine’ grievances and others. There was a 
widespread view that genuine grievances were few and far between, 
compared to those who were pursuing issues unreasonably, which made 
deserving cases harder to identify: ‘There are inevitably some where you 
have quite a genuine parent who actually has very genuine reasons, but 
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they tend to end up getting treated a bit like everybody else’ (L1). 
Respondent T6 said that it could be hard to tell the difference between 
cases once ‘the heat of battle takes over’. 
 
Use of legal representation by parents 
 
7.18.7. A number of respondents noted the greater propensity of parents 
to use legal representation to challenge decisions: ‘There are companies 
that are coming out of the woodwork for profit to give advice on 
admissions’(T5). Respondent C7 noted that: ‘We get parents now who will 
bring in consultants, barristers, solicitors’ (C7). In the SEN area, there was 
a widespread view that the use of legal representation by parents had 
increased: ‘With SEN we have three or four firms that we constantly 
interact with, who market themselves as SEN specialists’ (T4).  One 
respondent noted that the use of legal representation by parents could 
make it more difficult to resolve cases: ‘It’s not in their interests to reach 
an easy resolution’ (L1). 
 
7.18.8.  A respondent from Braan Council noted that there had been a 
‘culture shift’ in the use of representation at tribunals: ‘When I first 
started, the involvement of solicitors was very much a minority activity’ 
(B4). Local authorities were seen as having become more legalistic to keep 
up with parents: ‘Officers are struggling against…  parents with legal 
representation’ (C2). Most of the respondents who mentioned the issue of 
increased representation portrayed this phenomenon in a negative light, 
with particular concerns that parents were being exploited by 
unscrupulous legal firms: ‘Some solicitors perhaps don’t do parents justice 
on some of the cases’ (T1). 
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The impact of central government policy changes 
  
7.18.9. A number of respondents referred to the impact of changes in 
central government policy as creating challenges for their work. The 
academy and free schools programmes were seen as making lines of 
responsibility and decision-making more complex. Respondents also cited 
other examples, such as the remit given to the Education Funding Agency 
(EFA) to deal with complaints about academies: ‘The problem now is 
we’re getting into this very confused state of ‘Does it go to the 
Ombudsman or does it go to the EFA?’ (A3). Several respondents referred 
to challenges that arose from amendments to the Admissions and 
Admission Appeal Codes: ‘That tends to be where the most guidance gets 
issued and reissued’ (T4). Respondent A6 noted that guidance ‘chops and 
changes every five minutes’. 
 
7.18.10. Respondents also felt that changes to the rules governing 
admissions could bring about increased workload and lead to unpredictable 
long term results: ‘There was no idea of the bombardment of the number 
of applications that we would receive’ (E5). Another respondent noted 
that while the changes to the Admissions Code would give schools more 
flexibility to over-admit, it would also store up future problems as she 
predicted that parents would eventually start complaining if classrooms 
were too full: ‘…schools are going to find it difficult, and eventually 
parents will find it difficult’ (C7). Finally, lack of clarity in the guidance 
available from central government was cited by some respondents: ‘The 
codes of practice are clearly written by somebody in Whitehall who 
doesn’t do the actual job’ (A4). 
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The commissioning of independent reports by parents 
 
7.18.11. A major challenge reported by respondents in the SEN area 
related to countering professional expert reports commissioned by 
parents. These were one of the tools parents were increasingly using to 
ensure that they achieved their desired outcomes: ‘If they [parents]… are 
able to pay for independent professional reports to say what they want, 
then they are more likely to get the decision they want’ (L1). This was 
referred to as a consumerist process where parents could buy reports ‘off 
the shelf’, that all said more or less the same thing: ‘You could probably… 
put together two or three reports and there would only be slight 
differences’ (T3). Respondent E8 said that private professionals were 
‘being commissioned to recommend over-provision’, and this made it 
harder to counter the view that the local authority would only provide the 
minimum. One respondent also noted that some private practitioners 
brought questionable ideological preferences into the equation: ‘There are 
some professionals out there that are either unethical or completely 
removed from reality’ (L4). 
 
Working with health professionals 
 
7.18.12. Working with professionals in the health and social care area who 
were not directly employed by the local authority was seen as a challenge 
by a number of respondents: ‘They’re a bit less keen to get involved in a 
tribunal situation’ (B1). Respondent T3 noted that the quality of reports 
being provided by health professionals was often inadequate, with a ‘lack 
of detail in the professional reports, [and] sweeping statements from 
medics’ (T3). Respondent L4 noted that NHS professionals were often not 
as prepared for the tribunal process as private practitioners: ‘We have 
very, very good professionals but they’re not professional witnesses, 
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whereas… what I call ‘A Teams’ on the other side… They practically live 
at the tribunal’ (L4). 
 
7.19. Internal and external influences on decision-making 
 
7.19.1. Respondents were asked to describe any internal and external 
influences on their decision-making. Some of the pressures and challenges 
described above could also have been categorised as influences and it is 
recognised that there is some fluidity between these categories. The key 
difference is that influences could affect decision-making without 
necessarily being seen as challenging: the influence of colleagues, for 
example. Table 7.9 outlines the main influences referred to by 
respondents. 
 
Table 7.9: main influences on decision-making cited by respondents 
 
All areas SEN 
 Legislation 
 Codes 
 Internal and external colleagues  
 Elected members 
 Legal advice 
 Local charities 
 
 
Government legislation and codes 
 
7.19.2. By far the most frequently cited external influence by 
respondents was the legislation which governed their decision-making and, 
particularly, the codes that accompanied the legislation in the admissions 
and SEN areas and the guidance issued for transport. In the admissions 
area, the Admissions Code was a strong influence: ‘That would be our first 
point of reference in any decisions that are made’ (A6). Despite the 
broader scope for discretionary decision-making in relation to SEN, 
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respondents also described the centrality of legislation and the SEN Code 
of Practice as an influence on their decision-making: ‘The Education Act 
and the Code of Practice... Of course, I’m guided by those two main 
pieces of regulation’ (L4). 
 
Colleagues inside and outside the local authority 
 
7.19.3. Officers in all decision-making areas referred to the existence of 
various regional officer groups which met to discuss professional issues in 
relation to their decision-making areas and which exerted a ‘professional 
influence’: ‘Whether that is just email contact, or else formal contact 
through things like the Transport Officers Group, or else attendance at an 
annual admissions get together’ (B2). Within their local authorities, 
respondents frequently cited other teams and departments as influences 
on their decision-making and this seemed to reflect the interdisciplinary 
nature of decision-making, which required input from various sources: 
‘They’re all impacting on and giving us information to go towards making 
a decision’ (A3). In the SEN area, the importance of the broader multi-
disciplinary team was emphasised by several respondents: ‘I need to work 
in a collaborative way with… the Health Service and also Social Care or 
Social Services’ (L4). One respondent noted that colleagues in other areas 
were not only important but, in relation to the provision of professional 
advice, were crucial to the decision-making of SEN panels: ‘It’s still very 
much on the position or the evidence and views of the professionals. Not 
anything far broader than that’ (L1). 
 
Elected members 
 
7.19.4. Elected members were seen by a number of respondents as 
influential, with one respondent describing the influence of elected 
members as twofold: ‘One is… fighting for their constituents, then the 
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second obviously is in terms of… the policies that the councillors or 
executive members want to set’ (T8). Respondents referred to receiving 
significant correspondence from elected members: ‘The councillor and MP 
involvement is far greater now’ (B5). Respondent E8 noted that the 
pressure from elected members in her local authority came more from 
their desire to ensure budgets were under control and that spending was 
kept down: ‘When you're the decision maker.. you are the profligate or 
the parsimonious. As far as the elected members are concerned you are 
the profligate’ (E8). 
 
Legal advice  
 
7.19.5. Respondents described legal advice as an influence on their work: 
‘The law is always subject to interpretation as well. So it is a case of just 
seeking advice’ (E3). Several respondents noted that they would only seek 
legal advice in relation to the most complex and potential high cost cases. 
They pointed out that their authorities experienced high levels of appeals 
and, therefore, that SEN officers tended to be well informed in relation to 
any legal issues. One respondent (a solicitor) noted that: ‘I am there when 
they hit a bit of an obstacle I suppose’ (B3). Another respondent said that 
interaction between the legal department and the SEN team tended to be 
around judicial review applications. Generally, however, advice was only 
sought on cases that had been challenged and it was rarely sought in 
relation to routine decision-making. 
 
Local charities 
 
7.19.6. Several respondents noted that local charities and parent 
organisations could have a significant influence on their decision-making: 
‘The local ASD support group… is very influential (E3);  ‘I think that 
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organisations like… the local branch of the National Autistic Society, they 
will influence every resource in your policy’ (E8). 
 
7.20. Chapter summary 
 
7.20.1. This chapter has reported the empirical findings of the research 
and presented data relating to the operation of redress mechanisms, 
bureaucratic decision-makers and their decision-making, and the decision-
making environment. The following chapter will discuss the significance 
and value of these findings in understanding the factors responsible for the 
exercise of bureaucratic control by redress mechanisms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
- 248 - 
 
8. DISCUSSION 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
8.1.1. This chapter seeks to identify the principal contribution that the thesis 
has made to existing empirical and theoretical understandings of whether, 
to what extent, and how, redress mechanisms control bureaucratic 
decision-making. Based on the empirical data, it will identify 14 factors, 
each with a set of supporting propositions, for explaining the presence or 
absence of bureaucratic control by redress mechanisms. 
 
8.1.2. In reading this chapter, a few points should be noted. In keeping with 
the aims of the thesis (see chapter 6), the data’s main contribution has 
been to provide the empirical prompt for the refinement of existing 
frameworks and the development of further hypotheses. The ‘propositions’ 
set out in this chapter should, therefore, be seen as hypotheses in the 
common sense of the word – suppositions to explain known facts based on 
limited evidence (Walliman 2010) – which aim to provide a basis for future 
research. It should also be noted that in reducing a mass of data for 
reporting purposes, and then seeking to articulate overall trends, an 
element of simplification is unavoidable. The chapter, therefore, seeks to 
simplify reality sufficiently to allow for meaningful analysis, at the same 
time as seeking to avoid losing sight of the inherent complexity of the 
social phenomena being examined. 
 
8.1.3. The chapter is in three parts, following the same structure as chapter 7. 
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PART I: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF REDRESS MECHANISMS 
8.2. Introduction to Part I 
 
8.2.1. This part of the chapter discusses the characteristics of redress 
mechanisms and identifies two clusters of factors: the first relates to the 
nature and quality of redress mechanisms’ decisions, and the second to 
redress mechanisms’ approach and mode of operation. 
 
8.3. The nature and quality of redress mechanisms’ decisions 
 
Factor A: the nature of cases being reviewed by a redress mechanism 
 
8.3.1. The question here relates to whether there is intrinsic scope, in the 
cases referred to them, for guidance on good administration to be 
provided by redress mechanisms. Using Dunsire’s (1979) terminology, the 
ability of a redress mechanism to act as a ‘director’ is reliant on the 
existence of cases which allow for direction to be provided in the first 
place. Since redress mechanisms rely, for their ‘detector’ (ibid.), on 
citizens referring cases for review, it is important to be clear about the 
types of cases that are subject to control oversight. The data collected in 
this thesis suggests that, in the local authority education context, the 
cases referred to redress mechanisms present some limitations on their 
ability to provide meaningful guidance to decision-makers. 
 
8.3.2. In relation to the LGO, local authority respondents often referred to 
cases as being weak, focused on peripheral issues, and not applicable to 
their own local context. Echoing Van de Pol’s (2009) experience, cases 
were frequently seen as limited to individual circumstances, requiring only 
procedural tweaks, and providing little opportunity for the identification 
of broader principles. In relation to the tribunal, a strong finding  was that 
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local authority respondents felt the cases that were appealed were most 
often about resource allocation rather than the quality of decision-making. 
As a result, learning from the tribunal was generally limited to improving 
how cases were conceded and defended. The data on judicial review 
suggested that decision-makers considered cases referred to the court to 
have more scope for generating substantive learning: court cases were 
perceived to have the potential to lead to large scale changes in policy 
and practice. 
 
8.3.3. The volume of cases being reviewed by redress mechanisms was also 
seen as important. Some local authority respondents suggested that the 
low volume of LGO cases meant that there were limits to its influence. 
Interestingly, however, matching Platt et al’s (2010) finding, the low 
volume of court cases was cited as a reason for their increased potential 
to have a major influence. At the same time, some of the local authority 
respondents were blasé about the significance of the tribunal, which was 
seen as a routine process to which they had become habituated. One 
suggestion, therefore, might be that familiarity breeds contempt when it 
comes to decision-makers’ interactions with redress mechanisms. This may 
explain Loveland’s (1995) and Halliday’s (2004) findings in relation to non-
compliance with judicial review, where high volumes of cases were 
reviewed by the courts. It may also explain why in some of the most 
important areas of bureaucratic decision-making consistently high levels of 
upheld tribunal cases have not improved decision-making (Thomas 2015). 
In this view, the shock value of redress mechanisms may, therefore, 
depend on cases being isolated enough to take decision-makers by surprise 
and to disrupt routines. This argues against the assumption that the 
isolated nature of redress mechanism cases represents a limit on their 
bureaucratic control functions (Rawlings 1986). 
 
- 251 - 
 
8.3.4. On the other hand, while the isolated intrusion of redress mechanisms 
may heighten their impact in individual cases, it seems clear that – in 
order to exercise routine control over administration – a reasonable 
volume of cases must be subject to review. In relation to Feldman’s (2003) 
and Dunsire’s (1979) identification of three elements of control – the 
correction of error (directing), the limitation of excess (limitation), and 
the capacity to change the world (structuring) – error correction and the 
limitation of excess is only possible where cases are challenged in the first 
place and in sufficient numbers. The structuring dimension of control is 
less reliant on a high volume of cases, however, the issue here also relates 
to the quality of the cases being challenged. As Mulcahy (2013) has argued 
in relation to the civil courts, in the context of the increasing use of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, there is a need to ensure that significant 
cases are allowed to reach formal adjudication.  
 
8.3.5. So the question of volume is a complex one. For control to be exercised 
across all its dimensions, a reasonably high volumes of cases will be 
necessary. At the same time, high volumes may lead to bureaucratic 
inertia, whereas lower volumes of cases may present shocks to the 
administrative system that can catalyse change. Hood’s (1995) ‘contrived 
randomness’ model of control is relevant here: control is predicated on 
the fact that administrators never know which cases are likely to be 
challenged. Looked at in this way, the random and occasional nature of 
cases may be part of what allows redress mechanisms to exercise effective 
control, rather than a limitation on their effectiveness. Nonetheless, even 
if this point is accepted, it remains necessary for decision-makers to be at 
sufficient risk of random control and, as a result, it is likely that receipt of 
a certain volume of cases will remain important.  
 
8.3.6. The question of case volumes is also important to the overall design of 
the administrative justice system (Bondy and Le Sueur 2012, Le Sueur 
2012). The data in this thesis indicate that redress mechanisms are in 
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competition with each other for grievances and that the presence of one 
redress mechanism (particularly a tribunal) may limit the extent to which 
other redress mechanisms are able to perform a control function. The 
opportunity to have a decision reconsidered on its merits by a tribunal is 
likely to be the most attractive option for most citizens with a grievance. 
As a result, the courts and the ombudsman may be left to deal with only a 
small selection of issues, often at the periphery of administration. This 
division of labor between redress mechanisms is significant, because each 
mechanism is controlling a different aspect of bureaucratic decision-
making (maladministration, legality, and merits). This represents a failure 
to take a ‘horses for courses’ approach to administrative justice, where 
cases are matched with the most appropriate means of dealing with them 
(AJTC 2012). 
 
8.3.7. Box 8.1 below summarises the propositions advanced in this section.  
Box 8.1: propositions relating to the nature of the cases being reviewed 
by a redress mechanism  
 
 
i. Cases received by redress mechanisms must contain the potential 
for principles of good administration to be developed. 
 
ii. A reasonably high volume of cases is required for redress 
mechanisms to perform effectively the ‘directing’ and ‘limiting’ 
aspects of their control functions. 
 
iii. A low volume of cases allows for the exercise of ‘structuring’ 
control, but where volumes are low, the intrinsic potential of 
cases for the development of principles of good administration 
becomes more important. 
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iv. For redress mechanisms to harness the potential of ‘contrived 
randomness’, there must be a realistic chance of routine decision-
making being challenged.  
 
v. The presence of a tribunal in an administrative setting is likely to 
restrict the flow of cases to other redress mechanisms, leading to 
some aspects of decision-making being more subject to control 
than others. 
 
 
Factor B: the nature of the principles of good administration put 
forward by redress mechanisms 
 
8.3.8. The key questions here are (a) whether redress mechanisms’ decisions 
provide guidance about good administration and (b) if they do, which 
model of administrative justice decisions conform to.  
 
8.3.9. Even where cases are amenable to the development of principles of good 
administration, their potential may not be realized. Halliday’s (2004) 
analytic framework suggests that the clarity, consistency, and coherence 
of the principles of good administration being propounded by redress 
mechanisms are conditions for the achievement of compliance; however, a 
pre-condition must be that redress mechanisms issue such principles in the 
first place. While there may be an assumption that principles are 
developed by courts through the operation of precedent in common law, 
there has been little discussion of the extent to which tribunals (Buck 
2006) and ombudsman schemes (Gill 2012, Langbroeak and Rijpkema 2006, 
Langbroek and Remac 2012, Remac 2013) are involved in this activity. This 
thesis’ decision analysis found that the published cases of redress 
mechanisms provided useful, if not transformational, guidance on 
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principles of good administration. With regard to LGO decisions, the issues 
raised across all the cases in the sample amount to a reasonably 
comprehensive set of directions on the requirements of good 
administration. In terms of the upper tribunal’s decisions, the decision 
analysis showed a narrower emphasis on clarifying the specific SEN 
statutory framework, with less emphasis on matters of routine 
administration and a greater difficulty in identifying clear directing 
principles in a number of cases. In relation to the courts, the data suggest 
that, although very few in number, decisions have clarified the 
interpretation of legislation and provided guidance on good administrative 
practice.  
 
8.3.10. The results of the decision analysis are somewhat at odds with the 
views of administrators themselves who, as noted above, tended to see 
the cases being considered by redress mechanisms as inherently limited. 
This may be explained by the fact that the decision analysis considered 
only published cases, which were more likely to raise significant issues, 
whereas respondents’ views were based on their experiences of dealing 
with routine cases. This is important, because the research found that 
administrators were much less likely to know about cases against other 
authorities than they were to know about their own cases (see factor K 
below). While upheld cases against respondents’ own authorities were 
likely to have involved redress mechanisms performing a ‘directing’ and 
‘limiting’ control function, it seems probable that the most important 
‘structuring’ decisions will have been those that are reported. And these 
cases were those that were least likely to be taken note of by decision-
makers. 
 
8.3.11. This section now discusses the data in relation to the models of 
administrative justice described in chapter 2. Sainsbury (2008) and Buck et 
al (2011) have argued that Mashaw (1983) and Adler’s (2003) models can 
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also be applied to redress mechanisms, as well as primary decision-making 
in bureaucracies. This approach is followed here in order to analyze which 
models of administrative justice were seen to feature in redress 
mechanisms’ decision-making and to get a clearer sense of the particular 
type of ‘direction’ which redress mechanisms were involved in issuing. In 
relation to the tribunal and the LGO’s decisions, a clear finding was that 
local authority respondents saw them as focused on the individual needs of 
complainants and as taking a ‘pro-parent’ stance. Generally, redress 
mechanisms were seen to prioritize and favor individual interests and 
notions of individual justice over those of the broader community (c.f. 
Tweedie 1989). Their focus on individual injustices meant that their 
decision-making was perceived to conform to a quite different logic to 
that which guided bureaucratic decision-making. 
 
8.3.12. While some respondents considered that this individual focus 
provided a helpful and acceptable corrective to the collective focus of 
day-to-day administration, some respondents (especially commenting on 
the tribunal) reacted strongly against it, finding it to be ‘immoral’. As will 
be discussed further below, there was a very strong ‘clash of values’ 
(Richardson and Machin 1999, 2000) between the dominant models of 
justice endorsed by redress mechanisms and decision-makers. The latter 
saw the citizens who ‘shouted loudest’ getting provision which could not 
be made routinely available to others, with redress mechanisms 
facilitating this. In relation to both the court and the tribunal - in addition 
to perceiving a highly individually focused approach - respondents 
perceived a strong and foreign concern with legality.  
 
8.3.13. As may be evident from the discussion so far, the focus on the 
individual case and the application of rules with a view to securing the fair 
treatment of the individual, fits strongly with Mashaw’s (1983) ‘moral 
judgment’ model of administrative justice. It also fits with other models 
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which can be seen to have equivalence to Mashaw’s model, such as Adler’s 
(2003) ‘legal judgment’ model, Kagan’s (2010) ‘adversarial legalism’ and 
Galligan’s (1996) ‘administrative justice’ model. It may have been 
expected that the tribunal’s model of justice – since it includes 
professional membership – will have included strong aspects of the 
‘professional treatment’ model. However, there was little suggestion that 
the tribunal was significantly influenced by the professional judgment of 
the education member.  
 
8.3.14. In relation to the LGO, a strong finding was that, in addition to 
operating to a primarily ‘moral judgment’ model of administrative justice, 
it also shared an outlook which was closer to that of administrators. 
Indeed, the LGO was described by some respondents as having shared 
values and a common purpose. Perhaps as a result of the LGO’s 
inquisitorial approach or the fact that it is staffed by bureaucrats and 
operates as a traditional bureaucracy, the LGO appeared to be more 
sensitive to bureaucratic concerns and to arguments about the collective 
interests of public administration. The association of the LGO with 
bureaucratic perspectives meant that its primarily ‘moral judgment’ 
model was often tempered by the existence of the ‘bureaucratic 
rationality’ (Mashaw 1983), ‘bureaucratic legalism’ (Kagan 2010) and 
‘bureaucratic administration’ (Galligan 1996) models of administrative 
justice.  
 
8.3.15. Perhaps as a result of this ability to work across these competing 
perspectives, the LGO was also described as being able to reach 
negotiated settlements with authorities. Such outcomes could be seen as 
the reaching of an accommodation between individual and collective 
interests, and between the requirements of good administration and those 
of efficient administration. This also suggests that the LGO’s approach 
contains elements of Kagan’s (2010) negotiation model of decision-making, 
involving a quite different approach to the solely adjudicative approach of 
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courts and tribunals. The possible effects of adopting a negotiated 
approach in some cases are considered further below.  
 
8.3.16. The importance of establishing the dominant model of 
administrative justice to which redress mechanisms conform is that 
previous work (Halliday 2004, Richardson and Machin 2000) provides a 
strong suggestion that rival normative frameworks are a significant 
impediment to the achievement of administrative change. Therefore, the 
first step in assessing the potential for normative conflict between redress 
mechanisms and administrators is to be clear about the nature of the 
normative principles propounded in the decisions of redress mechanisms. 
This point is also emphasized in Hertogh’s (2001) work, which suggests 
that the degree of ‘policy tension’ between redress mechanisms and 
administrators is a key factor in determining whether or not changes in 
administrative practice occur.  
 
8.3.17. This suggests that, at least at a theoretical level, the fact that 
the LGO was perceived to incorporate a greater variety of models of 
administrative justice and to have a willingness to understand and to 
compromise with bureaucratic perspectives, may reduce the amount of 
policy tension between it and decision-makers. If this is the case, and if it 
is correct that such normative conflict is a major barrier to the exercise of 
bureaucratic control by redress mechanisms, then it is likely that the LGO 
will be in a better position to exercise such control than the court and the 
tribunal.  
 
8.3.18. Figure 8.1 below summarises the models of administrative justice 
adopted by redress mechanisms.  
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Figure 8.1: matrix showing the position of redress mechanisms’ between 
contending forces (individual-collective and law-administration) and 
identifying their models of administrative justice  
 
 
 
8.3.19. Figure 8.1 not only shows the models of justice with which each 
redress mechanism is associated, but also places these in the context of 
what this thesis sees as the main contending forces which shape the 
bureaucratic environment: the struggle between individual and collective 
interests and between law and administration. Situating each redress 
mechanism within the resulting matrix created by these contending forces 
allows for a more precise sense of their normative positioning. This will 
also allow for greater clarity when the thesis turns to the models of justice 
operating in relation to bureaucratic decision-making (see factor H below). 
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Box 8.2: propositions relating to the nature of the principles of good 
administration put forward by redress mechanisms 
 
i. The decisions of redress mechanisms must provide guidance to 
decision-makers in relation to good administration. 
 
ii. To reach decision-makers (given their relative lack of awareness – 
see factor K below), the provision of guidance must take place in 
the course of decisions on unreported cases, as well as in those 
which are selected for reporting. 
 
iii. The decisions of tribunals are more likely to be restricted to the 
clarification of legal positions within sector specific statutory 
frameworks, whereas the decisions of courts and ombudsmen are 
more likely to provide general guidance on good administration. 
 
iv. Redress mechanisms are likely to conform primarily to the moral 
judgment model of administrative justice, although ombudsman 
schemes have the potential to draw on a wider range of models, 
including bureaucratic rationality and negotiation.  
 
v. The bureaucratic environment is principally shaped by the struggle 
between two principal sets of rival forces – individual and 
collective interests, and law and administration – and differences 
between redress mechanisms and between redress mechanisms 
and bureaucracies can be most clearly defined in these terms. 
 
vi. The closer redress mechanisms and decision-makers are to each in 
terms of their models of justice and their location on the 
individual-collective and law-administration matrix, the less 
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resistance there is likely to be to the exercise of control by 
redress mechanisms. 
 
 
Factor C: the quality of the decisions taken by redress mechanisms. 
8.3.20. Three main aspects arose from the data in relation to the quality 
of the decisions taken by redress mechanisms. Two of these already 
feature in Halliday’s (2004) analytic framework and relate to the clarity 
and consistency of decisions. The third relates to how administrators 
perceived the merits of redress mechanisms’ decisions. 
 
8.3.21. In terms of clarity, a strong trend is evident from the decision 
analysis and the responses of local authority respondents: LGO decisions 
were seen as clearest, followed by the tribunal’s, followed by the court’s. 
Overall, respondents perceived the decisions of all redress mechanisms as 
‘clear’ or ‘fairly clear’. This is perhaps surprising given previous 
assessments of the clarity and consistency of administrative law (Halliday 
2004) and this thesis’ own decision analysis, which suggested that 
administrators would be likely to struggle with the legal language of court 
and tribunal decisions. Indeed, some respondents did comment on the 
difficulty of legal terminology and there was some support for Wasby’s 
(1970) suggestion that the technicality of language in decisions constitutes 
a barrier to impact and Hume’s (2009) finding that the language of 
judgments is an important factor in the degree to which they are adopted 
by other decision-makers.  
 
8.3.22. There is, of course, a difference between understanding the plain 
text of a judgment and understanding its underlying principles (Sunkin 
2004). There was some evidence that respondents struggled with this and 
that drawing lessons from one context to another could be challenging. 
There was also evidence that decision-makers tended to see some of the 
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stances set out by redress mechanisms in reductive ways. For example, the 
criticism put forward by some respondents that redress mechanisms were 
‘pro-parent’ could be seen as a rather dismissive means of understanding 
the way in which redress mechanisms emphasised the consideration of 
fairness in the individual case. Some decision-makers interpreted this 
stance as one of inherent bias, rather than seeming to get to grips with 
what redress mechanisms were signaling about the need for fair individual 
treatment. 
 
8.3.23. Generally, the decision analysis found considerable variations in 
the way decisions were presented. LGO decisions were written in the most 
accessible way for a lay audience, while tribunal and court decisions were 
written with a legal audience in mind (c.f. Langbroek et al 2015). A point 
that applied across the board was that decisions did not seem to be 
written with the purpose of influencing decision-makers, reflecting the 
ambivalence expressed by redress mechanism respondents about fulfilling 
such a role (see factor G below). There is of course a question about 
whether court decisions need to be presented in a way that can be 
understood by lay people; as Harlow and Rawlings (2009) have pointed out, 
there is a community of legal commentators and advisors who can help 
extract principles from cases and provide the interpretative community in 
which judgments are understood. While this is the case, the findings of 
this thesis suggest that administrators do not have particularly close 
relationships with their legal advisors (see factor K below).  
 
8.3.24. It seems unlikely, therefore, that reliance on lawyers to interpret 
and disseminate principles from legal judgments will be sufficient if the 
aim of courts is to achieve proactive, structuring control over 
administration. The focus in the literature on the impact of courts, 
especially where scholars have been working in a legal tradition, has 
tended to be on whether administrators have the legal skills to understand 
judgments rather than on whether judges have the communication skills to 
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clearly explain decisions to the various audiences that might require to 
know about them. This point is important and the way in which decisions 
are written, the audiences they are imagined to be written for, and the 
means with which they are communicated have tended to be neglected 
areas in existing literature (Hall 2011). 
 
8.3.25. The LGO stands out in relation to other redress mechanisms in 
that it is able to supplement its reported decisions with a range of 
approaches to disseminating principles of good administration. Its ability 
to produce thematic reports and to reflect annually on trends, allows 
greater scope for the explicit development of principles and guidance. The 
LGO’s Axioms of Good Administrative Practice and its Focus Reports spell 
out points of good practice in ways which are likely to be clear to 
bureaucratic audiences. Some of the work of the LGO can therefore be 
seen to have addressed criticisms about the readability and usefulness of 
ombudsman reports (Drewry and Harlow 1990). In addition to written 
communication, the LGO offers training to local authorities in complaint 
handling and its officers occasionally engage with local authority networks.  
 
8.3.26. Partington and Kirton-Darling (2007), referring to tribunals, 
suggested that there are three ways beyond the publication of individual 
decisions in which redress mechanisms could provide feedback to decision-
makers: official reports; direct communication; and informal contact. As 
will be clear from the above discussion, only the LGO’s activities operate 
across this spectrum of feedback, with the tribunal’s feedback capacity 
having actually decreased over time. Indeed, the latter went from 
publishing all tribunal decisions in an online database to publishing none 
and from having a stand-alone annual report to having only a section in a 
wider annual report prepared by HMCTS.  
 
8.3.27. While the range of approaches to dissemination open to the LGO 
is a clear advantage, the LGO can be criticized for failing to make explicit 
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use of its own Axioms of Good Administrative Practice. LGO respondents 
reported never having used them as part of their investigations, and the 
decision analysis also found no reference to them. This finding is similar to 
that of Langbroek and Rijkema (2006) who found that the Dutch National 
Ombudsman failed to explicitly draw out and use principles of good 
administration in its decisions. Nonetheless, the LGO can be seen to have a 
wider range of tools at its disposal with which to seek to influence 
administrators.  
 
8.3.28. In terms of consistency, local authority respondents reported a 
similar pattern to that examined above in relation to clarity – LGO 
decisions were seen as the most consistent, followed by the tribunal, 
followed by the court. Overall, decisions were considered to be in the 
consistent to fairly consistent range for all redress mechanisms. Where 
administrators seemed to have more trouble with redress mechanisms’ 
decisions was in terms of their merits. Here, a number of local authority 
respondents expressed the view that, while they found decisions clear and 
consistent, the problem was that they did not agree with them. 
 
8.3.29. In relation to the LGO, some respondents considered that 
investigators could make mistakes and that they were not always 
sufficiently expert in the areas being reviewed. In the case of the tribunal, 
the fact that it was reviewing the merits of decisions meant that there was 
scope for divergent views on the same set of facts. Where this was the 
case, respondents found it difficult to accept a tribunal’s decision as 
superior, instead considering that the tribunal had allowed itself to be 
misled by parental anxieties and the use of ‘off the shelf’ independent 
reports. This points to the fact that – while clarity and consistency are 
important pre-requisites to decisions being accepted by decision-makers – 
the extent to which they are persuaded to agree with decisions is likely to 
be significant in terms of their subsequent decision-making around the 
implementation of a judgment. Decisions must not only clearly set out the 
- 264 - 
 
principle, but also make an argument for why that principle should be 
preferred over others. Where administrators disagree with redress 
mechanisms’ decisions, minimal forms of compliance become more likely 
(see factors J and L below). 
 
8.3.30. In relation to both the LGO and the tribunal, some administrators 
said that they were likely to find decisions persuasive. There was, 
however, a range of factors cited by respondents which suggested that 
disagreement on the merits of cases could often occur. In relation to the 
LGO, this included a perception that it operated in an ideal world, used 
hindsight when making judgments, and did not always understand 
decision-making contexts. In relation to the tribunal, this included a view 
that the tribunal privileged parents over children, took an anti-local 
authority line, ignored locally determined criteria, and took decisions 
based on new information. In relation to both the LGO and the tribunal, 
some respondents considered that there was bias in favor of appellants 
and complainants. Understanding these factors, and the fundamental 
perceptions which some decision-makers have of a redress mechanisms’ 
decisions may, therefore, be important if redress mechanisms wish to 
improve the persuasiveness of their judgments and overcome potential 
barriers to their implementation. 
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Box 8.3: propositions relating to the quality of decisions taken by redress 
mechanisms 
 
i. A lack of clarity in decisions is likely to represent a barrier to 
redress mechanisms achieving control. 
 
ii. The decisions of ombudsman schemes are likely to be 
perceived by decision-makers as being clearer and more 
consistent than those of courts and tribunals, as a result of 
their ability to communicate with administrators in a broader 
range of ways and in lay terminology.  
 
iii. The more redress mechanisms explain their decisions in terms 
of their potential consequences for future decision-making and 
the more clearly decisions are written with the learning needs 
of decision-makers in mind, the more likely they will be to 
influence administrative practice. 
 
iv. Clarity and consistency are crucial to the achievement of 
control, but, administrators’ subjective assessment of the 
merits of redress mechanisms’ decisions are likely to be as 
important. 
 
v. Where administrators disagree with the merits of a decision, 
they are more likely to adopt a ‘minimal’ approach to 
compliance (see factor J below), so that redress mechanisms 
need to focus not only on the clarity and consistency of 
decisions, but also on their persuasiveness. 
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8.4. The status, powers, processes, and approach of redress mechanisms 
Factor D: the perceived status and legitimacy of redress mechanisms. 
8.4.1. The status of redress mechanisms and the degree to which they are 
considered to be legitimate is an important factor in explaining whether 
their authority will be recognized and their guidance complied with. Rist 
(1994) argues that the characteristics of the source of a ‘learning stimuli’ 
is crucial when it comes to inter-organisational learning. The court was the 
mechanism whose legitimacy and status were seen by local authority 
respondents as highest. The court’s authority, its ability to make binding 
decisions, and its accepted precedent setting role meant that respondents 
saw it as an institution to be respected. Many respondents also considered 
the LGO to be a highly respected institution. For many, the authority of 
the LGO was unquestioned, although some respondents were less sure, 
particularly where it appeared to be challenging settled local authority 
practices. There was also a tendency, as noted above, to minimize the 
importance of LGO cases and to see them as driven by undeserving 
individuals. 
 
8.4.2. Local authority respondents were much more ambivalent about the 
legitimacy of the tribunal and it tended to be seen as a necessary evil, 
rather than in any more positive terms. The tribunal’s decisions were 
treated with a ‘pinch of salt’ by some administrators. The tribunal’s 
failure to take account of local contexts in its decision-making, and its 
narrow emphasis on legality, meant that administrators considered its 
decisions to be lacking in legitimacy in the educational context. In relation 
to both the tribunal and the LGO, some local authority respondents 
questioned their expertise and knowledge base in relation to the matters 
being reviewed. The upper tribunal was viewed as having more authority, 
with local authority respondents noting that they would treat it as they 
would a court. 
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8.4.3. Theories regarding the psychology of procedural justice (Lind and Tyler 
1988) suggest that the legitimacy of decisions, and the degree to which 
they will be accepted, depends in part on the way in which those who are 
subject to the decisions perceive the fairness of the decision-making 
process. In addition, therefore, to considering local authority respondents’ 
explicit statements in relation to how they perceived the status of redress 
mechanisms, it is possible to assess the degree to which they are seen as 
legitimate by reference to data about how local authority respondents 
perceived the process of being reviewed by redress mechanisms. Here, as 
noted above, local authority respondents often perceived both the LGO 
and the tribunal to be biased towards parents. In relation to the tribunal, 
local authority respondents were also critical of the confrontational style 
of hearings and what was perceived as a negative attitude towards local 
authorities by some tribunal panels. These views were, therefore, likely to 
affect the extent to which the LGO and tribunal were seen as legitimate 
institutions.  
 
8.4.4. Although not explicitly raised by local authority respondents, it is also 
likely that local authority decision-makers viewed the court as the most 
legitimate source of formal authority amongst redress mechanisms, due to 
its history and its clear constitutional role in relation to public 
administration. The lack of clarity over the source and nature of the 
powers exercised by the LGO and the tribunal (i.e. whether their powers 
spring from legislative, executive, or judicial sources) may help to explain 
why respondents had – at the outset – a more ambivalent view with regard 
to the status of these redress mechanisms. The arguments about the 
proper constitutional positioning of ombudsman schemes (Buck et al 2011, 
Gill 2014) and tribunals (Thomas 2011) show that this positioning is 
contestable, with the source of the ombudsman’s authority (particularly in 
relation to local government) remaining unclear and the status of the 
tribunal continuing to sit uncomfortably between executive and judicial 
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functions. It is unclear whether ombudsman schemes and tribunals fit 
within vertical, diagonal, or horizontal modes of accountability (Bovens 
2007) and this ambivalence may have an effect on decision-makers’ 
propensity to accept redress mechanisms’ decisions. 
Box 8.4: propositions relating to the perceived status and legitimacy of 
redress mechanisms 
 
 
i. The extent to which the authority of a redress mechanism is 
perceived as legitimate provides the context in which 
subsequent responses to specific decisions take place. 
 
ii. The more decision-makers perceive a redress mechanism to 
exercise legitimate authority, the more they will be 
disposed to accept and act upon their decisions. 
 
iii. Generally, courts are likely to be perceived as having higher 
status, formal authority, and legitimacy than ombudsman 
schemes and tribunals. 
 
iv. Where the constitutional source of  redress mechanisms’ 
authority is ambiguous, it is more likely that their 
legitimacy will be questioned by decision-makers. 
 
v. Whether redress mechanisms’ processes are perceived to be 
fair is likely to have an effect on whether redress 
mechanism’s decisions are seen as legitimate. 
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Factor E: the sanctioning power of redress mechanisms 
8.4.5. The literature suggests that sanctioning power is likely to be an 
important factor in relation to the ability of redress mechanisms to 
exercise control. Adler (2003) has argued that the greater the formal 
authority of a redress mechanism, the more likely it is to exert an 
influence over the administrative process. Similarly, Halliday (2004) has 
suggested that the ability to act as a sanction is crucial when it comes to 
redress mechanisms competing for attention with other normative 
influences in the bureaucratic environment. Although some (Hertogh 2001, 
Hall 2011) have suggested that cooperative relationships may be more 
effective than coercive power in explaining compliance with decisions (a 
point returned to below), what appears to be clear is that redress 
mechanisms must exercise power in some form. As Dunsire (1979, 1984) 
suggests in his theory of control, control mechanisms must be able to act 
as ‘effectors’.  
 
8.4.6. Interestingly, in the case of both the LGO and the court, local authority 
respondents perceived their power less in terms of formal sanctions and 
more in terms of the attendant negative publicity and reputational 
damage that would arise from cases being ‘lost’. The LGO’s ability to 
choose which cases resulted in formal reports and which would be dealt 
with less formally, provided strong incentives for local authorities to settle 
cases and to agree ‘local settlements’. Where a local authority refused to 
accept its recommendations, the LGO could also use a procedure whereby 
the local authority would be compelled to make an announcement in the 
local press that a complaint had been upheld and that it had refused to 
comply with the ombudsman. Publicity was, therefore, the main sanction 
available to the LGO and it was the threat of negative publicity which was 
seen as allowing for the more informal settlement of disputes in the LGO’s 
‘shadow’ (Gallanter 1983).  
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8.4.7. While this approach was helpful from the perspective of resolving 
individual cases – the classic fire-fighting (Harlow and Rawlings 2009) mode 
of ombudsman operation – there was some evidence that this could reduce 
the LGO’s ability to pursue the aim of generating administrative 
improvement. Indeed, LGO respondents noted that administrative changes 
that were agreed as part of local settlements were not followed up as they 
would have been following the publication of an official report. There was 
also a sense, from the data provided by local authority respondents, that 
local settlements would be agreed as a face-saving mechanism and to 
avoid having to make substantive changes to their decision-making. For 
example, some respondents referred to not having had any cases upheld 
but then went on to describe local settlements where the LGO’s view had 
clearly been that the administrative action had been inappropriate.  
 
8.4.8. The local settlement process, therefore, seemed to allow local 
authorities to conclude cases without having officially been found to have 
acted maladministratively. Given that very few cases reach a formal 
report stage, the question then is whether – for the bulk of the LGO’s work 
– local authorities are able to find an easy way out of cases which militates 
against administrative change. Indeed, the lack of clarity around blame 
allocation and the failure to clearly report action as being 
maladministrative, may well result in administrators’ existing practices, 
processes, and outlooks remaining unchanged. Such use of ‘informal 
resolution’ by ombudsman schemes has been seen by Bondy et al (2014) to 
be both confusing from the perspective of citizens and as acting against 
the development of clear principles and the pursuit of administrative 
change. 
 
8.4.9. In relation to the court, local authority respondents were not only 
concerned about its formal powers to quash decisions and prevent or 
compel action, but also by the fact that decisions resulted in negative 
publicity and a loss of control by local authorities. This loss of control 
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related to the fact that the processes of local authorities – generally kept 
hidden from public view and determined by the authorities themselves – 
could suddenly become the subject of debate and decision in a public 
forum. Unlike the LGO, however, the court’s ability to compel action and 
its formal authority to set precedent were also seen as important in 
addition to the publicity that attended court cases. Here, perhaps even 
more so than in relation to LGO settlements, there was a sense that local 
authority respondents wished to avoid formal decisions by courts in order 
to preserve control and maintain their freedom of action in relation to 
their administrative practices.  
 
8.4.10. This may help to explain the high level of responsiveness to 
judicial review threats reported by a number of local authority 
respondents – settlements were often negotiated with individuals in order 
to prevent possible influxes of cases or widespread changes in practice. 
The desire to avoid the formal decisions of the court and to a lesser extent 
the LGO, could therefore be seen as attempts to evade more directive 
forms of control. In other words, losing individual battles to win the larger 
administrative war. Some local authority respondents noted that cases 
that were settled could lead to lessons being learned and practices being 
changed. As we shall see below, the thesis found mixed data with regard 
to whether cynicism and calculation or ideology and normative alignments 
were most responsible for explaining decision-making around both 
settlement and the implementation of judgments (see factor J). 
 
8.4.11. In relation to the tribunal, the fact that its decisions were not 
published and that upper tribunal decisions did not seem to attract 
significant negative publicity for local authorities, meant that the extent 
to which it was perceived as a sanction was less clear. The tribunal’s 
power to substitute its decisions for those of administrators, was seen as a 
considerable sanction, but one that would only affect the case in question 
rather than one that could affect whole classes of cases. The upper 
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tribunal’s decisions were more likely to be seen as having the potential to 
set directions for future behaviour, although as noted below (see factor 
K), there seemed to be little awareness of its decisions and, the only 
direct example of ambiguous compliance in the empirical data occurred 
following an upper tribunal decision. Generally, the tribunal process was 
one that local authorities were able to manage in the dark and outwith the 
glare of publicity. 
 
8.4.12. Generally, therefore, the relationship between the existence of a 
power to sanction and the ability to exercise control of administrative 
decision-making is a complex one, mediated to a significant degree by its 
effect on settlement rates. Indeed, the existence of such power – along 
with the more general encouragement of settlement within the justice 
system (Genn 2008; Genn 2012; Mulcahy 2013) – encourages the concession 
of individual cases, often at the expense of the development of principles 
of good administration. Figure 8.2 below provides a visual representation 
of the relationship which is suggested to exist between sanctioning power 
and settlement rates, and the consequent effect of sanctioning and 
settlement on the potential for learning from redress mechanisms. Of 
course, it is possible to argue that settlement activities are likely to show 
an element of learning, as guesses are made about the likely positions of a 
redress mechanism as part of negotiations. However, there is significant 
uncertainty about the justice value of settlements and the extent to which 
they reflect the principled positions of redress mechanisms (Genn 2012). 
And, as we shall argue below (see factor M), compliance which occurs 
solely in the shadow of redress mechanisms is indicative of a very limited 
and narrow from of control affecting only the tip of the iceberg of the 
bureaucratic process.  
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Figure 8.2: the relationship between sanctioning, settlement, and 
learning 
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Box 8.5: propositions relating to the sanctioning power of redress 
mechanisms 
 
 
i. Coercive sanctioning power, including negative publicity, 
reputational damage, and substituting decisions, is likely to be 
effective in prompting changes in individual cases subject to 
challenge. 
 
ii. The existence of sanctions may, however, also increase the 
use of settlements as a means of evading more directive forms of 
control by redress mechanisms. 
 
iii. While the shadow of redress mechanism can provide a very 
effective force for individuals to obtain redress, settlements may 
result in a failure to establish clear points of principle and to 
provide the impetus for administrative change. 
 
iv. Where settlements are heavily used this may exacerbate 
the fact that there may be limited intrinsic potential for learning 
in the cases referred to redress mechanisms (see factor A). 
 
v. There is not a straightforward relationship between the 
existence of sanctioning power and redress mechanisms’ ability 
to control bureaucratic decision-making. 
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Factor F: the procedural approach of redress mechanisms. 
8.4.13. There are a number of variations in procedural approach adopted 
by redress mechanisms. Table 8.1 provides a summary of the variations 
that will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs. 
Table 8.1: variations in the procedural approaches adopted by redress 
mechanisms 
 
 
 
Court Tribunal LGO 
Review process Adversarial Adversarial 
 
Inquisitorial 
Basis of review Retrospective De novo Retrospective 
 
Decision 
standard 
Legality Legality 
Merits 
Maladministration 
Decision mode Adjudication 
 
Adjudication Adjudication 
Resolution 
Decision status Binding 
Precedent 
Binding 
No precedent 
Not binding 
No precedent 
Follow up None None Some 
 
  
8.4.14. Review process. The data show that whether the process adopted 
by a redress mechanisms is adversarial or inquisitorial is potentially 
important in determining attitudes to a particular redress mechanism, as 
well as in determining what can be learned from it. The tribunal process 
was seen by respondents as a highly adversarial one. Tribunal hearings 
were seen by many respondents as confrontational and leading to 
resentment. The confrontational nature of adversarial hearings, which 
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were noted to be making increasing use of barristers, seemed to 
exacerbate the strongly divergent normative stances adopted by the 
tribunal and decision-makers (see factor B above and factor H below). The 
adversarial process was also seen as giving parents an unfair advantage in 
that they could ‘buy’ expert help that could not be afforded by the local 
authority. This led some respondents to consider that the tribunal assisted 
the most able parents to receive public funding, while the potentially 
more deserving children of less well-resourced parents missed out (this 
point will be returned to below in discussing factor H and factor N). 
Adversarialism in the tribunal context was, therefore, seen as an approach 
which was more likely to generate resentment amongst decision-makers 
and to reduce goodwill towards the tribunal and its decisions. 
Respondents’ lack of direct experience of court hearings meant that they 
did not provide data in relation to the effect of adversarialism in the court 
process.  
 
8.4.15. In relation to the LGO, some local authority respondents referred 
to its inquisitorial approach as an advantage. This was because the LGO 
took a ‘root and branch’ approach where the basis of the authority’s 
decision-making required to be explained end-to-end. The inquisitorial 
mode was also seen by respondents as providing opportunities to clarify 
understandings on both sides. Local authority respondents commented that 
by the time an investigation concluded, it was usually clear what the 
outcome would be. The LGO’s practice of sharing findings in draft with 
local authorities was also seen to be beneficial: it allowed local authority 
respondents the opportunity to ensure that the decision took full account 
of their position. This data echoed Van Acker et al’s (2015) finding that 
ensuring a mutual understanding may increase the degree to which 
decisions are accepted. Generally, the LGO’s procedural approach stood in 
stark contrast to that of the tribunal on two counts: firstly, in being a 
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better means of identifying areas for improvement in decision-making; and 
secondly, in being less alienating for decision-makers. 
 
8.4.16. Basis of review. The court and the LGO both establish whether 
decision-making is reasonable retrospectively based on the situation as it 
existed at the time of the original decision. The tribunal’s approach is 
different in that it takes de novo decisions on the merits of disputes as 
those merits appear at the time of the hearing. While this benefits 
appellants, from the perspective of providing feedback to decision-
makers, this approach is unlikely to be helpful. This was pointed out by 
one of the tribunal respondents, who suggested that in future the tribunal 
process might be changed to become retrospective in order to provide 
better feedback. Local authority respondents often believed that the 
tribunal’s decisions seemed to be swayed by additional evidence 
commissioned by parents, which were widely seen as biased and bordering 
on unethical. It is perhaps not surprising that learning not to lose tribunals 
and about how to counter such parental evidence was cited as a major 
aspect of what they had learned from the tribunal, rather than 
improvements in substantive decision-making.  
 
8.4.17. Decision standards. The data suggest that the decision standards 
adopted by a redress mechanism – legality, merits review, or 
maladministration – are likely to be important in terms of its ability to 
exercise a control function. The first point here is that each redress 
mechanism, by having different decision standards, is effectively 
controlling for a different aspect of bureaucratic decision-making. The 
court’s primary concern is with substantive legality and common law 
principles of good administration; the tribunal’s primary concern is with 
substantive legality and the merits of cases; and the ombudsman’s primary 
concern is with extra-legal principles of good administration. As has 
already been pointed out above, the fact that each mechanism controls a 
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different aspect of decision-making, and that each mechanism is likely to 
be in competition with the others for the receipt of disputes, suggests that 
the overall system of control provided by redress mechanisms is likely to 
be inefficient. The dominance of one redress mechanism, often likely to 
be a tribunal, will squeeze out the presence of the other mechanisms, 
rendering them somewhat marginal, and effectively resulting in certain 
aspects of decision-making being less controlled for than others.  
 
8.4.18. The standard adopted by a redress mechanism is also likely to be 
important in shaping bureaucratic responses. We have already noted 
above, for example, that the court’s and the tribunal’s concern with 
legality was likely to be seen by administrators as more foreign than the 
ombudsman’s concern with the concept of maladministration. While there 
has been criticism regarding the opacity of the concept of 
maladministration, it seems that respondents did not find it a particularly 
obscure notion. This may be because they tended to see maladministration 
as accepting administrators’ own definitions of fair procedures in most 
cases, rather than necessarily challenging the fairness of the procedures 
themselves. This view of maladministration is a rather limited one and 
suggests a timid approach on the LGO’s part. Indeed, local authority 
respondents were clear that the role of the ombudsman was not to create 
new standards of fairness, but to bring local authorities up to accepted 
minimum standards. One of the reasons, therefore, why local authorities 
might tend to see ombudsman decisions as according with their own 
perspectives, is that they are rather tame. While an inquisitorial and 
retrospective approach offers potential to highlight deficiencies in 
decision-making, the congruence of perspectives between the ombudsman 
and administrators may reduce the extent to which the ombudsman 
presents a challenge to administration. In Galligan’s (1996) terms, the 
model of justice suggested by the LGO’s interpretation of the 
maladministration standard is unlikely to break the hegemony of the 
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‘bureaucratic administration’ mode of decision-making. It may even be 
that the LGO’s focus on process and its general acceptance of bureaucratic 
norms legitimizes this hegemony. 
 
8.4.19. One of the historic criticisms of maladministration is that it fails 
to consider the merits of decisions. This was seen by some early critics 
(Marshall 1973) as a means of ensuring that the administrative process 
would be protected from any serious degree of challenge. The question of 
whether the ability to review the merits of a case is also a way of 
enhancing the degree to which administration may be controlled is, 
however, an ambiguous one. In relation to the tribunal, there was 
evidence that its focus on merits review undermined its legitimacy in the 
eyes of administrators. Indeed, while merits review provides a powerful 
tool from the perspective of the individual wishing to challenge an 
administrative decision, it was seen to draw the tribunal into an inherently 
more subjective and controversial aspect of decision-making. While the 
emphasis on good process, a feature of both ombudsmen and courts’ 
approaches to good administration, may sometime seem peripheral to the 
heart of a decision (its merits), it is likely to be seen as a more legitimate 
and more objective concern.  
 
8.4.20. In this study, decision-makers rarely seemed to be moved by the 
tribunal’s decisions on the merits of cases and to amend their routine 
decision-making in line with the tribunal’s approach. Instead, it seemed 
that local authorities went away from tribunal hearings agreeing to 
disagree. That the tribunal had come to a particular decision was not seen 
as the achievement of an authoritatively fair outcome; it was often simply 
seen as an opinion from a tribunal perceived to be misguided in its 
approach and priorities. As may already be clear, the ability of 
administrators to dismiss merits-based decision-making by the tribunal was 
reinforced by the fact that decisions were taken de novo, so that not only 
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might the merits be a matter for disagreement, but also the basis of the 
decision might be quite different from the authority’s initial decision. 
 
8.4.21. Decision mode. In relation to redress mechanisms’ mode of 
decision-making, only the LGO took a proactive approach to brokering 
resolutions, in addition to fulfilling its core role of adjudication, which is 
shared by the court and the tribunal. Although settlements are a 
considerable feature of the work and influence of courts and tribunals, the 
difference with the ombudsman is that it has a proactive resolution role – 
directly suggesting settlements. The key criticism here is that this 
approach leads to a failure to develop principles of good administration 
and to a pragmatic approach that lets authorities ‘off the hook’. On the 
other hand, the use of resolution approaches requires the LGO to enter 
into closer relationships with public bodies, with a certain amount of good 
will developed as a result. This may be seen, as pointed out above, as a 
failure on the part of the ombudsman – with the suggestion that it is too 
ready to accept administrative realities and too reticent to develop more 
stretching principles of good administration – but it could also be seen as a 
reasonable accommodation with administrative reality which allows the 
LGO to extend its influence. Reaching workable accommodations with 
administrators may, therefore, be an effective means of securing 
administrative change. However, as noted above in relation to factor E, it 
may actually allow administrators to evade more powerful and widespread 
control and only really be effective in relation to the presenting case. 
 
8.4.22. Decision status. In terms of the status of decisions, the fact that 
the decisions of the courts and the tribunals were formally binding on the 
parties, while the decisions of the ombudsman were not, did not seem to 
be particularly significant. As a result of the sanctions in place for non-
compliance with the LGO, administrators were unlikely not to make the 
amendments required in the individual case. Of more relevance here, is 
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the status of ombudsman and tribunal cases in terms of their precedental 
effect. While the court and upper tribunal were understood in an 
uncomplicated fashion as precedent-setting bodies, the status of the LGO 
and the tribunal were less clear. Both bodies emphasised – at a rhetorical 
level – that they did not set precedents and that they considered 
individual cases on their merits. At the same time, however, there was 
some expectation on the part of redress mechanism respondents that local 
authorities would amend their practices as a result of redress mechanisms’ 
conclusions.  
 
8.4.23. Even where technically the rule of precedent does not operate, 
dispute resolution systems are likely to build their own submerged systems 
of precedent (Buck 2006). This point is also made by Morris (2008), 
discussing the Financial Ombudsman Service, who argues that it is 
misleading for dispute resolution schemes to suggest that they do not have 
a precedental effect since such an effect is inevitable in practice for 
adjudicatory bodies. As argued above, it seems clear that the tribunal and 
the ombudsman do seek to develop coherent principles through their case 
work. However, the suggestion here is that the ambiguity around the 
formal status of decisions allows decision-makers to more easily escape 
from the implications of unpopular decisions, compared to the decisions of 
those redress mechanisms that unambiguously have a precedent-setting 
role. Some respondents in this study, for example, commented on the fact 
that decisions did not carry the force of precedent to explain why they 
might not always make wider changes in their practice following a decision 
of the LGO or the tribunal.  
 
8.4.24. Finally, the ability to follow up on decided cases to check 
compliance has been identified as potentially significant (Cannon 2004, 
Mullen 2008, Van Acker et al 2015). Only the LGO conducted any kind of 
follow up on cases, however, LGO respondents acknowledged that this 
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practice was very limited. Even where follow up occurred, this was a 
paper exercise and LGO respondents emphasised that they would not to 
get involved in audits of processes following on from cases. As a result, the 
current approach of the LGO does not make the most of the ability to 
follow up on cases and this feature of its process could be deployed more 
effectively. Having said this, the argument may again be made that the 
LGO’s reliance on trusting authorities to comply with decisions is part of 
what makes the ombudsman effective, in that it builds positive and 
trusting relationships with administrators. If processes of follow-up are too 
intrusive, it could potentially destabilize a relationship which, at least 
potentially, allows the ombudsman to achieve a number of its goals. 
Box 8.6: propositions relating to the procedural approach of redress 
mechanisms 
 
 
Review process 
 
i. Adversarial processes are more likely to lead to confrontation, 
resentment, and a loss of good will, exacerbating the distance 
between normative stances that is already likely to exist between 
administrators and redress mechanisms (see factor B and factor 
H). 
 
ii. Inquisitorial processes are more likely to root out areas for 
improvement, to result in clearer decisions, and to be seen as 
persuasive, as well as more likely to avoid confrontation with 
administrators. 
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Basis of review 
 
iii. Redress mechanisms which take de novo decisions, rather than a 
retrospective approach, have inherently less scope to provide 
guidance to administrators. 
 
iv. Where a redress mechanism adopts a de novo approach, it is likely 
that learning will be limited to changing the ways in which cases 
are conceded, defended, and presented, rather than leading to 
changes in routine decision-making. 
 
Decision standard 
 
v. Where redress mechanisms are in competition within an 
administrative environment, the likely dominance of one 
mechanism (see proposition A (v.)) reduces the comprehensiveness 
of the overall control of decision-making by administrative justice 
institutions: legality, merits, and maladministration are likely to 
be controlled for in an uneven and inefficient manner within a 
particular administrative setting. 
 
vi. Maladministration is likely to be well understood and accepted by 
administrators, since it accepts their own understandings of good 
administrative practice and is not seen to create new standards of 
fairness. 
 
vii. The closer the maladministration standard is to the dominant 
paradigm of administration, the more readily it may be accepted 
by administrators (see factor B and H), but at the same time, the 
closer these perspectives are, the less potential there will be for 
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significant enhancements of bureaucratic approaches to fairness. 
 
viii. The ability to review the merits of decisions is likely to draw 
redress mechanisms into controversy and to result in their 
decisions being seen as more subjective and less legitimate; while 
merits review may be a powerful tool for the individual appellant, 
it is less likely to result in significant shifts in administrative 
practice, compared with approaches which stress legality or 
maladministration. 
 
Decision mode 
 
ix. Redress mechanisms that take a proactive role in brokering 
settlements, may increase their ability to influence administrators 
through their development of good relationships, but at the same 
time risk compromising the development of clear principles of 
good administration.  
 
x. Where redress mechanisms broker settlements, it is important that 
they ensure that principles are formally developed in a proportion 
of their casework, although in order to be effective this requires 
administrators to have good levels of awareness of the formal 
decisions that are issued against other local authorities and this 
may happen infrequently in practice (see factor K below). 
 
Decision status 
 
xi. The greater the degree of ambiguity in the precedental status of a 
redress mechanism’s decisions, the more likely it is that the 
implications of a judgment for wider administrative practice can 
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be ignored by administrators. 
 
Follow up  
 
xii. The ability to follow up proactively on concluded cases is a 
potentially powerful design feature for a redress mechanism, since 
it allows the deployment of a more proactive ‘detector’ than 
merely relying on the submission of further challenges by citizens. 
 
xiii. If follow up processes are too intrusive, however, there is a risk 
that relationships between a redress mechanism and 
administrators based on cooperation and trust are destabilized. 
 
 
Factor G: redress mechanisms’ role perception and style of control 
8.4.25. A key issue in relation to a redress mechanism’s ability to perform 
a control function is the degree to which it considers such a function to be 
part of its role. LGO respondents were clear that they aimed to improve 
administrative decision-making through making recommendations on 
specific cases as well as through more general advice and guidance, but 
that this was a ‘residual’ role. As noted above in relation to factor F, a 
result of this stance was that the LGO performed only a very limited form 
of follow up on cases and LGO respondents described the fundamental 
approach of the ombudsman as ‘reactive’. Generally, LGO respondents 
saw the organisation as conforming to the fire-fighting (Harlow and 
Rawlings 2009) and reactive (Stuhmcke 2012) models of ombudsmanry. The 
achievement of a proactive and ex ante control over administrative 
decision-making was, perhaps surprisingly, not a particularly strong 
motivation for the LGO. 
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8.4.26. Similarly, tribunal respondents saw their prime role as the 
provision of individual redress, with a secondary function to assist 
decision-makers to get decisions ‘right first time’. In relation to the latter, 
one respondent commented that judges frequently highlighted good and 
bad practice in their decisions. Another respondent considered that 
beyond publishing decisions that were particularly important, there was 
little that the tribunal could or should be doing in relation to influencing 
administrative practice: there were strict limits to the improvement 
function of tribunals and it was not the tribunal’s responsibility to train 
one of the parties. Overall, therefore, the tribunal’s perception of its own 
role was further towards the ‘fire-fighting’ model than the LGO’s. While it 
also considered that part of its role should be to help administrators to 
improve, this appeared to be a much more ad hoc activity.  
 
8.4.27. This court respondent said that the court would not be concerned 
with what happens following its decisions and that it would not be 
appropriate for judges to have any proactive role in generating 
administrative improvements beyond issuing decisions. At the same time, 
however, she did expect that judgments of the higher courts would be 
complied with and operated on the assumption that decisions would be 
used as a source of guidance on the meaning of law. As a result, there was 
an implicit acknowledgment that the court performed an important 
declaratory function even if no proactive measures were taken in terms of 
ensuring that decisions would be influential. Generally, the greater the 
degree to which a redress mechanism consciously saw its role as involving 
an element of ex ante control, the more proactive measures it took to try 
to achieve this. This can be seen in the more proactive approach of the 
LGO, compared with the tribunal and the court. 
 
8.4.28. In terms of the nature of the relationship between redress 
mechanisms and decision-makers, Hertogh (2001) has suggested that 
redress mechanisms using a more cooperative style of control, are more 
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likely to generate ‘policy impact’. A similar suggestion has been made by 
Hall (2011), who draws on communication theory to suggest that effective 
communication must involve two way dialogue and the existence of 
interpretive communities, which allow for shared understandings to be 
developed. Other research has similarly suggested that cooperative 
approaches are particularly likely to be effective in an ombudsman context 
(IFF/PHSO 2010, Gill 2011) and, in the context of learning between 
organisations, Rist (1994) has highlighted the importance of close 
relationships to the effective transmission of knowledge. Bondy and Le 
Sueur (2012), in their examples of redress mechanisms that are effective 
in feeding back to decision-makers, cite close and trusting relationships as 
an important factor.  
 
8.4.29. The question here, therefore, is what kind of relationships the 
redress mechanisms considered in the thesis had with administrators. LGO 
respondents, and a majority of local authority respondents, considered 
that the LGO developed good, cooperative working relationships with 
administrators, where advice would be provided and matters arising from 
casework could be discussed. The LGO was seen as an approachable 
organisation and some even described the relationship as a partnership in 
pursuit of shared goals. The fact that administrators could challenge 
aspects of the LGO’s approach and findings and engage in discussion where 
they did not agree was seen positively by local authority respondents. Such 
approaches heightened the legitimacy of ultimate outcomes, as a result of 
being more cooperatively produced. While not all administrators saw their 
relationships as cooperative, there was nonetheless good evidence in the 
data to support Hertogh’s (2001) suggestion that (a) ombudsmen tend to 
operate a cooperative mode of control and (b) this kind of cooperation can 
be useful in bringing about changes in administration. 
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8.4.30. While there was some support for Hertogh’s (ibid.) hypothesis, as 
noted above, the more cooperative approaches of the LGO take place in 
the context of it also being able to deploy significant sanctions. These 
were generally used sparingly and operated as a coercive back stop which 
supported routine cooperative relationships being developed. As Halliday 
(2004) has suggested, therefore, drawing on the regulation literature, the 
question may not so much be about whether cooperation or coercion are 
best placed to bring about behaviour change and more about the ability to 
use both modes effectively. The point is that there is a danger in too 
readily identifying the LGO’s style as cooperative, whereas in fact, it 
operates a mixed mode of control, drawing on both approaches depending 
on circumstances. The suggestion, therefore, is that the ability to function 
in a mixed mode of control (rather than only one or the other) is likely to 
represent an advantage for redress mechanisms, since both approaches 
appear to have a role in the achievement of control.  
 
8.4.31. Tribunal respondents referred to several instances where they 
interacted with local authority staff outside of hearings and, perhaps 
surprisingly, there was also evidence of cooperative approaches here. The 
existence of tribunal user forums, for example, provided a space in which 
communication could take place, while the tribunal had closely 
cooperated with several local authorities in the course of a pilot project to 
streamline how appealed cases were dealt with. While these examples 
show the tribunal operating in a more cooperative way, discussion and 
cooperation appear to be restricted to matters of tribunal process rather 
than substantive decision-making. Indeed, tribunal respondents and local 
authority respondents made clear that tribunal user forums were about 
discussing procedural aspects of appeals. Similarly, the tribunal’s pilot 
project did not seek to improve substantive decision-making, but merely 
to ensure that the administrative process around appeals was as efficient 
as it could be. Nonetheless, such approaches stand out when compared to 
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the much more distant, non-existent relationship, which the court had 
with decision-makers. It may also be that, although focused on matters of 
procedure, interaction and cooperation with the tribunal may lead to 
enhanced mutual understanding in the longer term.  
 
8.4.32. As we have already noted briefly above, more cooperative 
approaches are not without their problems. King (2012), in discussing 
Hertogh’s (2001) work, for example, notes there is a danger that 
cooperative relationships may result in redress mechanisms becoming 
overly influenced by administrators (rather than vice versa). Indeed, the 
risk of ‘capture’ by administrators, the potentially murky constitutional 
space created by such relationships, and the appearance of bias, are all 
significant drawbacks. There is also a question about whether the 
development of cooperative relationships and the idea – theoretically 
sound – that true mutual understanding requires bi-directional interaction, 
can be meaningfully applied beyond ombudsman schemes and the lower 
tier of the tribunal. As the legal weight of cases increases in those cases 
dealt with by the upper tribunal and the court, the need for clearer 
separation of powers and visibly detached adjudication, must become 
greater. In the higher courts and tribunals, the benefits of mixed modes of 
control become outweighed by their disadvantages.  
Box 8.7: propositions relating to the redress mechanisms’ role perception 
and style of control 
 
 
i. The more redress mechanisms see the ex ante control of 
bureaucratic decision-making as part of their role, the more 
likely they are to take proactive measures to influence 
administrators. 
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ii. Redress mechanisms are unlikely to consider the ex ante 
control of administrative decision-making to be their primary 
function, remaining predominantly focused on the resolution of 
individual disputes. 
 
iii. The ability to use mixed modes of control, both cooperative 
and coercive, is likely to represent an advantage for redress 
mechanisms seeking to achieve bureaucratic control. 
 
iv. While there are likely to be benefits derived from the 
development of cooperative relationships, there are also likely 
to be associated risks, including the appearance of bias, 
constitutional impropriety, and becoming ‘captured’ by 
bureaucratic interests. 
 
v. The development of cooperative approaches is only likely to be 
appropriate for ombudsman schemes and lower tier tribunals, 
and unlikely to be appropriate in relation to the higher 
tribunals and courts.  
 
 
PART II: BUREAUCRATIC DECISION-MAKING AND DECISION-MAKERS 
8.5. Introduction to part II 
 
8.5.1. This part of the chapter first considers factors relating to bureaucratic 
decision-making itself, including the model of administrative justice which 
dominates a particular setting and the degree of structure which 
characterises decision-making. The chapter then considers factors relating 
to the decision-makers, including their commitment to learning from 
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redress mechanisms and the organisational learning mechanisms they put 
in place for doing so.  
 
8.6. The nature of bureaucratic decision-making 
Factor H: the model of justice dominating administrative decision-
making. 
8.6.1. In terms of exploring the normative foundations of the decision-making 
areas subject to study in this thesis, admissions and home-to-school 
transport are discussed together due to the congruence of approaches in 
these areas. Here, local authority respondents described an approach to 
decision-making which very strongly favored consistent rule application 
and a view of fairness which prioritised the efficient application of criteria 
across cases. Individuals were treated ‘like a number’ and decision-making 
was strongly routinised, to the extent that much of it was automated. 
Some respondents did not even consider their work to be decision-making, 
but saw it instead as a simple matter of neutral policy implementation. 
Respondents considered that their decision-making was devoid of 
discretion and that, where it did exist, discretion was entirely ‘pre-
prescribed’. Generally, decision-making was seen as involving the 
application of clear criteria to unambiguous facts, which suggests that this 
decision-making conformed to ‘type 1 decision-making’ (Harrison and 
Pelletier 2001) which has been described as ‘programmed’, ‘routine’, 
‘structured’, and ‘generic’ (Simon 1997, Gifford 1983, Cooke and Slack 
1991, Drucker 1967). 
 
8.6.2. Local authority respondents justified this approach by suggesting that it 
was more objective and that to depart from it would involve decision-
makers making inherently unfair individual assessments. Fairness was seen 
to reside in treating citizens alike and in the preservation of the common 
good through the consistent allocation of scarce resources. This approach, 
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therefore, strongly emphasised collectivist interests (Tweedie 1989). Local 
authority respondents did recognise that greater levels of individuation 
(Harlow and Rawlings 2009) were required to ensure that legitimate 
individual interests were safeguarded; however, this was seen as being 
impossible to realize in the course of routine administration without 
descending into subjectivity. These respondents, therefore, had a strong 
Davisonian view of administrative discretion as a source of arbitrariness 
and as an aspect of decision-making which required to be limited and 
confined (Davis 1969). This was achieved by the discretionary aspects of 
decision-making being almost wholly delegated to the appeal stage of 
decision-making and removed from routine administration (via the IAPs in 
admissions and the internal review arrangements in transport). 
 
8.6.3. In terms of the model of justice operating in this area, the model 
variously described as bureaucratic rationality (Mashaw 1983), 
bureaucratic administration (Galligan 1996) and bureaucratic legalism 
(Kagan 2010) was clearly dominant. This model emphasises efficiency, 
formality, impersonality, bureaucratic routine, and its claim to fairness 
lies in its supposed objectivity, its treatment of like cases alike, and its 
pursuit of correct aggregate decision-making in a context of limited 
resources. One of the notable features here is the uniformity and strength 
of this model of justice in terms of local authority respondents’ 
perceptions. There was little room for alternative approaches and no 
competition from other ways of justifying the administrative justice of 
decision-making. Instead, administrators saw fairness in strongly binary 
terms, as one respondent put it: ‘You are either an impartial service that 
does everything strictly according to criteria, or you are not’. Such views 
provide strong support for Mashaw’s (1983) and Hood’s (1991) important 
insight that administrative values are strongly competitive and that their 
underlying logics have a tendency to exclude alternative perspectives. In 
part, the existence of this approach to decision-making results from the 
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statutory framework, but it also seems very much to reflect the core 
preferences of bureaucrats. This echoes Tweedie’s (1989) findings that 
bureaucracies tend towards the prioritization of collective interests (most 
strongly associated with the bureaucratic rationality model) and Galligan’s 
(1996) view that such approaches have a hegemonic hold over 
administration.  
 
8.6.4. In terms of SEN, this decision-making area shared a strong orientation 
towards the maintenance of collective interests and a normative stance 
that considered an element of standardization to be essential to the 
provision of fair treatment across all cases. While SEN decision-makers 
considered individual cases in more detail, that individual consideration 
occurred in the context of a collectivist approach: decisions on provision 
were heavily influenced by the availability of resources, the need to 
ensure fair allocation across cases, and local criteria which were meant to 
ensure a degree of standardization. As a result, although SEN decision-
making involved a larger degree of individuation than the admissions and 
transport area, collectivist and bureaucratic imperatives still provided the 
dominant impetus. Departures from this approach were seen as normative 
violations by administrators, who spoke of the immorality that resulted 
from some individuals being able to secure better educational provision as 
a result of intervention by redress mechanisms. A strongly collectivist 
approach, therefore, conforming to the bureaucratic rationality (Mashaw 
1983), bureaucratic administration (Galligan 1996) and bureaucratic 
legalism (Kagan 2010) models could also be seen to operate in SEN. 
 
8.6.5. However, unlike in the admissions and transport area, the SEN area 
featured a plurality of models of justice. Here, a strong emphasis on 
individual interests and individuation (although always subsidiary to 
collectivist approaches) resulted from the influence of education, health 
and social care professionals. Professional input into decision-making 
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encouraged a perception of children as clients and a strong emphasis on 
understanding and meeting their particular needs. Unlike admissions and 
transport, where respondents treated the individual ‘like a number’, a 
respondent in the SEN area referred to treating children ‘like a flower’. 
This application of professional judgment can be seen to fit clearly within 
the professional treatment model (Mashaw 1983). While the greater focus 
on individuation may suggest an approach more in keeping with that of 
redress mechanisms, it is important to note that the approach was less 
guided by notions of individual rights and fair treatment, and much more 
guided by the idea that professional and administrative expertise was 
required to ensure that children’s needs were met. The achievement of 
the latter was strongly seen by local authority respondents to reside in the 
administrative and professional, rather than the legal, sphere. 
 
8.6.6. Another mode of decision-making in the SEN area was negotiation (Kagan 
2010). Although this mode of decision-making is ignored in much 
administrative justice theory and does not have a particular model of 
justice associated with it, it is possible to identify the particular fairness 
claim which might underlie it as follows: the balancing of interests, the 
reaching of compromises that will satisfy both parties in a dispute, the 
facilitation of good ongoing relationships, and the preservation of 
resources through consensual resolution of disputes. Negotiation is, 
therefore, less a matter of the application of values to cases, and more 
that of a pragmatic response which recognizes that workable outcomes are 
predicated on the degree to which they are acceptable to parents. As such 
the negotiation mode of decision-making can be associated in part with 
Adler’s (2003, 2010) consumerist model, where consumer satisfaction is a 
key goal of administrative decision-making and the standard by which its 
fairness is measured.  
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8.6.7. Negotiation as a mode of decision-making was most likely to come into 
play once cases had been appealed and local authorities were brought to 
the negotiating table in the shadow of the tribunal. This is the 
circumstance when the tribunal appeared most influential on decision-
makers and when its decisions in previous cases were most likely to be 
taken account of. Decision-making here was shaped by attempts to satisfy 
individuals within the overall context of the likely decision of the tribunal, 
all the while seeking to preserve the collective interest as far as possible 
and not giving in to those who administrators saw as ‘shouting the 
loudest’. Overall, therefore, routine decision-making in SEN could be seen 
to be dominated by the bureaucratic rationality model, with a strong 
secondary influence being the professional treatment model, while in 
appealed cases the negotiation mode of decision-making was prevalent 
(emphasising aspects of the consumerist model of administrative justice). 
 
8.6.8. In terms of the structure of SEN decision-making and the degree to 
which it conformed to either rule-based or discretionary approaches, a 
rule-based approach was in evidence as a result of the statutory 
framework and the strict use of local criteria. However, these rules were 
more open-textured and allowed for the greater exercise of judgment in 
decision-making. Indeed, discretion – rather than being effectively excised 
from decision-making – was prevalent in all aspects of SEN decision-making 
and seen as key in ensuring good results for children. While such discretion 
was ubiquitous, it should not be confused with personal whim: generally, 
discretionary decision-making was guided by widely shared common values 
amongst administrators and a strong local sense of how things should be 
done. In this sense, the SEN area was much more reflective of arguments 
in the literature on discretion (see chapter 2) which questions whether any 
truly non-discretionary decision-making can exist and, at the same time, 
challenges the idea that discretion is equivalent to decision-makers being 
given entirely free reign. As a result, decision-making here was finely 
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balanced between rule-based and discretionary elements, with decision-
making being a complicated interaction between open-textured rules, 
administrative and professional discretion, and complex individual 
circumstances. 
 
8.6.9. Overall, SEN decision-making can be seen to fit within the ‘type 3 
decision-making’ category outlined in chapter 2 of this thesis. This is the 
kind of decision-making described as ‘modified adjudication’ by Galligan 
(1996), which sits between the two poles of administrative decision-
making: routine bureaucratic decision-making (type 1 decision-making) 
and unique policy decision-making (type 2 decision-making). Here, 
decision-making is only semi-programmed by rules and there is 
considerable discretion in terms of deciding individual cases. A particular 
feature of such decision-making is that it constitutes a middle ground 
between the achievement of the common good and the fair treatment of 
the individual (Galligan 1996). Whereas in type 1 decision-making, a ‘pre-
programmed’ decision is taken about the appropriate balance between 
individual and collective interests ahead of any actual decisions in cases, 
in type 3 decision-making the balancing of individual and collective 
interests occurs in each and every decision taken by decision-makers. Each 
decision is, therefore, a contestable and potentially controversial 
balancing act and this defining characteristic of bureaucratic decision-
making helps to explain the real challenge faced by decision-makers. A 
summary of the key differences between admission and transport and SEN 
decision-making is presented figure 8.3 and the significance of these 
differences is returned to in relation to factor I below. 
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Figure 8.3: the structure of type 1 (admissions and transport) and type 3 
(SEN) decision-making 
 
 
 
8.6.10. Having described these areas of decision-making, the chapter now 
seeks to explain the significance of the different justice models operating 
in each area for the exercise of control by redress mechanisms. A key 
conclusion here is that the models of administrative justice endorsed by 
redress mechanisms (see factor B above) are significantly different to the 
models of administrative justice that characterise bureaucratic decision-
making. What we observe is a ‘clash of values’ similar to that which has 
been described in previous empirical research (Richardson and Machin 
2000). While some have argued that the existence of a public service ethos 
means that there is not such a gulf between administrative and legal 
values (Platt et al 2010), this thesis has found significant gaps between the 
normative stances of redress mechanisms and administrators. The 
operation of different models of justice in each area represents a 
substantial barrier to the exercise of control. Halliday (2004) has 
previously referred to this when arguing that the greater the degree of 
congruence between the models of justice propounded by courts and those 
- 298 - 
 
characterizing administrative decision-making, the more likely compliance 
will be. Hertogh (2001) also makes reference to this point in his concept of 
‘policy tension’. The clash of values between redress mechanisms and 
administrators can be seen to exist across three main dimensions: the 
models of justice they adopt, their different orientations to collective and 
individual interests, and their different prioritization of legal and 
administrative values. Figure 8.4 summarises the argument and provides a 
visual representation of the normative distance between redress 
mechanisms and decision-makers. 
 
Figure 8.4: the clash of values between redress mechanisms and decision-
makers 
 
 
- 299 - 
 
8.6.11. A clash of values was highlighted most strongly in the data 
provided by local authority respondents working in the SEN area when 
discussing the tribunal. The tribunal’s emphasis on legal values and its 
perceived disregard for professional and administrative expertise were 
seen very negatively by local authority respondents. Its prioritisation of 
individual interests over collective ones was seen to result in inconsistent, 
unfair, and immoral outcomes between individuals. Values also clashed in 
relation to whose interests the tribunal served: decision-makers saw 
themselves as defenders of the interests of the child, while they saw the 
tribunal as being driven by the needs of parents. Respondents saw the 
tribunal as being swayed by parents who, acting as knowledgeable 
consumers, were able to secure their desired educational provision 
through effective use of the appeal system. This may explain why the 
consumerist model of justice operated in the tribunal’s shadow: 
administrators considered that satisfying parental preferences would be 
important, because they saw this as a feature of the tribunal’s decision-
making. 
 
8.6.12. This clash of values was least significant in relation to the LGO. 
The LGO’s straddling of legal and administrative values and its greater 
propensity to accept arguments about the need to protect collective 
interests, meant that its normative position was closer to that of 
administrators. While this does not suggest total synergy, the LGO’s 
greater closeness suggests that it may be easier for it to bridge the gap 
between world views. The reduced ‘policy tension’ (Hertogh 2001) that 
appears to exist naturally between the ombudsman and administrators 
may facilitate its attempts at control, even before other aspects of the 
LGO’s mode of operation (such as communicative capacity and cooperative 
style of control) come into play. Of course, as noted earlier in this 
discussion, normative closeness may also risk the ombudsman being 
subject to administrative ‘capture’ and to the outcomes of control being 
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inherently weaker, in the sense that the normative adjustment required of 
decision-makers is minimal and unlikely to threaten the status quo.  
 
Box 8.8: propositions relating to the model of justice dominating 
administrative decision-making 
 
i. Bureaucratic rationality is likely to be the dominant model of 
administrative justice across bureaucratic decision-making, 
reflecting a strong inherent preference amongst bureaucrats 
for a model of fairness that privileges collective and 
administrative interests. 
 
ii. The existence of a gap between the normative stances of 
redress mechanisms and decision-makers, defined across three 
dimensions – their models of justice, their preference for 
collective or individual interests, and their prioritisation of 
administrative or legal values – represents a significant 
challenge to the achievement of control by redress 
mechanisms. 
 
iii. The greater the gap between the normative stances referred to 
in proposition H (ii) above, the less likely redress mechanisms 
are to exercise effective control over administrative decision-
making and vice versa. 
 
iv. This clash of values does not mean that redress mechanisms 
are unable to affect any changes in administration, but it does 
suggest that changes will be limited if they require an 
amendment to fundamental views about the requirements of 
fairness. 
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Factor I: the structure of bureaucratic decision-making. 
8.6.13. As part of the discussion of factor H above, the chapter has 
already provided an analysis of the structure of bureaucratic decision-
making operating in the areas considered in this thesis. It remains, 
therefore, to comment on the potential significance of these structural 
differences in relation to the exercise of control by redress mechanisms, 
and some suggestions are made here about the possible impact that 
decision-making structure and decision-making type will have.  
 
8.6.14. The key question which may be speculated on is whether type 1 
decision-making, with its high degree of structure and confined discretion, 
is more or less amenable to control, than type 3 decision-making, with its 
more open structure and more routine use of discretion. In answering this 
question it is worth remembering that the nature and scale of the 
‘directions’ provided by redress mechanisms can vary considerably and be 
seen as existing on a continuum: at one end, the changes that are required 
are easily reducible to simple rules and process changes; at the other end, 
the changes required are more fundamental and akin to changes in 
decision-making values and paradigms. Drawing on the organisational 
learning literature, these extremes can be referred to respectively as 
changes requiring ‘single loop learning’ and changes requiring ‘double loop 
learning’ (Argyris and Schon 1978). 
 
8.6.15. Figure 8.5 below sets out this thesis’ suggestion with regard to 
how the ability of redress mechanisms to exercise control over type 1 
decision-making and type 3 decision-making might vary depending on the 
extent to which the directions of redress mechanisms require either single 
loop or double loop learning. In brief, the figure suggests that type 1 
decision-making is more likely to be subject to control where the 
directions of redress mechanisms require process or rule change (single 
loop learning) and less likely to be subject to control where redress 
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mechanisms require paradigm or value change (double loop learning). The 
situation is exactly reversed in relation to type 3 decision-making. The 
reason why type 1 decision-making is more amenable to rule change than 
type 3 decision-making is related to the structure of the decision-making 
environment – the highly rule-bound nature of type 1 decision-making and 
its tightly controlled hierarchic structure mean that, assuming 
administrators wish to implement the changes suggested by redress 
mechanisms, rule changes should be easier to implement and diffuse 
throughout the organisation. This contrasts with type 3 decision-making, 
whose open textured, discretionary and more complex environment mean 
that the transmission, diffusion and correct interpretation of rule changes 
is likely to be more difficult.  
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Figure 8.5: variations in the likelihood of control being exercised, 
depending on the types of changes required and the types of decision-
making  
 
 
8.6.16. In relation to directions which require value changes, the 
hypothesis is that type 3 decision-making will be more amenable to 
control, although for reasons which will be discussed, still highly resistant 
to these kind of changes. The reason why type 3 decision-making may be 
more amenable is that this decision-making environment is inherently 
more pluralistic in normative terms than type 1 decision-making. In the 
latter, there is a monopolistic and hegemonistic value system in operation, 
with the imperatives of the bureaucratic rationality model dominating 
entirely the normative space in which decision-making takes place. This 
environment is driven strongly by intra-bureaucratic preferences for 
collectivist approaches. As shown in figure 8.3 above, choices about the 
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balancing of individual and collective interests are taken in a pre-decision 
phase, so that decision-making is strongly and centrally steered towards a 
particular normative position. Type 3 decision-making, on the other hand, 
is less autopoetic and much more pluralistic in its range of normative 
influences. Its greater discretionary aspects also leave more space for 
decision-makers to make choices between alternatives and to select 
between different models of fairness. As shown in figure 8.3 above, 
decisions about balancing interests are not pre-prescribed but occur in 
each and every decision that is taken. So although type 3 decision-making 
environments are likely to be highly competitive, their pluralistic nature at 
least allows redress mechanisms to compete.  
 
8.6.17. While it may be the case that double loop learning is more 
possible in type 3 environments, it is nonetheless worth stressing the fact 
that such learning remains highly unlikely in the context of public 
bureaucracies (Common 2004; Thomas 2015). Partly as a result of the 
statutory frameworks in which they exist, and partly as a result of the 
inherent complexity of public bureaucracies, the likelihood of ever 
achieving radical value change is slight. As a result, a further conclusion is 
that although type 3 decision-making is theoretically more amenable to 
value change, because such value change is inherently difficult in public 
bureaucracies, the likelihood of achieving any form of learning (i.e. single 
or double loop) in type 3 decision-making is likely to be less than that of 
achieving any form of learning in type 1 decision-making.  
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Box 8.9: propositions relating to the structure of bureaucratic decision-
making 
 
i. Type 1 decision-making is more likely to be effectively controlled 
by redress mechanisms where the latter’s directions constitute 
attempts at rule change (single loop learning) and less likely to be 
effectively controlled where the directions constitute attempts at 
value change (double loop learning). 
 
ii. Type 3 decision-making is more likely to be effectively controlled 
by redress mechanisms, where the latter’s directions constitute 
attempts at value change (double loop learning) and less likely to 
be effectively controlled where the directions constitute attempts 
at rule change (single loop learning). 
 
iii. Because of the inherent difficulty of achieving double loop 
learning and value change in public bureaucracies, type 3 
decision-making is less likely to be the site of any form of 
learning, while type 1 decision-making is more likely to be subject 
to at least some form of (single loop) learning. 
 
 
8.7. The characteristics of decision-makers 
Factor J: the commitment of decision-makers to be controlled by, and 
to learn from, redress mechanisms. 
8.7.1. The data on decision-makers’ commitment show higher levels of 
commitment to learning from the LGO and the court, and more limited 
commitment to the tribunal. In relation to the LGO, local authority 
respondents generally expressed a very strong commitment to learning, 
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suggesting that they would automatically seek to implement decisions, and 
not citing any examples of non-compliance. Local authority respondents 
also reported having made a significant number of changes as a result of 
the LGO’s decisions. In relation to the court, respondents expressed a 
similarly high level of commitment to learning, although fewer examples 
of this happening in practice were provided. When discussing the tribunal, 
respondents expressed commitment, but this was with some caveats and 
limitations. A number of respondents suggested that, although there may 
have been some substantive learning when the tribunal was first set up 
(echoing Sunkin and Pick’s (2001) finding that impact may change over 
time), learning was now largely confined to finding better ways to win 
tribunal cases. Commitment was, therefore, to a narrow form of learning 
and this was reflected in the examples provided by respondents, where 
changes were more likely to be about the way cases were conceded and 
defended, than about substantive process and practice changes. 
 
8.7.2. The overall picture, in summary, is one where high commitment was 
expressed in relation to the LGO and the court and lower commitment was 
expressed in relation to the tribunal. However, this picture needs to be 
considered in light of other data, for example, relating to decision-makers’ 
perceptions of the potential for learning from redress mechanisms’ 
decisions. Indeed, it is worth remembering that LGO cases were often 
perceived as ‘weak’ and peripheral to administration. The point is that, 
even where commitment appears to be higher, the context is important in 
being clear about exactly what administrators were committed to. In the 
LGO’s case, commitment was perhaps limited to making small changes 
that did not risk upsetting the status quo. So what exactly were decision-
makers committed to? 
 
8.7.3. The first issue relates to whether there was significant commitment to 
learning from cases against other local authorities. Almost all the 
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examples of actual learning cited by respondents referred to changes 
made following direct experiences of review. It is, of course, likely that 
such cases will be those most vividly remembered by administrators, but 
the data nonetheless suggest that limited learning occurred as a result of 
decisions that were external to the authorities in question. This finding is 
echoed by the data on processes of knowledge acquisition (see factor K 
below) which suggest that there is only middling awareness of cases 
against other local authorities and that authorities were unlikely to have 
set up particularly effective Organisational Learning Mechanisms (OLMs – 
Lipshitz and Popper 2000). What this indicates, therefore, is a stronger 
commitment amongst decision-makers to learn from their own direct 
experiences, and a much weaker commitment to the value of learning 
from redress mechanism decisions that arise elsewhere. This shows a 
reactive approach to learning from redress mechanisms, where authorities 
will often prefer to wait until they are challenged by a citizen before 
considering what a redress mechanism’s position might be, rather than 
taking a more proactive stance to establishing and implementing such 
positions. 
 
8.7.4. The second issue relates to how far decision-makers’ commitment is 
determinative of actual behaviour in submitting to control by redress 
mechanisms. Here it is instructive to examine the only significant example 
of non-compliance discussed by administrators. This involved a case that 
had been upheld by the upper tribunal and the court of appeal. 
Administrators who discussed the case showed a clear commitment to 
learning, in the sense that they took the case seriously and spent 
considerable amounts of time to try to understand the judgments and to 
consider their implications. However, while they appeared minded to 
comply if they could, they ultimately decided to adopt a ‘wait and see’ 
approach, where they would only make changes if they were to be directly 
challenged themselves and unable to convince a future tribunal of the 
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reasonableness of their position. In explaining their reasoning, respondents 
made clear that the scale of the change and the resource implications 
associated with it were so significant as to make their current SEN 
transport policy untenable. Ultimately, they did not feel that this could be 
justified nor that the tribunal and the court’s decisions were reasonable in 
seeming to require such a change in established policy.  
 
8.7.5. This example of non-compliance strongly supports Hertogh’s (2001) 
suggestion that the degree of ‘policy tension’ in a judgment – the distance 
between the directions in a judgment and current administrative practices 
– is an important factor in determining the likelihood of judgments being 
taken on board. It also recalls Halliday’s (2004) discussion of the fact that 
commitment, while important, will not necessarily lead to compliance 
where other factors are in play. Indeed, the analysis here suggests that the 
importance of commitment as a factor facilitating the exercise of control 
by redress mechanisms will vary depending on the type of cases involved. 
Where cases are ‘routine’, in the sense that there is low policy tension and 
low resource implications involved (as with the bulk of LGO cases, for 
example), a normative commitment to learning from redress mechanisms 
is likely to be important. Where cases are ‘exceptional’, in the sense that 
there is high policy tension and high resource implications involved (as 
with the case of non-compliance discussed above), normative commitment 
is not irrelevant but is likely to be trumped by the existence of other 
powerful factors. This suggestion is described in visual form in figure 8.6 
below. 
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Figure 8.6: differential effect of normative commitment depending on the 
degree of policy tension and the resource implications of decisions 
 
 
8.7.6. Effectively, the argument set out in figure 8.6 is this: commitment to 
learning is likely to be most determinative of compliant behaviour where 
cases are the least important (in change and resource terms). Here, an 
absence of commitment is likely to lead to non-compliance, while the 
presence of commitment makes compliance much more likely. However, 
where cases are most important, commitment to learning is likely to be 
least determinative of compliant behaviour. Here, normative commitment, 
even where it exists, is likely to struggle for dominance against other 
factors. 
 
8.7.7. That normative commitment may have such a differential effect is 
important, because some have suggested that the existence of 
commitment is key to explaining what they see as a general propensity for 
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administrators to comply with decisions by redress mechanisms (Calvo et 
al 2007, Platt et al 2010). In particular, the concept of the public service 
ethos has been suggested as important in explaining why, generally, 
administrators are likely to be predisposed to implement the decisions of 
redress mechanisms. This ethos strongly supports notions of the rule of law 
(Woodhouse 1997), an important aspect of which should be to act in line 
with the decisions made by redress mechanisms. Although this thesis found 
strong support for the suggestion that a public service ethos exists 
amongst administrators, with a strong desire amongst respondents to ‘do it 
right’, the argument here is that there is a complicated relationship 
between such commitments and actual behaviour.   
 
8.7.8. This is for two reasons. The first is set out in figure 8.6 above – 
normative commitment will only go so far where other countervailing 
factors are present. The second is that, within the ‘public service ethos’, 
the normative stances of administrators are both capacious and multi-
dimensional. Indeed, the ‘public service ethos’ contains within it many of 
the fundamental tensions that populate public administration, in 
particular, multiple competing conceptions of fair administration (Mashaw 
1983). As a result, the battle between efficiency and fairness, between 
the collective and the individual, between law and administration, is not 
resolved by the adoption of a public service ethos. The public service 
ethos, far from resolving such conflicts, merely reflects the normative 
complexity of the task. At the same time as the ethos compels decision-
makers to act lawfully, it compels them to have a mind to resource 
implications and to other sources of legitimate guidance which influence 
the administrative setting (see factor N below). Given the gap identified 
above between redress mechanisms and administrators in terms of their 
fundamental stances on the fairness of decision-making, it should not be 
surprising that a commitment to learning might not only be trumped by 
resource issues, but also by the fact that administrators are influenced by 
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justifiable, rival normative commitments that may suggest non-compliant 
courses of action. 
 
8.7.9. More generally, a question is raised here about whether compliance 
decision-making is best explained by stressing the rational assessment of 
costs and benefits (e.g. Simon 1997) or theories stressing the realization of 
normative ideals (e.g. March 1994). Rather than being in conflict here, 
however, rational and normative factors appear to play equally important 
roles. This is because, in assessing practical costs and benefits (such as the 
effort required to make changes or the financial costs associated with 
them), administrators are also likely to be making calculations about the 
normative costs and benefits of certain actions. Here, the psychological 
and social costs of not complying with decisions which are considered to 
be authoritative by society, will be one of the factors that will form part 
of administrators’ consequential calculations. In assessing these normative 
costs and benefits, administrators will, as suggested above, be seeking to 
balance the contradictory requirements of good administration and 
decide, in each case, which model of justice they should adopt and which 
they should depart from. Rarely, therefore, will the normative positions of 
administrators be unequivocal, since decisions will infrequently be able to 
satisfy more than one model of fairness. 
Box 8.10: propositions relating to the commitment of decision-makers to 
be controlled by, and to learn from, redress mechanisms 
 
i. Decision-makers’ commitment to learning from the tribunal is 
more limited than their commitment to learning from the LGO 
and the court. 
 
ii. In examining decision-makers’ commitment, it is important be 
clear about what they are committed to; in relation to the 
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LGO, the perception that cases were weak and peripheral, 
meant that commitment was to the implementation of small 
changes that would not affect the status quo. 
 
iii. Decision-makers are more likely to be committed to making 
changes as a result of redress mechanisms’ decisions on their 
own cases, and less committed to making changes where 
decisions are about other authorities. 
 
iv. The extent to which normative commitment to learning from 
redress mechanisms may be a determinative factor in whether 
redress mechanisms achieve control, depends on the nature of 
the particular directions by redress mechanisms. 
 
v. In routine cases, where policy tension and the resource 
implications are low, normative commitment to learning is 
likely to be a significant factor: variations in commitment 
levels may help explain compliance levels here. 
 
vi. In exceptional cases, where policy tension and the resource 
implications are significant, normative commitment is less 
likely to be an important factor: even where commitment is 
high, such commitment is unlikely to outweigh other factors. 
 
vii. The existence of a public service ethos and a desire to act 
lawfully and in line with the directions of redress mechanisms, 
generally, run up against competition from other factors: (a) 
policy tension and resource implications and (b) contrary but 
simultaneously held normative commitments which also 
feature as part of the public service ethos. 
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Factor K: decision-makers’ processes of knowledge acquisition 
8.7.10. Before considering the processes by which administrators became 
aware of redress mechanisms’ decisions, it is important to contextualize 
those processes in relation to decision-makers’ overall levels of awareness. 
Here the findings were clear: administrators generally reported high 
awareness of decisions against their own authorities, but when it came to 
decisions about other local authorities, they reported middling awareness. 
These results seem to indicate that administrators were not confident 
about the comprehensiveness of their processes for finding out about the 
decisions of redress mechanisms. The data on levels of awareness also 
suggest strongly that decision-makers are likely to make judgments on the 
overall value of feedback from redress mechanisms on the basis of a small 
and local sample of decisions, rather than on the basis of wider 
knowledge. As noted above, this is potentially problematic since those 
cases that are publicly reported are likely to be those that contain the 
most standard-setting potential and the most relevant guidance for future 
action.  
 
8.7.11. Although the average levels of awareness were consistent across 
the sample, there was a significant amount of variation between 
individuals and, particularly, significant variation depending on the 
seniority and degree of specialization of the officer involved. Those with a 
specialized dispute resolution role were more likely to have higher 
awareness with regard to the decisions of redress mechanisms than those 
whose role was either managerial or involved primary decision-making. In 
relation to the latter, the qualitative data suggested that managers would 
know more than primary decision-makers, but this knowledge was likely to 
be higher level and more generic than specialist staff. The other main 
variation here related to the status of various decision-makers within the 
organisation, and whether or not they had high or low status. This variable 
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is potentially important in explaining not just who has knowledge about 
the decisions of redress mechanisms within an organisation, but also who 
has the status and ability to use that knowledge effectively. Figure 8.7 
below, shows four key categories of staff displayed in a matrix whose axes 
plot level of seniority against job specialization. 
Figure 8.7: staff categories on a matrix plotting level of seniority against 
job specialization  
 
 
8.7.12. Figure 8.7 is offered as a means of displaying not only the likely 
variations in awareness within organisational settings, but also how 
knowledge about redress mechanisms is contained within certain job roles 
and how that containment may limit the extent to which knowledge is put 
into practice. The suggestion is that those with the most specialist 
knowledge – the complaint and appeal specialists and the legal advisers – 
are unlikely to have a major influence on routine administration. This is 
because complaints and appeal specialists do not have a high status within 
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the organisation and, therefore, struggle to get routine decision-makers 
and managers interested in feedback from redress mechanisms. This 
supports the suggestion that the status of those receiving knowledge into 
the organisation is important in terms of the extent to which it is 
subsequently transmitted (Rist 1994). In relation to legal advisers, they 
often do have a high status within organisations, however, the issue here is 
that legal advisers tend to be removed from the routine bureaucratic 
process. They are called upon infrequently to troubleshoot particular 
problems that arise when a local authority is challenged. As a result, their 
knowledge and potential influence tends to have a limited effect in 
practice outwith challenged cases.  
 
8.7.13. On the other side of the matrix, managers have some knowledge, 
and more than junior decision-making officers, but the breadth of matters 
they deal with means that they are likely to have only a partial grasp of 
redress mechanisms’ requirements. So although they have the authority to 
effect change, they will not necessarily either have the knowledge or the 
time to be able to do so. Finally, figure 8.7 suggests that routine decision-
makers are those who are least likely to have either in-depth knowledge of 
casework or to be able to effect significant change as a result. Figure 8.7, 
therefore, suggests a picture where awareness and knowledge are 
distributed differentially within organisations and factors of organisational 
structure and hierarchy are likely to interfere with the extent to which 
knowledge is converted into concrete changes.  
 
8.7.14. This differential awareness may also be explained in terms of the 
different ways in which administrators went about finding out about cases. 
Here local authority respondents described three approaches – systematic, 
ad hoc, and unsystematic – which are summarised in table 8.2 below. 
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Table 8.2: different approaches to finding out about redress mechanisms’ 
decisions 
 
Systematic Ad Hoc Unsystematic 
Routine monitoring 
Central information 
storage 
Part of individual roles 
Proactive scanning 
 
Occasional problem 
solving  
No clear storage 
system 
Not part of individual 
roles 
Reactive approach 
Neither reactive nor 
proactive systems 
Information acquisition 
left to chance 
 
 
8.7.15. Interestingly, respondents within the same authority reported 
different approaches to finding out about cases, which suggests that even 
where more systematic approaches were reported these may not function 
effectively. Respondents generally reported that time and resources were 
the most significant barrier to adopting systematic and proactive 
approaches to finding out about cases and this resulted in most 
respondents referring to the existence of a more ad hoc system within 
their local authority. As may be evident, therefore, there appears to be a 
substantial gap between local authority respondents’ commitment to 
learning from redress mechanisms and the measures they actually take to 
implement this commitment. The existence of Organisational Learning 
Mechanisms (OLMs) – the structures and processes for collecting, analyzing 
and using data  (Lipshitz and Popper 2000, Barrados and Mayne 2003) – can 
probably be taken as a more accurate measure of decision-makers’ 
commitment to learning from redress mechanisms. And, in this respect, 
the findings suggest that systematic approaches are likely to be unusual.  
 
8.7.16. In terms of the sources of information used by local authority 
respondents, the data showed that networking with colleagues was by far 
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the most common way that administrators found out about decisions. This 
was followed by training, newsletters/ email summaries, and websites. 
Interestingly, very few respondents referred to receiving information from 
their legal teams, which supports the suggestion made in the discussion of 
figure 8.7, that the knowledge of legal advisers is likely to be ‘siloed’ and 
have a limited effect on wider bureaucratic processes. This data is 
potentially important in suggesting the most effective  channels through 
which redress mechanisms’ decisions reach decision-makers. The data 
suggest, for example, that being able to participate in or influence 
professional networks is likely to be particularly effective as a means of 
disseminating information.  
 
8.7.17. Halliday (2013), in a study looking into legal compliance in the 
context of local authority roads maintenance, has recently suggested that 
public sector networks may be able to play a significant role in enhancing 
legal compliance. Hall (2011) has also suggested that the ability of redress 
mechanisms to form ‘interpretive communities’ with administrators can 
significantly enhance their ability to be influential. Existing professional 
public sector networks may provide a locus for such communities and a 
tool to be leveraged in encouraging learning from redress mechanisms. 
The data also suggest that the channel and presentation of information is 
likely to be important. This might include, for example, preparing 
information about cases in a format that could easily be used in a training 
context and providing summary information of the sort that is most likely 
to capture the attention of time pressured administrators (Gill 2012).  
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Box 8.11: propositions relating to decision-makers’ processes of 
knowledge acquisition 
 
 
i. Decision-makers are likely to be more aware of their own cases 
than they are of cases against other authorities, and this may 
limit the extent to which they are exposed to important, 
standard-setting directions of redress mechanisms. 
 
ii. There are likely to be significant variations in awareness 
between individuals, with these variations resulting from their 
degree of seniority and specialization. 
 
iii. Those with the greatest specialist knowledge are least likely to 
be able to effect change in the administrative process, because 
they have low organisational status or because they are 
isolated from routine administration. 
 
iv. Those with the greatest ability to affect change – managers and 
senior managers – may have difficulty in doing so as a result of 
their more generalist roles and lower levels of knowledge. 
 
v. Routine decision-makers are those who are least likely to have 
significant knowledge about the requirements of redress 
mechanisms. 
 
vi. Decision-makers’ commitment to learning from redress 
mechanisms is best measured in relation to the extent to which 
that commitment is reflected in practice through the creation 
of Organisational Learning Mechanisms. 
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vii. Processes of organisational learning are likely to vary in the 
degree to which they are systematic, ad hoc, or unsystematic. 
 
viii. Networking groups represent a key site of knowledge 
acquisition and transmission for decision-makers and are likely 
to be an important channel through which to enhance 
awareness and adoption of redress mechanisms’ decisions. 
 
ix. Other common sources of information suggest that the way in 
which redress mechanisms communicate and package their 
decisions for consumption by decision-makers is likely to make 
a difference. 
 
 
Factor L: decision-makers’ processes of knowledge interpretation, 
dissemination, and storage 
8.7.18. The data indicate three broad approaches that decision-makers 
might take to the interpretation, dissemination, and storage of redress 
mechanisms’ decisions. These approaches represent a spectrum of 
practice from proactive to more reactive learning processes, as illustrated 
in figure 8.8 below. 
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Figure 8.8: three learning models, illustrating typical approaches to 
learning from the decisions of redress mechanisms 
 
 
8.7.19. The maximal learning model involves centralized decision-making 
about whether and how to comply with decisions. Here, decision-makers 
give formal consideration to whether to comply with decisions. There is, 
therefore, a clear decision point, with a conclusive view reached about 
whether compliance will take place and, if so, what form it will take. In 
this model, where decisions are taken to comply, the result is more likely 
to involve formal means of implementation (such as changes in official 
guidance or the adoption of training programmes). While the likelihood 
that control will be exercised is dependent on particular compliance 
decisions, the fact that a structured approach is taken – in itself – 
increases the chance of compliance. An important distinction was whether 
individuals or groups were responsible for compliance decision-making, 
with the suggestion that group decision processes were more likely to have 
broader organisational support and less trouble being implemented.  
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8.7.20. The median learning model represents a different approach, 
where compliance decision-making is decentralized. Here decisions are 
passed through the organisation in their ‘raw’ form with the expectation 
that decision-makers will read them, assess them, and make any changes 
that may be required as a result. In this more ‘laisser faire’ approach, 
compliance decision-making becomes diffused throughout the 
organisational setting, leading to more uneven results. Even where 
appropriate decisions are taken by administrators, the visibility and 
sustainability of any changes (Van Acker et al 2015) is likely to be reduced, 
since change involves local adaptations in practice rather than more 
formal implementation processes. The means by which any learning is 
recorded is also likely to be much more transitory, particularly as modern 
bureaucracies have been thought to have lost much of their ability to store 
knowledge (Pollitt 2009). In this model, information is circulated within 
the organisation, but without any strong central direction. The individual 
is left to decide, so that the importance of individual decision-makers’ 
conscientiousness and capacity become much more important. 
 
8.7.21. The minimal learning model goes beyond a ‘laisser faire’ approach 
to one which effectively involves an organisational culture of default non-
compliance. Here, compliance decisions are neither made centrally nor 
passed down the bureaucratic chain. Instead, the basic organisational 
stance is that changes will not be made unless they are forced as a result 
of the organisation being challenged in an individual case. The approach is 
entirely reactive, with no attempt to use the decisions of redress 
mechanisms as opportunities to amend routine decision-making. Instead, 
the decisions of redress mechanisms only become relevant retrospectively 
when a case has been challenged and administrators require to know the 
likely position of a redress mechanism to assist in the process of 
negotiating in the mechanism’s shadow. Here, compliance decision-making 
is restricted to the individual case. 
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8.7.22. As noted above, the maximal learning model is most likely to 
result in redress mechanisms achieving a measure of control, even 
although centralized decision-making may result in non-compliance 
decisions. Generally, this seemed to be the model adopted by 
administrators when deciding how to respond to redress mechanisms’ 
decisions about their own cases. When directly under the spotlight, clear, 
central decisions about compliance were more likely to be taken. The 
median and the minimal compliance model are generally less likely to 
result in the significant exercise of control by redress mechanisms. In the 
case of the median model, this is because the adoption of a decentralized 
approach puts the emphasis onto decision-makers throughout the 
organisation who are less likely to have the awareness, time, expertise, 
and commitment to take appropriate action. In the case of the minimal 
model, this is because compliance is dependent on cases being challenged 
by citizens in the first place and because any learning is confined to 
challenged cases rather than the broader administrative process. As will 
be clear, the minimal approach was the one which was perhaps most 
associated with attitudes towards the tribunal, where there was little in 
the way of proactive learning and a high propensity to settle cases in the 
shadow of the tribunal. Generally, the median and the minimal approaches 
were more likely to be those adopted towards decisions made by redress 
mechanisms against other local authorities. 
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Box 8.12: Propositions relating to decision-makers’ processes of 
knowledge interpretation, dissemination, and storage 
 
 
i. The learning processes adopted by administrators are likely to vary 
in relation to how proactive or reactive they are and three 
learning models can be identified: the maximal, median, and 
minimal learning models. 
 
ii. The maximal learning model involves centralized processes of 
knowledge interpretation, dissemination, and storage and is most 
likely to involve formal processes of implementation. 
 
iii. The median learning model involves decentralized processes of 
knowledge interpretation, dissemination, and storage and is most 
likely to involve informal processes of implementation. 
 
iv. The minimal learning model effectively involves an organisational 
stance of non-compliance, except where there is a realistic chance 
of adjudication by a redress mechanism and, here, learning is 
restricted to individual cases. 
 
v. The maximal learning model is most likely to be adopted when 
administrators are considering the implications of redress 
mechanisms’ decisions against their own authorities; the median 
and minimal learning models are most likely to be adopted where 
administrators are considering decisions against other authorities. 
 
vi. Overall, the maximal learning model is most likely to facilitate the 
exercise of control by redress mechanisms, as a result of its formal 
- 324 - 
 
and structured processes of decision-making and implementation. 
 
vii. The median learning model is less likely to facilitate the exercise 
of control by redress mechanisms, and is much more reliant on 
individual variations which will result in patchy control where it is 
achieved at all. 
 
viii. The minimal model’s relationship to the extent of control 
exercised by a redress mechanism depends on the volume and 
proportion of cases which are challenged; if this is high and many 
cases enter the redress mechanisms’ shadow, control will be 
significant, but if volumes are low and few cases enter its shadow, 
then control will be peripheral. 
 
 
PART III: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DECISION-MAKING ENVIRONMENT 
8.8. Pressures, challenges, and influences in the decision-making 
environment  
 
8.8.1. This part of the chapter considers two factors relating to the decision-
making environment: the pressures and challenges facing decision-makers 
and external influences on decision-making. 
Factor M: pressures and challenges facing decision-makers. 
8.8.2. The perceived pressures and challenges affecting decision-making 
provide the context in which decision-makers respond to redress 
mechanisms’ decisions. Understanding the ‘administrative soup’ (Sunkin 
2004) of matters which call for administrators’ attention is important, 
even though these are often very mundane; the so-called ‘practical 
influences’ referred to by Galligan (1996). An example of this is the strong 
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trend in the data around pressures on resources – a constant feature of 
public administration, although perhaps particularly acute in light of 
current austerity policies. Similarly, the continual tinkering with 
administrative systems by politicians was cited as a bugbear which made 
the administrative task more complex. Such factors are so common across 
administrative settings that their importance may be neglected when it 
comes to considering the core concern of this thesis. However, they are 
likely to be important in shaping the everyday realities of decision-makers. 
Respondents often suggested that the tasks and pressures at hand were 
more likely to call for their attention than redress mechanisms. In the 
context of services that were struggling to carry out their basic decision-
making tasks and being affected by continual, radical changes in education 
policy (see chapter 5), the capacity of administrators to learn from redress 
appears to be restricted. 
 
8.8.3. In addition to these well-known pressures on public administration, one 
strong trend in the data related to an increase in consumerist behaviour on 
the part of parents. Respondents commented that the policy rhetoric in 
education was all about ‘choice’ and that this language permeated policy 
documents, but that the reality was that real choice was rarely available 
to parents and, where preferences were a consideration in decision-
making, these could often not be met as a result of the need to ration 
public resources. Respondents found themselves between a rock and hard 
place: central government policy encouraged parents to acts as 
consumers, but left local authorities with the job of managing limited 
resources fairly. As we saw above, decision-making in this area was 
strongly dominated by bureaucratic rationality as a model of justice, and 
this perhaps explains administrators’ strong reactions against consumerist 
approaches in public services.  
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8.8.4. Generally, increasingly vocal, knowledgeable, and well represented 
parents were seen as increasing workloads and distorting local authorities’ 
attempts to ensure that all children got their share of a limited public 
purse. The encouragement given to parents to act as consumers in an 
education marketplace clashed with the collectivist approaches which 
dominated these administrative settings. Attempts to use consumer power 
– such as referrals to redress mechanisms – were seen by many respondents 
as attempts by a privileged minority to distort the provision of education 
services in their favor and at the expense of less resourceful parents. This 
echoes the findings of Hastings and Matthews (2011) in relation to 
potential distortions of public service delivery in favor of the middle 
classes. That redress mechanisms were seen as facilitators of such 
distortions and that complainants were viewed in this way, emphasizes 
again the gap that exists between decision-makers and redress 
mechanisms and illustrates why administrators often felt that the cases 
considered by redress mechanisms were unrepresentative and, even, 
underserving. 
Box 8.13: propositions relating to the pressures and challenges facing 
administrators 
 
i. Mundane features of public administration – such as lack of 
resources and policy change – are likely to shape the daily 
concerns of decision-makers. 
 
ii. Such pressures are likely to limit the amount of time and resources 
that administrators will have to organize themselves to learn from 
redress mechanisms’ decisions, even where they are committed to 
doing so. 
 
iii. A strong pressure in the education area is the encouragement of 
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consumerist approaches by central government, which was seen to 
have created increasingly pushy, knowledgeable and well 
represented parents. 
 
iv. Although parental consumerism was seen as a challenge, it was 
strongly resisted by decision-makers, who saw it as a distorting 
force, privileging the interests of the middle class. 
 
v. Redress mechanisms are likely to be seen – at least by some 
administrators – as facilitating undeserving individual consumer 
interests, which impedes administrators from achieving equity for 
parents. 
 
vi. Resistance to consumerist logics in public service, and a fear of 
increasing individual challenges to the collectivist outlook of 
bureaucracy, may in part help to explain some of the normative 
distance between redress mechanisms and decision-makers. 
 
 
Factor N: external influences on decision-makers. 
8.8.5. A surprising finding, given the suggestions in the literature of an ‘audit 
explosion’ (Power 1997) and a surfeit of accountability (see Bovens 2007), 
was that bureaucratic decision-making in the local authority education 
area was not subject to a multiplicity of control mechanisms. For example, 
local authority respondents reported that their decision-making was not 
subject to performance audits nor to inspection regimes. The only other 
specific ‘review’ type control mechanism (Hood 1995) in operation was the 
Office of the Schools Adjudicator, a tribunal operating in a largely 
regulatory capacity (see chapter 5). That there was limited direct 
competition from other specifically instituted control mechanisms, and 
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little evidence of the plethora of bodies for regulation inside government 
highlighted by Hood et al (2000) does not mean that there were no 
external influences over administrative decision-making. For example, 
central government was cited as a strong influence in the sense that it was 
responsible for producing the legislation, codes and guidance for decision-
making, even though its role was very limited in relation to the monitoring 
and the implementation of these frameworks. This role was, however, 
fulfilled by local authority elected members, who were identified as being 
involved in reviewing aggregate outcomes and the financial efficiency of 
decision-making. Although this did not come out very strongly in the data, 
it is likely that the need for administrators to report these outcomes and 
keep spending under control, with the knowledge that this would be 
subject to local political scrutiny, was influential. Indeed, the collectivist 
orientation of administrators and their concern with the delivery of 
fairness across cases, may have been significantly influenced by the 
perspectives and priorities of elected members.  
 
8.8.6. Overall, therefore, what we can see is a strong norm-setting influence 
from central government (as the key source of law and guidance in this 
area) and a significant influence from local politicians and their concern 
with the overall effectiveness of decision-making. In addition to these ‘top 
down’ influences, respondents identified ‘horizontal’ influences in the 
form of professional colleagues inside and outside their authorities, and 
‘bottom-up’ influences in the form of pressure from parent organisations 
and local charities. While these influences, unlike hierarchical control 
forms, had no formal authority in relation to administrative decision-
making, they also had an important norm setting function, providing the 
context for behaviour which administrators would deem to be appropriate. 
Indeed, as Dunsire (1979, 1984) notes in his theory of control, 
administrative systems often operate ‘under control’ as a result of a web 
of carefully balanced influences acting on them. This is what allows 
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administrative systems to be kept in check, even though perfect control of 
administration is likely to be impossible. The main features of this ‘web’ in 
relation to the local authority education area are shown in figure 8.9 
below. This figure describes the main influences described by local 
authority respondents, and classifies them according to whether they are 
top-down, horizontal, or bottom up, and whether they have a principally 
individualist or collectivist orientation. Figure 8.9 also makes a suggestion 
about the likely relative strength of these influences on administrative 
decision-making, and helps support the suggestions outlined below about 
the particular isostatic balance that exists in this area of administration. 
Figure 8.9: influences on administrative decision-making 
 
 
8.8.7. Our discussion of the normative outlooks of administrators and the way 
in which they perceived the fairness of their decision-making (see factor H 
above) can lead us to draw some tentative conclusions about the relative 
strength of these various influences on administrators i.e. what the 
current isostatic balance (Dunsire 1984) of local authority education 
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decision-making involves. In this regard, it is likely that the stress on 
collectivist interests, aggregate outcomes and financial efficiency of 
central and local government represent a powerful force, either helping to 
create the conditions for – or reinforcing the general predispositions of 
administrators towards – the strongly collectivist ‘bureaucratic rationality’ 
approach described above.28 The more individualist interest and concern 
with specific case outcomes adopted by redress mechanisms, on the other 
hand, did not seem to be strongly reflected in the way administrators 
perceived and described their decision-making. The horizontal influence of 
professional networks is likely to be influential, emphasizing and providing 
the context in which distinct professional and administrative norms can 
operate. The influence of these groups was also seen in the data above in 
relation to where administrators were likely to acquire knowledge. Finally, 
the bottom up influence of parents and parent organisations, most strongly 
associated with consumerist perspectives, were influential in the sense 
that they required to be dealt with, but also seemed to be largely resisted 
by local authority decision-makers. Their perspective and their emphasis 
on the full vindication of individual rights, provided only a limited 
influence on the normative outlooks of administrators. The suggestions 
made here about the relative strength of the various influences in the web 
of control are shown in the arrows in figure 8.9. 
 
8.8.8. While there is debate about the degree to which bureaucracies are 
autopoetic or highly porous to their external environments (see chapter 2), 
figure 8.9 suggests that the web of external influences which hold 
administrative decision-making ‘under control’ push it strongly towards an 
isostatic balance which emphasizes the importance of collectivist and 
                                               
28
 There is clearly a danger of over-simplification in equating central and local government concerns only 
with aggregate outcomes, particularly since the policy framework explicitly calls for some degree of 
individuation. At the same time, however, the data presented here suggest that commitments to 
individuation are largely rhetorical and unfunded, leaving it to the local tier of government to deal with the 
consequences of what could be seen as cynical game-playing on the part of central government.  
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administrative perspectives. It seems likely, given the discussion above, 
that administrators’ strong preferences for modes of administration 
stressing the achievement of collectively good outcomes and the 
importance of efficiency in resource allocation are strongly supported by 
central government, local political control, and professional networks. 
Whether these influences are determinative of the dominant modes of 
decision-making or simply reinforce existing predispositions is unclear. 
However, it seems likely that a combination of innate preference for 
collectivist approaches, combined with support from other norm-setting 
influences in the broader environment, provide an explanation for 
Galligan’s (1996) widely supported view that the ‘bureaucratic 
administration’ model exercises a hegemonic hold on public 
administration. Here, what we can see is that the strong internal logics of 
bureaucracy find normative succor in the external environment and a 
strong basis for resisting the potentially disruptive normative alternatives 
suggested by redress mechanisms or others, such as parents and service 
users.  
Box 8.14: propositions relating to the internal influences on bureaucratic 
decision-making 
 
i. The existence of an ‘audit society’ and multiple overlapping 
accountability mechanisms, is likely to be less true of some areas of 
public administration than others. 
 
ii. In the local authority education context, redress mechanisms do not 
face strong competition from other specific accountability 
mechanisms, with only local politicians providing this function. 
 
iii. Even where there is not a plethora of accountability mechanisms, 
bureaucratic decision-making is likely to be strongly influenced by 
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the norm-setting potential of central government and professional 
groupings, and by the direct review capacity of their political 
principals. 
 
iv. It is likely that a combination of bureaucratic predisposition and 
supporting external influences, help to explain the strong hold of 
the ‘bureaucratic administration’ model of decision-making on 
public administration. 
 
v. The existence of reinforcing external norms is likely to strengthen 
and legitimize the internal logics administrators adopt in their 
decision-making and to help them to resist alternative, more 
individualist, normative ideals such as those put forward by redress 
mechanisms. 
 
vi. The existence of redress mechanisms may help to ensure that the 
isostatic balance of an administrative system is not too heavily 
weighted against the fulfilment of individual rights; however, in the 
system under study in this thesis, it is likely that this balance is only 
very slightly redressed. 
 
 
8.9. Chapter summary 
 
8.9.1. This chapter has provided a discussion of the thesis’ empirical findings. 
It has identified 14 factors which are likely to help explain the extent to 
which redress mechanisms exercise control over bureaucratic decision-
making. For each of these factors, the chapter has provided a set of 
propositions, which provide a summary of the key conclusions of the 
thesis, combining empirical insights with further analysis of the literature, 
in order to explain the phenomenon of control by redress mechanisms. The 
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detail of these propositions offers new empirical and conceptual insights, 
which support, extend, and develop the findings of previous research. 
Many of these hypotheses have the potential to be operationalized in 
future research and to be tested in different contexts. By way of 
conclusion, the next and final chapter of the thesis will now set out an 
overall model for explaining the exercise of control by redress 
mechanisms.  
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9. CONCLUSION 
 
9.1. Introduction 
 
9.1.1. This chapter presents an overall model summarising the factors that 
have been found to facilitate or impede the control of bureaucratic 
decision-making by redress mechanisms. In presenting this model, the 
chapter will set out an argument for the thesis’ contribution to the 
existing literature. It will then apply the model back to the data in order 
to draw conclusions about the extent to which bureaucratic control is 
achieved in the local authority education area. The chapter then considers 
the implications of the thesis’ findings for administrative justice policy, 
before closing with some suggestions for future research. 
 
9.2. A model for understanding bureaucratic control by redress 
mechanisms 
 
9.2.1. In this section, a summary model is presented which brings together the 
factors and propositions discussed in chapter 8. Figure 9.1 presents the 
factors around a simplified systems diagram, which illustrates the key 
elements involved in the control of bureaucratic decision-making by 
redress mechanisms. In brief, this involves examining the effect of an 
input (the decisions and actions of redress mechanisms) on a process 
(bureaucratic decision-making) which results in an output (bureaucratic 
decisions) which are then subject to feedback (referrals to redress 
mechanisms). For each area of the system, particular sets of factors are in 
operation. Setting out the factors in this way and presenting them in the 
context of a systems model is considered helpful in providing a snapshot of 
the key relationships considered in the study of bureaucratic control.  
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Figure 9.1: model summarising the factors responsible for the exercise of control by redress mechanisms 
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9.2.2. In setting out this thesis’ contribution, it should be noted that its focus, 
scope, and conceptual outlook vary in important ways from much of the 
existing socio-legal literature on the impact of judicial review. The thesis’ 
comparative approach, in particular, and the consideration of how three 
mechanisms – the key institutions of administrative justice – individually 
and collectively control bureaucratic decision-making have allowed for 
new perspectives to be developed. Here, Hertogh’s (2001) comparative 
work has been built on to generate new insights into variations in control 
between redress mechanisms and, just as importantly, to give a better 
sense than has been given so far about how the administrative justice 
system – as a whole – functions as a control on bureaucratic decision-
making.  
 
9.2.3. The nature of this comparison, bringing together three diverse 
mechanisms, has also provided the impetus for a broader approach to be 
taken to defining the particular phenomenon under study. In his study, 
Halliday (2004) found the concept of compliance more helpful than the 
concept of impact, partly because the former gives a clearer sense of the 
regulatory purpose of that relationship (i.e. not impact for its own sake, 
but to ensure compliance with administrative law). While this thesis 
supports Halliday’s (2004) approach, the idea of ‘compliance’ is not easily 
transferred across to the study of ombudsman schemes: while we could 
talk of compliance with an ombudsman’s principles of good administration, 
the absence of legal weight to these principles, means that the concept of 
compliance is somewhat limiting.  
 
9.2.4. The adoption of a control perspective is, therefore, argued to have been 
helpful, allowing for the breadth of approaches between redress 
mechanisms, as well as giving a clearer sense of where the particular 
relationship under study (how redress mechanisms control administration) 
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fits in with a broader phenomenon of legal and social scientific interest 
(how control over administration is achieved in all its guises). The 
specifically legal emphasis of compliance as a concept was seen as limiting 
and obscuring this connection to a broader world of action aimed at 
keeping public bureaucracies ‘under control’ (Dunsire 1979, Hood 1995, 
Beck Jorgensen and Larsen 1987). The thesis’ subsequent emphasis on 
organisational learning, as the internal organisational processes through 
which control is emphasized, has also helped to contribute to existing 
perspectives in the socio-legal literature. In particular, the thesis has 
sought to demonstrate the value of drawing on organisational learning to 
elucidate the processes by which knowledge is received, transmitted, 
interpreted and stored within organisations. Conceptually, organisational 
learning has provided a framework for understanding the internal dynamics 
of organisations in relation to various types of knowledge and is the other 
side of the coin of control, which provides a framework for analyzing the 
relationship between organisations and institutions.  
 
9.2.5. The preliminary argument here, therefore, is that the framing of this 
study has allowed for a fresh perspective to be added to the literature. In 
moving on to outline the substantive contribution of the thesis to the 
literature, it should be noted that this conclusion will not rehearse every 
analytical refinement suggested in chapter 8; the summary boxes through 
that chapter may be referred to for a summary snapshot of these detailed 
contributions. In this conclusion, the aim is instead to identify the overall 
contribution which the model in figure 9.1 has made to the fundamental 
conceptual basis for understanding the exercise of control by redress 
mechanisms. This contribution can most clearly be seen by comparing the 
model to Halliday’s (2004) analytic framework, which – as argued in 
chapter 4 – constitutes one of the most comprehensive attempts in the 
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literature to explain the relationships between a redress mechanism and 
the decision-makers subject to it. Three main contributions are identified.  
 
9.2.6. The first contribution relates to the novel emphasis this thesis’ model 
places on the nature of the cases that are received by redress mechanisms 
– the ‘feedback’ element of the system shown in figure 9.1.29 The 
importance of the type of issues being challenged, the volume of cases 
that are received, and the potential for competition between redress 
mechanisms for disputes, are all brought into focus by a specific emphasis 
in the model on the ‘feedback’ area. At its broadest level, this focus helps 
to make a connection between scholarly interest in the control exercised 
by redress mechanisms and another major theme of socio-legal interest: 
the accessibility of the justice system. If the basis of the exercise of 
control is the nature of the feedback received from the bureaucratic 
decision-making system, then accessibility becomes a foundational issue 
for those interested in control. This echoes Dunsire’s (1984) emphasis on 
the importance of ‘detection’ to a system of control – control cannot be 
exercised unless there are effective means of detecting the presence of 
errors within the system. The addition of this explicit focus within the 
model and the theoretical propositions derived from this, therefore, 
represent the thesis’ first contribution to the conceptual framework. 
 
9.2.7. The second contribution is to place a novel emphasis – not only on the 
nature of the principles being propounded by redress mechanisms – but on 
a range of other factors to do with the way in which they operate (factors 
D to G in the model, summarized as ‘approach of redress mechanisms’ in 
figure 9.1). It is here that the thesis’ comparative approach has been most 
helpful for the generation of new insights. Whereas the literature on 
                                               
29
 Up until this point factor A was discussed in relation to the characteristics of redress mechanisms, 
however, its position is now more clearly reflected as relating to ‘feedback’ in the systems model. 
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judicial review considered a single mechanism in isolation, and therefore 
perhaps took for granted various ways in which it operated, the 
introduction of a comparative element has allowed for an emphasis on 
matters that did not feature significantly in previous research. This is 
particularly the case in relation to factor E, where issues around 
differential responses to processes involving adversarialism and 
inquisitorialism, de novo and retrospective decision making, and the 
importance of rules of precedent have been explored. While this set of 
factors builds on existing insights, it develops and extends these 
sufficiently to allow the thesis to claim that a distinct contribution is made 
to the overall framework within which control by redress mechanisms 
should be studied. In particular, the model calls for factors around the 
‘approach of redress mechanisms’ to form an explicit focus in future 
research and outlines a number of new propositions about the aspects of 
these approaches that should be explored.  
 
9.2.8. The third and final contribution to the existing conceptual framework 
relates to the model’s emphasis on the nature of decision-making in a 
particular administrative area, in addition to the emphasis on the 
characteristics of decision-makers which is the mainstay of existing 
approaches (this is summarized as ‘decision-making’ in figure 9.1). While 
existing literature has discussed the rival tensions between various models 
of justice (factor H), it has not paid significant attention to the 
differential effect created by the structure of bureaucratic decision-
making (factor I). Again, this is where this thesis’ comparative approach 
has proved to be particularly helpful in generating insight: most existing 
studies have considered the interaction of redress mechanisms and 
bureaucratic decision-makers in the context of a single type of decision-
making. In this thesis, although the overall focus was on educational 
decision-making, this involved looking at quite different decision-making 
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areas conforming to different decision types. The importance of this 
contribution, in addition to simply adding an area suggested for 
exploration in future work, is that it has allowed for novel theorizing in 
relation to the way in which decision type affects the propensity for 
redress mechanisms to achieve control. The recognition that there are 
different types and gradations of bureaucratic decision-making undertaken 
in different parts of public administration and that these have qualities 
which may have an intrinsic impact on the ability of redress mechanisms to 
exercise control is, therefore, argued to be a helpful development of 
existing ideas which have centered largely on the normative character of 
decision-making rather than its fundamental structure. 
 
9.3. Bureaucratic control by redress mechanisms in the local authority 
education area 
 
9.3.1. Having described the overall model, it is now possible to provide a brief 
account of the extent to which redress mechanisms exercised control in 
the particular area of public administration investigated in this thesis. 
While measuring the degree of control being exercised was explicitly not 
an objective of the research (see chapters 1 and 6), a summary is provided 
here on the assumption that readers are likely to be interested in this, in 
addition to the thesis’ principal focus on understanding factors of control. 
 
9.3.2. One clear conclusion arising from the data was that the redress 
mechanisms studied here were not well designed to perform a control 
function. They were too reactive, dealt with too few cases, and did not 
function effectively as a whole system of redress. In terms of the latter, 
the presence of tribunals tended to edge out other redress mechanisms, 
leading to inefficiency, and a system whereby the full range of 
administrative justice principles were unlikely to be controlled for. Even 
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where redress mechanisms operated processes and approaches that might 
be beneficial to the achievement of control (such as in the case of the LGO 
with its inquisitorial process and its ability to follow up on cases), they 
were not used to their full potential. Particular issues such as the 
tribunal’s de novo approach to cases and the lack of published decisions 
were also significant impediments to decision-makers learning. 
 
9.3.3. While decision-makers generally perceived decisions of redress 
mechanisms to be clear, redress mechanisms paid insufficient attention to 
the persuasive effect of decisions. These were not written with the needs 
of decision-makers in mind nor with the intention of overcoming likely 
bureaucratic resistance. Generally, redress mechanisms perceived their 
roles in very conservative and cautious ways and it is perhaps not 
surprising, therefore, that their approaches were mostly reactive and that, 
consequently, decision-makers took only limited steps to take account of 
their decisions.  
 
9.3.4. Nonetheless, a clear finding was that authorities were generally 
compliant in individual cases and when directly under review: redress 
mechanisms appeared to be able to secure individual redress. For LGO 
cases, direct experiences of review led to limited but nonetheless useful 
changes in routine bureaucratic decision-making, while in tribunal cases 
changes were narrowly confined to decision-making around conceding and 
defending cases. While the suggestion was that courts could have the most 
transformational effect, there was little evidence of such transformations 
having occurred in the accounts of respondents. Overall, therefore, 
redress mechanisms appeared to operate most effectively in terms in the 
correcting and limiting control modes, and least effectively in terms of the 
structuring mode. In other words, direct review was likely to lead to errors 
being corrected and unreasonable discretion being limited, but the extent 
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to which redress mechanisms resulted in ex ante control was much less 
clear. 
 
9.3.5. The data revealed that redress mechanisms faced a significant challenge 
in penetrating the bureaucratic environment of local authority decision-
making and of establishing a more powerful form of prospective control. 
Strong alternative logics shaped the work of redress mechanisms and 
decision-makers with little sense of ‘shared purpose’ between them. 
Where greater congruence was achieved, in the case of the LGO, this 
seemed a matter of the ombudsman moving towards bureaucratic 
perspectives, rather than vice versa. While there was evidence that 
decision-makers were often willing to learn in a ‘single loop’ fashion from 
their direct experiences of review, there was little evidence of more 
profound ‘double loop’ learning or of learning from published external 
cases. In the tribunal’s case, learning was entirely reactive and only 
occurred on a case-by-case basis in response to particular challenges. In 
some cases it appeared acceding to single-loop changes, as with agreeing 
to settlements, was a means of ensuring that fundamental control of 
bureaucratic decision-making remained with the local authority. 
 
9.3.6. Indeed, decision-makers’ commitment to learning was ambiguous, 
showing a mixture of genuine commitment and cynicism, as well as being 
limited in the extent to which it was translated into practice. This may in 
part have been due to the fact that the external environment strongly 
reinforced the internal logics of bureaucratic decision-making, rendering 
them much less open to challenge by redress mechanisms. In most cases, 
the local authorities in this study did not organize themselves to learn 
from redress mechanisms, and while there were mixed practices, the 
general sense was that authorities committed little effort to the creation 
of robust organizational learning mechanisms. In the words of one 
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respondent, the ‘professional value’ in doing so was not always clear to 
decision-makers. 
 
9.3.7. Drawing on Galligan’s (1996) terminology, we can conclude that the 
decision-making areas considered in this thesis were indeed under the 
hegemonic hold of the ‘bureaucratic administration’ model, with the idea 
of ‘fair treatment’ being a largely peripheral concern. The isostatic 
balance (Dunsire 1984) in these areas of public administration was 
therefore heavily weighted against the dominant approaches endorsed by 
redress mechanisms. And, while redress mechanisms performed a small 
role in ensuring that the isostatic balance did not wholly neglect the fair 
treatment of the individual, they do not do so in ways powerful enough to 
disrupt the fundamental outlook of decision-makers. In other words, and in 
final conclusion, the data suggest that control of local authority education 
decision-making by redress mechanisms was likely to have been limited.  
 
9.4. Policy implications of the thesis 
 
9.4.1. Current administrative justice policy retains a commitment to improving 
bureaucratic decision-making by government agencies and using feedback 
from redress mechanisms as one way to achieve this. As we saw in chapter 
4, however, the current Government’s commitment to administrative 
justice in general and the ‘right first time’ agenda in particular is 
extremely weak. Current policy largely involves restrictions in access to 
administrative justice and attempts to shield decision-making from robust 
oversight. So in setting out the policy implications of the thesis, and what 
might be done to realize the rhetorical commitment of policymakers, 
there should be recognition that the current policy environment is likely to 
be highly resistant to any real change. It should also be remembered, as 
discussed in chapter 4, that the idea that redress mechanisms should 
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perform any kind of prospective control on decision-making, and that 
feedback should be widely used to shape administrative practice, is 
contested. Nonetheless, it is considered useful to explore some areas 
where changes could be made if policymakers were serious about 
enhancing redress mechanisms’ control functions. 
 
9.4.2. The focus of the policy recommendations below is on the design of the 
redress system. Other approaches to encouraging organisations to learn 
from redress mechanisms, such as ‘polluter pays’ systems, have been 
helpfully discussed elsewhere (Thomas 2015). As a result, the 
recommendations below focus on improvements that might be made to the 
system of redress. This directly addresses one of Bondy and Le Sueur’s 
(2012) nine principles for redress design, which is that: 
 
‘As well as dealing with individual grievances, redress mechanisms 
should contribute to improvements in public services.’ 
 
The five recommendations below, therefore, aim to contribute towards 
this principle of redress design and flesh out some ways in which it might 
be achieved in practice. For each recommendation a brief explanation is 
provided with regard to how it would address issues identified in the 
thesis. 
 
Recommendation 1: enhance the accessibility of the administrative justice 
system 
 
9.4.3. While the volume of cases considered by redress mechanisms may not be 
a significant impediment to them generating occasional far reaching 
change, the exercise of control requires that a significant number of cases 
are subject to review. Complaints, appeals and requests for review are the 
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‘detectors’ which allow redress mechanisms to exercise their control 
functions: as such the quality and volume of these control inputs is 
essential to the level of control that redress mechanisms can exercise. As 
Dunsire (1979) suggests, a system of control is only as good as its weakest 
element. Here, redress mechanisms are at a serious disadvantage as a 
result of relying on the random referral of cases in the context of a justice 
system which is increasingly concerned with diverting cases away from 
redress mechanisms and towards various forms of internal resolution or 
Alternative Dispute Resolution. An administrative justice system interested 
in maximizing the learning potential to be derived from the work of 
redress mechanisms, therefore, would seek to ensure that sufficient cases 
reach adjudication and that a system of triage exists to ensure that the 
right kinds of cases are formally adjudicated (c.f. Mulcahy 2013). 
 
Recommendation 2: enhance co-ordination and cooperation between 
redress mechanisms 
 
9.4.4. The learning potential to be derived from cases referred to redress 
mechanisms is likely to be significantly reduced as a result of the narrow 
remits and approaches of each redress mechanism. The AJTC (2012) refer 
to a ‘horses for courses’ approach whereby disputes and processes should 
be matched in ways that meet the needs of the citizen. The suggestion 
here is that this approach should also be adopted in ensuring that the 
learning potential of cases is fully exploited. One approach might be to 
facilitate the transfer of cases between redress mechanisms where there 
are indications, for example, that extra-legal administrative problems are 
at play. Such case transfers were previously proposed by Lord Woolf (1995) 
in relation to the courts and the ombudsman. Similarly, a tribunal might, 
for example, refer a case to an ombudsman where maladministration is 
suspected. Or an ombudsman might refer a case to the court where a 
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point of law requires to be clarified. This would provide both a more 
holistic remedy from the perspective of the aggrieved citizen and allow 
the relatively few cases that are challenged to be considered across all the 
dimensions of administrative fairness which the administrative justice 
system seeks to safeguard (maladministration, merits, legality).  
 
9.4.5. More radically, redress mechanisms might be given extended remits, so 
that ombudsman schemes might be able to consider the merits of 
decisions, while tribunals might be able to criticize maladministration. 
While this suggestion may be anathema to both legal scholars and 
administrators for whom this distinction is important, Dunleavy et al 
(2010) have rightly pointed out that the distinction between complaints 
and appeals is one of the great sources of dissatisfaction with the redress 
system for citizens. There is also now an example within the UK of an 
ombudsman scheme incorporating an appeal jurisdiction (Mullen and Gill 
2015). Generally, particularly in areas where a tribunal is in operation and 
there is a risk that the majority of disputes will be diverted there, thought 
is required about how to ensure that the administrative justice system 
promotes the control of all aspects of bureaucratic decision-making. 
 
Recommendation 3: improve redress mechanisms’ communication  
 
9.4.6. The LGO’s (and ombudsman schemes in general) approach to 
communicating its findings and issuing guidance should be seen as a model 
for other redress mechanisms. While far from perfect, their use of plainer 
language, their openness to explaining their decisions informally, and the 
variety of means at their disposal to communicate with decision-makers 
are distinct advantages. The court and the tribunal’s more technical and 
idiosyncratic approaches – while they may be necessary in order to define 
legal positions with the requisite precision – are unlikely to be as 
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accessible for decision-makers. For all redress mechanisms, there is a need 
to focus more on the needs of decision-makers as an audience and on 
facilitating the transmission of guidance into practice. There is a need not 
only to simplify language and presentation, but to make communication 
more persuasive and compelling.  
 
9.4.7. The ombudsman’s cooperative approach is likely to be an advantage and 
could be developed further to make full use of its ability to engage and 
participate in policy networks, a key site of potential influence (Halliday 
2013). This approach – while it would not be suitable for the upper tribunal 
or the court – could also be extended to the lower tribunals. More 
cooperative relationships and the creation of interpretive spaces and 
communities in which principles of good administration can be discussed 
and disseminated are likely to be effective in promoting good 
administrative practice. 
 
Recommendation 4: improve the tribunal’s current approach 
 
9.4.8. There are specific issues in relation to the tribunal’s current approach 
that may helpfully be addressed. The first would be to place a duty on the 
tribunal, not only to determine a case based on current evidence, but also 
to provide an opinion with regard to the quality of the authority’s original 
decision. This would not be a formal determination but would be designed 
to provide decision-making feedback to authorities. It is noteworthy that 
the tribunal has recently been given pilot powers to make 
recommendations regarding the health and social care aspects of cases 
they review.30 This may be a useful precedent for the approach suggested 
here and a power could also be provided for recommending administrative 
                                               
30
 See the Special Educational Needs and Disability (First-tier Tribunal Recommendation Power) (Pilot) 
Regulations 2015  
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improvements where these are considered necessary by the tribunal. The 
tribunal should also begin to publish its decisions, to provide a wider 
potential source of learning for decision-makers and make greater use of 
publicity as a tool for securing improvements. It seems unlikely that the 
move towards adversarialism and the increasingly court-like nature of 
tribunals can be reversed. However, efforts to ensure that hearings are 
non-confrontational and attempts to return the tribunal to its more 
inquisitorial roots are likely to reduce some of the antagonism currently 
perceived by decision-makers. 
 
Recommendation 5: make the ombudsman a learning champion 
 
9.4.9. One of the clear conclusions of this thesis is that the ombudsman 
institution has a number of potential advantages when it comes to helping 
decision-makers to learn, albeit these are currently imperfectly realized. 
In addition to borrowing some of these approaches in other parts of the 
administrative justice system, the existing potential of the ombudsman 
could be harnessed and developed so that it takes on a broader role in 
relation to disseminating and overseeing principles of good administration. 
This role would be that of a learning agent within the administrative 
justice system, a role which would have three facets: 
 
o Spokesperson: working collaboratively with courts and tribunals, 
the ombudsman could distil and disseminate important decisions 
taken by other redress mechanisms. This would draw on the 
institution’s skill in packaging messages in ways that are 
accessible to administrators. Rather than only drawing on its own 
casework, it could bring together and disseminate important, 
cross-cutting administrative justice principles. Drawing on its 
closer understanding of bureaucratic decision-makers, the 
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ombudsman could be charged with the coherent presentation of 
administrative justice principles to bureaucratic audiences. 
o Relationship manager: here the ombudsman would function as a 
conduit for interchange between decision-makers and redress 
mechanisms. The ombudsman could either create professional 
networks or develop existing ones, which would function as 
spaces in which administrative justice principles could be 
disseminated and as fora in which shared understandings of good 
practice could be jointly developed. This would capitalise on the 
ombudsman’s ability to enter into professional networks and 
would allow it to extend its scope as a policy actor. This would 
also allow the ombudsman to identify more clearly areas where 
the decision-makers require training or guidance. 
o System fixer: The third dimension of the ombudsman as learning 
agent would require new powers of own-initiative investigation, 
which could be harnessed to trouble-shoot problem areas within 
the administrative justice system. For example, the ombudsman 
might launch an investigation in areas where there are high levels 
of successful appeals, or in response to concerns raised in the 
annual reports of the Senior President of Tribunals. The 
ombudsman might also investigate where new initiatives have a 
significant knock on effect on the administrative justice system, 
such as currently in relation to mandatory reconsideration. There 
is also potential for the ombudsman to follow up individual cases. 
Particularly where important legal precedents are set, the 
ombudsman could have a role akin to Special Masters in the US 
court system (Cannon 2004). Here, judges might refer cases to 
the ombudsman for follow up where public interest issues appear 
to be at stake. Such a proactive role is quite different from the 
fire-fighting approach currently adopted by the LGO; however, 
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this thesis’ findings suggest that the potential benefits of the 
ombudsman within the administrative justice system are currently 
underdeveloped.  
 
9.4.10. The developments suggested in the ombudsman’s role within the 
administrative justice system would build on recent innovations, such as 
the quasi-regulatory role performed by the Scottish Public Services 
Ombudsman in relation to public services complaint handling (Gill 2014). 
Here, the ombudsman has taken on a broader role in relation to the 
complaints system, involving a much more proactive interest in helping 
administrators to deliver fair outcomes for citizens. This involves a 
standard setting and monitoring function, the provision of training, and 
the coordination of professional networks aimed at developing good 
complaint handling practice. While this new role has yet to be evaluated 
and, although there are some potential issues in relation to its 
constitutional implications (ibid.), it perhaps points the way towards the 
expanded role suggested in recommendation 5. 
 
9.4.11. As noted above, it is recognized that the focus on the design of 
redress mechanisms is only one side of the coin and some authors have 
suggested that it is only decision-makers themselves who can affect 
bureaucratic change and that, consequently, the focus should be on them 
(Adler 2003). While this is true, the argument here is that the current 
design of redress mechanisms does not facilitate learning and control and 
that this acts as a signal to decision-makers that this agenda is not 
particularly valued. While the attitudes and approaches of decision-makers 
are indeed important, the first step in enhancing the learning and control 
capacity of the administrative justice system would be to ensure that its 
institutions are designed in such a way as to maximize their control 
potential.  
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9.4.12. Finally, as noted above, existing studies have tended to shy away 
from discussing the policy and practice dimensions of their findings. There 
are three reasons for this: (a) the contested nature of redress mechanisms’ 
control functions (see chapter 4) has made authors reluctant to discuss 
practical measures for change when there is little agreement over the 
extent, even in an ideal world, that redress mechanisms should exercise 
‘more’ control (b) studies have tended to have limitations, considered 
small and unrepresentative areas of public administration, and resulted in 
data that do not provide a sufficient evidence base for policy change and 
(c) it seems likely that the scale of changes in policy, which empirical data 
might have suggested to be required, has led to some reticence in 
exploring them. While these issues are significant, this thesis considers 
that it is important to explore the real world significance of findings even 
where doing so might be contestable and difficult. While the 
recommendations should, therefore, be read alongside caveats about the 
contested nature of the enterprise and the limitations of the data on 
which they are based, they are nonetheless considered to be a useful essay 
in connecting empirical and theoretical knowledge back to the real world.  
 
9.5. Future research 
 
9.5.1. The model developed as part of this research, which refines and extends 
existing models in the literature, provides a basis for the conduct of 
further comparative research on the control functions of redress 
mechanisms. The model sets out hypotheses which could be 
operationalized and tested in a range of contexts. Although the purpose of 
this thesis meant that a qualitative approach was most appropriate, future 
research should take note of King’s (2012) criticism of the qualitative 
focus of existing studies and consider quantitative approaches. It would 
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also be worth following up on the intriguing fact that the few quantitative 
studies that have been conducted to date have produced much more 
positive outcomes than their qualitative counterparts (Creyke and 
Macmillan 2004, Platt et al 2010). The model set out in this thesis could be 
used as the basis for designing such a quantitative research project.  
 
9.5.2. Future research may also wish to examine other redress mechanisms and 
investigate, for example, departmental complaint handling agencies, 
which have often been suggested as being particularly effective in terms 
of helping decision-makers to learn from casework. Studies may also wish 
to consider international perspectives, and perhaps compare how different 
legal and bureaucratic systems and cultures mediate the extent to which 
redress mechanisms are able to exercise control. There would also be 
merit – since the fundamental question in such research relates to 
behaviour change – in comparing the control functions of redress 
mechanisms with those of other bodies which seek to exercise a 
controlling influence on bureaucrats. Van Acker et al (2015) for example 
have considered ombudsman schemes in comparative perspective with 
audit agencies, and it would be possible for future research to make 
similar comparisons with inspectorates or regulators. Other fertile areas of 
comparison might be between responses to redress mechanisms in the 
public and private sector. 
 
9.5.3. Generally, although Cane (2004) has expressed scepticism about the 
value of empirical studies that consider the bureaucratic impact of redress 
mechanisms, many gaps remain in our empirical knowledge and this area 
remains a fertile one for further study. 
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APPENDIX 1 – CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LOCAL AUTHORITY SAMPLE 
Case study Location  Council type Council size 
(1000s of 
pupils)* 
Number of 
complaints to 
LGO ** 
Number of 
appeals to 
tribunal ^ 
Incidence of 
review 
factor^^ 
Earn Council 
South East of 
England 
County council 
 
> 150 
 
>50 > 100 >5 
Leven Council 
South East of 
England 
County council 
 
> 150 
 
35 - 40 > 100 >5 
Tummel 
Council 
East of England County council 
 
> 150 
 
35 - 40 75 - 80 >5 
Carron Council 
Yorkshire and 
the Humber 
County council 
 
50 – 100 
 
40 - 45 15 - 20 3 - 4 
Almond 
Council 
East of England County council 
 
50 – 100 
 
10 - 15 45 - 50 3 – 4 
Braan Council West Midlands County council 
 
100- 150 
15 - 20 30 - 35 2 - 3 
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◊ To protect the anonymity of the case study authorities only approximate figures are 
provided; these are shown either as figures greater than (>) or as figures in a range   
(-). 
 
* Figures taken from the Department for Education, ‘Schools, Pupils and their 
Characteristics: January 2011’. 
See:https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-
education/series/statistics-school-and-pupil-numbers. 
 
** Average number of complaints received by the Local Government Ombudsman and 
passed to an investigation team per year, for the years 2009-2011. These were the 
latest figures available at the time of conducting the research.  The figures were 
obtained by searching through the Annual Reviews for 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 
published for each local authority.   
See: http://www.lgo.org.uk/CouncilsPerformance/. 
 
^ Average number of appeals registered by the First Tier Tribunal per year, for the 
years 2008-2010.  These were the latest figures available at the time of conducting 
the research and were obtained in the Special Education Needs Tribunal Annual 
Reports for 2008-2009 and 2009-2010.   
See: http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/corporate-reports/tribunals/send. 
 
^^ The incidence of review factor was calculated by adding together the total average 
number of complaints to the Local Government Ombudsman (2009-2011) and the total 
average number of appeals to the First Tier Tribunal (2008-2010).  The resulting figure 
was divided by two to give the total average number of complaints and appeals.  To 
make the figures more manageable for comparison purposes the total average number 
of complaints and appeals was then divided by 10 to produce the factor shown in this 
column. 
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APPENDIX 2 – EXAMPLE INTERVIEW GUIDE 
A. Your role and decision-making 
 
1. Your role 
 
2. The types of decision you take 
 
3. Influences on your decision-making 
 
4. Main pressures and challenges regarding decision-making 
 
B. Your experiences of being reviewed by redress mechanisms 
 
1. Frequency of review 
 
2. Outcomes of review 
 
3. Examples 
 
4. What happened after redress mechanism decisions 
 
5. Interaction with redress mechanisms outside of cases 
 
C. Your awareness of redress mechanism decisions 
 
1. Awareness of cases about your authority  
 
2. Awareness of cases in other authorities  
 
3. Mechanisms for finding out about decisions 
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4. Differences in awareness between staff 
 
5. Barriers to awareness 
 
D. Your response to redress mechanism decisions 
 
1. Importance attached to implementing decisions 
 
2. Importance attached to learning from cases in other authorities 
 
3. Process for implementing redress mechanism decisions 
 
4. Examples of change to practice/ policy following decisions 
 
5. Examples of non-implementation and disagreement with decisions 
 
6. Barriers to implementing and learning from decision 
 
E. The nature of decisions taken by redress mechanisms 
 
1. Recurrent themes/principles in redress mechanism decisions 
 
2. Consistency between redress mechanism decisions  
 
3. Comprehensibility/clarity of redress mechanisms decisions 
 
4. Barriers to understanding redress mechanism decisions 
 
5. Quality of redress mechanism decisions (and other information produced by 
these bodies) 
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6. Significance of decisions beyond individual circumstances of the case 
(frequency, examples) 
 
7. Predictability of redress mechanism decisions 
 
F. Other influences on your day-to-day work 
 
1. Influential organisations/stakeholders/pressures in relation to decision-
making 
 
2. Overall influence of redress mechanisms on decision-making 
 
3. Anything the interview has not covered 
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APPENDIX 3 – INTERVIEWEE IDENTIFIERS 
 
Note: wherever possible positions are generic job titles to protect the anonymity of 
respondents. 
 
Almond Council 
 
Identifier Position 
A1 Senior SEN Manager 
A2 Admissions Officer 
A3 Admissions Officer 
A4 Admissions Appeal Officer 
A5 Admissions and Transport Officer 
A6 Admissions and Transport Manager 
 
Braan Council 
 
Identifier Position 
B1 SEN officer 
B2 Senior Admissions and Transport Manager 
B3 Legal adviser 
B4 Senior SEN Manager 
B5 Transport Officer 
B6 Admissions Officer 
B7 Admissions Appeals Manager 
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Carron Council 
 
Identifier Position 
C1 Legal Adviser 
C2 Admissions Appeals Officer 
C3 Transport Officer 
C4 SEN Manager 
C5  SEN Officer 
C6  SEN Senior Manager 
C7 Admissions Manager 
C8 Admissions Officer 
 
Earn Council 
 
Identifier Position 
E1 Admissions Manager 
E2 SEN Tribunal Manager 
E3 SEN Manager 
E4 Admissions Appeals Officer 
E5 Admissions and Transport Manager 
E6 SEN Manager 
E7 Transport and Admissions Manager 
E8 Senior SEN Manager 
E9 Admissions Appeal Officer 
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Leven Council 
 
Identifier Position 
L1 SEN Manager 
L2 Admissions/ Transport Customer Manager 
L3 Senior SEN Manager 
L4 SEN Tribunal Officer 
L5 Admission Appeals Manager 
L6 Legal adviser 
 
Tummel Council 
 
Identifier Position 
T1 Tribunal officer 
T2 Transport Manager 
T3 Senior SEN Manager 
T4 Legal adviser 
T5 Senior Admissions and Transport Manager 
T6 Senior Manager 
T7 Complaint Manager 
T8 Admissions and Transport Manager 
 
Parent support organisations 
 
Identifier Organisation 
P1  Other Parent Support Organisation Worker 
P2 Other Parent Support Organisation Worker 
P3  Other Parent Support Organisation Worker 
P4 Parent Partnership Service Worker 
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P5 School Choice Adviser 
P6 Parent Partnership Service Worker 
P7 Parent 
P8 Parent Partnership Service Worker 
P9  Parent Partnership Service Worker 
P10  Parent Partnership Service Worker 
P11  Parent Partnership Service Worker 
P12  Parent Partnership Service Worker 
P13  Parent Partnership Service Worker 
P14 Parent Partnership Service Worker 
P15 Parent Partnership Service Worker 
 
Local Government Ombudsman 
 
Identifier Position 
O1  Investigator 
O2  Investigator 
O3  Investigator 
O4 Manager 
 
First Tier and Upper Tribunal 
 
Identifier Position 
TR1 Senior Tribunal Judge 
TR2 Senior Tribunal Judge 
TR3 Senior Upper Tribunal Judge 
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Administrative Court 
 
Identifier Position 
AC1 Senior Judge 
 
Policy officials 
 
Identifier Position 
PO1 Policy Manager, Ministry of Justice 
PO2 Policy Manager, Department for Education 
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APPENDIX 4 – DECISION ANALYSIS 
 
1. LGO Decisions 
Reference Learning Points 
08 014 474 Independent Appeal Panel (IAP) clerks and members should be properly trained. Reasons should be 
given for decisions. Notes should be taken of hearings. IAP members have a responsibility to challenge, 
not just accept, a school’s case. 
08 011 742 IAPs should consider the requirements of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 when a parent’s 
grounds include a claim of disability discrimination.  
09 005 338 IAPs should consider all the factors listed in the Code when considering whether an oversubscribed 
school will be prejudiced by admission of a child. Reasons should be recorded. 
10 011 837   
10 011 846 
IAPs should not invent new criteria when making decisions. IAP clerks should be properly trained. 
Reasons should be recorded. IAP clerks should give appropriate legal advice to IAP members and advice 
should also be related to parents. 
09 007 281 The Department for Education should provide guidance with regard to what should happen if an IAP 
decides that some, but not all, children who appeal for a particular school may be admitted without 
prejudice to the efficient education of children at that school. 
10 006 162 IAPs should fully consider the arguments raised in an appeal, including claims of disability 
discrimination. Admission authorities should provide parents with reasons for decisions and appeal 
information. IAP hearings should be held in line with statutory timescales. IAPs must be visibly 
independent. 
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09 010 311  
(+ 7 others) 
IAP clerks and members should be properly trained. Notes of hearings should be made. Admission 
authorities should not send letters to parents on the IAP’s behalf. Chairs should refrain from asking 
irrelevant questions. Where a test is applied as part of admission arrangements, alternative tests 
should be provided where a test is initially disrupted. 
10 004 884 IAPs should be visibly impartial. Admission authorities should provide requested information to IAPs. 
Decision letters should give reasons and be signed by the IAP Chair or Clerk. IAP clerks and members 
should be properly trained. IAP clerks should give accurate guidance at hearings. 
11 003 563 Admission authorities must provide their case to parents ahead of a hearing. IAPs must consider the 
question of prejudice to the school as part of their decision-making. 
10 012 911 10 
013 069 
Where several appeals are heard together, each child’s case should be given individual consideration. 
All grounds of appeal must be considered in deliberations. 
07B04696 
07B10996 
Education and social care needs should be considered holistically by local authorities in decision-
making about a child with SEN. The whole family’s needs should be considered. 
08 014 997 Local authorities should not unreasonably delay in making SEN provision. 
07A14912 Local authorities should make arrangements for provision of education to excluded children. Attempts 
to agree placement with parents should not prevent the meeting of statutory timescales. 
09 001 513 Local authorities should make the provision required by a SEN statement. 
08 005 914 Where a child is out of school because the school named in the statement is unable to make adequate 
provision, alternative full time provision should be made. Local authorities should communicate 
decisions clearly. 
365 
 
 
 
08 014 844 Local authorities must regularly review SEN provision and ensure statements of SEN are updated 
accordingly. Local authorities should consider professional evidence when deciding whether provision 
meets a child’s needs. 
09 004 278 
09 011 462 
Local authorities should proactively check whether provision is in line with a statement where there 
are suggestions to the contrary. 
09 018 565  
09 018 567 
SEN decision-making panels must consider all relevant evidence. Local authorities must clearly 
communicate decisions so that they may be challenged by parents.  Local authorities must regularly 
review SEN provision for a child. Local authorities must cooperate where a case is being transferred. 
10 002 102 10 
005 663 
Provision should be provided as required in a SEN statement or, if provision is no longer suitable, the 
SEN statement should be amended.  
11 007 324 Local authorities should provide alternative arrangements for children unable to attend school for a 
reason other than sickness or exclusion. Local authorities should challenge schools that unreasonably 
refuse to admit a child under a fair access protocol. 
10 005 330  
10 015 240 
Once a tribunal has determined that provision must be made, the appropriateness of that provision 
should not be questioned by the local authority. 
09 010 645 Local authorities should: properly consider and keep a record of evidence; set out the grounds for 
decisions; consider a child’s individual circumstances; make provision for children with SEN or a 
disability living beneath the minimum distance from school in their transport policies; convene a fresh 
panel, if a case is re-heard by a transport appeal panel. 
09 008 248 Local authorities should make sure, when contracting transport services, that appropriate criminal 
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record checks are made for transport staff.  
09R012 826 If a parent’s argument has previously been accepted as valid, a local authority should have good 
reasons for departing from its position. Local authority transport policies should clearly communicate 
the extent to which parental preferences for single/ mixed schooling will be a factor in awarding 
transport. 
 
2. Upper Tribunal Decisions (and Court of Appeal Decisions from Upper Tribunal Decisions) 
Reference Possible Learning Points 
[2009] UKUT 
178 (AAC) 
Comparative costs, including transport costs, between the local authority’s choice of provision and the 
parent’s, should only be considered where the local authority does not agree to the parent’s choice. 
[2009] UKUT 
239 (AAC) 
The tribunal should give adequate reasons. Careful distinctions should be made between educational 
and social need when determining the suitability of residential provision. Expert opinion should not go 
unchallenged; where there is a conflict of opinion, reasons should be given for preferring one account 
over another. 
[2009] UKUT 
295 (AAC) 
The tribunal should not admit late evidence unless there are exceptional circumstances or serious risk 
that the child’s interests will be prejudiced. 
[2010] UKUT 
34 (AAC) 
The tribunal should provide reasons with regard to its treatment of important evidence and sufficiently 
explain the basis of decisions. 
2010] UKUT 
96 (AAC) 
An individual may be considered a child in terms of the Education Act 1996 even where he/ she is above 
compulsory school age. 
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[2010] UKUT 
180 (AAC) 
When deciding whether admission of a child with a SEN statement would be incompatible with the 
efficiency of education for other children, incompatibility must be demonstrated (rather than simply 
having some adverse effect).   
[2010] UKUT 
205 (AAC) 
No obvious learning points. 
[2010] UKUT 
249 (AAC) 
No obvious learning points. 
[2010] UKUT 
242 (AAC) 
No obvious learning points. 
[2010] UKUT 
292 (AAC) 
Disproportionate precision is not required when assessing the comparative costs of provision. What is 
required is sufficient accurate information that is material to the balancing exercise. 
[2010] UKUT 
349 (AAC) 
The views of a child must be given weight according to the context of the case. Unquestioningly letting 
the views of a child be determinative is likely to be unlawful, as is ignoring them. The more mature the 
child, the more weight should be given to his/ her views. 
[2010] UKUT 
368 (AAC) 
No obvious learning points. 
[2010] UKUT 
8 (AAC) 
The tribunal must explore evidential conflicts and avoid taking account of irrelevant considerations. 
[2010] UKUT 
376 (AAC) 
When assessing comparative costs, it is reasonable to use the Age Weighted Pupil Unit (AWPU) as the 
basis for the calculation.   
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[2010] UKUT 
395 (AAC) 
The tribunal’s reasons must cover the key issues involved in an appeal. 
[2010] UKUT 
406 (AAC) 
Professional views about whether a child’s needs may be met in mainstream education are not relevant 
where a parent has expressed a preference for such provision.  
[2010] UKUT 
15 (AAC) 
The tribunal must provide reasons for decisions to exclude evidence from a hearing. 
[2011] UKUT 
50 (AAC) 
Decisions on whether SEN provision should be made other than in a school, should consider both 
whether the provision as a whole and ‘any part’ of the provision would be inappropriate to be made in 
a school. 
[2011] UKUT 
51 (AAC) 
When assessing the comparative costs of provision, the potential wider benefits of the parent’s 
preferences, including those relating to health and social reasons, should be considered. 
[2011] UKUT 
191 (AAC) 
No obvious learning point. 
 
[2011] UKUT 
215 (AAC) 
The statutory tests around ‘unreasonable public expenditure’ and incompatibility with ‘effective use of 
resources’  are distinct and may both apply in determining whether a local authority should meet 
parental preferences. 
[2011] UKUT 
292 (AAC) 
No obvious learning points. 
[2011] UKUT 
393 (AAC) 
Where a parent’s choice of school is not named in the SEN statement, and the parent has expressed a 
general preference for mainstream education, the school or type of provision named in the statement 
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must consist of mainstream provision (unless this would interfere with the efficient education of other 
pupils). 
[2011] UKUT 
468 (AAC) 
While SEN statements must be specific, specificity is variable dependent on the facts of the case. 
[2011] UKUT 
499 (AAC) 
When determining whether the needs of a child should be formally assessed, the current provision for a 
child must be examined rather than simply assuming its adequacy in meeting a child’s needs. 
[2012] UKUT 
85 (AAC) 
No obvious learning points. 
[2011] UKUT 
67 (AAC) 
In deciding whether to meet parental preferences, the additional cost of transporting a child to the 
parent’s preferred school should be considered. Where those costs do not constitute an inefficient use 
of resources, local authorities should comply with parental preference.  
[2012] UKUT 
211 (AAC) 
Where a child is approaching a transition in his/ her schooling, the tribunal should consider the full 
range of matters subject to an appeal, including the longer term provision for a child. 
[2012] UKUT 
214 (AAC) 
Where not already explicitly provided for in a funding agreement, academies have a duty to admit a 
child if directed to do so by the tribunal.  
 
 
Reference Learning Points 
[2012] EWCA 
Civ 346 
Transport costs should be considered when assessing the comparative costs of provision and assessing 
whether expenditure would be unreasonable or inefficient.  
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[2011] EWCA 
Civ 709 
When assessing comparative costs, it is reasonable to use the Age Weighted Pupil Unit (AWPU) as the 
basis for the calculation.   
[2010] EWCA 
Civ 668 
It is reasonable to name an independent school in a statement of SEN where it has agreed a fee 
reduction to allow a particular child to attend. 
[2011] EWCA 
Civ 870 
Local authorities may be liable for costs where they knew, or should have known, before a hearing that 
they were in breach of a statutory duty. 
 
3. Administrative Court Decisions (Including Court of Appeal and Supreme Court Appeals from Administrative 
Court Decisions) 
 
Reference Learning Points 
[2010] EWHC 
3785 (Admin) 
Independent Appeal Panels (IAPs) should give reasons. Reasons must be explicit enough to ensure that 
the parties understand the basis on which the decision was reached. 
[2009] EWHC 
3060 (Admin) 
Review panels considering appeals against transport entitlement decisions have jurisdiction to consider 
the suitability of educational provision when deciding whether transport should be awarded. 
[2010] EWHC 
731 (Admin) 
An appeal pending before the tribunal does not relieve a local authority of its responsibility to provide 
education for a child. However, if it has good reason to believe it is practicable for the pupil to attend 
the named school, it is not required to make alternative provision pending the outcome of a tribunal. 
[2011] EWHC 
3350 (Admin) 
A local authority is likely to face costs if it fails to engage in the judicial process before the last 
minute.  
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[2012] EWHC 
943 (Admin) 
IAPs should ensure that the grounds for decisions in infant class size appeals are tenable. They should 
not quash an admission authority’s decision on grounds other than those allowed in regulations. 
Moreover they should ensure that adequate reasons are provided and that the reasons provided in 
letters match those recorded during the hearing. 
 
Reference Learning Points 
[2009] UKSC 
15 
Admissions criteria may distinguish between pupils based on their religious affiliation as long as the 
distinction is drawn on religious grounds and not on racial grounds. 
[2010] EWCA 
Civ 135 
The provision listed in a statement of SEN is mandatory and must be provided. 
[2010] EWCA 
Civ 1103 
IAP decisions follow a two stage decision-making process. Considering whether there is prejudice to a 
school at the first stage is an objective test, where the particular situation of the child is not relevant. 
The question to be considered at this stage is whether the admission of any child would prejudice 
efficient provision of education within the school. At the second stage, decision-making becomes 
concerned with whether prejudice to the particular child outweighs that to school. 
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